Voluntary housing transfer in Scotland a case of policy emergence by Taylor, Mary

Voluntary Housing Transfer in Scotland
A Case of Policy Emergence?
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
By
Mary Taylor
Department of Applied Social Science
University Of Stirling
----~--~~
~-,.'-~ /)
~9
June 2003
Abstract
This thesis examines the voluntary transfer of housing stock by Scottsh local authorities
between 1986 and 1997, under a Conservative Government. The study sought to identify
who had transferred what, why and how, employing a multi-theoretical approach and a
range of concepts from policy studies to investigate rationaliy and opportunity in policy-
making.
The study used quantitative methods to define and establish the incidence of transfer, which
was found in two forms: as partial transactions, with and without subsidy; and as privately
financed disposals of whole stocks. Similar volumes of transactions were found in Scotland
as in England, though on different terms and affecting fewer houses. Qualitative methods
were used to explore the decisions, actions and capacity of people involved in voluntary
sales of tenanted housing to other landlords. Key actors included tenants and community
activists, politicians and officials in councils, government departments and agencies.
The thesis argues that transfer in Scotland was the product of local responses to two key
developments. One was accumulated financial constraints; the other, particularly affecting
partial transfer, was the use of financial and organisational incentives, secured with
ministerial acquiescence. Although government was ultimately responsible for both
developments, it neither planned nor anticipated their consequences; it was often ii-
prepared to respond to local initiatives, partial and whole; and it failed to understand or
monitor the consequences. Most Scottsh councils ignored whole stock transfer in 1996,
when it came to be actively promoted by Conservative poliicians.
Paradoxically, while organisations representing institutional interests in council housing
vocalised opposition to stock disposals, their constituent members took action to transfer
ownership, with the conflcting values of local incumbents accommodated by stealth.
Transfer was later legally structured, when an afterthought from English legislation
accidentally turned power relations upside down, making ministerial consent conditional on
demonstrating lack of tenant opposition. Senior officials played a consistently critical role in
initiating, brokering, frustrating and nourishing local negotiations. This study demonstrates
the particular significance of local action in policy-making, allowing transfer to emerge in
response to wider constraints determined at the centre.
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Explanation
Community Based Housing Association - a term which applies to registered housing
associations, mainly in urban settings in the west of Scotland.
Compulsory Competitive Tendering first introduced to white collar public services in the late
1980s and to housing management in 1992. Its introduction was delayed in Scotland until after
LGR and then became Best Value.
Chartered Institute of Housing, the professional body for housing in UK with separate offices and
committee for / in Scotland.
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities which brings together all local authorities in Scotland,
even before LGR.
Discounted Cash Flow, a system of estimating the long-term cumulative value of assets, based
on estimates of income and expenditure over time.
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions: one of the many names of the relevant
government dept for housing in England. Earlier known as the DoE (Dept of Environment), and
later as the DTLGR (Dept of Transport, Local Government and the Regions) and most recently
ODPM (Office of the deputy Prime Minister).
Estates Renewal Challenge Fund - a short life subsidy fund administered by the DETR between
1996 and 2001 to support councils to transfer estates to alternative landlords.
General Government Expenditure, a measure of current government spending.
Housing Association Grant, a subsidy administered by the HC, HCiS and Scottish Homes.
Originally it started out as a generous deficit grant mechanism. From 1989 it came to respond to
targets set by others with targets set to fall and leverage of private borrowing to rise accordingly.
Housing Benefit for which all tenants are eligible provided their household income and rent meet
the eligibility criteria. The subsidy is funded by the Dept of Work and Pensions (formerly DSS)
and administered by local councils.
Housing Corporation - a government agency set up in 1964, with a Scottish operation from 1974
(known as HCiS) funding and supervising housing associations. HC has continued to exist in
relation to England only since 1988/9.
See HC above. The Scottish activities of HC were given to a new separate agency Scottish
Homes under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988.
Industry Department for Scotland, the department responsible for the Scottish New Towns.
Local Government Reform, which was proposed in principle in 1990/1, in detail as unitary local
government in 1992 with legislative proposals in 1993 and implementation from April 1996. It
made all Scottish mainland authorities into unitary councils dismantlng the previous system of
district and regional councils.
Large Scale Voluntary Transfer, used mainly but not exclusively to refer to whole stock transfers
by English councils.
National Housing Federation, representative body for housing associations (or RSLs) in England.
Net Present Value, the output from a TMV (below) .
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, a measure of borrowing by government and governmental
bodies, including councils but not including housing associations (RSLs).
Registered Social Landlord, a term first used in England in the mid 1990s and then under statute
in the (English) Housing Act 1996 to refer to housing associations and other landlords
Right to Buy, a right for sitting tenants to purchase their own home at a discount, much used by
public sector tenants after it was first introduced in 1980. It generated capital receipts, which in
Scotland were permitted to be 'recycled'. English councils were prevented from using their
receipts.
Scottish Executive, the name for the former Scottish Office (SO - below) from 1998 including
Ministers (MSPs elected to the Scottish Parliament).
Scottish Office, the name of the devolved administration of Scotland under the auspices of the
Secretary of State.
Scottish Special Housing Association, unusually a state sponsored and statutory association first
established in 1937, would up in 1988 with its assets and operations transferred to Scottish
Homes.
Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, representative body for housing associations.
Tenanted Market Valuation, a specialised model derived from DCF principles.
Voluntary Transfer Housing Association, an informal name given to the first crop of associations
emerging from LSVT (above).
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Chapter One
Introducing 'Stock Transfer'
In the summer of 2001, the Scottsh Executive published a publicity leaflet, 'Community
Ownership in Scotland - the Facts and the Figures', showing over half a million houses
'transferred' so far by various public sector landlords across England and Scotland. The
homes formerly owned by public landlords had passed to Registered Social Landlords
(RSLs) in something called 'Large-Scale Voluntary Transfer' (LSVT). Around 65,000 of
these houses were in Scotland (and half in Glasgow alone).' These 'facts' and 'figures'
were pulled together following a government commission to disseminate the research
evidence about the benefits of transfer (Scottish Executive, 2001). The leaflet lies at the
popular end of a discourse chain about stock transfer, called 'Community Ownership', aimed
at reassuring and persuading people to support future transfers to new landlords.
The leaflet sought to reassure its audience (of tenants, staff, councillors) by accentuating
positive outcomes, gauged by ballot success, value for money, guarantees on rents, tenant
satisfaction and general improvements in staff morale. The leaflet, published by a Labour
government in Scotland specifically commented:
The policy of transfer has not led to large scale job losses and has generally
provided staff with enhanced career opportunities and job satisfaction.
Scottsh Executive, 2001: 1
This implied there had been a 'policy' of transfer, which had 'delivered' many reassuring and
satisfactory outcomes. This statement appeared ironic considering that most of the
transfers were completed before 1997 when the Labour Party was publicly opposed to
transfer. In its 1997 election manifesto, Scottish Labour undertook to stop housing stock
transfer by councils from being compulsory and committed itself to tenant control of housing
(Scottsh Labour Party, 1997). Again ironically, anecdotal evidence during new Labour's first
term suggested that many councils were coming to regard new Labour proposals as closer
to representing compulsory stock transfer than Conservative appetite for voluntary stock
transfer during their time in office. This ostensibly simple government leaflet about the 'facts'
therefore reveals some of the paradoxes in 'stock transfer' in Scotland, which are at the
heart of this thesis.
Although it is far from clear that Conservative central government promoted voluntary stock
transfer as such in Scotland before 1996, in practice both Tory and Labour politicians have
supported transfers. Indeed some MPs and MSPs argue that new Labour's housing policy
at the end of the twentieth century is in fact Conservative policy (Curry, 2000; Harding,
1 The leaflet is reproduced in full at Appendix One. It was commissioned by the Scottish Executive in December 2000. The
timing was important as at least three councils - including Glasgow - were due to ballot tenants in the course of the next 12
months.
2000). Future studies might usefully examine how Labour succeeded in driving more
councils into considering transfers within a few years of coming to offce, than ideologically-
minded Conservatives seemed able to achieve in the preceding 12 years. Though others
may be concerned with how Labour shifted its stance, the primary concern of this thesis is
with the nature of policy in relation to stock transfer under a Conservative central
government, prior to May 1997, when many Scottsh councils transferred estates to other
landlords. If 'policy' is documentation outlining a programme with objectives, resources and
targets, then stock transfer policy was only adopted by the Conservatives in Scotland after
most transfers were completed, paradoxically by Labour councils seemingly opposed to
transfer. This impels an examination of the meaning of 'policy', focussing on concepts and
processes to explain:
. Whether transfer has been 'policy';
. Whose policy it was and why;
. When it came into operation and on what terms;
. What form it took and what constitutes implementation.
In the absence of a clear document of policy origin, this study used competing theories
about policy-making, the specialist housing literature, and original data to establish whether
and how stock transfer 'policy' might be said to emerge. Before we return to these issues in
more detail, the terminology of transfer warrants some consideration.
Boundaries and Definitions
There is little doubt on the ground in Scotland that transfers have taken place, yet this is
barely recognised in the housing policy literature at the UK leveL. Most contemporary
housing literature shows extensive LSVT in England, contrasting with one transfer in
Scotland, though one textbook mentions lots of small disposals to community-based
landlords in Scotland (Harriott and Matthews, 1998). This difference of perspective may be a
matter of timing of transfer, but also raises more fundamental questions about the definition
of social phenomena. Housing researchers are urged not to take for granted policy-driven
facts or definitions (Kemeny, 1992). The government leaflet (above) referred to Community
Ownership without defining what 'community ownership' is or what is meant by 'transfer' - of
what, to whom, when, where, how or why. This prompts consideration of what constitutes
'transfer' and 'community ownership'.
'Community ownership'
Arguably, stock transfer originated from a Labour-controlled council, under the rubric of
'Community Ownership' (Nicholson et aI, 1985; Clapham, Kintrea and Whitefield, 1991).
Since 1997, Community Ownership and New Housing Partnerships have become banner
headlines for New Labour housing policy in Scotland (Scottish Offce, 1998; Scottish
Executive, 2000). On the ground in Scotland, Community Ownership is often
indistinguishable from stock transfer, and indeed the Government's own publicity leaflet
(above) conflates the two, using the terms interchangeably. However, leaving aside current
2
uses of the term, 'Community Ownership' was the name of a category of government
subsidy, administered by a government agency and spent by associations buying up former
council housing during the early 1990s (Taylor, 1996b). That is how it is used in this thesis.
'Transfer'
There is no single, still less official, definition of stock transfer: those involved in different
streams of transfer emphasise different dimensions as important. At its simplest it is a sale
of assets (properties and homes) in which people live. Transfer is thus provisionally defined
as follows:
Working definition of stock transfer
I. the disposal of tenanted, rented housing by a public landlord
to an alternative social landlord, usually voluntary
There are many subtleties and variations beyond this broad definition - concerning the
profile of sellers and buyers, and the terms of transactions.3 Such definitional matters are
more than mere semantics and are explored later in this thesis in the context of quantitative
data collection (primary and secondary) and analysis. A definition was imposed on data
collection in Scotland, to create a robust dataset. However, particularly in analysing
secondary datasets on English (and other Scottsh) transfers, different interpretations of
transfer can be derived based on government records (or 'policy facts'). Moreover,
qualitative methods have been used to identify the characteristics which respondents saw
as important to a definition of stock transfer (see Appendix Two). This allowed a fuller and
more refined definition to be produced later, based on empirical evidence.
In the absence of an official or operational definition, the term 'stock transfer' has been used
in practice to refer to all manner of transactions in Scotland, which makes monitoring
unnecessarily complicated, inconsistent and unreliable. Scottish Homes and New Town
disposals of rented housing were conducted simultaneously on different terms. That they
were all called 'transfers' may have served to confuse popular, professional and political
debates about the terms and conditions surrounding disposals and complicates study of
policy about transfer. Definitions are thus all the more important, at least for research, even
if policy-makers resist such clear definition.
'Large scale'
The term large-scale voluntary transfer (LSVT) is used in the Scottish Executive leaflet to
cover a range of transfers on different terms and conditions, mixing transfers on different
2 Voluntary landlords are constitutionally private with not for profit objectives, and are generally regulated by state agencies.
3 These affect the purpose of the sale, whether it is compulsory or not and the proportion of the seller's stock. The variations
affect the value, the price, any subsidy or 'dowry' funding, the level of occupancy, the profie of tenants and their living
conditions. It also affects the characteristics of the destination landlord body and tenants' role in the new governan.ce
arrangements.
3
scales by local authorities and Scottish Homes (not including New Towns). Though the word
'transfer' first appears in a major report on housing in Glasgow (Grieve, 1986:8), the term
LSVT originated in England in the early 1990s and has come to be used as a shorthand for
transfer generally. Even though LSVT stands for large-scale transfer, the average size of
transfer (in Scotland) is small though some individual cases indicate the larger end of the
spectrum.4
This thesis avoids the term LSVT where possible: preferring the term the whole transfer.
Sellers sold their entire rented housing stock via LSVT, mainly in England, and one
transaction in Scotland (Berwickshire). The alternative to whole transfer is partial, referring
to those disposals where only part of the stock is sold - mainly, but not exclusively, in
Scotland. This thesis thus refers to whole and partial transfer and the importance of the
whole versus partial distinction will become clear in examining the data on England and
Scotland respectively in Chapters Five and Six. These reveal the contradictory trends
running concurrently in English and Scottish housing policy during the 1980s and 1990s.
'Voluntary'
At this stage, the use of the word 'voluntary' warrants some attention as part of the central
paradox. The 1980s seemed to be dominated by statutory privatisation by the Thatcher
government (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). In housing, the Right to Buy was compulsory in
allowing individual tenants to buy their own home, against the landlord's wishes. Statutory or
compulsory disposals involving multiple properties for rent were limited to a handful of (high
profile) situations:5 the New Towns (on wind-up of the Development Corporations); a
handful of Housing Action Trusts (HATs) in England; and Tenant's Choice. The latter came
out of controversial legislation in 1988, commonly presumed to be the basis for all transfer.
Scottish legislation gave individual tenants the right to transfer the ownership of their home
to another landlord (Tenant's Choice). The arrangements (Tenants' (sic) Choice) were
collective in England, though critical differences between these mechanisms were not
clearly distinguished at the time (for example, Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, 1991;
Malpass and Murie; 1990).6 In the absence of compulsion, most transfers were thus
voluntary for the disposing landlord, subject to tenant consent and, in turn, to ministerial
4 The breakdown shows 90 LSVTs from Scottish Homes stock (over 40,000 homes) and almost double that number - 182
LSVTs of local authority stock but half the number of homes - over 20,000. The average size was 239 homes.
5 Compulsory transfers were not a resounding success as discussed in Chapter four. In all five Scottish New Towns, local
Labour councils won majority tenant support in competition with 'private' landlords, whilst other neighbouring Labour
authorities were transferring parts of their stock to such 'private' landlords (Muirhead, 1997).
6 Diferent mechanisms are contained in the different legislation north and south of the border, using the same name.
Scottish Tenant's Choice allows individual households to control decision-making in relation to their own home. Under the
Housing etc (Scotland) Act 1988, an individual secure tenant has the individual right to transfer the ownership of their
particular home to another landlord - and retain their tenancy of that home - against the wishes of their current landlord, as
long as the new landlord is 'approved' by Scottish Homes. The scheme was also known at the time as Pick a Landlord or
Pick a Tenant, according to one's point of view.
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permissionJ Eventually ballots were adopted to demonstrate tenant consent but many of the
original transfer transactions were conducted without ballot (Clapham, Kintrea and
Whitefield, 1991).
Bodies with an interest in council housing clashed spectacularly in public exchanges over
issues of principle, as we shall see shortly. For now we can note that housing stock
transfers here are taken to be voluntary in the sense that they were initiated by the
landlords, without statutory coercion. Later chapters will show that in Scotland it was,
paradoxically, Labour councils which 'voluntarily' transferred housing stock, using generous
government resources, in spite of oft-stated opposition to government policy. Since this
paradox is not reported in the lierature, this thesis explores how it was possible.
Council Housing as an Institution
Stock transfer is of huge potential significance in reconfiguring the role of the state in British
housing provision, with 'Community Ownership' policy potentially removing all remaining
housing in Scotland from council control (Scottsh Executive, 2000). However this study
seeks to be of historic value in being about the origins and development of policy, which
may help to determine the shape of housing institutions in Scotland in the 21st century.
Using a perspective from Lane and Ersson (2000), to which Chapter Two returns,
institutions are underpinned by rules - laws, procedures and guidance, and by beliefs and
practices. They are thus more than mere organisations though the responsible bodies look
afJer their assets and their people, both producers and consumers, who in turn protect the
institution. British council housing is arguably such an institution.
The opportunity for councils to build, own and manage housing was established
incrementally before 1919, when legislation created a national mechanism for state housing
provision. The 1919 Act gave all municipalities legal power to build and manage housing,
with central government providing financial assistance (Hughes and Lowe, 1991). Though
the assistance was designed to be temporary, governments since that time have continually
offered subsidy, with strings attached, to support a plethora of different initiatives. Provision
of council housing was democratically controlled, managed without profit, allowing councils
to combine powers and incentives to suit local circumstances (Cole and Furbey, 1994).
Councils were not generally prescribed to act in particular ways until the 1970s when
government starting imposing requirements: to prioritise allocation to homeless people, to
7 Later chapters and appendices show the full picture and its origins but in brief a council has the power to decide to sell any
of its houses to another body and, unless the houses are surplus to requirements, the authority must seek the Secretary of
State's consent. Where the relevant houses are occupied by tenants, the Secretary of State expects to be satisfied that
affected tenants have been consulted and that a majority of tenants is 'not opposed'. The expectation of evidence of majority
consent is contained within a government 'Information Paper' (SOD, 1988). Tenants do not have a statutory right to be
consulted about proposals by their landlord to transfer ownership to an alternative landlord. In 'voluntary transfers', the
burden of proof of majority consent is on the selling landlord: this means that in practice, councils do consult tenants about
the future ownership of their homes, through secret postal ballots conducted under the auspices of the Electoral Reform
Society. After July 1999, the First Minister in the Scottsh Executive became responsible for consent as housing became a
devolved matter under the Scotland Act, 1998.
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charge 'reasonable' rents, and to sell to sitting tenants (Balchin, 1995). Such rule changes
dramatically increased constraints on councils' housing operations.
Although council housing afforded its beneficiaries a degree of comfort and security (AMA,
1985; Co le and Furbey, 1994; Rodger, 1989), the core of the institution has been
substantially eroded in recent years. Factors include three groups of changes, as part of
changes in the political environment. First the legal structure of tenure has changed through
the Right to Buy (Malpass and Murie, 1999); secondly, public resources have declined
steeply due to the deliberate, removal of central government subsidy and increased reliance
on private funding (Balchin, 1995; Gibb, Munro and Satsangi, 1999). Thirdly, the value and
social standing of the council tenancy has changed affecting perception and identity (Kemp,
2000). These provided the context for stock transfer in the late 1980s. By 2000, stock
transfer in England had taken half a million council houses into the voluntary sector. Thus
council housing, as such, no longer exists in some areas, with one in four councils having
transferred their entire stock to new landlords (Perry, 2001).
Council housing in Scotland featured particular characteristics due to different local political
perspectives on housing, and later contributing to those local perspectives (Rodger, 1989;
Devine and Findlay, 1996). Reference to housing in public policy texts remains dominated
by an increasingly outdated perception of Scotland as a nation of council tenants (Brown,
McCrone and Paterson, 1996; Devine and Findlay, 1996). Certainly most councils built more
housing than their English counterparts, especially post-1945: by 1981 around 58% of the
Scottish population lived in council housing, with local variations (Rodger, 1989: 11). Claims
of residualisation of council housing in Scotland, could be contested based on the fact that
in some areas (until relatively recently), some local councils owned over 90% of the local
stock (Currie and Murie, 1996: 26). Overall however, sales to sittng tenants had
considerable impact in Scotland from 1980, (relatively greater than in England), eroding
council dominance of housing though leaving a higher level of council ownership than in
England (Currie and Murie, 1996).8 Where councils in Scotland developed and managed
much housing during the 20th century, the notion and role of council housing increasingly
came into question, both financially and ideologically.
Conflicting Stances
The Conservatives' policy commitment in 1979 to home ownership, giving tenants rights to
purchase their individual home at a discount (henceforth referred to as the Right to Buy -
RTB), was thought to have helped win at least two elections (Thatcher, 1993). Experience of
rising rents and increasingly generous discount rates provided financial catalysts for many
tenants to switch tenure. In preparing for a third term in 1987, the Conservatives seemed
anxious to wrest more housing from municipal control, as revealed in the following quote
from the Scottsh Housing Minister in public correspondence with CoSLA and Shelter:
8 See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/stats/bulletins/00019-00.asp
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If run down areas of council housing are to be given a new direction it can
only be by breaking up existing council monopolies and diversifying
ownership and management ... (Councils) should give up exclusive control
which they exercise over large areas of housing ... In a modern diverse
society, it is necessary to harness the efforts of all available agencies,
public and private, in creating a worthwhile environment in which people
want to live.
Michael Ancram, Scottish Housing Minister: Scottish Office press release April 1987
The legal mechanism for achieving change in Scotland was a new set of property rights
called Tenant's Choice (see above), which enjoyed a controversial reception (Midwinter et
aI, 1991; Tulloch, 1998). Formal tenant opposition came from organised groups, notably the
Scottish Tenants' Organisation (STO) (Nicholson, 1990), who argued that tenants could
choose between
...staying in council housing, which is starved of resources, where rents are
to be put up and repairs or improvements aren't carried out; and moving to
another landlord where the tenant is told they could get repairs done and
their houses improved sooner. That is the kind of "choice " tenants are
faced with.
Scottish Tenants' Organisation, 1988: 10
STO referred to new ballot practice in England noting, with some satisfaction, 'successful
rejections' by tenants, notably in Peterborough New Town. Further quotes encapsulate the
depth of organised tenant opposition to private involvement in council housing:
When we as tenants look at the contents of the new Housing laws and the
brutal attacks on our rent levels and security of tenancies we can be left in
no doubt that this government is intent on forcing us into the private
sector... this government is intent on the reduction of housing in the public
sector: we cannot allow this to happen ...
Scottish Tenants' Organisation, 1988: 2
The Tories believe that public housing is badly managed and that rents are
too low! They claim that housing problems can be solved by 'market forces:..
Those of us who remember Rachmann would disagree.
Scottsh Tenants' Organisation, 1988: 18
Most councils and their representative body (CoSLA) were also formally opposed to
government policy in many spheres, not least in housing policy, but without referring to
transfer, still less campaigning against it.9 For example, a joint campaign between CoSLA
and Shelter before the 1987 election protested mainly about cutbacks, arguing for
reinstatement of resources:
9 A review of CoSLA campaign, research and policy publications in 1988 showed 11 out of 17 focussing on housing.
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The current lack of investment means that existing houses are becoming run
down. If the government doesn't take action soon and recognise the
important contribution that council housing makes to the community then we
will be witnessing the creation of a second rate housing sector... Councils are
striving to maintain ... services despite government cutbacks.
CoS LA 1987a: 3
These stances might have meant that there were no transfers in Scotland, as is commonly
perceived to be the case. This study shows the extent of decision-making to sell council
housing, on different terms to England, though with only one transaction of a type
recognised in England. The paradox addressed in this thesis is that it was local defenders
of council housing who took action to conduct transfer in Scotland without trumpeting or
fanfare; moreover just as central government publicly promoted stock transfer, local transfer
activity evaporated.
Rationale for Transfer in Scotland: Impediments and Incentives
If the existence of council housing can be seen as voluntary, based on local action in
response to resource opportunities determined by central government, then arguably its
disappearance through stock transfer differs little. Textbook explanations for transfer dwell
on the financial and administrative arrangements for English councils which pursued
transfer, arising from legislative change in or after 1988 (Malpass and Williams 1997;
Harriott and Matthews, 1998; Cowan and Marsh, 2001). Most point to transfer as LSVT,
driven by ideologically-minded Conservative councillors and opportunistic managers
escaping from resource constraints. Most explanations neglect political differences within
England in representing transfer as a Tory phenomenon in leafy suburbs (Harriott and
Matthews, 1998). Such explanations and have limited application north of the border, and
perhaps even within England. Material differences in the culture, structure and mechanisms
of the Scottish arrangements are not usually reflected, even in housing literature which
purports to analyse events at the UK level (Cole and Furbey 1994; Balchin, 1995; Malpass
and Williams, 1997; Harriott and Matthews, 1998; Cowan and Marsh, 2001). Unfortunately,
the wider literature about Scottish government and public policy commonly pick up on such
sources, thereby losing opportunities to explore policy which might be 'concurrent'
(Midwinter et aI, 1991). This thesis seeks to reveal the contradictory and parallel nature of
transfers in the two jurisdictions.
Successive waves of resource cuts to public housing in Scotland certainly mirror
developments elsewhere in the UK (Currie and Murie, 1996; Gibb et aI, 1999). However,
Scottish councils' use of capital receipts was not so tightly circumscribed as their English
counterparts (Gibb et aI, 1999) and rental subsidy mechanisms were critically different.
Resource cutbacks affected expenditure in capital and revenue budgets. While council
resources were squeezed, assistance to the private sector was protected, even increased.
Moreover, government agencies were relatively generously funded, to distribute subsidy to
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registered housing associations.lo These included new, tenant-controlled landlords owning
former council housing (Robertson, 1992), following the first British transfers, initiated in
Glasgow in 1985/6 (Ospina, 1987; Clapham et aI, 1991).
If transfer was a Tory council phenomenon, there were few candidates for disposal in
Scotland. In the 1980s and 1990s, councils were increasingly controlled by parties opposed
to the Conservative Government (Kellas, 1994). Conservative electoral success was waning
in the early 1990s: there were barely enough MPs to staff the ministerial posts in the
Scottish Office (Lynch, 2001). Even after a slight upturn in 1992, the Conservatives' poor
support in Scotland left them high and dry as a minority central government pursuing
English policies out of touch with the policy elite and public opinion (Brown et aI, 1996;
Lynch, 2001).
The Conservatives promoted the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act, 1994 to achieve the
comprehensive reorganisation of local government in Scotland into 32 single tier authorities.
There was little evidence of a coherent boundary rationale and critics accused the
Conservatives of gerrymandering (Midwinter, 1995; Brown et aI, 1996). However, where the
Conservatives controlled six district councils after the 1992 council elections, by 1995/6
(post-reorganisation), they had none. Most councils were Labour-held before the 1995
elections: most of the new authorities were controlled by Labour toO.ll Councilors elected in
April 1995, continued to argue for more investment in deteriorating council housing while
awaiting the arrival of the cavalry in the form of a Labour government which might save
them after the next general election. Conservative Housing Ministers missed few
opportunities in what became the final throes of their administration to press on councils the
advantages of stock transfer. For example,
I think stock transfer is the way forward for the housing stock. I do look to
a time when council housing is a thing of the past. I am willing to facilitate
(stock transfer) and streamline the procedures ... If (counctÏs) want to
protect their empires- you have to ask them why they are choosing that
over an investment opportunity.
Raymond Robertson, Minister of Housing: interviewed for Scottish Housing Monitor, 1996
By 1996, district councils in Scotland mainly under Labour control, had quietly transferred
stock to other landlords, creating small new tenant-controlled bodies in peripheral estates
with poor quality of life, to refurbish and manage rented housing. They had been supported
by generous grants channelled through the government's agency (Clapham et aI, 1991;
Taylor, 1996b; Graham et aI, 1997). One district council under Conservative control prior to
reorganisation had transferred all its stock by 1995, the year before draft government
guidance on transfer was issued. By 1996, after reorganisation, little or no housing was
10 Such bodies are increasingly known as Registered Social Landlords RSLs. The relevant government agencies were the
Housing Corporation in Scotland (HCiS) unti/1989, thereafter known as Scottish Homes (SH) - see Chapter Seven.
11 The Scotsman, 6 Apri/1995.
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being transferred on any scale by the unitary successor councils. Meanwhile in England,
Conservative-controlled shire districts were selling wholesale out of rented housing
provision and sales were reported to generate huge cash receipts for the selling councils
(Mullns et aI, 1995; Wilcox, 1996).
During the 1990s, government-sponsored bodies in Scotland were involved in heated
discussions about transfer. Scottish Homes' disposal programme was strongly driven from
1991, and hotly contested at all levels at Westminster, in the media, at public debates,
roadshows, local ballots. Simultaneously, plans for statutory wind-up of the five New Town
Development Corporations was even more hotly contested. Much confusion around stock
transfer came from activities at this time. All of these factors - resources, reorganisation,
weak Conservative support - had some bearing on stock transfer by Scottish local
authorities before 1997. Issues of interest concern both the presence and absence of
transfer. While the financial pressures are largely self-evident, it is not clear how or why
some councils and not others responded by pursuing transfer. Nor is it clear how or why
councils, largely opposed to government policy, conducted any transfers at all, if this was
what the government wanted.
Actions and Decisions: the Meaning of 'Policy'
A survey of councils' 'policies' on voluntary transfer, reported two out of three councils
opposed to transfer (Nicholson, 1990). Councils which had 'decided' not to consider
transfer, included some where councillors specifically decided on a 'no transfer' policy,
whereas some opposition was recorded as 'non-decision-making' (Nicholson, 1990).12 While
17 councils were considering transfer, only two councils had a written policy and there was
a general reluctance to initiate action:
... the majority of authorities adopt a reactive stance responding to tenant-
led initiatives, ... to locally based associations.
Nicholson, 1990: 6
The notion of tenant-led initiatives appears spurious given the stance articulated by the body
representing tenants' interests and yet as later chapters show, tenants were central to
action. In 1989, a transfer Code of Practice simply urged councils to ensure the 'best
possible deal' for tenants, involve them as much as possible and protect council access to
the lettngs supply (CoSLA, 1989). Six years later, a joint Code of Practice devoted
considerable attention to the need for balanced, unambiguous and comprehensive
information to tenants, in preparation for ballots. It conceded that transfer would
12 A telephone survey of senior staff showed 17 district councils considering transfers: 33 were reported to be opposed to
voluntary transfers through specific decisions taken by the council (7), non-decision-making (10) and 'other'indications (16).
The survey of authorities (50 responses) showed those councils which had 'decided' not to consider transfer, but only 7 of
those decisions had been formally taken by the council. Chapter Six shows that not all of those willing to consider transfer
actually did so (Moray, Gordon, Angus, Ross and Cromart) and some who had taken no decision or decided against,
ended up pursuing a transfer, not always to completion (Hamilon, Argyle and Bute, Kirkcaldy, Monklands).
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...continue to be important in future .... and must be seen to be promoted
fairly, representing value for money and being clearly in the interests of
tenants.
CoS LA, SFHA, CIH, 1995: 9
Since there was no published policy framework for transfer by 1995,13 we must question
what constitutes policy and consider the relative significance of formal decision-making by
councils. If 'policy' were limited to formal decisions with a clear programme and
implementation plans leading to politically sanctioned actions, then disposal by Scottish
Homes would make a classic study, as it sold its own rented stock in voluntary stock
transfers in just such a strategically managed programme.14 Scottish Homes transfers
indeed underline the way in which 'stock transfer' is understood differently according to local
circumstances: later chapters will show how the contested meanings of transfer leaked into
each other. However our focus is council transfers, where there is no formal policy for a
starting point, even though the processes and terminology are deceptively similar.
In voluntary transfer, process, power and capacity are vitaL. Decision-making depends on
the consent of a majority of affected tenants. Councils could and would not push tenants,
faced with high profile tenant hostility. While there was no way of recording opposition, it
could nevertheless be made known. Given Labour councillors' assumed dependence on
tenants' votes, there was little mileage in deciding to promote transfer with any great
fanfare. In the absence of ballots in Scotland until the early 1990s, councils consulted
tenants about transfer in more informal ways (Nicholson, 1990). This brings to the fore the
basic process for voluntary transfer, which highlights the range of stakeholders, their
interests, interactions and power, which are at the heart of this thesis.
Non-Rational Policy?
The account so far indicates conflicting stances and contradictory action in Scottsh housing
policy, with fewer transfers completed the more the Conservatives promoted the policy: this
undermines reliance on rational explanations of policy-making. Other issues of significance
emerge, including the ideology about privatisation, the interests of the various players, the
nature of communication and power relations between actors. Though there are many
dimensions to stock transfer (technical, financial, legal and organisational), political research
on transfers by local authorities appears more relevant.
Certain themes already stand out from the discussion. They include questions of clarity
about definition and the nature of evidence about transfer, differences of policy and practice
within the UK and the relative adequacy of the literature about housing in Scotland. Further
13 The Code of Practice covers homelessness, Community Care, Nominations and Waiting lists, CCT, Benefits and private
sector grants. It usually cites reference to relevant acts and guidance. In the case of transfer it cites nothing, though it is the
longest section of the Code.
14 Scottish Homes sold mainly to housing associations albeit on a larger scale, while simultaneously distributing government
subsidy to fund capital investment to refurbish stock transferred by councils to other associations, and only exceptionally in
relation to the stock it was itself transferring to other landlords.
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issues are about power relations between central and local government, and finally the
nature of policy itself. The earlier discussion about definitions and boundaries revealed
issues about capacity and interests, highlighting the importance of questions about whether
there was a policy on transfer, whose policy it was, when it came to be, what form it took
and how it may have been implemented. As suggested by Lasswell (1950), these questions
can be summed up as the who, why and how of stock transfer in Scotland.
Clearly we need a definition of policy in order to proceed. The literature suggests various
different possible types of study, focussing on any of the following: content, process, output,
evaluation or advocacy, though probably not all of these at once (Hogwood and Gunn,
1984). Policy analysis takes many different forms, some of which are retrospective about
policy - of policy; and some about policy to come - for policy. We now set aside any further
reference to the latter since the focus here is historic, of policy. Further, the approach here
is purposely more about transfer as process and output, rather than policy content.
Theory of policy 'for the real world' indicates policy as a process, consisting of nine stages
each following the last in a logical sequence, shown overleaf.
Nine Stages In Rational Policy Process
Deciding to decide
Deciding how to decide
Issue definition
Forecasting
Siftng objectives and priorities
Option analysis
I! Implementation monitoring and control
Evaluation and review
Maintenance succession and termination
Source: Hogwood and Gunn, 1987: 4
This model assumes that implementation is what councils do within a framework of policy
set at the centre. British institutionalist policy theory is often predicated on such rational
decision-making with formal, documented decisions. As Chapter Four will show, housing
studies often take government objectives as the reference point for policy study, implying a
top-down and linear view of policy starting with central government's aspirations, enacted
through legislation. For example, housing research under the heading of implementation
assumes that a policy framework is already clearly defined by the preceding stages (issue
definition, sifting objectives and so on) (Malpass and Means, 1993). However, a government
Information Paper (SDD, 1988) and occasional ministerial speeches hardly provide a robust
framework for transfer as the preferred policy of central government in Scotland; nor does
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guidance (SODD, 1996a), appearing years after completion of many transfers and quite
different from previous practice. The circumstances in Scotland are thus not conducive to a
rational account of policy and so it could be argued that research cannot examine
implementation per se.
As Chapter Two will show, there are other explanations of policy and implementation: no
one, prior definition of policy has been applied in this case, permitting a more open
approach. At its loosest, policy can be taken to mean a web of decisions and / or action
(Easton, in Hill 1997a) or non decision-making and its consequences (Bachrach and Baratz,
1963). Such a broad approach has allowed this research to develop so as to gather different
types of evidence about the nature of policy. At least two possibilities exist. The first
encompasses the possibility of clear policy objectives and planned programmes to support
the notion of a linear, staged process driven from the top down by central government
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). At the other end of the spectrum the second possibility
involves gathering evidence to explain policy more effectively as accidental (Kingdon, 1995).
Also competing for attention are explanations about 'muddling through' (Lindblom, 1979)
and bottom-up accounts with lots of local action but not necessarily formal policy (Hjern and
Porter, 1981). Lastly, the thesis draws on ideas about networks and power dependency.
These can help to examine the possibility of policy emergence, which seems alien to the
study of British policy-making.
Research Focus, Approaches and Method
This thesis focuses on transfers by Scottsh councils 1985 - 1997, although other streams
of transfer impinge inescapably on transfer during the 1990s (Taylor,1998a). It does not aim
to evaluate stock transfer nor to appraise its impact. The study combines quantitative and
qualitative methods covered more fully in Chapter Three. In summary, they have included
data collection through a variety of self-completion postal questionnaires, analysis of
documents and offcial statistics, and semi-structured interviews with selected actors.
Relevant details are supported byappendices.15
Investigations started in the mid-1990s out of an apparently 'simple' data monitoring
exercise, when it seemed that councils in Scotland were disposing of stock to new landlords
but in quite different ways to their counterparts in England and perhaps for quite different
reasons and on different terms and conditions. It became important to develop an
understanding of these differences, drawn from theory to move beyond unreflexive empirical
study (Kemeny, 1992). Moreover, common sense alone may not explain phenomena which
remain a puzzle or paradox without theory (Gilbert, 1995). Such a paradox exists here in the
form of Scottsh Labour-held councils voluntarily disposing of housing, while opposed to
15 Appendices give details of approaches to data analysis and summary tables, legal references, forms of surveys, the
questions posed and showing who was interviewed, their role at the time and since, along with other summary information of
their views. The case studies are writen up in some detail under a consistent set of headings regarding the origins scale and
timing of the transfers in that area, as well as material on imperatives, opposition, key actors and networks. A chronology of
key events and the research process are also included among the appendices.
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government policy of selling council housing and while being funded to do so by
Conservatives intent on cuttng public expenditure.
Efforts to maintain a dataset on Scottish transfers using seller and government consent data
were intermittently thwarted and disrupted16 but ultimately successful, providing unforeseen
opportunities for analysis and comparison. A quantitative approach allowed the researcher
to identify and analyse who disposed of what, to whom when, both in Scotland and in
England. Quantitative research can neither explain active transfer by councils opposed to
central government, nor lack of transfer by overtly ideological councils. The process of
accessing quantitative data (for England and Scotland) was inadvertently revealing about
the policy process, enriching more deliberate methods of gathering information about
approaches to policy-making. Complementary qualitative research explored how and why
(mostly partial) transfers in Scotland were conducted; and why whole transfers were
relatively absent.
Quantitative data examination covers England and Scotland until March 2001, exploring
typological variety, temporal and spatial dimensions. By contrast, the qualitative analysis of
interviews and the primary focus of this study address Scottish experience in the period up
to May 1997 when the Conservatives left office. Scottish experience of transfer was the
more interesting given the precarious position of the Conservatives in Scotland, and
remarkable in light of the leakage into council transfers from other streams of transfer,
including England. Focussing on Scotland permits gaps to be filled in the UK housing
literature, and on housing in Scottsh public policy literature.
In-depth qualitative interviews were conducted during 1998 with some 30 actors, political
and administrative (see Appendix Four). Elite actor interviews (in local case studies and at
the centre of policy-making) allowed the researcher to learn more about the rationales of
different actors at the local scale. Actors included elected representatives and paid officials
at the central and local scale, as well as tenants/ community activists. The case studies
were five Scottsh councils active in transfer at different stages during Conservative central
administrations from 1987 - 1997, including an aborted transfer. Interviews and their
analysis were structured using criteria gleaned from policy theory, specifically with a view to
testing different policy theories and concepts.
This study establishes who conducted transfers, where and when. Using competing political
theories, it contributes to our understanding of why and how different institutional actors -
agencies and individuals - have used transfer to satisfy their own goals. It thus improves
both our knowledge of changes to council housing in Scotland and our understanding of
why and how those changes took place. The research identifies the origins and driving
forces behind transfers by local authorities in Scotland at different times between 1985 and
16 Delays arose from restricted access to offcial consent information, by personnel changes arising from reorganisation and
by the researcher's own digressions into policy and practice.
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1997, distinguishing two main types of transfer - partial in the early years and whole, where
different explanations may apply.
Structure of Thesis
Having set some of the parameters for transfer by Scottish local authorities, the rest of this
thesis explores and expands on these themes. Chapter Two moves on to look at the
broader policy studies literature on the alternative ways of viewing policy as stance,
decisions, action, or process. Explanations fall broadly into two groups - the first
emphasising linear, rational policy with central government in control of decisions from the
top; the other emphasising accidents and mess, the importance of bottom-up actions and
the near impossibility of control from the centre. The chapter concludes by breaking down
the central research question into a number of subsidiary questions addressed in later
chapters.
Chapter Three discusses in more detail the various methods used to gather and analyse
data, and relates these to the nature of evidence relevant to different theoretical
explanations taken from Chapter Two, notably the behavioural approach, institutional ism
and rational choice. This chapter also discusses reflexivity and the researcher's relationship
to the data, as well as the rationale for adopting a case study approach. Finally it considers
the value of elite interviews as a research method.
The housing policy literature is reviewed in Chapter Four. It identifies the explanations
offered for who or what made transfers happen, focussing mainly on stock transfer in
England. This helps to reveal staged conceptions of the policy process and power relations
in that process, as far as can be assessed from whole transfers in England, though without
any clear analysis of practice to date. It shows the poor coverage of Scottish experience of
transfer and the lack of definition of the phenomenon.
Quantitative data analysis of stock transfer is presented in Chapters Five and Six on
England and Scotland respectively. Each shows who transferred stock when, where, to
whom, on what terms, for what purpose, incorporating original spatial and temporal analysis
of data to allow comparison as far as possible. Both draw on complete datasets about
transfer, either collected by or on behalf on government departments. Chapter Five
(England) differentiates whole and partial transfers and associates transactions and political
control in different regions of England. It concludes by exploring possible explanations for
cycles and patterns. Chapter Six (Scotland) provides a definition of transfer, challenges the
supposed absence of transfer by revealing as many transactions in Scotland as in England
but on a smaller scale. The chapter draws out similarities and differences with the patterns
in England, to explore the possibility of concurrent policy. It summarises the outcome of
transfer preparations for five councils which embarked on transfer (on various scales),
including one failed attempt at transfer. It concludes by explaining the rationale for selecting
the case study councils.
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Chapters Seven and Eight are predicated on an institutionalist approach and consider
changes made to rules governing the system of social housing in Scotland. They assess the
relative significance of these rules in explaining the presence and absence of stock transfer,
drawing on primary documentary sources and interview material with political, administrative
and executive actors at the centre of the system, not bound to particular locations. Chapter
Seven examines the political and financial situation in 1986, contextualising the origin of
transfers before considering legislation in 1988 thought to have structured transfer. In the
absence of a clear legal framework, Chapter Eight then examines less formal rules and
resource patterns from 1988 - 1997, in an attempt to establish what control central
government had over its agents' behaviour. This chapter will show government and its
agencies weakening scope for local authority stock transfer during the fourth term, as it
became 'policy'.
Narratives from the five case studies provide the basis for Chapters Nine and Ten, drawing
on qualitative analysis of original interviews with elite actors at the local scale. Chapter Nine
uses the material to examine local rationales and imperatives for transfer, while Chapter
Ten shows how transfer worked, or not. It takes a rational choice focus on the policy
process examining the role, stance and capacity of different types of local actors (elected,
paid, voluntary), bringing out the significance of actions by staff at all levels preceding rather
than following decision-making. It also allows us to see how the opposing stances of the
different players could be quietly accommodated with each other and the critical role of
individual staff in brokering relationships at the local scale.
The final chapter brings together conclusions as to who made Scottsh local authority stock
transfer happen, how and why. It will argue that different methodological and theoretical
approaches complement each other in demonstrating and explaining the paradox of transfer
in Scotland. More specifically it will show the weakness of institutional and top-down
approaches where there are no clearly stated policy goals, even though a focus on rules
can help to understand power relations. Rather, behavioural and rational choice
approaches can assist in explaining perverse and contradictory policy outcomes in the form
of (non- )decision-making, and (in)action.
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Chapter Two
Theorising About Policy-Making
This chapter sets a theoretical context chosen to inform this study of housing stock transfer. It
examines a range of concepts used in political theory and policy studies and the way in which
these are combined in different schools of thought. Whilst some accounts emphasise linear
and rational accounts of the policy process, others talk of 'messy' accidents. In the former,
actors at the top determine action further down the line. In the latter, lower level actors
exercise effective power through their actions. These can be summarised as top-down versus
bottom-up accounts of policy though such terms also apply to different approaches to
researching policy.
Particular attention is paid in this chapter to the concept and meaning of implementation. A
further salient issue is the significance of power relationships between actors and the
networks or policy communities within which actors operate. This chapter contributes to that
discussion by exploring alternative perspectives about the randomness of policy. To a limited
degree only, the role of the state will be discussed, referring to applications of (neo-)elitist and
(neo-)pluralist theory for different research approaches. The chapter concludes by indicating
the themes pursued later in the thesis.
Underlying the main theoretical positions are arguments about whether policy theory is
universal rather than bounded to particular spatial or temporal settings. Though many existing
housing policy accounts indicate stock transfer in general as linear or planned in response to
central government policy, this study queries the. extent to which this applies in the case of
Scottish stock transfers. This chapter primarily explores the literature on policy in the abstract,
separate from the stock transfer context, though the opportunity is taken at the end to identify
those themes and concepts selected to help elucidate the phenomenon of stock transfer by
Scottish councils.
Using Policy Theory
Housing studies commonly focus on policy content or output and critics argue that housing
research is seldom theoretically informed (Kemeny, 1992; Malpass and Means, 1993; Jacobs,
1999). As stated in the introduction, the purpose of using theory in research is to help to solve
a puzzle or paradox which cannot be explained by mere common sense (Gilbert, 1995).
Housing studies has no theory of its own but has the luxury and challenge of deploying theory
from a wide range of different perspectives. This has potential to enrich both the field of
housing enquiry and whatever discipline theory may be drawn from, including politics (Cowan
and Marsh, 2001). Politics is seen as a particularly legitimate and useful filter for housing
studies given the critical role of central and local government in British social housing
(Kemeny, 1992).
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Though policy studies often focus on outputs/ outcomes, such an examination is insufficient to
explain decisions and actions. Nevertheless, outputs can provide a good starting point for the
study of power, decision-making and actors' rationales (Hill, 1997a). One typology of
approaches to policy analysis (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) features four main types:
organisational, procedural (also referred to as 'institutional', behavioural, and politicaL. The
last dominates British public policy studies including housing policy analysis, with a focus on
the content of policy while neglecting the production of policy, which is the focus here. We
return to the other three approaches in due course.
Policy theory provides the opportunity to explore power and decision-making by bodies with
legitimate authority (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). Such bodies include central government, local
authorities, government agencies and voluntary bodies regulated by government agencies.17
Politics promotes the description, analysis and explanation of the actions of actors and their
underlying perspectives and values (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). While researchers are
cautioned against over-stretching the power of broad generalisation beyond time and space,
theory and concepts can be used to underpin the study of policy (Hill, 1997a). Hil suggests
that policy studies need to burrow into the nature and exercise of power in particular domains,
as well as the translation of policy into action, Le. implementation.1B The very notion of theory
implies universal application but policy theory appears strongly culturally bound.
American political scientists are preoccupied with policy as a rational process with grand set-
piece debates and on the whole such scholars look for normative solutions to problems in the
political sphere (Hill, 1997b). British approaches to British (and by extension Scottish) policy
are centred on the Westminster model and unconsciously institutionalist, by default neglecting
behaviourist approaches (Rhodes, 1997). Yet, the UK or Westminster model may now be
redundant partly due to restructuring under the Thatcher and Major governments (Campbell
and Wilson, 1998). Meanwhile, British academic policy studies are often theoretically
malnourished, even anti-theoretical, focussing unduly on the content of the centre's
documented intentions rather than the actions of the various players (e.g. March and Olsen,
1996; Rhodes, 1997; Hill, 1997b). Defending neo-institutionalism, Rhodes reluctantly accepts
the charge of excess empiricism and pragmatism, but challenges behaviourism - the
dominant mode of political enquiry in North America - to learn in turn from institutional ism.
These two perspectives rarely engage or speak to each other and the approach to policy
studies in Europe and North America are premised on fundamentally different values,
structures and relationships between actors (Hill, 1997a). Thus while approaches prevalent in
USA can be used in a British - indeed Scottish - context, there may be limitations on
applicability of perspectives such as behaviourism in a UK context, requiring the exercise of
due caution. Rhodes concludes in favour of multi-theoretical and reflexive approaches to
policy (to which the next chapter returns).
17 Such as registered housing associations, or Registered Social Landlords. RSLs.
18 Later, Hil claimed that implementation was yesterday's issue (Hill, 1997b).
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This study takes the point made by Hill (1997a) and Kemeny (1992), that policy 'works' at a
number of different levels or layers: policy studies therefore have to make explicit where they
fit. This study is firmly rooted in the context of British public policy and as has already been
argued in the introduction, the exploration of political dimensions is especially focussed on
Scotland, which remains essentially British even post-devolution (Lynch 2001). Very litte is
written within the UK literature on government and policy about the nature of policy-making in
Scotland (Brown, McCrone, Paterson, 1996) and Lynch argues that few policy studies
examine the behaviour of pressure groups in Scotland. Though this may change with the
advent of devolution, the period under examination precedes the establishment of a Scottsh
Parliament. This study seeks to make real the aspiration to explain housing policy 'in terms of
interaction between wider social vested interests ... and practices and interests of the state'
(Kemeny, 1992:48). It therefore examines both the micro level interactions between individual
actors in organisations and macro level operations of central government (and its agencies) in
Scotland within a UK context.
Defining policy
Before going any further, we must clarify the concept of 'policy' though there are many
plausible definitions. Policy is probably not an elephant, although Ham and Hill (1993)
suggest that some see it as just that, in the sense that it can be recognised but not defined.
Hill argues in later years that government policy is 'like jugglery - if it works, it's policy' (Hill,
1997b: 381). A modern British textbook explanation shows policy having been defined
variously in one of four categories: stances, decisions, actions, processes (Hill, 1997a). As
these are core building blocks in this thesis, each is now considered in turn.
Stance
Stance relates to the positions adopted by different actors (individuals and institutions) in
relation to an issue. Policy as stance is much more about the content of views about a
particular arena or field and this characterises much of the policy literature about housing in
Scotland at least (Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, 1991; Robertson, 1992; Currie and Murie,
1996; Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996). The content of policy is only of interest in this
study to the extent that it is about the different stances taken by different actors and the way
these are contested, negotiated, reconciled and accommodated - or not. The introduction
showed that at the level of public rhetoric, actors hold fundamentally incompatible ideological
positions about the role of the state in housing.
Positions or values have been classified in three categories - Deep Core, Near Core and
Secondary Beliefs, in descending order of attachment (Sabatier, 1986). Deep Core beliefs are
fundamental ontological axioms held by the actors in question. The issues are of the order of
good vs. evil, nature vs nurture or their position on equity in distributive welfare and social
justice. Actors are no more likely to change Deep Core beliefs than to convert to a different
religion. Actors are less directly attached to Near Core beliefs, in essence strategies for
achieving Deep Core beliefs. Near Core change occurs as experience reveals anomalies in a
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strategy for achieving a Deep Core tenet. Such experience might be triggered by external
events. Sabatier has argued that Near Core beliefs may include policy positions about forms
of government intervention in relation to vulnerable groups, use of persuasion as opposed to
coercion as tactics for achieving policy goals. Least deeply held are Secondary Beliefs, that is
tactics or particular decisions to implement core positions. Such decisions may be about
budgets, rules, procedures or performance and are susceptible to being changed relatively
easily, particularly as part of organisational policy learning (Bennett, 1992; Hall, 1993).
Though Sabatier's classification was developed around policy elite views, it could be argued
that it has wider application. Stakeholders in this study adopt different positions about the
institution of council housing in terms of public ownership of assets, coinciding with personal
use of space. This highlights the conflict between an ideological position on the one hand and
accommodation of physical comfort on the other. Arguably people cannot accommodate
others' views on grand ideological questions of property ownership (Lindblom, 1965).
Attachment to council housing is commonly assumed to be in the unchanging, Deep Core
category of values but such an assumption is challenged in this thesis as we see its
advocates taking apparently perverse decisions and action to remove housing from council
ownership. In so doing it can be argued that they were placing physical comfort and security
ahead of tenure attachment in the Deep Core category of beliefs.
Decisions
Policy has been portrayed as a series of interrelated decisions about objectives and how to
operationalise them (Hil, 1997a). Not only can policy be conceived as being (more than) one
decision at more than one level, it can equally be seen as failure to decide, or avoidance of
decision-taking: non-decision-making can be policy too (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). Non-
decision-making relates to discussions about power, manifested overtly, covertly and as
avoidance of latent conflict (to which we return shortly). The non-decision-making approach
avoids overt conflict by suppressing latent conflict: for instance, the fact that items never
reach an agenda may itself be a use of power. Bachrach and Baratz argued that non-
decision-making often involves the protection of vested interests and should perhaps be seen
as action rather than decision (see below). Crucially, decisions may be taken without
implementation being achieved and thus formal decision-making, documented or otherwise
cannot be taken at face value on its own as policy (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier,
1986).
Housing policy involves many different actors with varying relationships and capacity for
action, which makes for a degree of mess. This makes Easton's notion of policy as a web of
decisions and/ or actions rather attractive (Hill, 1997a) because it encapsulates the idea that:
...policy emerges over time, is adaptable and is subject to experimentation and
development by different actors in different circumstances and with
different intentions.
Hill 1997:7
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In the metaphor of the web, non-decisions are as important as decisions in constituting policy
and in portraying the complex inter-relationships not only between actors, but within
institutions and with other relevant policy ideas around the same time. Potential confusion
may reflect the inherent tension between what organisations say and what they do (Brunsson,
1989). The web suggests something which is rather messy, (if not 'policy mess' as such -
Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The notion of policy as a web should prevent predetermined
thinking about what methods or theories may be appropriate to examine the policy in
question. It also allows the use of a variety of methods, reflecting a pluralist view of policy-
making. Actors' stances and decisions are essentially irrelevant without capacity for action,
derived from their power and identity (March and Olsen, 1996). These relate to concepts of
power and implementation to which we return.
Action
While decisions tell us about policy-makers' intentions, we also need to examine their actions,
though the boundary between decision and action is often blurred. A rational model of policy
places ideas at the centre of control over action, but Brunsson (1989) showed that the reverse
could be true, with action effectively controlling the promotion of ideas. Further, he argued
that it would suit managers (or politicians) not to know about what action was being taken in
their name, as this liberated them to propound their preferred ideas. Perversely, an
organisational gap between policy as intentions (strategy) and action (implementation) can be
positively useful to policy-makers (Brunsson, 1989).
Where policy has been depicted as a course of action (Heclo in Hill 1997a), this mayor may
not be deliberate, or preceded by conscious decisions. Policy-makers can equally choose not
to act and indeed may not control policy outcomes (Hill 1997a). Although the government was
in charge of British public policy inputs, it was unable to control the outcomes (Marsh and
Rhodes, 1992). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the government changed
incentive structures to produce changes in behaviour lower down.19 Thus the UK witnessed
... centrally induced change producing unpredictable consequences, fol/owed by
attempts to gain control of ostensible loyalists seeking to advance their
interests through the turmoiL.
Hill 1997b: 383
Barrett and Fudge (1981) view policy as being about actions, including those of 'street level
bureaucrats' (Lipsky cited in Hill 1997a). Observers disagree as to whether action connects
with policy-makers' intentions at all, whether consistently, flowing from them, or thwarting
them at any given point. This reflects the different, even conflicting, preferences, values and
beliefs of political actors and their capacity to act. If policy is action, people may see political
action as a manifestation of their identity (March and Olsen, 1996). Institutions are collections
of individuals, operating with shared meanings and practices. The collective political identity
19 It could be argued that the Right to Buy introduced in 1980 achieved such radical changes in incentive structures.
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of those individuals shapes the institutions and processes of change, though actors tend not
to be conscious of this on a daily basis (March and Olsen, 1996). The process of change
depends on four grand factors. Firstly, individuals' identity at the outset may be challenged by
a changing paradigm. Secondly, capacity to change requires a combination of political will
and competence. Thirdly, accounts of events and definitions of political and social
phenomena are (re-)constructed in the minds of stakeholders. Fourthly, individuals reinterpret
their prior identity as they adapt their behaviour to changing conditions (March and Olsen,
1996). In this case, staff and tenants may have to review their attachment to council housing
and thereby may change the institution.
Process
Contrasting with the mess of contradictory decisions and action, policy can be represented as
a logical sequence of steps. (Hood, 1976 in Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Hogwood and
Gunn, 1984; Sabatier, 1986). It is commonly accepted that conceptualising policy as a linear
process assists in comprehending its complexities. However, writers have tended to disagree
about what the correct stages are, and about whether this accurately reflects how all policy
actors operate, which undermines theoretical claims to universality. For some, the critical
distinction is between formulation and implementation of policy, while for others even this
distinction is false. A further disagreement is about how problems are defined and arrive on
the agenda at all, as opposed to which solutions are selected, when and why.
Accounts such as Hogwood and Gunn (1984) emphasise the linear nature of policy and
reveal a highly complex structure of staging. The first attempt (by Easton) suggested a
biologically-based systems model for policy analysis, incorporating inputs, decisions, outputs
and outcomes (Hill, 1997a). While the Easton model may have been the first to conceptualise
policy as a process, the basis on which it did so was considered flawed: over-structured and
too contrived (Hill, 1997a). It was not simple or clear what constituted an input and many
objections focussed on the impenetrable nature of the 'black box' of decision-making
highlighted by the model, but not elucidated by it.
The policy process was first identified as staged or phased in the mid 1970s by Jenkins (Hill,
1997a). A decade later, Hogwood and Gunn defined six stages of policy-making 'in the real
world' (sic), featuring problem identification, objective-setting, development of strategy,
generation of alternatives, implementation and monitoring (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). None
of the stages was referred to explicitly as 'A Decision', implying that decision-making took
place throughout. By 1987, the process of policy making 'for the real world' was further
refined, into nine different stages, shown in the introduction(Hogwood, 1987). Implementation
constituted merely one step in a linear model involving a degree of iteration: certain stages
might be revisited, jumped, or skipped over so quickly as to be relatively insignificant.
The linear model can be criticised for presenting policy as excessively rational, planned and
predictable - as though delivering intended outcomes. Other accounts emphasise the policy
process as being rather more messy, the art of the possible and thus far from linear, rational
22
or predictable with implementation being the whole of the policy process (Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1973; Hjern and Porter, 1981). Others have argued that policy happens by
accident (Kingdon, 1995) or that good policy-making is incremental (Lindblom, 1979).
Kingdon maintained that the two key components of the policy process are agenda-setting
and the generation of solutions or policy alternatives. Though attaching importance to a
staged process, Kingdon also emphasised individual actors as 'policy entrepreneurs' in taking
action to highlight (or suppress) issues and link problems with solutions. Particularly at the
agenda-settng stage, he argued, action would contribute to policy, as a prelude to formal
decision-making, rather than following it. None of the possible stages in the process
represents a watertight compartment, which means they can leak from one to another. Thus,
for example, policy-makers may not know the detail required for translating policy into
practice, even though prescriptions for perfect implementation tend to suggest otherwise (see
below). Equally, those responsible for 'delivering' policy may seek to change the policy -
whether to make it work, to suit other (own) purposes or because they did not fully understand
what was intended (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hudson, 1993). Arguably this is the nub of the
impenetrable black box to which Easton's critics referred and indirectly emphasises action.
Nevertheless, it can be useful to conceptualise the policy process as staged. Even though
each stage carries different significance from one policy episode or arena to another,
contingent on a variety of independent variables (Hill, 1997a), breaking the process into
stages assists abstraction about policy development. The greatest utility of a linear
canception of the policy process may be as an heuristic device for examining particular policy
scenarios even if such a process is of limited value as a universal explanation of all scenarios.
So at this stage we can establish that the very concept of policy is contested. It is probably
safe to say that research cannot point to policy simply by finding a document labelled 'policy',
with formal, visible decision-making, preceded by explicit problem identification and
generation of alternatives, followed by consistent coherent adherence to rules. Indeed even if
there were a document which contained objectives, a strategy and framework for action, its
existence would not confirm that anything had been achieved, or that particular actions or
events resulted from policy. It has been identified variously as stances, decisions, actions or
processes with none of these categories being entirely useful on its own: all have been open
to criticism.
In some respects this serves to confuse rather than clarify what sort of evidence may be
sought about the existence, status or character of policy. We might find that actors on the
ground had very different - even incompatible - views about the issues in question which
would affect the output and outcome of policy. Relevant evidence of policy may therefore also
include action at different levels to support or implement some programme or other. Research
thus needs to look for evidence of relevant inputs, processes and outputs, using a range of
approaches to policy. This leaves the operational definition of policy for this study as: -
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Working Definition of 'Policy'
:~' Actions or decisions taken by individuals or groups based on their
stance on a particular issue within a process of which the
protagonist(s) may not be aware. It need not be labelled or overtly
recognised as policy.
Researching policy
Eliists, Pluralists and Power
Though theories emphasise these concepts in different relationship to each other, it is the
distribution and use of power which fundamentally divides theorists about policy and politics.
Broadly, theorists fall into two camps, disagreeing about the extent or centrality of state
power. Pluralists see the policy stage as accessible to all with the state as merely one player
among many. Elitists regard the stage as being structured and defined by the larger groups,
of which the state is the most important, controlling both the political and economic aspects of
power. Neither pluralism nor elitism can be generalised beyond time and place (Hill, 1997a)
which begs the question whether either can be properly regarded as useful theory.
Elite theory postulates that the fundamental political and economic power of the state is
greater than any other. It is argued that the underlying deep structure of power relations
affects and constrains the capacity of actors at the smaller scale. This structure is determined
by a range of demographic, technological, economic, organisational and ideological factors
which actors cannot readily change (Hill, 1997a). A state-centred coalition uses incorporation
and integration to subvert latent conflict, for instance between the demands of the economy
and the needs / wishes of consumers or workers (Hill, 1997a). This body of theory is more
inclined to rely on institutional approaches to the study of policy involving formal powers, rules
and procedures. Indeed the value of the institutional approach (below) is predicated on elite
theorists' recognition of the centrality of the state in the study of policy (Marsh and Stoker,
1995), even if the state does not always achieve its aims.
By contrast, pluralists emphasise behaviour, action, the power of pressure groups, actors and
power relations between actors, and their capacity to thwart or divert the intentions of others
for their own ends. Pluralism does not presume the intrinsic dominance of the state or state
actors. Ham and Hill (1993) maintain that pluralist analysis of power relations is suspect
because there may be the appearance of false consensus between actors, who may
articulate common preferences at the local scale. Yet elite theory does not explain how or
why people in institutions behave in the way they do and how policy made by the state may
fail or be diverted.
Arguably researchers need to examine empirically the precise balance and manifestation of
power and housing researchers are invited to theorise the role of the state more explicitly.
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Without power, no actor at any scale can realise his or her stance or aspirations. Research
may focus on actions or decisions taken by actors but the study of these alone offer an
incomplete guide to understanding power. The study of power is essential where actors'
preferences differ (Ham and Hill, 1993). Hill (1997a) supports Dahl's argument that to take the
analysis of power relations deeper, research has to examine actors in similar settings and
analyse concrete decisions (and absence of decisions), as in this study.
Power
The simplest definition of power is formulated thus:
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would
not otherwise do.
Dah11957: 203
This reveals neither how much A has in relation to B, nor of what kind, nor does it reveal
anything about how this power is exercised. Alternative definitions of power emphasise the
scope for opponents to thwart change by others:
Power is exercised when A devotes energy to creating or reinforcing social
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process
of only those issues which are innocuous to A
Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 648
Such power can be exercised through fear or threat, subversion or incorporation and the use
of rules to divert, deflect and delay others. In addition, more subtle means to avoid taking
decisions can include the management of influence by anticipating and moulding others'
reactions to proposals (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).
Conflict
According to Lukes, power can be exercised differently in three types of conflict: overt, covert
and latent (Ham and Hill, 1993). In cases of overt conflict, power is relatively easy to study
because it is readily observable and often relating to high profile, key issues, involving the use
of fear, threats, coercion. Situations where power is exercised covertly are by definition
harder to scrutinise because the conflict is potential and therefore does not necessarily come
to the surface. Power is more likely to be exercised in such cases by less visible means,
involving the use of rules, control of resources and the management of influence. This
requires examination of negotiations around secondary aspects and evidence of advocacy
coalitions (see Implementation below). In contrast, latent conflict does not surface at all, by
definition. Power may be exercised subtly, consciously and precisely in order to minimise the
risk of overt conflict. In such cases, the management of influence and the shaping of
preferences come to the fore. Conflict may focus on ideas and manifest itself on issues of
limited strategic significance. Such cases are best studied via symbols, language and the
propagation of myths (Hill, 1997a).
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Gathering Appropriate Evidence
The nature of evidence should vary according to the purpose and type of study as well as the
theoretical framework supporting it (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). Their typology involves six
main types with the first four corresponding quite closely to Hogwood and Gunn's typology
(above). These are normative theory, the institutional approach, behavioural analysis and
rational choice theory and all have been applied frequently over the years. Two more recent
approaches are added: the feminist perspective and discourse theory. Stoker summarises
each approach in terms of its subject matter, its methodological orientation, the nature of the
theory, its perspective of the role of the state and politics, and finally its perceived status
within political science (Marsh and Stoker, 1995).
Normative theory, the feminist perspective and discourse analysis20 are not regarded as
particularly useful here, not least because these schools are associated with ambitions to
produce prescriptions or to generate falsifiable predictions, for policy and thus beyond the
scope of this thesis. This study is consciously retrospective and empirically based, of policy,
not for it. Three approaches appear more productive for revealing the range and interplay of
interests relevant to the research question in this study. They include the twin pillars of policy
studies, namely: behavioural analysis and the institutionalist approach (Rhodes, 1997). The
third is rational choice theory, recently integrated into 'new institutional politics' by Lane and
Ersson (2000). The main points of each approach are summarised here, integrating the
classification used by Hogwood and Gunn as appropriate. We return later to their potential
application in this study.
Behavioural Analysis
This approach uses empirical studies to examine observable behaviour, both of individuals
and in aggregate, using quantitative analysis of tangible outcome measures (such as voting).
It has a positivist tendency to assume that it is possible to know everything provided the right
evidence is gathered in the right way (Sanders in Marsh and Stoker, 1995), though in using
quantitative analysis of data on the incidence of transfer, no such assumption is made.
Though the inductive nature of the behavioural approach may be valued for its prescriptive
potential (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) or its capacity for generating 'falsifiable predictions'
(Marsh and Stoker, 1995), it is valuable in this study more because it recognises the bottom-
up and action-based approach to policy analysis. The study of implementation, particularly
viewed from underneath or inside, seems to borrow heavily from behavioural analysis in
examining the relationships and alliances between actors and their networks (March and
Olsen, 1996). This study draws on behavioural analysis in collecting information on actors in
different organisations and on their networks, using interviews to explore actions. Evidence
20 Critical discourse analysis has been applied by this author (Taylor, 1999) to explore communication strategies in other forms
of stock transfer in Scotland. A key conclusion from that analysis was that the method had limited analytical utility relative to the
resources required to analyse documents at an appropriate level of detail. The most recent example of such analysis is an
examination of the development of the concept of Tenants in Control in Glasgow transfer documents from the council and the
housing association.
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was also accumulated quantitatively for evidence of outcomes rather than rely on intentions of
decision-making and action.
The Institutionalist Approach
The traditional institutionalist approach homes in on intentions and structures of government
alongside the evaluation of outcomes in relation to the centre's policy goals, but neglects
action and practice. Such approaches are less quantitative than behavioural analysis and
tend to use qualitative methodologies, though not exclusively (Rhodes, 1997).21 Unlike the
behavioural approach, institutional ism is relativist and empirically based (rather like housing
studies), and historically to the point of being anti-theoretical or distrusting theory (Rhodes,
1997). The institutionalist approach has long been associated with state-centric studies of the
Westminster model, though the renaissance of institutional ism is signalled by Lane and
Ersson (2000), in reasserting that institutions matter. They argue in favour of methods
focussing on rules, procedures and the formal organisation of systems as well as their impact
on political practice.
This study draws partly on an institutional studies approach in establishing the rules I
procedures developed and used, pursuing March and Olsen's argument that what is
significant is the political order of rights and rules, as much as the content of those rights and
rules (March and Olsen, 1996). Since rules and procedures do not determine political
behaviour precisely (March and Olsen, 1996), they cannot tell the whole story and need to be
complemented with other approaches including a focus on networks and exchange. Lane and
Ersson (2000) recognise two schools of institutionalism, based on sociology and rational
choice theory respectively. The latter approach underpins Chapters Seven and Eight, which
examine successive layers of rules for possible explanations of outcomes.
Rational Choice
Rational choice theory focuses on an exchange perspective: the social and political
negotiation and bargaining choices made by rational, self-interested individuals (Ward, 1995).
Rational choice theory originates in market-dominated situations but its use is less well-
developed in situations where there are competing criteria for choice and where non-egoistic
motivations may be important (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). Arguably, actors in public policy (ie.
value-driven) situations use bargaining or exchange to do what they ought to do, not just what
their selfish interests dictate (Hjern and Porter, 1981; Lane and Ersson, 2000). Though this
could limit the potential for using a rational choice perspective in studying public policy where
multiple, competing objectives are standard fare (Stewart, 1988), rational choice theory may
be of value in investigating the conditions of collective choice, precisely where alternatives are
straightforward (Marsh and Stoker, 1995; Lane and Ersson, 2000). Not only did rational
choice theory inform a conscious, normative strategy on the part of the Thatcher
21 Hogwood and Gunn (1984) refer to a similar approach under the headings of 'organisational/structural approaches' and
'procedural or managerial approaches', reflecting the fashion in the mid-1980s, for using administrative techniques to aid
policy-making (including implementation).
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administration, but it remains a useful research approach to British public policy in the 1980s
and 1990s (Campbell and Wilson, 1998). Moreover, rational choice is revealed in the
behaviour of key government actors in that period with bureaucrats maximising their own
interests (Hill 1997b; Campbell and Wilson, 1998).
Exchange is one way of telling stories about politics (March and Olsen, 1996). The capacity of
the individual to realise their wishes and operations depends on the nature of their desires,
their access to and use of resources and their rights. March and Olsen offered two versions
of exchange: the Pareto/ optimal and the coercive. In the Pareto / optimal version, some are
better off as a result of bargaining, while others are not worse off, strictly speaking. By
contrast in the coercive version, the players are unequal from the start and one player can
impose his or her will on others at their expense. However rational choice is not a paradigm of
itself, as it fails to recognise the importance of external social structures: instead it should be
seen as an heuristic device to reveal bounded rationality and moral motivations (Ward, 1995).
Similarly, it has been argued that institutional rules and interests determine the framework in
which actors' behaviour is governed by rational choice (Lane and Ersson, 2000). Later
chapters explore the validity of this approach in Scottish transfers.
Linking Policy, Problems and Solutions
Having reviewed the main concepts of policy and theoretical positions we can move on to
ways in which commentators manipulate these concepts to explain policy. More dynamic
relationships can be mapped using the various concepts outlined above since policy is not
static or fixed but dynamic and shifting in time and space. This applies both in terms of the
circumstances or problems policy may be designed to accommodate and in terms of the
'solutions' selected or pursued. This focuses on champions and entrepreneurs, critical
junctures and windows of opportunity. Thereafter sections examine implementation and
networks as a means of examining the interconnections between the different components of
policy.
Visible Champions and Invisible Entrepreneurs
Stoker maintains that politics gives
...special consideration to how the political process is resolved in the act of
government - in particular how issues reach and leave the governments
agenda and how within that arena issues are discussed- contested and
decided
Marsh and Stoker 1995: 6
As mentioned above, Kingdon (1995) argues that agenda-settng and the generation of
alternative solutions are key elements in a policy process with bounded rationality. This
approach recognises the importance of the actions of key individuals in setting agendas and
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selecting alternatives. The relationship between the elements is critical: policy action is
contingent on convergence between three streams shown in Figure 1 (below).
Action is not quite random. While problems may be identified objectively and legitimately,
solutions are not identified, agreed or delivered without plausible policy proposals being
attached to a contemporary, pressing problem.22 The existence and nature of problems and
the content and direction of policy solutions / proposals are promoted by powerful individual
actors, labelled 'champions', and 'entrepreneurs':
The chances of a subject rising on a governmental agenda are enhanced if
that subject is pushed by participants in the visible cluster and dampened if
neglected by those participants.
Kingdon, 1995: 208
Figure 1: Pre-requisites for action
Problem
identification by
visible champions
Plausible solutions
preferred by invisible
policy entrepreneurs
Receptive political
climate
Linkage of problems and
solutions
Source: adapted from Kingdon, 1995
Participants can be distinguished as more or less visible (Kingdon, 1995). The visible are
elected or seek to represent others - ministers, councillors, tenants - any of whom may
champion proposals or solutions. By contrast, the less visible or hidden entrepreneurs, are
paid offcials - specialists, academic advisers and interest / lobby groups. Generating
alternative proposals is likely to be carried out by the less visible specialists, whereas elected
or representative (visible) champions loom very large at the problem identification and
22 This analysis is based on monitoring policy change in the US on transportation and health insurance reforms and his work is
litte known in UK policy lierature.
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agenda-setting stages. Interest groups operate behind the scenes championing solutions to
respond to problems on visible participants' agendas: to this extent, they can have
considerable influence, if not power and authority. Perhaps Hill's ostensible loyalists (above)
were invisible champions protecting their own interests during periods of turmoiL.
In Kingdon's scheme, policy proposals tend to be developed and then problems found to
which they can offer a solution, given the right opportunity. By way of corollary, absence of
political sponsorship means that a solution may never become associated, / attached to a
problem, since:
... for a condition to become a problem people must be convinced that
something must be done to change it.
Kingdon, 1995: 119
Thus, 'entrepreneurs' need to be ready to exploit opportunities in the stream of political events
and work over a long gestation period at 'softening up' others, creating the 'right' climate for
their preferred solutions. This involves hidden participants in using opportunistic, informal,
one-to-one exchanges with visible participants to expose problems needing attention.23
Critical Junctures and Windows of Opportunity
Though softening helps create the right climate, window-opening is not necessarily under the
control of any individual or organisation. It may be influenced by outside forces or
circumstances, due to 'dumb luck' or 'fortuitous coupling' (Kingdon, 1995). For example,
journalists may highlight stories about a particular issue, which in turn may encapsulate or
reveal problems with wider significance. Equally, events can change - as this thesis shows -
in response to chance such as extreme weather, or to election timing and outcomes, or
personnel or organisational restructuring changes. These in turn, build up public pressure for
change.
Timing is'everything: hooking solutions up to problems needs critically to happen at the very
moment when the political climate is receptive to particular proposals (Kingdon, 1995). Others
similarly stress the importance of critical junctures or 'punctuated equilibria' in creating the
potential for change, particularly from the bottom up (March and Olsen, 1996). 'Windows of
opportunity' open for very short periods, allowing streams of problems and policy solutions to
converge, and they close equally quickly. If a solution / proposal is not attached to a problem
while the climate is receptive another problem may surface to receive attention, or another
proposal may be adopted to deal with the first problem. Champions therefore have to act
quickly and decisively: since persuasion and bargaining are critical at such times, an
exchange perspective is important (March and Olsen, 1996). Research using this approach
needs to gather evidence about 'softening-up' practices, including visible participants
23 This may include visits to housing estates by poliicians or civil servants, accompanied by local managers or councillors. See
later chapters.
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championing solutions which have had a long technical gestation in response to problems
with no obvious solution (Kingdon, 1995).
Implementation
Implementation emerges repeatedly in accounts of policy while the concept of implementation
has various interpretations. Much of the literature about implementation uses isolated
empirical public policy studies in the US and the UK, mainly during the 1970s and 1980s. The
British studies (Hood, Hogwood and Gunn) did not engage with their American predecessors
(Pressman and Wildavsky, Bowen, Sabatier) and contemporaries, nor vice versa. The
literature on Scottish public policy seldom engages directly with conceptions of policy
implementation.
Prescribing Perfect Linear Conditions
For those who see policy as a rational, linear process, implementation is but one (late) stage
starting with ideas and decisions (e.g. Malpass and Means, 1993). Others see policy as
messier and regard implementation as a series of actions at different stages (Sabatier, 1986;
Richardson and Jordan, 1979). A research focus on implementation (bottom-up action) is
thought appropriate precisely when clear goals or objectives are missing and there is a
multiude of governmental directives and actors (Hill, 1997b). Yet some commentators see
the study of implementation as irrelevant unless there is a single clear policy, as though
perfect conditions could be prescribed.
The concept of implementation first appeared in the UK policy literature in 1976. Hood (cited
in Richardson and Jordan, 1979) offered five conditions for 'perfect administration', predicated
on a linear process view of policy: a unitary system with a single command structure; uniform
norms and rules; perfect obedience; perfect information, communication and co-ordination;
sufficiency of time and / or resources. This approach has been common in housing studies:
housing policy accounts are often written as though by selecting the correct objectives,
appropriate actions would flow from administration, producing the desired effect - like water
flowing downhill (Cole and Furbey, 1994). This resonates with recipes for 'perfect
administration' such as shown in the above example. Richardson and Jordan (1979) viewed
this prescription with some scepticism and set Hood's model up to show the lack of realism
inherent in the top-down, linear approach. They argued that the power of the implementers,
from the bottom up, is considerable and understated. Drawing from empirical British public
policy studies towards a normative approach, Hogwood and Gunn prescribed ten conditions
for perfect implementation, shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Conditions for implementation
Condition Similarity to other
authors
1. Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling Sabatier 1986
constraints
2. Adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the proqramme Hood, 1976 
3. The required combination of resources is actuallv available
4. The policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect Sabatier and Mazmanian,
1979
5. The relationship between cause and effect is direct with few if any intervening Sabatier, 1986
links
6. Dependency relationships are minimal Hood, 1976 
7. There is understanding of an agreement on objectives Sabatier and Mazmanian,
1979
8. Tasks are fully specified in the correct sequence
9. There is perfect communication and co-ordination
10. Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance Hood,1976
Sabatier (various)
Source: adapted from Hogwood and Gunn, 1984
The column on the right shows the similarity with other contemporary authors' views of
implementation - for example theoretical prescriptions in a US context (Sabatier and
Mazmanian, 1979). Three sets of issues emerge as those to which Hogwood and Gunn alone
refer: availability of resources, the specification of tasks and perfect communication. These
may be regarded as essentially administrative matters, rather than normative solutions to
theoretical problems of implementation (Sabatier, 1986). Sabatier and colleagues were
originally interested in explaining reasons for differences in the relative success of US
government programmes: their theoretical conception presented six prerequisites for perfect
implementation (per Table 2).
Table 2: Six Conditions for Perfect Implementation
1. . Clear and consistent objectives
2. Adequate causal theory
3. Implementation processes legally structured to enhance compliance by implementing offcials and by target
qroups
4. Committed and skilful implementinq officials
5. Support of interest groups and sovereiqns
6. Changes in socio-economic conditions which do not substantially undermine political support or causal
theory.
Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979: 489
Having been developed initially without reference to any empirical evidence, the conditions
were revised to accommodate 'mess'. Sabatier came to acknowledge that the 'top-down'
focus of his early work assumed central government policy decisions (enshrined in legislation)
as the starting point,24 The revised conditions recognised the power of bottom-up action,
24 Since the first three conditions for perfect implementation would have been dealt with prior to statute, they were not so much
about implementation as an inheritance from earlier stages and decisions in the policy process. The second three conditions
(nos 4 - 6) were 'the product of subsequent political and economic pressure' (Sabatier 1986: 25).
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rejected hierarchical control as 'impossible' and constrained 'street level bureaucrats' within
'acceptable bounds', by means of advocacy coalitions (see below) (Sabatier, 1986).
Belief in the potential of top-down policy is dented by the notion of 'policy by accident'
(Kingdon, 1995) and by earlier challenges to top-down approaches to policy. Critics of US
public policy analysis argued against a top-down emphasis with inappropriate focus on goals
defined at the centre, resource inputs (or lack of) and failure to account for officials' discretion.
In any event, they claimed, goals may not be clearly defined and it is absurd to draw a
theoretical distinction between policy formulation and implementation (Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1973). In a British context too, focussing on implementation alone betrays too rigid
an interpretation of the stages of the policy process and gives insufficient attention to bottom-
up actions at other stages (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). In this respect, it is not relevant to think
prescriptively in terms of perfect conditions.
Nevertheless, studying policy implementation on its own is a way of homing in on a policy
issue, precisely when there is limited evidence of clear information on policy origins,
intentions and outcomes (Sabatier, 1986). This appears perverse: if the notion of
implementation is predicated on the existence of policy objectives and a strategy, what is
there to implement? However, Sabatier (1986) argues that when there are no clear policy
goals and no clear process, implementation is precisely what needs to be examined, in the
form of action rather than as one stage in a linear process. Arguably, this is precisely what is
required in this study, for small-scale transfers at least.
'Clearance' and 'Veto' Points
In implementation, 'the specification of conditions that must be met seems less fruitful than a
quotation of odds' (Kingdon 1995: 218). Arguably, it is a miracle that anything gets done at all
in public policy: the probability of policy being implemented, as intended, is infinitesimally
smalL. In particular, policy is more likely to stumble or be diverted as the number of 'clearance
points' increases (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). To counter top-down neglect of the
unintended consequences of policy, research can use 'clearance points', derived from
probability theory, to represent the various junctures at which decisions are required
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). This notion can reveal where and how policy can come to
be diverted off target, beyond the control of policy-makers at the centre. More constructively,
the concept of 'clearance points' can dispel policy-makers' despair by helping to minimise
failure. Real actors would not wait to clear every decision individually, particularly where
problems arise (Bowen, 1982). Astute implementers, usually senior officials, would identify
critical blockages, diverting extra resources into path clearing at 'clearance points'. Early and
repeated success creates a bandwagon effect which later dispels resistance and releases
potential blockages (Bowen, 1982). A similar concept of 'veto points' helps to understand how
actors' behaviour can be legally structured through rules and procedures.25 Though not
claimed as such by Sabatier, rules and procedures can be viewed as institutionalist (Lane and
25 Veto points are taken here to mean the same as 'clearance points' per Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984. This concept arises
from Sabatier's later empirical studies.
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Ersson, 2000). Veto points imply a linear process: however difficult it might be to achieve this
in practice, the very existence of a manageable conceptual framework should lead policy-
makers to a better understanding of implementation (Sabatier, 1986). This implies that perfect
implementation is attainable, if only in the abstract.
Acceptabilty Spaces, Advocacy Coaliions and Mutual Adjustment
Yet more incremental policy change can be more successful than wholesale change as less
radical changes are less likely to arouse intense hostility (Sabatier, 1986). Whereas the pre-
empirical model overstates the importance of clear and consistent objectives, later studies
show that a multitude of partially conflicting objectives can be accommodated into an
'acceptability space' between the competing objectives of various interests or stakeholders
(Sabatier, 1986: 29). This depends critically on cumulative learning taking place at the policy
core through an 'advocacy coalition' framework of policy change.
The concept of an 'advocacy coalition framework' facilitates the study of power relations
utilising earlier distinctions between actors' varying levels of attachment to beliefs in changing
the 'policy core' (Sabatier, 1986: 29). Actors seek to realise common goals over time: while
they may be reluctant to alter their beliefs concerning core issues, some negotiation may be
possible between them around Secondary Beliefs. Negotiated changes are the result of
policy-oriented learning particularly inside informal coalitions during implementation (Sabatier,
1986). Thus for instance, a policy-maker may anticipate a policy proposal challenging the
Deep Core values of participants, recipients or end-users of policy, creating the possibility of
conflict. Sabatier argued that where actors from public and private organisations shared belief
sets, advocacy coalitions could be built up though this could take time. It is bargaining - or
exchange - which allows participants to accommodate their different stances (March and
Olsen, 1996). The literature contains recurring themes about how conflicting values or
stances may be reconciled and acted out, conditioned by factors about the depth and strength
of those values, and the power of actors to realise their interests. These perspectives are
especially relevant in a study of a period characterised by overt conflict in the public
atmosphere governing relations between central government and local organisations (Marsh
and Rhodes, 1992).
Unless the issues at stake are strategically important, incorporation can be the most effective
political or managerial strategy for defusing opposition or circumventing overt conflict.
Moreover, it can silence opposition by institutionalising it (Rhodes, 1997). Partisan mutual
adjustment was offered by Lindblom (1965) as a means of avoiding costly policy mistakes,
allowing policy-makers to review the effect of their actions. Lindblom later argued that such
adjustment would not arise in debates for example about public vs. private enterprise, as the
values of dominant social groups would prevail (Lindblom, 1979). This study is precisely
about public enterprise - the ownership of housing. Yet in this case, exchange and bargaining
wil be shown to have involved potential opponents to alternatives to council housing: Labour
councillors, tenants, trade unionists and staff on the ground.
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Discretion and Bottom-Up Action in Creating Policy
Prescribing perfect conditions for implementation underplays the significance of the power of
the actors on the ground (Hudson, 1993; Barrett and Fudge, 1981). An analysis of US public
officials' behaviour in pressurised situations shows their individual decisions becoming public
policy in effect. Bureaucrats' actions are diffcult to control as their activities can involve
relatively high degrees of discretion in exchanges with relatively powerless individual clients.
Lipsky argued that public employees are 'the most likely of all to distort the organisation in
their own interests' (Hill 1997a: 207). This could produce what Hood (1995) describes 'fatal
remedies' or unintended effects of policy, as though policy is what the centre wants. It also
underlines Brunsson's argument (above) about action controlling ideas more effectively than
vice versa. Most implementation critics are 'bottom-uppers' whose research and analytical
focus is on action, actors and networks. The bottom-up approach to research starts by
identifying the network of local actors involved in service delivery as a vehicle for identifying
the relevant local, regional and national actors. This perspective, drawing on the behavioural
approach, now merits further attention in its own right.
Implementation Structures: Capacity of Actors and Organisations
'Bottom-uppers' object to the lack of theory in a top-down, institutionalist approach to
implementation. Their approach is predicated on pluralist theory of the state and contends
that a framework must take on board the reality of co-operation between the multitude of
actors in public and private organisations for policy implementation (Hjern and Porter, 1981).
Tneir approach depends on identifying the pool of organisations relevant to a policy sphere
and distinguishing programme rationales and organisation rationales. For example, a
programme might require a focus on a particular set of tasks (e.g. neighbourhood
regeneration using complex Challenge Funding) cutting horizontally across departmental or
organisational boundaries, whereas an organisational rationale might revolve around vertical,
hierarchical structures of service delivery, maximising preservation of the status quo. Unable
to satisfy both rationales at once, people in organisations might give priority to one over the
other (Hjern and Porter, 1981). The significance of these same issues is highlighted in the
context of the present-day British emphasis on public sector partnerships (Painter et a/1997;
Mullins, Reid and Walker, 2001).
The tension between competing rationales allows an implementation structure to emerge,
consisting of subsets of people in different organisations, who view a particular programme as
their primary interest or goal. Such structures (e.g. task forces, working groups) are
'administrative entities' which aim to satisfy the objectives of a policy programme (Hjern and
Porter, 1981). An implementation structure is likely to be less formal than a conventional
organisational or bureaucratic structure. It is more likely to exist organically and to change
dynamically in response to the needs of the programme: decisions to co-operate are based
on consent and negotiation as actors' values are less individualistic than rational choice
economists assume. However, the formulation and enforcement of obligations in the
implementation of programmes is more problematic in situations where multiple organisations
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are involved (Hjern and Porter, 1981). The main elements of Hjern and Porter's
implementation structures model can be summarised as follows:
Implementation Structures - 'Ideal' Model Features
tl Participants have a variety of goals and motives.
!,,
Programme rationales determine how resources are applied.
Authority relationships are replaced by 'co-ordinative competence'.
In the face of local discretion, control strategies are of limited value.
: There is no single structure of implementation but a variety.
Each structure contains specialised roles which vary from
programme to programme.
Structures differ in cohesiveness, and shift continually.
Source: Hjern and Porter, 1981
Though this model is criticised for producing excessively complex relationships, it can be
approached for research using networks (Hjern and Porter, 1981). The researcher can avoid
becoming bogged down in data constrained by organisational structures by using abstract
analytical frameworks based on one of two fundamental conceptions of relationships between
actors. The first is the rational choice exchange perspective, where two or more parties
perceive an optimal, mutual gain from collaboration. The second is the power dependency
approach, more akin to the coercive approach outlined earlier, where one party is assumed to
have more power than others in the relationship. A phenomenological approach allows
individuals' motives (and capacity) for participation in implementation structures to be
analysed (Hjern and Porter, 1981). Since policy implementation is critically dependent on
actors' individual and collective capacity, this approach allows participants' perceptions of
their relationships to be explored more abstractly.
Networks, Policy Communities and Power Dependency
The idea of networks is now well established in British public policy studies though networks
and communities jostle for attention. Policy communities in a UK context were first depicted
as a consensual style of government involving committees, co-options and a myriad of
interconnecting interpenetrating organisations (Richardson and Jordan, 1979). Taking issue
with Richardson and Jordan's use of 'policy networks' as though nearly synonymous with
'policy communities', Rhodes (1993) worked at drawing out distinctions between the two more
clearly over a number of years. On the assumption that the source of power is either political
(institutions and rules) or economic (resources and budgets), Rhodes borrowed Benson's
definition of a policy network as a 'cluster or complex of organisations connected to each
other by resource dependencies' (Rhodes, 1997:10). Initially five different types of network
were distinguished on a tight / loose continuum. Differences centred on common interests in
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an issue, profession, or product, or arising from intergovernmental relations. These are shown
in Table 3 (annotated to give examples from Scottish housing in the 1990s).
Table 3: Rhodes typology of policy networks and communities
Type of network Characteristics Possible examples in
Scottish housina
Policy 1 territorial community Stable, highly restricted membership, vertically interdependent, None
limited horizontal articulation
Professional network Per policy 1 territorial community plus serves member interests Chartered Institute of
Housing
Intergovernmental network Limited membership, limited vertical interdependence, COS LA 
extensive horizontal articulation
Producer network Fluctuating membership, limited vertical interdependence, Nalgol Unison
serves member interests SFHA
Issue network Unstable, wide membership, limited vertical interdependence Shelter
Source: Rhodes, 1997: 38
The coherence of this definition of networks was later refined for use in empirical
investigation, to explore power relations in the context of English intergovernmental networks.
The framework distinguishes issue networks and policy communities, referring to the idea of a
'dominant coalition', predicated on the argument that power is not equally but asymmetrically
shared and that research must recognise the state's capacity to create and strengthen (or
break) policy communities (Rhodes, 1985). It produced a framework of power dependency
resting on five propositions, shown below.
Power Dependency Framework
I... Any organisation is dependent on other organisations for resources;
. In order to achieve their goals, organisations have to exchange
resources;
l Although decision-making within any organisation is constrained, the
dominant coalition retains some discretion;
The dominant coaliion employs strategies within known rules of the
game to regulate the process of resource exchange;
Variations in the degree of discretion enjoyed by anyone body are a
product of the goals and relative power potential of interacting
. organisations, governed by the relative resources of each
"
~ organisation, the rules of the game and the process of exchange.
í~
Source: Rhodes, 1985
The acknowledged weakness of this abstracted power dependency model lies in its failure to
analyse what might be going on 'on the ground' (Rhodes, 1997) which means that the critical
issue is to distinguish subtle but important differences between actors in terms of their
capacity to influence policy. Thus structures of power-dependency vary along four key
dimensions: the constellation of interests (topographic, functional, expert); membership (scale
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and type); interdependence (vertical and horizontal); and resource distribution (Rhodes,
1997). On this basis policy communities can be distinguished from looser networks by virtue
of being highly integrated, with stable, consistent relationships, continuity of restricted
membership with consensus of ideology, values and broad policy preferences. Crucially,
policy communities enjoy vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery
responsibilities and on exchange of resources, but there is little or no horizontal
interdependence. Communities are also insulated from other networks / communities and
from the general public, consciously excluding some persons and organisations. The
dominant member can guarantee compliance of members (Rhodes, 1997:44)
Loose networks (notably in local government) have more participants, which in turn means
more extensive horizontal interdependence. They have no single focal point around which to
organise. Their structures and resources tend to be dispersed and professional interests are
fragmented and divided. They are merely consulted, with little or no exchange. Networks are
inherently more porous and thus vulnerable to a reduction of influence by hostile
organisations, whereas tight policy communities are impervious to hostile influence. This was
a particular feature of British central/local relations in the 1980s (Rhodes, 1985). The content
of Rhodes' observations about central local relations in the 1980s is highly relevant to this
study in addition to the value of his analytical framework for analysing relationships in policy
networks. Although Rhodes did not clarify how these may be applied methodologically, this
thesis later assesses an abstracted model of organisational relations in Scottish stock transfer
against this framework. None of this literature brings out the importance of trust in
interpersonal relations.
Networks, Communities and Pressure Groups in Scotland
Such distinctions between policy communities and networks are less clear in literature about
policy in Scotland. The 'Scottsh policy community' denotes the consensus line held in
negotiations with government in London by the 'Scottsh policy elite' (Brown, McCrone and
Paterson, 1996: 1 09). It is claimed firstly that members of the elite all know each other, at least
professionally; and secondly that pressure groups have considerable leverage in Scotland in
advancing their interests and thwarting others. Others distinguish between different types of
networks as pressure groups. Lynch (2001) argues that pressure groups are thick on the
ground in Scotland because of the strength of civil society and the traditional strength of the
public sector. They can be classified as based on interests (selfish) or causes (altruistic)
(Baggot, 1995); or insiders and outsiders (Grant, 1995) which means some are 'more equal
than others'. Although pressure groups are important in Scotland, they rarely feature in
Scottsh policy studies. Some - such as CoSLA - exist as separate and uniquely Scottsh
entities (Lynch 2001) but according to Midwinter et al (1991) interest groups usually only
enjoy limited autonomy as they exist mainly as UK subsidiaries, which serves to minimise
public clashes over policy positions within the UK.26
26 The Chartered Institute of Housing is a good example of such an organisation.
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However, the geography of Scottish politics of itself creates closer public access to the
machinery of central government in Scotland, not least by incorporation into the 'Scottish
policy community'. This might be due to government funding, involvement in providing advice
and expertise or implementation (Lynch, 2001). The civil service has an enhanced role vis-à-
vis strong policy communities or networks (used synonymously) using judiciously blended
tactics of 'co-option and firmness' to control 'modalities of implementation' (Midwinter et aI,
1991). The civil service and the machinery of government have been argued to be effectively
beyond ministerial control and represented a powerful source of resistance to Conservative
politicians in Scotland during the 1980s, undermining the success of top-down policy. 27
Applying Policy Theory to Scottish Stock Transfer
It is clear from the literature that policy analysis cannot take for granted the existence of clear
policy goals, with stances and decisions articulated in public documents. Nor can
implementation of published policy documents and statements be guaranteed - at all, or in the
shape intended, as action is subject to influence from many competing directions and
sources. Researchers are faced with fundamental disagreement between 'top-down' and
'bottom-up' perspectives, about how policy is made. These differences are both normative
and methodological concerns (Hil 1997b).
Fundamental schisms divide theorists on the issue of the power of the state in relation to
other agencies and actors. While the same concepts and elements are present in terms of
stances, decisions, action, process and power relations, theorists attach different significance
to them and to the analysis of relationships between them. Hill and others discuss how
research should be conducted into policy, arguing that the choice of methods should be
determined by the type of situation. Arguably three types of policy situation can be
distinguished (Hill, 1997b; Sabatier, 1986). The first is where rules and frameworks are clear
from the outset: what Sabatier calls a 'dominant and clear public policy programme'. Second
are cases where the rules appear to develop in the course of policy. Thirdly, there are
situations described by both Hill and Sabatier as being 'without rules' or a dominant piece of
legislation, where policy is indistinguishable from practical implementation. The first and third
types of situations outlined by Hill and Sabatier are of particular interest here in relation to two
phases of policy making in stock transfer, outlined shortly. These two main ideal types of
policy-making are identified in the summaries below and will henceforth be referred to as
'rational' and 'opportunistic'.
Rational Model
This model is predicated on the assumption that the state and its agents have more power
than other actors. The state controls key resources and rules, not limited to legislation, and
thereby controls the deeper structure of the behaviour of actors at the local scale, by means
of incentives and constraints (Lane and Ersson, 2000). It is understood that rather than
27 Midwinter et al (1991) note that Scottish Ministers had broad portolios stretching across different departments, and therefore
almost impossible to manage.
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confront its opponents, the state - not least in pre-devolution Scotland - consciously
incorporates actors in order to subvert their opposition (Brown, Paterson and McCrone,
1996). This model relies on the existence of clear public statements of policy, against which
pre-defined outcomes are assessed (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). Such policies are mainly the
product of political work by elected members, in a linear and logical process of decision-
making (Hogwood and Gunn, 1987). According to this model, elected members at all levels
are supported by offcials paid to implement policy in an assumed hierarchical chain of
command and co-ordination. Throughout this model the process relies on policy makers
having adequate understanding of problems and solutions as well as valid theory of cause
and effect (Sabatier, 1979).
Opportunistic Model
The organising principles and precepts of this model are based on action - what happens on
the ground - rather than what is intended by government, even when this is clearly articulated
(Hill, 1997b). It does not presume greater power on the part of state actors, nor the primacy of
the elected member (Campbell and Wilson, 1998). Rather, it assumes that at the local scale,
actors may be in conflict over stances about problems (Hjern and Porter, 1981 ).28 Yet it
recognises that actors may adjust to and accommodate each other, realigning in advocacy
coalitions to achieve practical goals, provided there is no conflct about core, non-negotiable
positions (Sabatier. 1986). This model highlights the different values, stances and behaviour
or actions of actors, emphasising bargaining and adaptation of identities and relationships
(March and Olsen, 1996). The model recognises that policy goals may be pursued by visible
champions and bureaucrats or invisible entrepreneurs (Hudson, 1993; Kingdon, 1995),
exploiting critical junctures and windows of opportunity to clear blockages, and pursue their
interests and preferences (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Bowen, 1982). In this respect,
policy might be said to emerge, through post-hoc interpretation of practice, action and events.
Phases of Stock Transfer Policy in Scotland
Two phases of policy surface in our account so far and at this preliminary stage, we can put
forward a hypothesis of two phases of transfer 'policy' between 1986 and 1997, with quite
different possible explanations in terms of concepts and policy theory. Arguably, the first
phase of policy was characterised by a local, bottom-up initiative, preceding formal policy-
making at the centre. Latent conflict with institutional stakeholders was defused by stealthy
incorporation. This produced mutual partisan adjustment between ideological opponents at
the centre and in localities, quietly accommodating each other to achieve their own goals.
A second, shorter phase manifested itself in the formal publication of a policy document
issued by the centre (Scottish Offce, 1996a), without reference to policy networks and
pressure groups, though presumably preceded by deliberation inside central government. The
policy overtly challenged the deeply held values of institutional stakeholders in the form of
workers (providers) and tenants (users) in the sector. Because the policy was 'voluntary'
28 Relevant problems might include the future ownership of British council housing.
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rather than coercive, these actors had power to resist the policy of the centre, as witnessed
by absence of outcomes. No assumption is made at this stage that either phase of stock
transfer necessarily fits either of the ideal types.
Competing Theoretical Approaches
Hill argued that the choice of methods should be determined by the type of policy situation
(Hill, 1997b). The more apparent mess, the less policy would be top-down, rational and linear,
and the stronger the argument for examining action, actors' networks and relationships (Hill,
1997b; Sabatier, 1986; Hjern and Porter, 1981). Such situations might be best approached
using qualitative methods, including interviews with actors to complement quantitative
evidence of outcomes of real action, not necessarily defined before the event (Hill, 1997b).
Thus, in the case of informal, less well-documented policy situations, (such as early stock
transfer in Scotland), it would be pointless to look for programme objectives and a framework
of rules. By contrast, where there was a published policy document, and a degree of formality,
planning and intentionality surrounding the process, the researcher ought to rely on document
analysis, resource inputs and official records of policy outcomes and impacts, defined
according to the originating policy framework.
Rather than adopt such an approach here, a range of different and potentially complementary
methods were applied throughout the period 1986 - 1997, in an attempt to reveal which
methods are most useful in enhancing our understanding of the transfer phenomenon and of
the processes which produced it. The ideal types were examined using a combination of
institutionalist, behaviourist and rational choice approaches. Each approach may have
something to offer in a multi-theoretical study seeking to elucidate the phenomenon of
Scottsh local authority stock transfer.
Each carries its own prior assumptions about the power of the state and its agents relative to
other actors. Where institutionalists (such as commonly in housing studies) focus on
organisations, rules and procedures and often take the centre's intentions as the starting
point, the behavioural approach highlights action measured quantitatively, by outputs, though
these might not be clearly defined by the centre. Rational choice theorists emphasise
bargaining and exchange between actors at all levels, with new institutionalists emphasising
more recently that exchange must recognise the underpinning framework of rules. Qualitative
research can help to establish stances, decisions, actions and processes, and can help to
reveal to what extent local action followed, generated or influenced the structuring of rules
and processes, as later chapters wil reveaL. Evidence was gathered and analysed on the
basis of these dimensions though not necessarily in terms of detailed fieldwork, rehearsed in
the next chapter.
The last four chapters of the thesis are organised making use of these approaches. Chapter
Seven takes a traditional institutionalist perspective examining legislation, in an attempt to
clarify the legal structure of rules. Chapter Eight then adopts a new institutionalist
perspective, exploring wider administrative rules and financial arrangements involving
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resource incentives and constraints at the centre of policy making. Chapter Nine examines
the competing stances of actors and organisations using case study material to establish
which actors did what and why behaved as they did. In particular Chapter Ten uses
behaviourist and rational choice perspectives focussing on exchange, bargaining, power
relations at local scale to understand how actors adjusted to the new arrangements, and to
explore how their identity was changed. The final chapter returns to appraise the relative
merits of the ideal types in relation to the hypothesis, to answer the central paradox about
how ostensible opponents could in practice undertake voluntary transfer.
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Chapter Three
Knowledge and Understanding in Researching Policy
This chapter discusses the nature of research and methodological considerations
surrounding the production of the thesis. It examines the relationship and links between
theory, concepts and data about phenomena, linking the theories (discussed in Chapter
Two) with the phenomenon of stock transfer. The chapter shows the use of a range of
methods: partly quantitative, focussing on secondary and primary datasets and partly
qualitative, using semi-structured interviews with key actors. The previous chapter reviewed
established schools of theory about policy-making: now their methodological implications
are discussed.
The significance of knowledge, interpretation and reflexivity are discussed, examining the
researcher's relationship to the data. This relationship has altered over the period of the
study as the researcher has learned more about the subject and gained a wider perspective.
The researcher's profile has facilitated access to certain kinds of actors and influenced the
conduct of the research, particularly the qualitative dimension. The strengths and
weaknesses of the methods are appraised. Their strength lies in access to a wide range of
policy actors in different interrelated spheres over a long period both at the national and
local scale, via interviews and case studies. The main weakness lies in the problems of
delayed access to the quantitative data, after completion of qualitative interviews. This has
contributed to lengthening the production of the thesis.
Theory, Concepts and Phenomena: Appropriate Evidence
Gilbert (1995) sees all research as a chain, relating theory, concepts and phenomena,
observed through the collection of 'facts'. These facts must be interpreted before being
turned into a written account. Similarly, Phillips and Pugh (2000) claim that a thesis
specifically involves a hypothesis which arises from the data, interpreted via the
researcher's imagination informed by theory. In keeping with the notion of research as a
chain, Gilbert (1995) invites the researcher to identify the relationships between concepts
drawn from theory in order to identify which explanations may be valid.
Housing researchers are challenged to test theory critically, reflexively and rigorously to
address shortcomings in this field (Kemeny, 1992). The last chapter showed the two-phase
hypothesis of this study and the theoretical basis from which it was derived. This section
aims to clarify the link between the type of theory and methods used. A distinction is
commonly drawn between normative and other types of theory. As Chapter Two shows, this
study is not normative, which requires an examination of the alternatives, methodologically
speaking.
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Using Theory for Induction or Deduction?
Normative theory29 refers to what ought to be and while Rhodes (1997) argues that the
alternative to normative theory is causal theory, Stoker refers to the alternative as
'descriptive/ empirical' (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). Stoker's view of descriptive/ empirical
research indicates that explanations can be built off the facts, using induction rather than
deduction. This involves no prior assumptions about the relationship between the outcome
and its cause (dependent and independent or antecedent variables). Rather, induction
permits analysis of the data to establish a theory to explain the phenomenon. This research
is consciously empirical, even though empirical studies may be criticised for being bound to
time and space, which raises questions about their capacity for generalisation (an issue to
which this chapter returns). A choice has been made to take a deductive, rather than an
inductive approach to Scottish transfers (the primary focus of the thesis). The approach here
is the use of theory to interpret and understand practice rather than develop theory from
data (Gilbert, 1995; Rhodes, 1997).
Concepts
Concepts link theory to phenomena and the concepts summarised at the end of Chapter
Two included different conceptions of policy: as stance, decision and action or linear
processes. It discussed manifestations of power relations and conflict; champions and
entrepreneurs; networks and communities; clearance or veto points, critical junctures or
punctuated equilibrium; acceptability space and partisan mutual adjustment. These
concepts are highlighted to differing degrees in competing theories. Use of a multi-
theoretical, predominantly deductive, approach allows evidence pertinent to these concepts
to be related to each other in different ways, as shown by the discussion of quantitative and
qualitative methods (see page 49).
Issues and relationships are analysed at different levels based on documentation and
interviews. The various levels include inter-institutional relationships at the
intergovernmental level, transactional relationships between sellers (local councils) and
buyers (housing associations), and relationships between institutions and individuals. These
issues have the potential to reveal something of the power relations between and inside
organisations and thus permit a view to be taken on the relevance of elitist and pluralist
perspectives on policy-making.
Phenomena: Observable 'Facts'
Phenomena - in this case transactions of public (council) stock to alternative landlords, are
the third link in the chain. Problematically, non-transactions are also phenomena, reflecting
inaction and non-decision-making and possibly policy failure, however diffcult this is to
research. If stock transfer were government policy and elite theory were the most valid
explanation for transfer on the ground, then the government's explicit policy of transfer in
29 According to Rhodes, 'normative'in the British institutional context means the Westminster model, involving a neutral civil
service, cabinet government, majority part rules.
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later years should have produced more transfer.3D Quantitative research can reveal the
presence or absence of transfer but it does not permit the counterfactual questions to be
addressed, such as why some councils did not pursue transfer: this requires qualitative
investigation as in this study.
This turns our attention to how the researcher can establish the existence of transactions.
Gilbert (1995) refers us to 'observable facts', though researchers are cautioned against the
simple unquestioning acceptance of 'facts' and exhorted to 'clarify concepts and air
problems surrounding fundamental definitions' (Kemeny, 1992:24). The most clearly
observable indicators or measures of decision and action are completed transactions,
though knowledge of their existence relies on recording and documentation, which cannot
be taken for granted.31 The inclusion of non-transactions is not readily observable other than
by its absence. Understanding absence of transfer relies to a large extent on insider
knowledge. This is where the case study vehicle becomes highly relevant as a means of
exploring non-decisions and inaction, as well as of decisions or actions, for a richer
explanation.
In order to be able to analyse data about the observable phenomena (transfer), there needs
to be an understanding of what constitutes the dependent and independent variables. The
dependent variable is the effect or outcome and the independent! antecedent variables are
the cause. The purpose of research is to show the link between the variables, which is
affected by how tight the hypothesis is and how closely the link can be modelled or
dèmonstrated (Procter in Gilbert, 1995). The existence of a stock transfer transaction (when
present) is the dependent variable in this study. Transactions reveal quantitative evidence of
decisions made and actions taken, regardless of whether the approach is inductive (Chapter
Five: England) or deductive (Chapter Six: Scotland). However, using an inductive approach,
the absence of stock transfer reveals nothing about the nature of the (potential) seller or the
housing stock or the system within which other transfers occurred.
Based on deduction from an institutionalist perspective, the independent - causal - variables
are rules and procedures (explored in Chapters Seven and Eight). An institutional approach
also produces observable 'facts' in the form of policy documents, rules and procedures; and
the allocation and use of resources both by the centre and at the local leveL. Some of the
observable facts are thus in the form of system inputs and intentions, while others appear as
outputs. However, since institutional theory is not presumed to offer the only explanation,
interviews and case studies of local action allow different concepts about actors and
networks to be tested (Chapters Eight - Ten).
Thus in the case of Scotland, transactions and non-transactions have been chosen as the
outcome I dependent variable for qualitative data analysis, allowing political and ideological
30 Particularly from Conservative-controlled authorities which though few in number nevertheless existed. Later chapters
examine the link commonly made between the presence of transfer and Conservative control of authorities.
31 Detailed appendices support Chapters Five and Six in showing how the data were collected, cleaned and analysed.
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preferences to be examined, following spatial and temporal characteristics of quantitative
evidence of transfer. Rules are assumed to be a constant factor at particular points in time,
though their interpretation by actors is not. The extent to which the 'facts' are observable
relies - in this case - on the existence of and access to data about transactions. This issue is
explored further under the heading of primary and secondary sources of quantitative data
(see below), and reflexivity, which affects both collection and interpretation of evidence.
Knowledge, Interpretation and Reflexivity
A thesis can never be unbiased observation and research must be reflexive, revealing the
central importance of the researcher's role as interpreter (Phillips and Pugh, 2000). While
more empirical housing research needs to link theory and evidence, researchers are urged
to act reflexively, building interpretation from statistics and facts (Kemeny, 1992). Rhodes
(1997) responds to postmodern critics - though somewhat grudgingly - accepting that there
is no reason why opponents should be convinced by a case built on one person's criteria.
He argues that academics need to anchor their knowledge in qualitative narratives
predicated on real world interactions, which reconstitute and reconfirm the academic's
knowledge. While Rhodes accepts that the researcher's challenge is to make explicit,
acknowledge and defend their criteria 'reflexively', he argues that the researcher must also
move beyond self-referential discourses to render their expertise more accountable
(Rhodes, 1997).
The notion of reflexivity is neither explained nor explored in these texts, though there has
been a burgeoning literature in recent years. The validity of any researcher's claim to
authority is questioned in a discussion of reflexivity in research methods (Alvesson and
Skoldberg, 2000). They argue that the two key components of reflexivity are careful
interpretation and self-reflection on the part of the researcher. The former must reject any
assumption that the relationship between the 'data' and 'reality' are unproblematic or
unequivocaL. The element of reflection requires the researcher to pay attention to his/her
own context and views which can influence interpretation at various levels - perception,
cognition, language, theory, ideology and culture (see next section). This undoubtedly
makes research more rather than less difficult, but neither impossible nor invalid, provided
the challenges are recognised and there is no pretence at finding 'the truth' rather than an
understanding. Thus,
It is pragmatically fruitful to assume the existence of a reality beyond the
researcher's egocentricity... and researchers can say something meaningful
about this reality.
Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000:3
Similarly, Steier argues that truth is not 'out there', waiting to be found. Researchers are
challenged to explain how they can make sense of another person's realities (Steier, 1991).
Rather, there are many different versions of 'the truth' disguised as narratives constructed
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by academics who ought to reveal their own relationship to the data, without implying that
their story tells 'how it really is, out there'. This discussion begs the question as to whether
any research can establish or explain anything with any certainty. Stoker distinguishes
positivistic and probabilistic positions on research (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). While the
positivist position assumes that the researcher can measure and know phenomena
comprehensively, reflexivity in social and political research is a response to the limits of
positivism (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). Critically, research requires an agent - the
researcher - and cannot of itself, as it were independently, make everything definitively
known. Instead, the researcher should make explicit their own interpretation of the 'facts'.
By contrast, the probabilistic approach is about establishing understanding (Moyser and
Wagstaff, 1987; Gomm, Hammersley & Foster, 2000). Gomm et al see the probabilistic
approach as enumerative (rather than analytic) induction - in other words, the researcher
can only conclude that X may lead to V but not necessarily that this will be the case. The
challenge to the researcher is thus to give an account of the phenomenon which reveals the
interplay of variables and forces, showing some of the possible interpretations in a
multivariate world (Gomm et aI, 2000). Such arguments are relevant in research generally
but there are particularly clear limits to the resources at the disposal of the part-time student,
which make a reflexive approach even more crucial in a doctoral thesis.
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) highlight the importance of acknowledging the central
importance of the role of interpretation of data (or 'capta'), as well as the characteristics and
role of the researcher and their relationship to the data. Such awareness involves judicious
use of the personal pronoun - 'i', 'my' and so on - precisely to signal the researcher's
attention to their own role and relationship to the data. Such use of personal pronouns is
commonly spurned in academic circles (and by computer spell-check devices). Vet this is a
critical component of reflexive research. Paraphrasing Steier's question - 'why do research
at all if it is only self-regarding?', we should consider whether anyone has the right to do
research and claim anything without acknowledging their own relationship to the data. My
relationship to stock transfer has changed from being responsible for assisting others to
deliver transfer in the field 'now', to more detached reflection and publication after the event.
Research Journey
It is pertinent at this point to declare and account for my self and my relationship to the data,
as my relationship with the phenomenon and data has changed over time. Some of the
relevant dimensions are visible to others (including respondents) while other matters affect
my perception of the issues. i am white, female, a mature student and parent, with
competing demands on my time - factors recognised by Phillps and Pugh (2000) as
affecting the social context and study experience of the part-time researcher. i am also
middle-class, educated, audibly not Scots, and with personal political views and loyalties. I
am not a tenant but a former housing manager. i was increasingly visible on the
professional conference circuit from the mid-1990s, and publishing intermittently in the trade
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press on transfer discussions and activities in Scotland. This places me as having insider
knowledge and recognition in the professional domain. These factors may all be relevant to
access to actors, and to the conduct and analysis of interviews.
My background in housing is that of practitioner, with professional experience dating from
the late 1970s, expanded by experience in a voluntary capacity as a housing association
committee member from the mid-1980s. Paid experience lay at the frontlne within a state
landlord agency (SSHA) and managerially in the voluntary sector. Latterly I had been
involved in representing (and lobbying on behalf of) the Glasgow voluntary sector, requiring
extensive liaison with local authorities and central government, and thus familiarity with the
settings and individuals. A period of freelance consultancy (1988 - 1990), included both
abortive and successful attempts at faciltating community ownership transfer in
Lanarkshire, seen as a Labour stronghold in favour of council housing. This means I have a
sense of personal history of the events of the period under examination: the challenge for
me as researcher has therefore been to detach and transcend my own perspective.
A job move in 1990 to academic employment on housing issues, entailed a shift from
advocacy and consultancy to research, including the management of a database on the
emerging 'community ownership transfers'. Academic output increasingly needed to be
theoretically informed, and so the opportunity to embark on postgraduate research in 1994
was both a response to external pressure and a vehicle for personal development, creating
its own challenges. My involvement in and knowledge of stock transfer meant that i was
visible to professional actors as well as to some politicians and civil servants,32 increasingly
as a commentator, and therefore perceived as a potential combatant - whether as threat or
ally since I was occasionally publicly critical of aspects of the policy. This familarity both
blocked access to data at times, though it later facilitated access. However, I was probably
not known to tenants and my perceived demeanour and status might have interfered.
Moreover, while I regard myself as broadly independent of the various stances taken on this
contested policy area, there is no guarantee that others will see me in this light, in spite of
my best efforts. This may have affected interview access and conduct, establishing good
rapport with some but failing to access others.
My personal and professional situation prolonged the process of research and writing, which
had both benefits and drawbacks. Among the drawbacks were elongation and extension of
the study to a PhD, which produced a more pragmatic and thus less strategic research
design. In addition, much of the analysis was completed years after completion of the
interviews (in 1998). Nevertheless, the delay has also meant better access to quantitative
data at a later stage. Moreover, I have a more distant and detached relationship to analysis
32 I spoke at and chaired many conferences, published in professional press from 1995 onwards and remain involved in
commenting on the development of transfer. After completion of the majority of interviews in 1998, i was seconded to the
Scottish Parliament in 2000, then contracted to research stock transfer data for the Scottsh Executive in 2001, which
indirectly led to access to the data on transfer in England. The latter are used in this thesis.
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and writing up than in earlier years, informed by more recent opportunities to analyse
contemporary events.
As a one-time protagonist, I have thus probably influenced others' thinking about stock
transfer but my own understanding of the phenomenon has also changed in the process, as
written output is merely evidence of dialogue between the researcher and others - a 'tiny
negotiated order, frozen in time' (Kemeny (1992:166). Alvesson and Skjoldberg (2000)
caution us that researchers risk being steered by their own text production. Whereas my
initial focus and approach were distinctly practice-based, for policy (Taylor, 1995, 1996c,
2000), the process of research and the use of different theoretical and political perspectives
has both broadened and deepened my understanding of the phenomenon.
Methods Used
This section summarises the main methods used in this study, referring to the
methodological literature, and appraising the strengths and weaknesses of the approach
taken. The approach has been both quantitative and qualitative, using case studies to
analyse events at the local scale. Where previous generations of political scientists have
argued about quantitative vs qualitative methods, there is greater recognition of the
relevance of combining the two: after all 'statistical analysis is not a rival to the institutional
approach - they complement each other' (Rhodes 1997: 81). Fielding (in Gilbert, 1995)
notes that both types of data and analysis are present all the time. Devine (in Marsh and
Stoker, 1995) argues that both methods should be appropriate to research goals, and so
must be combined appropriately.
Literature
Secondary Texts: Focus On England
Apart from the policy-making literature reviewed in Chapter Two, the remaining literature
about specialist policy content is taken from housing generally, with specific reference to
stock transfer or local housing companies. Material was gathered over a period of years
from 1993, culminating in a final trawl in October 2001, updating a commissioned, published
review of the research literature on stock transfer across the UK (Taylor, 2000).
If contemporary and ephemeral coverage is excluded, (along with work by the researcher),
there are relatively few texts on the subject. At the level of textbooks, material is mainly
about England whilst purporting to be about the UK. There are few key authors in the field:
five are academics, some of whom have completed government-commissioned research
(for London or Edinburgh), with one as a refugee from a failed partial transfer in England.
Early academic observers about Scotland have long since transferred research attention
elsewhere,33 Another commentator works for the UK professional housing body. Then there
are consultants advising councils how to transfer (either in England or in Scotland) with the
33 A plethora of different research was underway in 2001/2, funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, and the National
Audit among others.
49
latter also having recently evaluated transfer for the government. Research centres on
government commissions with a focus 'for policy', on making transfer work better as a
process. Failure is barely examined. Research is seldom undertaken outside of this sphere
and is limited to the organisational or political consequences. Meanwhile, the largest and
best source of material on fast-moving stock transfer developments is the trade press.34
Primary Texts and Documents: Scotland
Primary literature has been gathered mainly about Scotland because the secondary
literature is so weak in this area. Such primary sources have focussed on material produced
by central government, mainly about the system and context for transfer, and by local
government (as potential sellers) at the level of case study areas. This is analysed and
reported in Chapters Seven and Eight about rule changes to the system. Institutionalist
theory starts with documents, to reveal the stated intentions of politicians in control of public
institutions, and the rules and procedures created to shape behaviour from the top down, or
from the centre out. Thus taking the start point that institutions shape behaviour, documents,
structures and rules may present a good place to start to examine practice, even if they do
not reveal the whole picture. In this study, primary documents have been gathered about the
legislation, guidance, rules and resources in Scotland as a means of understanding what
may have shaped behaviour and by what means.
As discussed in Chapter Two, neo-institutionalists have come to acknowledge the role and
motivation of individual actors within institutions (Rhodes, 1997; Lane and Ersson, 2000).
This requires use of qualitative fieldwork with actors to complete the researcher's
understanding of policy intentions, and to complement the interpretation of quantitative
evidence of their actions.
Quantitative Data - 'Who?', 'Where?', 'What?'
The quantitative approach refers to the attempts to show the whole picture of local authority
transfers, revealed by the numbers and characteristics of transactions in Scotland and
England, which deals with the who, where and what of stock transfer. A behavioural
emphasis on decisions and actions impels the researcher to look for quantitative evidence
of outcomes of decisions and actions. In this case such evidence takes the form of
evidence of transfer transactions and their characteristics, as far as they can be established.
Such data collection and analysis was undertaken during 2001 and 2002 (although it
appears in this thesis before the qualitative analysis).
Scotland: Combining Primary And Secondary Data
Given the focus of this study on Scotland, and given the weakness of published literature
homing in on Scotland, considerable effort went into primary data collection in Scotland from
34 The most striking example is an independent magazine 'Social Housing' based in London, with limited circulation among
people interested in the financial aspects of stock transfer. It first became established in the early nineties and aims to carry
a database of all stock transfers, though (like the textbooks), in practice it mainly covers England, in spite of the
accumulating evidence from the researcher and others of different approaches.
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1994. The study originally sought to make use of secondary sources of data gathered
informally by junior officials in central government (Scottish Development Department and
its successors). Procter (in Gilbert, 1995) shows that researchers sometimes depend on
secondary sources in order to gather data at alL. The major disadvantage of secondary
material is that the researcher has no control over the method of collection used, and the
data may not otherwise be available within their resources or timescale. In this case, the
inadequacies of the data, and periodic withdrawal of access to the data prompted the
researcher to collect primary data from sellers and buyers for verification and extension of
the data.
A survey of all authorities (sellers) was undertaken in 1995 purposely prior to personnel
changes triggered by local government reorganisation; and again in 1996 to maintain
contact with the relevant authorities after reorganisation, to consolidate data (see Appendix
Five). Some surveys enjoyed good rates of response and provided data, which appear in
the research database, following verification with buyers. Authorities were later contacted in
January 1997 to establish their responses to government guidance on large-scale transfer35
and offering support with estimating stock value. A good rate of response was achieved by
this survey, which is discussed in Chapter Eight.
Contact with buyers in 1998 allowed the researcher 1) to complete missing information from
sellers and offcial sources, and 2) to extend the parameters regarding post-transfer
investment, in the absence of good secondary data at the time. The response rate on this
survey was insufficient for robust analysis and was supplemented with later, secondary
analysis of official investment records discussed in Chapter Six, with survey material
appended.
The researcher was commissioned by the Scottsh Executive in 2001 to retrieve as much
information as possible from existing sources about all stock transfers in Scotland to
housing associations by local authorities, Scottish Homes (and New Towns).36 Resources
and backing from government authority allowed secondary data from previously
inaccessible sources to be brought together, with paid assistance under the supervision of
the researcher. While primary data collection clearly gives the researcher more control over
definitions and the type of data requested, it does not necessarily produce a complete
sample (Gilbert, 1995). The main source of secondary data, minimal records of ministerial
consent to transfer, was incomplete and inaccurate, though secondary sources were
otherwise invaluable, particularly for post-transfer investment. In this respect, combining
primary and secondary data collection contributed to the production of a more robust
35 Correspondence following publication of the guidance presumed cet1ain, rather ambiious levels of receipts from stock
transfer sales.
36 See Appendix Six for details of the basis of data collection and analysis. Civil servants confirmed in March 2002 that no
analysis had been undet1aken. The government's Community Ownership leaflet (Appendix One) drew on a 'good practice'
dissemination project by private consultants, based on prior internal government sources only.
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dataset overall, as well as shedding light on interesting aspects of the policy process and
problems of definition, picked up in later chapters.
England: Secondary Official Data
In the case of England, this study relies essentially on secondary sources. Offcial
government statistics were made available readily on request to the researcher in January
2001.37 The criteria were rather limited though they permitted interesting analysis of trends:
and government officials confirmed that their data 'tend not to be analysed'.38 From June
2001, financial trade press coverage was complemented by a magazine produced by the
representative body for English housing associations (NHF), which commented on policy.
Further data were accessed in the course of 2001 from NHF and the Housing Corporation39
about 'transfer' associations, and some of their characteristics. This allowed for a fuller
spatial and temporal analysis of transfer in England.
Once again, the shortcomings of using official statistics must be stressed (Procter, in
Gilbert, 1995). It became important to identify key trends with which to compare the Scottsh
activities, as a means of defining transfer. Given the lack of analysis in published sources
about English transfers, this was not possible without access to existing data. However the
researcher had even less control over recording methods than in the Scottish case, and was
only able, with diffculty, to identify how the data were collated, stored and maintained. The
implications of these issues in an analysis of policy-making are explored in the relevant
chapters.
Referring to the social construction of knowledge, Latour and Woolgar are cited as
cautioning researchers not to take 'facts' at face value, though empirical housing
researchers commonly do precisely that (Kemeny, 1992). Kemeny argues that the
production of official statistics is loaded: due care is thus especially required with secondary,
official data. Latour and Woolgar suggest that data about artefacts may be susceptible to
manipulation in an attempt to show phenomena, or events, as in some way 'real' (for
example - see Appendix One). Latour and Woolgar argue that the progression from artefact
to fact should be seen as a spectrum, ranging from speculation to unquestioned status as
'fact' resulting from a body of evidence (Kemeny, 1992). For a researcher this should be
gathered through fieldwork, writing and dialogue. Arguably, transfer as 'fact' or definition has
undergone such a progression from the 1980s to date. Such a progression results from the
routine work of policy actors and commentators, without deliberation or reflection. Chapters
Four to Six will discuss assumptions about what constitutes transfer in terms of scale of
outcome as opposed to significance of episodes of decision-making.
37 The request was triggered by the commission from the Scottish Executive and the researcher's aspiration to produce
comparable datasets, in the absence of published analysis of data on England. Current raw data are now available on the
website at the DTLR.
38 In March 2002, the researcher was invited to provide the government department with analysis of the data.
39 The Housing Corporation is the government's regulatory body for England.
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Bearing in mind all these caveats, the net effect of both datasets is a potentially complete
sample of transactions for England and Scotland covering the period 1986 - 2001, though
analysis here focuses on the period to 1997. The extended period (especially for England) is
deliberately reported to shed light on definitional issues, in relation to the critique of the
current literature. Data have been analysed on a temporal and spatial basis and detailed
appendices show the way in which data were gathered, cleaned and analysed with the
results and analysis reported in Chapters Five and Six and summary tables included at
Appendices Seven and Eight.
Qualiative Data: How And Why - Presence And Absence Of Transfer
Quantitative, behavioural approaches cannot reveal anything beyond the absence of
transfer. Thus the phenomena which are not represented are transactions which were
aborted at an early stage, still-born due to lack of tenant support, or never conceived.
However, behaviourists also increasingly accept the case for qualitative evidence to extent
of gathering information about the motives and perspectives of these actors (Marsh and
Stoker, 1995). In this case qualitative data have been gathered for Scotland only, via
interviews conducted mainly during 1998, a year after the new government had taken over
and before much of its policy on housing had become clear. This represents an unusual
window in which to talk to actors.40 These took place with actors at the centre and in case
study areas, to explore the rationales, and motivations and processes of stock transfer: the
how and why of transfer in Scotland.
Using Case Studies
Case studies are useful because they allow phenomena to be examined under a
microscope. They are thus commonly used in housing research, and to good effect.
Robertson and McLaughlin (1996) cite Yin's argument that a case study is not a method, but
an approach at a scale which is manageable for the individual researcher. It is also
especially useful where the phenomenon is indistinguishable from context (Yin, 1993: 3).
Though not used in this way here, case studies may be used inductively for policy (as
commonly in government commissioned research on stock transfer), or in detailed, open-
ended examination. Gomm et al (2000) suggest that case studies are excellent for
ilustrating, testing, (including confirming and contradicting) theory. Case studies are used in
this way here in relation to stock transfer, drawing on Eckstein's arguments about the value
of case studies for deductive purposes.
Generalisability and Replicabilty
Case studies have value beyond mere description and can allow the researcher to examine
actions, decisions and outcomes at a scale, which allows wider causes and effects to be
revealed, indicating scope for generalisation (Yin, 1993). Eckstein (in Gomm et aI, 2000)
maintains that though case studies are not good for quantitative data collection, their
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strength and potential lies in developing understanding, although their capacity for revealing
the interplay of factors is not generally acknowledged. In political science, case studies are
used more often ideographically than nomothetically - that is, limited to the thing itself, rather
than seeking to generalise or extrapolate.
In a lengthy discussion about generalisability, researchers are alerted to beware of the risks
of seeking to make inappropriate or unsupported generalisations from case studies (Gomm
et aI, 2000). Case studies are commonly used as a means of exploring the real world, but
for a variety of purposes. Some of these are focussed on historical narratives to reveal the
unique character of a particular case.
Cases can be illuminating and more effective in describing the real world
because they are less threatening than first hand experience.
Gomm et ai, 2000: 9
Others may be used as a means of understanding causal relationships between variables in
a number of cases, with a view to generating universal laws or theories based on
deterministic rather than probabilistic principles. Even though it is not an ambition of this
study to generate universal theory, nevertheless there is an aspiration to ensure that the
cases selected here say something about stock transfer in Scotland beyond the cases
themselves.
Gomm et al conclude that expert opinion varies about whether case studies can or should
be used for purposes of generalisation. They point to a trade-off between the detail and
abstraction: the former gives a case study its uniqueness or authenticity while the latter
emphasises potential for generalisation or its replicability (see also Yin, 1993). The
distinction between the two hinges on the isolation of those factors which are common from
those which are contingent. Gomm et al exhort the researcher to be aware of the
methodological limitations of cases.
Researchers do not generally appreciate the inductive and deductive theoretical possibilities
beyond a merely descriptive approach to case studies (Eckstein, 2000). Going for the high
ground, Eckstein argues that it is impossible to take too rigid a line about what theory is or
political science would die altogether. Meantime, he asserts the need to 'generate
theoretical statements conducive to the goals of theoretical activity' (Gomm et aI, 2000:
126). According to Eckstein, the significance of the case should not be undersold in view of
its potential for accretion of concrete evidence within a theoretical framework.
Types of Cases
Case studies are a useful device for understanding the real world, and could breathe new
life into institutionalism by embracing new ideas about theory and method (Rhodes, 1997).
40 Had interviews been postponed unti transfer was more clearly on the new Labour agenda, interviewees might have been
too preoccupied to give their time or been swayed by views on the current situation.
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Cases are often used ideographically, but Rhodes argues that they can be used to test
theory, and thereby to facilitate generalisation. Rhodes draws on an early typology of case
studies developed by Eckstein about the scope for generalisation, depending on the design
of the research. Where Yin proposes three types - descriptive, exploratory, explanatory,
Eckstein proposes a more elaborate typology. These are summarised below based on a
subsequent contribution by Eckstein to a recent edited collection on case study method
(Gomm et aI, 2000). Eckstein's typology is a spectrum progressing from 'intuitive vision to
systematic procedure' in the research design. Each type is annotated (see Table 4 below)
in terms of its relevance in relation to the case studies selected for this research.
The table shows a range of types of case study with the 'disciplined-configurative' type most
closely fitting the approach used here, as judged after the event. Had the typology been
available earlier to the researcher, different research design decisions might have been
made to build a consciously heuristic series of cases. However, there was no underlying
hypothesis at the time of the interviews and the approach to their analysis has been
deductive, as previously discussed. The initial purpose of the case studies was to explore
events more openly and in more detail at the local scale, to establish the sequence of
events and rationales for decision and action from the various participants' perspectives,
using policy concepts to inform the structure of the interviews (see below).
Case Study Selection
The purpose of selecting a small number of cases and actors was to understand the impact
of a range of factors drawn from political science, which might have impinged on local
decision-making. In reviewing the basis of selection we need to distinguish between
probabilistic and purposive sampling (Gilbert, (1995). Whereas purposive sampling is
random, probability sampling applies here and has involved a selection of those cases
picked because they are known to feature a particular activity or characteristic and because
of their usefulness for testing explanations or hypotheses. Thus, for example, one authority
(Stirling) was chosen because transfer attempts did not get off the ground and because it
was Conservative-held.
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Table 4: Eckstein's typology of case studies
Type of case Description / explanation offered by Eckstein Comments on relevance to
study thisstudv
Rich detail in description, crude but vivid, elegant subtle Commonly used by political
and persuasive scientists
Ideographic- Deductive See supporting appendix
configurative Limited, intuitive analysis and no systematic accumulation Not applicable in this study as
of data. Welter of detail can make it impossible to analyse data were systematically
and thus open to many plausible interpretations collected
Impressive feel for case but may not 'add up' as
observations are not self-explanatory, yet good for (Yin comments that if only
understanding the thing itself description, difficult to tell
whether the case experience
is different below level of
policv rhetoric from centre)
Description and explanation as above - most common use Deductive as in this study, and
of case study but distinguished from above by virtue of not just passively
**Disciplined- systematic data collection and analysis Primary focus of cases in this
configurative** Unique explanation of single cases resting on a general research
hypothesis with explicit basis Deliberately systematic
( terminology Interpretation and generalisation based on theory approach to data collection
borrowed from Can put theory to work critically: can impugn theory where even though transactions
Verba) consistent framework used and forces rigorous articulation examined may not be use
of theoretical statements completed but failed or
Remains probabilstic rather than positivistic (Le. not aborted
loaicallv compellina explanations)"
Discover puzzles for theory to solve Inductive
Build series of cases one after another with increasingly Often used in govt
Heuristic refined questions commissioned research: for
Difficult to analyse as not directly comparable due to policy
research design choices
Grounded theory Would be relevant in a more
Increasingly attractive to political scientists deliberately designed and
longer-term study
Similar to Yin exploratory type
of case study, for preliminary
work to aenerate hvpothesis.
Using hypothesis, probe plausibility of candidate theories Inductive - attractive to
May invalidate or confirm theory- may simply undermine consider for future work under
Plausibility probe validity of they by showing where does not apply even if New Labour in examining
cannot prove opposite which councils might proceed
Can be empirical, preliminary, inconclusive - to stock transfer and why -
Expose whether theoretical rules or prescriptions are valid potentially useful outcome of
and worth testinQ on a larQer scale this research
Theory formulation: postulation of verifiable observations Not relevant at this stage or on
Must work hard to elucidate true principles and this scale
'Crucial' experimental work to falsify: 'hopeful fishing'?
Inductive
Validation of hypothesis and theory especially where
multiple cases
Barely relevant in human sciences though value in avoiding
amassinQ hUQe irrelevant datasets
" "
Source: adapted from Eckstein in Gomm et aI, 2000
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Case study selection first begs the question: what is the unit of analysis in a case study. A
case can be a very small element (Robertson and MacLaughlin, 1996). One case might be
a whole series of small incremental actions and decisions, however apparently trivial:
... a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on
any pertinent variable.
Eckstein in Gomm et ai, 2000: 124
In this study, the case could be an area, a seller, a buyer or a transaction (including non-
transactions). Five case study areas (sellers) were selected for detailed examination but,
following Eckstein, if transactions (and non-transactions) are the phenomenon, then there
are many more than five cases! The table below shows the numbers of (potential)
transactions for which data are available in each area and the number of buyers examined,
as follows.
Table 5: Case study phenomena
Seller area No. of buyers Relevant no. of Partial 41 Completed
(district councils before 1995/6) attempting transactions transactions
transactions (completed or
examined in attempted)
studv
Glasgow 3 25 . #
Motherwell 1 2 . #
Dundee 1 5 . #
BGrwickshire 1 1 #
Stirling 1 3 .
Totals 5 8 36
On the basis of transactions, there are 36 (potential) cases rather than 5 areas/ sellers, with
individuals interviewed in eight (potential) buyer organisations. As Appendix Ten and later
chapters show, the case studies are approached via the perspective of sellers and buyers
though some of the national level actors also comment on particular area approaches. The
cases were chosen for their similarities and differences embracing both small/ partial and
whole/ large-scale transfers at different times, and completed and aborted transfers. Thus
Stirling stands out as a case where transfer attempts (plural) failed and Berwickshire stands
out as the only case where the transaction was not small / partiaL. The other three seem
more similar though, as Appendix Ten shows, there are important differences of scale and
timing.
Interviews: Rationale, Type and Focus
Rational choice theory emphasises the importance of qualitative data to be able to access
the rationales and motivations of actors in the system. The process of stock transfer
involves an interaction between many different layers of interests. A rational choice
41 Partial transfer refers to those cases where only a proportion of the stock was sold leaving the seller with stock to rent.
Partial transfers contrast with whole transfers where the disposal affects the entire stock of the landlord.
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approach allows aspects such as exchange and bargaining behaviour, adjustment and
advocacy to be brought to the fore in the analysis of actions. This involves use of qualitative
methods including interviews with key actors. The qualitative focus is limited to Scotland as
the main focus of the study. In all some 30 interviews were conducted in the course of 1998
and early 1999. The appendices detail who was interviewed, their role in transfer, their level
/ scale of operation and their status at the time of the interview.
Various types of interview are possible involving different degrees of structuring. Highly
structured interviews are easier to analyse with the corollary that less structure makes it
harder to analyse (Robertson and McLaughlin, 1996). Semi-structured interviews can be
seen to be 'conversations with a purpose' though Walford (1994) shows semi-structured
interviews as best for developing understanding, which was their purpose in this study. Such
interviews are useful for exploring dimensions of decisions and actions (which by extension
also applies to cases of non-decision and non-action) (Fielding, 1995).
A standard list of questions was prepared in the interests of achieving replication logic (Yin,
1993) so that a consistent framework was being used for all respondents, regardless of the
level or extent of their authority. The questions were loosely structured and worded in an
open manner so that respondents could answer as fully as they saw fit. The interview
schedule was designed to faciliate discussion around the concepts discussed in Chapter
Two: thus the interviews relate to those concepts, but they were not referred to specifically
and do not correspond directly. In this respect the interview was rather more of a 'guided
conversation' (Fielding, 1995) allowing the researcher to explore certain defined themes.
The schedule was forwarded to each of the participants prior to the interview, to jog their
memory of events and to serve as a topic guide / agenda. In some cases the standard
questions were supplemented with additional questions, arising from documents or other
interviews. The emphasis was not necessarily on detailed recall but on the broader issues in
the mind of the respondent. Fielding (1995) argues that such semi-standardised interviews
are valuable for extracting a range of opinions from different perspectives, precisely their
use in this case. This use of the interviews to establish a definition used is thus a legitimate
use of semi-standardised interviews, and avoids imposing a standard definition when none
exists (see Appendix Two). By contrast this approach has helped to reveal perspectives and
meaning of transfer.
The interview schedule was prepared to elicit information and perspectives about the
various concepts discussed at the end of Chapter Two. These focussed on their
perspectives of the origins of transfer, the rationales and motivations of the actors and their
stance in relation to transfer both at the time and since. The schedule is reproduced at
Appendix Four. The main areas identified for interviews can be noted in summary here:
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Interview themes
. concept and definition of stock transfer
origin of policy - whose idea, where from
respondent's objectives
respondent's role and contribution to stock transfer
respondent's main contacts, supporters and opponents
view of outcome of transfer
key decision-makers and drivers
I policies, instruments, agencies driving and blocking transfer
Selection and Access Issues
Interviewees were selected from both the local and national stage, as shown in the
appendices. Arguably all of the people selected operate at some level in the policy elite.
According to the weakest definition, a policy elite can be defined as including anyone who
has authority to give an order whereas at its strongest I purest, a member of a policy elite
must be omnipotent (Moyser and Wagstaff, 1987). In this study, everyone interviewed was
assumed to have some power and formal authority. This includes tenant committee
members of housing associations who might not otherwise be regarded as part of the
housing policy elite.
The value of studying elites lies in increasing understanding: only members of elites can
reveal the sort of advice and information to which they have access (Moyser and Wagstaff,
1987). This relates to their stance on particular issues, decisions taken, actions and
processes pursued, attitudes and intentions beneath I beyond the documentation. Thus,
interviewing policy elites helps to unpack the mystique surrounding the behaviour of elites.
Moyser and Wagstaff, (1987) suggest three different approaches to identifying individuals in
elites - reputation, positional, decisional. In this study, a mixture of all three were employed.
At the local scale, the choice of interviewees was primarily decisional - i.e. what decision
had been taken (or not) by the organisation; the choice was second order reputation (based
on insider knowledge) of what kind of decision had been taken and third order positional i.e.
based on their role in the organisation. As for interviewees at the central I national stage in
Scotland, the choices were primarily positional (eg grade of civil servant or Ministerial
position) and only then by reputation (using limited snowballing).
Most interviewees were contacted initially by letter, in May 1998, to explain the purpose of
the research and interview and to request a suitable time and date. All responded positively
and some very quickly, particularly in Dundee, with the result that new quantitative data
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were brought forward during interviews with senior personnel.42 However, in Dundee and to
a lesser extent Glasgow, it was more difficult to achieve consistency of research design.
Interviews among housing association committee members (buyers) could not be
completed, as the individuals were unavailable or unwilling to take part, due to other
difficulties for their association. Some tenants were also reluctant to be interviewed: the
reasons given were ostensibly definitional, (because they did not regard their association as
having been involved in a transfer), or because their organisation was in the process of
being 'merged'. Had the difficulty of accessing a suitable Dundee committee member for
interview been anticipated, an alternative case study might have been chosen.
Some respondents suggested others who should be interviewed in referring to those they
regarded as key actors. For example one additional interview was conducted through
snowballing since this person had been suggested as being a key influence by at least three
respondents from different perspectives. Although snowballing is a useful technique, not all
possible leads were followed up due to lack of time and other resources, because the
individuals were retired, ill, or otherwise difficult to contact.
Conduct of Interviews
Writing about interviewing members of policy elites, Walford argues that to use semi-
structured interviews successfully, the researcher needs to have good credibility which
depends on being able to demonstrate sound knowledge of the topic (Walford, 1994). It
could be argued that my insider knowledge (discussed above) permitted such credibility, at
least with the policy elite. Walford argues that senior and powerful elite interviewees are
very skiled at answering questions (or avoiding answering questions). They may also play
games with the interviewer to test their credibility or trustworthiness, depending on the
relative status of the researcher and respondent. This requires considerable skill on the
researcher's part to manage rushed interviews, interruptions and self-aggrandising answers
especially - notes Walford (1994) - from retired civil servants. These issues are mentioned
in more detail in the course of the analysis in later chapters.
Matching and Interview Response Effect
Fielding alerts us to the importance of issues about matching between the researcher and
respondent in face to face interviews (Fielding in Gilbert, 1995). This relates to the previous
discussion about reflexivity. Relevant Issues include age, gender, class, religion and race,
any of which can affect the conduct of the interview (Robertson and McLaughlin, 1996).
Tensions did not appear evident in any of the interviews about religion or race. However,
most interviewees were male and many were older or senior to the researcher in different
ways. Yet, the researcher was already known to most interviewees and hopefully credible
not least due to my status as a lecturer (revealed in the letter of introduction). The
researcher's views about transfer were not disclosed and would not have been known to the
42 This was included in the database and is part of the analysis in Chapter Six.
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respondents. Thus gender and age gaps did not present an obstacle whereas the
researcher was aware of a class gap which may have interfered particularly with obtaining
and conducting interviews with tenant committee members. Surface matching was not
strong on gender, age and some class grounds: this was not a material obstacle to access
but may have had some filtering effect on the perspectives given, analysed and recorded.
Management of Boundaries and Focus
Most of the interviews were conducted over the summer of 1998, in the respondent's work
place or home, with some held in more informal city centre locations to suit both parties.
Most interviews took around an hour though some were closer to two hours in length.
Interviews normally followed the order of the standard list starting with the definition of a
stock transfer. This was a useful open and opening question although it occasionally led the
interviewee astray into details and the interviews had to be managed carefully to ensure that
the time was used to answer the questions. Nevertheless, useful insights were gained in this
way. The researcher always took care to introduce the interview by clarifying that the
boundaries of the study ran up to May 1997. However during 1998, it was often very difficult
to prevent leakage into the interview of post 1997 material, more relevant to contemporary
and fast moving transfer developments under the Labour's government's New Housing
Partnerships programme.
Scottsh Homes and New Town transfers also leaked into the interviews in ways which were
not intended by the research design but which showed the interconnections within the policy
stream: a more structured method would not have revealed such leakage and conflation. It
was also necessary, but difficult, to steer respondents away from discussion of the rights
and wrongs of transfer policy content, although the focus of the study was flagged as being
about the process of reaching decisions rather than policy evaluation. The researcher
became increasingly skilled at steering respondents back to the main focus.
A small number of interviews were taped, especially in 1997 before the standard questions
were finalised. These were not transcribed but as with other interviews, notes were made in
relation to the schedule, checked and annotated. Some later interviews were taped,
especially with senior people under diary pressure, to minimise the need for note-taking and
resulting delays. In general, the order of questions was less standard in an attempt to keep
the flow of conversation as natural as possible. It could be argued that all interviews should
have been tape-recorded, but some respondents may have been intimidated by this, and
others (notably senior civil servants) might have revealed less while literally on the record.
Regardless of whether the interview was taped, notes on each interview schedule were read
through afterwards and annotated by the researcher to record observations on how the
interview had gone, whether there were any gaps or omissions, or any non-verbal signals,
which might be significant. The researcher also noted methodological points at this stage
about the capacity / willngness of the respondent to recall key events or to reflect on what
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had happened. In the course of the interview, it was noted when a respondent had to be
prompted about particular issues if they had not been mentioned spontaneously.
The researcher should as far as possible use respondents' own words to generate and
define the constructs for the researcher's narrative (Fielding, 1995). Where an interviewee
used a telling phrase, a detailed note was made of the expression. No commitment to
confidentiality was given or sought. On the whole however, this account has been written
without attribution in mind and most interviewees' views have been paraphrased rather than
quoted directly. This is partly a consequence of not recording interviews and of a long gap
between the interviews and the analysis and reporting. Some have however been quoted
directly to give a flavour of their perspective.
Analysis of Interviews
The interviews have been analysed in a number of ways. First, it was important to construct
a narrative for each of the case studies to ensure as far as possible a complete account for
each area selected. Respondents' perspectives on definitions were analysed and have
informed the study's definition of transfer, used in consolidating quantitative data for
Scotland. Secondly, given that the schedule was prepared based on a review of the
literature about how policy is made and implemented, the various concepts were examined
deductively, across case studies and roles. These inform the discussion from Chapter
Seven onwards, about the changing rules and incentives and decision-making and action
centrally and locally, allowing a discussion of the issues in relation to the literature on
housing policy and on theories of the policy process. Thirdly, on the basis that this only
partly answers the questions set out in earlier chapters, the interviews were revisited on an
inductive basis highlighting the common themes which emerge. However this form of
analysis is not necessarily limited to the concepts derived from the review of the literature. In
addition, networks were informally mapped from the questions about contacts. This analysis
informs the discussion in Chapter Nine.
Discussion of Methods
An appraisal of methods is appropriate at this stage, focussing on the strengths and
weaknesses both of design and as experienced in use, although the design and use of
methods has sought to minimise any adverse effect from potential weaknesses.
Strengths
Having started with a weak dataset, efforts to refine the data have ultimately been effective
and produced more data than might have been hoped for at the outset. The data permit
both a comprehensive and comparable quantitative account of transfers at the national
scale in Scotland and England during the late eighties and early nineties and a more
exploratory, qualitative account at the local scale, albeit only in Scotland. The use of
interviews in case studies for has allowed non-transactions to be explored too. Although low
response rates were potentially a problem early on, in the end good quality information was
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achieved which gives a degree of confidence in data corroborated from different sources.
Yet it remains remarkable that so little hard information has been gathered or analysed by
central government or other agencies. This is surprising given the apparent priority attached
to this area of policy and the amount of scarce resources consumed over the period. It might
signify lack of priority to policy monitoring generally, or it may indicate that government was
not interested in the consequences, either because the policy was set to continue
regardless, or because there was a wish to conceal certain aspects - for example to
maximise room for manoeuvre.
Some of the early research was guided by unstructured curiosity, which had the merit of
being open to ideas appropriate to that early stage. This allowed questions and dimensions
to be developed and focussed. Later fieldwork (surveys and interviews) were informed by
concepts drawn from the bodies of literature on housing policy and policy theory. So while
the study has been predominantly empirical it is not been barefoot empiricism. A
consequence of the more focussed approach at a later stage is that structuring questions
may mean missing out on unanticipated perspectives or details. Nevertheless, this risk
should be smaller with a more open approach having been taken at an earlier stage
(Robertson and MacLaughlin, 1996). Similarly, March and Olsen (1996) argue that informal
and systematic approaches are needed to complete the research picture: in this way, open
and semi-structured approaches complement each other.
A further strength is the variety of perspectives gathered, by making contact with people
active in this area over the ten years in question. Interviewees were throughout Scotland
and not limited to Glasgow, which normally dominates the debate. The researcher has
successfully sought and gained access to senior central government politicians and civil
servants, usually regarded as the powerful elite. Their views can be set against those of
tenants often living in unacceptable conditions, which were, arguably, a major part of the
rationale for stock transfer. It has captured interesting and vivid insights from these various
perspectives, to obtain a more authentic and rounded picture of the process of policy-
making. Generally the fieldwork has succeeded in accessing for the first time oral evidence
from important actors at the national scale and the local scale through the case studies.
Yet remarkably, almost all of the interviewees found it diffcult to reflect on their own history
or participation in policy as a process. Those (including elected politicians) who had this
facility were rare and as often as not apologised for being cynical as though their
observations were not valid or 'not what was required'. Some indeed seemed to think it not
of interest or even relevant and would try and provide details of policy content in an effort -
it seemed - to give better interview value. This both reflects the preoccupation of people
involved in housing with the administrative detail of tasks rather than the process, and alerts
us to risks of 'social desirability'. In other words respondents tell the researcher whatever
shows them in a particular light (Fielding, 1995). This was evident to the extent that
individuals, faced with questions about who was key to particular periods or events, were
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reluctant to volunteer their own names and deferred to others' greater influence. This may
be explained by natural reticence or modesty, though it may also represent the inability of
respondents (in this field) to be able to examine processes and their own role in them.
There were some benefits in undertaking the research after the end of the Conservatives'
period of government. Some people seemed to have 'moved on' and were more detached
from the issues than might have been expected while the Conservatives were still in office.
By comparison, earlier timing of interviews might have run into problems of defensiveness
on the part of those pursuing the policies. That there was a new government and a new,
changed policy may have liberated some respondents - not necessarily the civil servants -
into being more candid about the Conservative period than they would otherwise have been.
Nevertheless, respondents often had to be steered off debates about current policy.
Weaknesses
Such an elongated period of research as involved in a part time PhD thesis implies some
weaknesses. Chief amongst these is that data collection was more organic, reactive and
later than was ideaL. Had good quantitative data been available sooner, different case
studies might have been selected, different questions posed to interviewees and analysed
differently. Not all interviews were conducted with a solid prior grounding in the policy theory
as pressure on the researcher's time and respondents' availability drove the premature
timing of some interviews.
While oral evidence is mainly a strength, a potential weakness of oral evidence lies in the
inherent unreliability of recall, with a 12 year time gap between thé earliest transfers and the
interviews. Recall can be diffcult over such a long period. The research is open to
allegations of filtered recalL. Interviewees were generally relaxed and comfortable about
speaking about their experience, although many respondents initially claimed poor recall
and some even articulated concern that they might be guilty of reinventing or reinterpreting
the past. Respondents may filter out those matters they do not wish to recall: they may
reinterpret the past in the light of what they know now and how they wish to be seen by the
researcher.
The interviewer was aware of this possibility from the outset and took the opportunity, as far
as possible, to corroborate factual aspects of events between interviews, or to check with
interviewees on minor discrepancies about dates, for example in relation to publications or
guidelines where dates were known. However, the researcher sought to avoid challenging
respondents with other evidence even though it was sometimes useful to puncture
complacency about past glories with more pointed questions about how practice might be
seen by others. One interviewee repeated continually that transfers really were not
important at the time (in spite of his heated and acrimonious public correspondence with the
Minister in the press at the time). He was quite unable to grasp why research about policy
history might be of interest to anyone. In practice, some of the early open questions
triggered detailed - often humorous or wry - memories of discussions, people and meetings,
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with candid and indiscreet tales indicating a good rapport in the interview. These also give
grounds for confidence in the recall capacities of most interviewees.
A small number of people were reluctant to offer any criticism but stressed how helpful
everyone had been while seeming to allude to some unhelpful behaviour, without wishing to
be drawn further. These were in the main committee members in new associations who
were not familiar with the researcher and may have felt uncomfortable or intimidated by a
research interview. The potential recall problem is compounded by poor policy definition,
personnel turnover and inadequate information systems to follow the many small
transactions at the time and since. As a result, the quantitative data only show completed
transactions and thus we cannot now see how many proposed transfers were not
completed. In addition, the data for England are secondary data about the dependent
variable, covering a more limited range of criteria.
There were problems too in researching the actions and decisions of central government.
Although there was an ostensible willingness to be helpful, in practice it was quite difficult to
obtain an interviewee from the Scottsh Office. Some who had been involved at earlier
stages, had later moved on to other roles within the Scottish Offce and felt too far away
from the issues to either want (or be able) to spend time being interviewed. One respondent
was heavily involved in transfers both at the start and towards the end of the period in a
senior capacity (now retired). He did in the end participate, though with much persuasion
and his agreement to be interviewed was prefaced by multiple caveats about how litte could
be said, though in fact, his comments were most revealing.
Civil servants were notably painstaking in their choice of words while on the record. They
answered strictly only those questions asked without elaborating and needed to be drawn.
By contrast once the tape recorder was switched off, they became quite forthcoming more
informally. The sensitivity in the British Civil Service around disclosing advice given to
Ministers is well-established (Campbell and Wilson, 1995; Moyser and Wagstaff, 1987). This
creates a cloak of secrecy around the role and power of the civil servants themselves. One
became quite agitated in this study at the implication that he might have been responsible
for persuading a Minister of the benefits of a policy! The same person was identified
separately by the Minister as the source of the idea - Tenant's Choice and was also the
only interviewee to turn some of the questions round to the researcher. Another adroitly
conveyed intellectual distance from what he regarded as a 'rather sily' (or brave) ministerial
idea which was ultimately unsuccessfuL.
Governmental secrecy undoubtedly affects the capacity of studies such as this to delve
more deeply into policy processes but this must be seen as an occupational hazard in
political research. Although documents were produced and correspondence conducted by
various parties throughout transfer discussions, these had often been 'archived' or 'purified'
- literally burned, shredded or otherwise 'unavailable'. This meant that respondents'
recollections could not always be verified against written sources. Scottish Offce files,
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though not obviously in the realm of offcial secrets, were certainly not available for perusal
by outsiders. The reason given was that there would be too many different files and
departments involved: they might well have been irretrievable in any case. Local authority
respondents were more immediately forthcoming though, in general, litte attempt was made
to access their files after reorganisation. This is undoubtedly a problem with policy research
going back over such a period. Yet this research was seeking to explore aspects of stock
transfer which were in any event less likely to have been documented. In that respect, the
success in achieving interviews with so many key actors across the range, compensates for
any perceived lack of documentary evidence.
Finally there is a danger that a content specialist researcher - such as myself - will have
both inside and outside knowledge of and a partisan relationship to the subject. While I was
neither vocally opposed to transfer, nor unreservedly in favour, public criticism of aspects of
government policy may have interfered with my access to respondents, the conduct of
interviews. However objective I try to be, my own stance cannot fail to affect my ability to
gather views, and decode, interpret, analyse and report the data.
Conclusions
A range of sources and methods have been used to fill gaps in our knowledge about what
constitutes a transfer, what transfer decisions were made, by whom and on what basis. This
has produced a complementary range and balance of quantitative and qualitative evidence
about transfer. A limited number of areas were selected reflecting both similar and different
characteristics of timing, scale, geography and politics. Within each area, certain buyers and
transactions were selected for detailed investigation and a range of actors were approached
with a standard set of questions, derived from a critical review of policy theory.
The approach has been multi-theoretical and deductive, making conscious use of competing
theories in analysing interviews, allowing policy concepts to relate differently to each other.
The use of theory has allowed my relationship to the data to develop and come to surface,
while my understanding and capacity to interpret has gone deeper as a result of the
fieldwork and theory combined.
This chapter has focussed on the overall method highlighting appendices covering the case
studies, the approach to the interviews with key actors centrally and locally. Later chapters
discuss what these interviews reveal about the process and the policy of stock transfer in
the various cases. The cases are not designed to be representative as such although some
generalisation should be valid in illustrating empirically how decisions are made in different
places at the same time within the same national policy and resource context.
Reference to documents and literature, supplemented by statistics and interviews, colours in
the institutional picture but since institutions, rules and procedures are not the whole story,
the interviews draw out relevant material about behaviour, motivations and choices in
Scotland. This allows an examination of the balance and source of power amongst the
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actors and assists in engaging with debates about the significance of state power in
determining policy change. Having reviewed how the research was conducted, the following
chapters can now turn to the literature on housing policy to find out how Scotland features in
the UK literature on housing policy.
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Chapter Four
Stock Transfer - The Specialist Literature
This chapter examines the UK literature on housing stock transfer, focussing on evidence
about the past, rather than polemic about the future. It draws on research evidence
gathered since the early 1990s. It mainly uses secondary material, including housing
textbooks, political memoirs, research reports and academic contributions as well as
contemporary magazine articles published by the professional body and by pressure
groups, where the focus is often on particular cases. Limited use is made in this chapter of
policy statements and documents.
The chapter is organised according to four main sections: what has been transferred where
by whom, to whom; why transfers have been conducted; by what process - how, and finally
transfers as outcomes. These permit an examination of the development and
implementation of central and local policy, power relations between actors and processes of
engagement at the local scale. It explores the different interests and stances of policy actors
and comments critically on the limitations of research and the existing literature in advancing
our understanding of the interplay of interests in the transfer process. Thus the chapter
presents a critical review of research and housing policy literature on the phenomenon of
stock transfer. Finally, it reveals the narrow focus in published material on certain aspects of
a particular type of transfer in England as though this were valid more widely. It is argued
that the literature fails to represent different approaches or spatial and temporal patterns of
transfer in England and Scotland. Therefore to understand the phenomenon of transfer in
the UK, increasingly we have to return to the data.
Who Transferred What, Where
In an end-of-century review of council housing, John Perry43 argued that the end of council
housing was nigh. He introduced his argument by referring to the reduction of public sector
housing stock in England through the Right to Buy, showing a drop from 5 million to 4 milion
houses between 1980 and 1988. Transfer accounted for the 'loss' of a further 450,000
properties in England in 1988 - 2000, and an accelerating pace of change year by year.
Indeed, while right to buy sales outstripped transfers until 1997,
Transfer is now ¡under New Labour) having a bigger impact than the right
to buy..a trend... certain to continue
Perry in Wilcox, 2001: 31
Perry referred to two types of transfer experience in England whereas Scotland and Wales
were discussed in terms of future practice, as though they did not have a history. Similarly,
Cowan and Marsh claimed in 2001 that the transfer process was 'just getting underway in
Scotland'.
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Location
Elsewhere, even in textbooks which claim to cover housing in the UK, reference to Scotland
indicates one Scottish transfer (Berwickshire), although
... smaller scale sales ¡unspecified) have taken place to community based
landlords using HAG from Scottish Homes.
Harriotl and Matlhews, 199B: 240
Neither the JRF annual compendium44 nor the trade press45 carry information about
transfers in Scotland (beyond reference to Berwickshire), although primary research on
Scottish transfers showed at least three different types of transfer. The first involves small-
scale subsidised transfers by local authorities (Taylor, 1998; Graham et aI, 1997). The
second stream involves disposals by Scottish Homes, privately funded without subsidy
(Graham et aI, 1999). The third category - also unsubsidised - refers to New Town transfers
at wind-up (Muirhead, 1998).46 In passing, Graham et al (1997) contrast Scottsh Homes
transfers - denoted 'policy-led' - with 'development-led' council transfers, motivated by the
need to access to development subsidy to improve the stock. Murie misleadingly refers to
such transfers as 'LSVT' (Currie and Murie, 1996: 66).
Information about transfers in Scotland is usually published by Scottish Homes or the
Scottsh Offce (Clapham et aI, 1991; Graham et aI, 1997; Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 2000) but
does not enter secondary discourse purporting to be about the UK. As a result, transfer
ptienomena in England and Scotland are not usually compared and transfer remains ill-
defined in the secondary literature. We return to a comparison here but first we have to look
at the headline figures for England.
Although published data about transfer are generally limited to England, textbook coverage
of the incidence of transfer is surprisingly poor even for England, given the potential
significance of the changes being wrought. The first reference to 'transfer' is in Malpass and
Means (1993) drawing on interim findings from government-commissioned research: by
1991, 16 authorities voluntarily divested themselves of their entire rented housing stocks.
Although the 77,000 tenancies affected represented less than 2% of all council tenancies in
England, even in 1991 transfer was presented as:
43 Policy Director of the Chaltered Institute of Housing - the professional body for housing in the UK.
44 Annual compendium of housing finance Housing Finance Review - published by Joseph Rowntree Foundation JRF. It has
become a key data source for British housing practiioners and researchers alike, since first publication in 1995. It lists
annual summaries of completed transfers, drawing on offcial sources, with commentary though without much explicit data
analysis.
45 Social Housing magazine: though seldom cited in the secondary lierature, it has been the best source of raw information
on completed transfers. It is issued monthly to subscribers and from 2002 on the Internet. The May issue carries an annual
update to March of that year, showing all UK transfers to date and listing every single transaction since 1988, with stock
numbers, buyer names, prices paid, subsidy used. Borrowing details are shown with amounts and names of lenders, who
suppolt the magazine with adveltising. A late addition to the trade press is Transfers Today published by the National
Housing Federation since 2001.
46 Neither of the second and third streams are within the remit of this study, though as later chapters show they leak into the
local authority stream.
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... a major contribution to central government's privatisation drive
Mullins in Malpass and Means, 1993: 169
Mullins's later work focused on the regulatory implications of transfer but he cited JRF
figures showing LSVT transfers affecting almost 250,000 houses up to 1996/7 (Marsh and
Mullins, 1998). By March 2000, the trade press showed over 400,000 houses affected by a
total of 134 transactions, accessing private funding of over £7 billion (Social Housing, 2000).
This starts to reveal different dimensions and measures of the phenomenon.
Transfer is commonly shown as a Tory shire phenomenon in leafy suburbs and rural areas
of England (Harriott and Matthews, 1998). Elsewhere,
The LSVT programme worked in the shire counties and areas where positive
asset values meant that stock transfer generated a windfall gain for the
local authority.. ¡but) the programme did not offer incentives ... where
there were negative values associated with the stock - in urban areas.
Murie and Nevin in Cowan and Marsh, 2001 :32
Only two of 68 transferring councils prior to 1998 were in disadvantaged urban areas (Murie
and Nevin in Cowan and Marsh, 2001). In 2001, these commentators47 argued that changes
in the 1996 Housing Act in England had catalysed interest in stock transfer among Labour
and Liberal Democrat authorities in some parts of England. The authors neither offered nor
referred to published analysis of the data on transfer, nor considered why some areas
pursued or did not pursue transfer before or after 1997. They did not examine or report the
authorities' political characteristics, nor what type of transfer applied in different areas
although they referred increasingly to two types. There have been no attempts by academic
or trade commentators to examine the constituent characteristics of transfer. Although
Harriott and Matthews (1998) suggested that 'transfer' policy might be approached and
analysed according to four categories, they then proceeded to confuse matters by referring
to various individual and collective exit mechanisms4B in public housing as 'transfers',
without distinguishing different types of transfer as such. Such lack of definition risks
unquestioning acceptance of facts about transfer, with assumptions based on recorded
transactions (to which Chapter Three refers).
47 The authors' primary concern is New Labour's policy shift post-1997 towards transfer - a move 'from antipathy to
acceptance'.
48 These include the Right to Buy, Tenant's Choice, HATs, Tenants Incentive Schemes and LSVT: some create owner-
occupation; others permit continued renting by alternative landlords; others again require a change of landlord - HATs - see
glossary.
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Types of Transfer - England
This thesis attempts to remedy the issue of definition by distinguishing two emerging types
of transfer in England (see Chapters Five and Six). By the late 1990s a second type of
transfer was emerging as over £300m became available to deal with stock in poor condition
in poor, urban neighbourhoods (Harriott and Matthews, 1998). Policy innovation produced
incentives for transfer in November 1995 - thus under the Conservatives (Cowan and
Marsh, 2001). Yet until 1999, all transfer information in the trade press was labelled LSVT
even though it contained reference to partial, grant-funded transfers. For the first time in
2000, the database distinguished LSVT and ERCF transfers, which the government dataset
had not done by 2002. For the moment, we will refer to these as LSVT and ERCF-funded49
based on the literature about English experience.
LSVT - Whole, Single Disposals?
Over 400,000 houses were transferred in the LSVT category between 1988 and March 2000
(Social Housing, 2000) and at an increasing annual pace, outstripping the published
'pipeline'. The average unit price was just over £9,000. Gross funding facilities of around
£6.5 bilion were secured against purchase values of £3.7 billion50: no grant was involved.
Social Housing commented simply that the difference between borrowing and price is due to
additional finance required to fund repair and renewal works. Previous issues (Social
Housing, 1999) had already highlighted wide fluctuation in average prices and funding
falling overall, though without explanation. By 2000, falling valuations were reported to be
hitting new 'lows' reflecting rent controls and 'more transfers of urban housing commanding
lower prices' (Social Housing, 2000: 5). This chapter returns to pricing and valuation in
discussing transfer as a process, to illustrate the importance of bargaining in transactions.
Later chapters explore spatial and temporal differences in the figures to produce a better
definition of the phenomenon. We can note at this stage the greater scale of LSVT with ten
times more stock transferred via LSVT than via ERCF in 1991 (Cowan and Marsh, 2001:
32). It is not assumed that LSVT indicates any particular scale of transfer and means whole,
single disposals, in contrast with partial disposals. For the moment, measurement based on
the number of houses affected may not be the best means of assessing significance.
ERCF-Funded: Partial With Subsidy?
In 1995/6, research for a client consortium (including the DoE, the Housing Corporation and
mainly Labour controlled metropolitan councils) showed ways in which government funding
could be used to assist partial transfers of stock in run-down estates (KPMG, 1996; Murie
and Nevin, 1999). The stock had negative value (reflecting poor property conditions),
producing no capital receipt to payoff debt. This provided a basis for the Conservative
government in England, to incentivise regeneration, bolstering private investment with
49 Estates Renewal Challenge Funding. NB Chapter Five and Appendix Six discuss the dataset further.
50 Purchase value is almost the same as sale value with some important deductions. Purchase value is best compared with
borrowing whereas sale value or receipts are best compared with historic debt.
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subsidy, for which authorities would have to compete (Harriott and Matthews, 1998). Bidding
started in 1996 though transactions and spending are recorded as starting from 1997.51
Early case examination revealed substantial variation in unit costs and marked disparities
between planned and actual costs in transferring the ownership of certain (usually tenanted)
council estates to other social landlords (Nevin, 1999; Murie and Nevin, 1999). One year
into the programme, actual public investment exceeded private funding and per unit
investment was way off target,52 suggesting rather turbulent or chaotic implementation, in
spite of almost rational policy-making beforehand. As no published analysis of the outturn
data is available, the data are explored further in Chapter Five, because they represent a
form of partial, subsidised transfer which, it is argued, has obtained in Scotland since 1986.
A distinction between whole, single and partial, subsidised disposals avoids reference to
local subsidy terminology and allows a more abstract definition to be developed as well as
some comparison of streams in the two countries.
Comparing Whole and Partial Transfers in England and Scotland
The only source of comparison to date between Scotland and England was in a review of
research evidence published by Scottish Homes (Taylor, 2000), using work in progress for
this thesis (see Table 6). Measuring the scale of the phenomenon in terms of the volume of
houses affected (rather than numbers of transactions) indicated less stock affected in
Scotland, but a considerable degree of transfer activity nevertheless, clearly not reported at
the UK leveL. The period of activity was similar and the acquiring landlords were generally
housing associations though there appeared to be more diversity of purchaser in Scotland.
What is striking is the apparent difference in price (or value) between different types of
activity. Also striking is the balance between partial and whole stock transfers in England
and Scotland: where in England, whole stock transfers exceeded partial by 10: 1, the ratio
was precisely the reverse in Scotland. Perversely, Malpass cited the researcher's data
(above) to show a European audience that there has been just one (whole stock) transfer in
Scotland, while there have been whole and partial transfers in England (Malpass, 2001 :3).
Chapter Six returns to a comparison based on a more thorough and consistent data
analysis than was possible in 1998.
51 See Chapter Five
52 The subsidy was to be administered by DETR direct and was discontinued by Labour after three years of operation.
Private investment was intended to take care of up to two thirds of the costs with public investment covering a third (and up
to half). Estimates in 1996/7 indicated ERCF proposals affecting 63,000 properties would cost the Exchequer £564m -
almost £9,000 per unit. By 1998/9 only 3,600 properties had consumed half the budget at £72,000 per unit (Nevin, 1999) with
a ratio of private investment to public subsidy approaching 1 :5, rather than 2: 1. However, outturn figures were different again
- fewer houses transferred at less public cost and with less public investment though private finance came closer to the
planned ratio (Social Housing, 2000, vol. 12, no 5, page 5).
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Table 6: Stock Transfer In England And Scotland 1986 -1998
Total nos. Destination Price ranges Period
landlord
Scotland (1
Local Authority - partial 25,150 Mainly HAs Under £3k 1986 - 98/9
Local Authority - whole 2,054 HA £5k 1995/6
Scottish Homes 38,817 Mainly HAs; £7k up to £12k 1991 - 98/9
various other
New Town Development 29,463 HAs; LAs; SH Up to £11k 1991 - 97
Corporations
Enaland (2)
Local Authority - partiall 30,000 est HAs and LHCs NK 1996 - 98
ERCF
Local Authority - whole 1 328,451 HAs £2 -13K 1988-98
LSVT
Sources:
1) Sources: updated from figures cited by Taylor in Wilcox (ed), 1998 based on personal communication.
2) Social Housing, December 1998 Vo!. 10 no 12; Nevin, 1999
Having established what is known about transfers, we need to examine what the literature
indicates about the reasons for pursuit of transfer to increase our understanding of why
some councils (and not others) have pursued stock transfer from a political viewpoint.
Why Transfer And For Whose Benefit?
For some there is only one rationale for transfer: it boils down to PSBR restrictions on
council borrowing (Harriott and Matthews, 1998). The opportunity for borrowing by housing
associations to count as private borrowing 'undermined the lingering attractions of municipal
landlordism' (Cole and Furbey, 1994; 205). While resources are clearly important, if this
was such an overwhelming case, why did all councils not go down the transfer path?
Voluntary transfers are seen by others as 'local responses to wider national housing
policies', highlighting the significant role of local key actors and negotiation or bargaining
(Malpass and Means, 1993: 169). Though the housing policy literature commonly takes
central government objectives as the starting point for policy analysis, this section examines
central and local objectives and rationales for transfer in turn.
Aims Of Policy
Central Government
Arguably stock transfer resulted from a succession of policy developments by central
government from the early 1980s, which helped create the right atmosphere and propitious
circumstances for local transfer initiatives (Kemp, 1990; Malpass and Means, 1993). The
literature refers to objectives being developed in the run-up to the 1987 General Election,
though it was only after that election that Willam Waldegrave MP, Minister of Housing under
Nicholas Ridley, made clear the government's overriding intentions to 'get rid of the state as
a big landlord' (Kemp, 1990; 797). This had not been articulated so clearly before the
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election though those in favour of council housing had been able to 'see the writing on the
wall' (Kemp, 1990).
Thatcher's memoirs show the discussion between the former PM and her Secretary of
State, Nicholas Ridley, in 1986 about how the forthcoming manifesto should deal with
housing (Thatcher, 1993). Housing, health and education were identified as three key
targets for radical reform. With the right to buy regarded as a major political success, the
aim of the 1987 manifesto was to further redistribute power in housing, by offering tenants
the right to form co-ops and to transfer the ownership of their individual homes to alternative
landlords. Thatcher describes Ridley's proposals as visionary:
...a limited number of radical and striking measures rather than a clutch of
irritating little ones.
Thatcher 1993: 570
Thatcher saw Ridley's proposals as a beautiful mixture of government intervention and
discipline on local authorities, unsetting Socialists and paternalist Tories. Deregulation and
choice for tenants would
...weaken the almost incestuous relationship between councils and tenants.
Ridley cited in Marsh and Mullins, 1998:128
The former PM's view was that compulsory transfers through Housing Action Trusts (HATs)
and Housing Revenue Account ring-fencing would generally assist in stimulating voluntary
disposals (author's italics).53 Thatcher devotes much energy in her memoirs to berating the
House of Lords for caving into propaganda and diluting the force of the HAT proposals by
introducing a requirement for tenant consent. This was to prove exceptionally significant as
later chapters will show.
The literature shows four stated objectives of housing policy following the Conservatives' re-
election in 1987 (Kemp, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Cole and Furbey, 1994; Currie and Murie,
1996; Harriott and M att hews , 1998; Audit Commission, 1993). Though there are important
differences in the detail of legislation and the programmes the government put in place in
the two jurisdictions, White Papers for England and Scotland alike featured four aims,
namely to:
1. encourage the spread of home ownership;
2. revitalise the private rented sector;
3. assist local authorities to become enablers; and
4. target public expenditure more effectively.
53 Thatcher's memoirs reveal misgivings in 1987/8 about the implications of rent rises for social security spending, which she
saw as the most difficult aspect of the proposals. However, this was subservient to the goal of reducing municipal influence
in public services and challenging insensitive, 'incompetent and corrupt state landlords' (Thatcher, 1993: 599).
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A range of measures had been used during the 1980s to introduce greater discipline into the
management of council housing but these were 'not enough', hence further legislative54 and
non-legislative measures were considered necessary (Kemp, 1990). Kemp argued that the
1987 White Paper signalled the most important recasting of housing policy since 1919, by
imposing compulsory housing transfers on some local authorities, deregulating private rents
and exposing the voluntary sector to more private borrowing and more financial risk. The
whole set of proposals implied an aim to eliminate council housing, which was greeted with
hostility by political opponents, tenants' groups and trade unions who could be argued as
viewing council housing as a source of votes, shelter and employment respectively (Kemp,
1990).
More specifically in relation to English council housing, Kemp shows the government's
objectives as seeking to produce:
1. greater diversity to break up council housing monopolies;
2. increased private investment;
3. better (housing management) services for tenants;
4. empowerment of staff and tenants.
The Scottish White Paper (Cmnd 242) flagged four different aspirations:
1. to increase choice;
2. improve supply and quality of housing;
3. encourage greater responsibility;
4. deal with residual homelessness.
This chapter returns to the first four objectives to establish what might have been known
about whether these objectives were delivered in England, whereas later chapters examine
the different emphasis in Scotland. The UK literature tends to default to the English
mechanisms, though the legal and resource arrangements in Scotland were clearly different
(Gibb and Munro, 1991).
In England, the government took powers to compulsorily transfer council stock to HATs,
requiring change though in the end not entirely successfully (Malpass and Means, 1993).
The Conservative government also proposed two specific mechanisms confusingly called
Tenant's Choice and Tenants' Choice, which became law in the form of the Housing Act
1988 and the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988 respectively. The mechanism took a different
form north and south of the border: a collective right in England but an individual right in
Scotland. Both mechanisms allowed tenants to initiate transfer of ownership of a rented
property to another, 'approved' landlord,55 though again not entirely successfully (Tulloch,
1998). Whether this constitutes concurrent policy is a theme to which we return (Midwinter
et aI, 1991).
54 Acts were passed both in 1988 and 1989 in England. The 1989 Act imposed severe constraints on English councils'
housing finance arrangements and required local surpluses (usually in low debt authorities) to subsidise Housing Benefit
(Wilcox, 1994).
55 Approval of the receiving landlord was delegated to the Housing Corporation and Scottish Homes respectively. T ulloch
shows at best lukewarm enthusiasm for implementation, at worst positive obstruction by agency staff.
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Transfer - as it emerged - was not the intended method of achieving the government's
objectives. Indeed, while many observers agreed that central government generally
welcomed transfer in principle, the Treasury in particular was concerned about the risk of
lending (to refinance council housing) swamping and distorting other borrowing. Thus, in the
end government sought to contain the flow of transfers in anyone year and in anyone
transaction 'so that mass landlordism was not simply reproduced in another sector' (Cole
and Furbey, 1994: 205). This suggested central government was seeking to channel the
behaviour of local actors.
Local
The rationale at the local scale was very different from that of central government (not least
in rhetoric). Early government-funded research clearly showed 'community ownership' (as
stock transfer in Scotland was first known) as a Labour council initiative dating back to the
mid-1980s, rather than originating with central government, predating the Conservatives'
1987 election manifesto by at least two years (Clapham, Kintrea and Whitefield, 1991 ).56 In
response to public resource cutbacks and private opportunities Glasgow City Council
developed new ideas for increasing private sector investment in council housing. Central
government offcials and ministers were initially sceptical of Glasgow's proposals and after
months of negotiation, proposed an alternative, channelling additional public resources
through a government agency thus using established mechanisms while distancing the
council from financial administration (Clapham et aI, 1991). A Scottish Office letter showed
government in Scotland to be 'sympathetic in principle' (SDD, 1988) (see Chapter Eight).
The first transfer in England was promoted by Conservative-held Chiltern DC in 1987
(Kemp, 1990; CSL, 1992) and observers highlighted ideology at the local scale as being an
important driving force in the early years (Malpass and Means, 1993). The English White
Paper acknowledged that a number of councils were voluntarily taking steps to transfer their
stock (DoE, 1987). Guidance was published following the first batch of transfers (DoE,
1988) revealing government's primary concern about establishing effective separation and
independence of the new landlord body from the counciL. Later waves of guidance
structured the programme - now known as LSVT - limiting the scale of transactions,
consolidating valuation methodology and introducing levies to allow government to benefit
from unanticipated surpluses. This was portrayed as 'maturing into a managed programme
over time' (Cowan and Marsh, 2001: 32). Where the earlier behaviour supported Bowen's
notion of path-clearing to create a bandwagon (Chapter Two), later English moves to
develop partial transfer with subsidy showed a more deliberative process of policy-making
56 Glasgow City Council called its new idea 'community ownership' to increase its acceptability. The council faciliated staff to
assist tenants to form pilot co-operatives (private bodies) with a view to funding by private sector grants from central
government, topped up with private loans (Nicholson et aI, 1985). In 1986 central government revised the proposals
providing funding for three pilot groups channelled via the Housing Corporation (then controlled from London): - known as
Phase 1. Phase 2 re-surfaced later that year, in a form closer to the original council proposal. Both involved the council in
selling part of its tenanted stock to housing associations (Clapham and Kintrea, 1994).
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with mutual accommodation of conflicting objectives to achieve shared goals (Lindblom,
1979; Sabatier, 1986).
Commentators often imply that what came to be known as 'transfer' was the intended
outcome of central government's policy, yet without offering supporting evidence. The
financial pressure resulted from deliberate decision-making to squeeze councils but it could
equally be argued that central government could not know the consequence of that
pressure. Transfer could be interpreted as bottom-up problem solving by invisible
entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1996). Transfer results from the local interplay of 'push and pull
factors' (Perry 2001). While the single push factor was the backlog of repairs, there were
four pull factors, one of which was assistance with historic debt (in Scotland), though it
should be noted that the latter was only introduced in principle in 1998 (Scottish Offce,
1999) and eventually also to England (DETR, 2001). The other three pull factors include: 1)
potential investment through private borrowing, 2) protection of housing stock for rent, 3)
use of surplus receipts to payoff historic debts. Yet surplus receipts could not be assumed
for every council in England or Scotland (Bramley et a/1993; KPMG 1996; Anderson 1997,
Scottish Homes / CoSLA 1998).
A combination of higher rents and lower outstanding debt made for considerable 'equity
release' in early English shire transfers. There were incentives for councils to transfer in the
early 1990s if the receipt extinguished debt and covered transaction costs, leaving a surplus
receipt. However a different structure of rent pricing made for much higher valuations in
certain areas of England allowing more generous receipts to be generated in those areas
(Wilcox, 1994). The opportunity to secure extra resources in this way provided behavioural
incentives for cash-strapped actors in local government, allowing surpluses to be recycled
into housing investment (Aldbourne Associates, 1998; Brown with Taylor, 2001), payoff
debts and fund other facilities (Wilcox, 1994; Mullins, 1996).57
Based on early government-funded research using local case studies, it was concluded that
stock transfer was a 'self-administered suicide pill' or alternative medicine to government
interference (Mal pass and Means, 1993). Similarly action at the local scale was partly
defensive - a form of 'coerced exchange to prevent a reduction in welfare' (Kemp, 1990:
804).
Unspecified actors on the local government stage saw opportunities to
...escape from draconian central control... towards the more benign
treatment of housing associations
Marsh and Mullns 1998:148
57 Some councils used funds to make the whole council debt free or fund swimming pools and recreational faciliies.
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Later commentators concluded that
... rather than dissatisfied tenants driving a transfer process, it was
disabled landlords who sought to resolve their dilemmas through transfer.
Cowan and Marsh 2001: 31
Both the early Scottish and English initiatives point to slightly different forms of bottom-up
action at a time of turmoil with ostensible loyalists operating as invisible champions to
protect their interests (see Chapter Two). Yet housing associations' behaviour was
arguably more subject to control by the regulatory body than councils were by central
government (Kemp, 1990; Malpass, 2001), even before increased regulation in 1996 (see
section on outcomes below). Central government certainly was not prepared for the first
transfers in the form in which they emerged (in England or Scotland) which left a vacuum to
be filled by local action to create a process, later consolidated via waves of government
guidance and revisions to the legal framework. This does not indicate what Sabatier called a
'dominant and clear policy programme' but lies in precisely the middle ground indicated by
Hill and Sabatier, where rules emerge in the course of policy, maturing into a managed
programme. We return to conflict between policy objectives and their contradictory
consequences, once we have established how transfer is conducted since the processes
and rules help to structure actors' behaviour (Rhodes, 1997; Lane and Ersson, 2000).
Managing the Transfer Process, Balancing Conflicting Interests
The process of conducting a transfer is a core interest of this thesis in power relations in the
policy process. These issues have been of considerable passing interest to researchers,
though not necessarily their primary focus. Latterly central government research has
examined the effectiveness of the process, for the purposes of streamlining future
administration5B (DTZ, 2000). Though he believed more transfer was a certainty, Perry's
commentary on the interests at play in the process of transfer would lead one to conclude
that transfer was far from a foregone conclusion (Wilcox, 2000). He shows a range of
formidable obstacles to transfer, including lender perceptions of risk resulting in higher rates
of interest, tenant opposition in ballots, complexity and fear of challenge and the capacity of
the profession (or lack of). This indicates the range of dimensions and stakeholders whose
stances and interests have to be accommodated through a process of consent and
approval, emphasising the significance of bargaining.
Process - Stages and Interests
Understanding of the process was slow to become established and was first documented by
government in England five years after transfer (DoE, 1993). The process is essentially
58 Ten years on government consultants recommended better future process on a number of issues: problem analysis,
communication and consultation with stakeholders including tenants, separation of conflcting interests, training, planning
and managing change (DTZ, 2000). Many similar points are made in Scottish Executive guidance on transfer first published
August 2000 (in response to criticism from a Scottsh Parliamentary commitee on the lack of an explicit framework for
developing or appraising NHP proposals).
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about local administrative decision-making within a framework of rules defined at the centre.
It is represented as though distilled to a number of key stages. This assumption of a linear
progression reveals a rational model of policy-making, with solutions found to problems
arising at each stage (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Figure 2 provides an example of such a
flow chart taken from later Scottish draft guidance.
Figure 2 : Sample Stock Transfer Flow Chart
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Key approvals (shaded grey in Figure 2 above) must be achieved by
A. Regulator (Scottish Homes or Housing Corporation) about the purchaser
B. The council - agreement to consult tenants about proposals to sell on certain terms
C. Tenants about the terms and conditions of sale (guarantees of rent and future service)
D. Central government - about terms (debt, receipts, lack of tenant opposition)
E. Lender - agreement to lend money to the purchaser
Research on valuations in early English transfers revealed more institutional stakeholder
interests in the process of transfer. These included: central government, (existing) tenants,
tax- and rate-payers, lenders, staff (and unions), consultants / advisers, buyers, sellers,
politicians - central and local, regulators (Kemp, 1990; Gardiner et aI, 1991). Some of these
categories conflate interests within organisations - notably those of staff and politicians. Not
all interests are formally represented as the process excludes wider community
participation, (by prospective tenants and political opponents other than tenants, though
opposition was vehemently articulated at every level (see below). Tenants may have a dual
role: each has an individual interest and opportunity to express their preferences and
exercise power, through the ballot, though the requirement for a majority constrains their
individual power to achieve their own wishes. However tenants can also become involved in
new governance or consultation arrangements, in a representative capacity (Clapham et aI,
1991; Nevin, 1999). This increases their power in the process.
Stakeholders have different windows of opportunity to influence proposals. To simplify
matters, Table 7 portrays formal roles and responsibilities in relation to stages/ windows.
Some stages continue in parallel (see example idealised process above) and are revisited
as stakeholder involvement and changing parameters help to refine objectives. Arguably
this process is the same regardless of the scale or method of financing the transfer, and
regardless too of whether the disposing landlord is a council or other public landlord, in
England, Scotland or elsewhere. Table 7 is annotated to show possible links with stages of
rational, linear policy-making: the absence of certain notional stages in this list reveals that
the specialist literature underplays or neglects implementation, monitoring, evaluation and
succession. At the same time some activities do not connect directly with policy theory.
Neither model fully conveys the need for prior stages to be revisited in the event of failure to
secure agreement and the need for provisional and detailed proposals to anticipate later
formal approvals by various interested parties. A strict order is implied: for example the
council/landlord cannot seek government approval without being able to demonstrate
majority tenant consent to the disposal and central government59 cannot agree to the
proposal if a majority of tenants oppose it (DETR, 1999; Scottish Offce, 1996). Thus tenants
must be consulted and lack of opposition demonstrated usually via a ballot,60
59 Secretary of State - or First Minister in Scotland after 1999.
60 A legal requirement to conduct ballots was first introduced in the Housing Scotland Act 2001.
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Table 7: Summary of participants' roles in stock transfer process administration
Stage 1 activity, (annotated in relation
Lto policy stages per Hogwood and .l
~
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Gunn, 19841 5l
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Initial exploration of transfer prospects and an ,/ ,/
assessment of what transfer might be expected to
achieve r decidina to decide?l"
Stock condition survey and valuation (latterly known as ,/ ,/ ,/
Option Appraisal) r issue definition?l
Feasibility study on a particular transfer vehicle ,/ ,/
r option analvsis?1
Identification and development of an appropriate ,/ ,/ ,/
transfer vehicle
Consultation with affected tenants culminating in ,/ ,/ ,/
soundinQs of tenant opinion
Formal ballot of tenants to reveal tenant opinion: ,/ ,/
prerequisite to CG consent to disposal
Formal decision-taking by disposing landlord, central ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/
government, acquiring landlord and lender to proceed
with the sale
Negotiation of the final terms of sale and of terms of ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/
emplovment for staff
Conveyancing and finalisation of legal transaction ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/
(imolementation?1
Receipt of proceeds of sale (assistance with same) ,/ ,/ ,/
(implementation ?J
Source: adapted from Audit Commission, 1993
Similarly lenders will not agree to lend without all of the above consents in place, including -
critically - regulatory approval which affects credit ratings and thus amounts of borrowing
and repayment arrangements. Some approvals depend on statutory and administrative
arrangements whereas the fifth one is a matter of business prudence in concluding a
contract. They all represent complex bargaining, mainly through the valuation, which we see
in the next section.
Competing Interests in Funding Transfer
Potential conflict of interest centres on the funding of the stock to be transferred and
according to the literature especially its value. This arose from a new valuation method
which emerged in the early 1990s, after its introduction in England by a local organisation -
Chiltern Hundreds HA (CSL, 1992). The traditional method61 was used for valuing housing
in the owner-occupied market and remains in use in 2002: it was also used to value housing
in most partial transfers in Scotland before 1996. The traditional method is neither
transparent, contestable nor does it provide room for negotiation.62 The new system is
called Discounted Cash Flow (DCF). Applied to stock transfer, the methodology is called
Tenanted Market Valuation (TMV) (DoE, 1993) (example included at Appendix Six). It came
61 The tradition method was based on comparable transaction values of capital assets.
62 See NAO, 1994; epA, 1994 for discussion about the conflct surrounding use of this method in the Waverley transfer in
1991.
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to be promoted by government for both LSVT and ERCF purposes in England (DoE, 1993);
and in Scottsh Homes and New Town transfers in Scotland from 1992 (Scottish Homes,
1992a). It was used with official endorsement in 1995 in Berwickshire and thereafter
promoted to Scottish local authorities (Scottish Office Development Department, 1996a).
Although this valuation is based on a technical appraisal of stock conditions, it is negotiable
and highly contested. Tulloch (1997) cites Millngton's argument that it is the inputs rather
than the methodology which are inadequate in modern valuation. Information is far from
perfect and it is equally shared. Certain aspects of the valuations are politically sensitive:
starting rents, future rental63 profiles, timing of major expenditure, discount rates (as
recommended by the Treasury) (Gardiner et aI, 1991). TMV assumptions and methodology
are standard but the local details determine the resulting sale price - Net Present Value
(NPV). The valuation is also critical to business planning, borrowing and investment (DoE,
1993): it is thus of considerable commercial and political sensitivity, of huge policy
importance and its implications are of critical significance in the ballot of sitting tenants and
in incentives for generating surpluses.
Valuation for stock transfer emerges as more of a dark art than a science, in spite of the
mystique of computer models and financial consultants. The valuation can be negotiated up,
(reducing expenditure and! or increasing income) or down (by increasing repair and renewal
estimates and lowering rents). Valuation is thus described as 'old-fashioned bargaining to
achieve a mutually acceptable price' (Audit Commission, 1993: 17). The negotiations have
been represented as a curious dance of scorpions between the sellers, buyers and
government (Gardiner et aI, 1991). Assumptions are negotiated to suit competing interests
which means that the resulting valuation or price is not just a simple number. Valuation is
more than a negotiated outcome but a central part of the process where stakeholders'
selfish perspectives interact. It provides the heuristic device to which Stoker and Marsh
(1996) refer, revealing bounded rationality and motivations not only of organisations but of
groupings and individuals within those organisations. This is a bureau-shaper's delight
(Campbell and Wilson, 1998) though the need to anticipate later stages requires a high
degree of adjustment and accommodation (Sabatier, 1986; Hill, 1997a).
While some stakeholders wish a high value or price, others wish it to be lower. The seller's
interest lies in maximising value and thereby price, available receipts and surpluses. Central
government shares the interest in a high price, to achieve greatest benefit for the PSBR in
the year of transfer though other government budgets (such as social security) may bear the
consequences. By contrast, buyers are interested in lower prices to minimise borrowing to
fund acquisition and maximise investment. Similarly, lenders are interested in lower prices,
especially to minimise exposure to risk. Thus higher prices, based on unrealistic
63 Existing and new tenants' rents were modelled differently often with dramatic diferences in starting rents and growth
profiles: non-transferring tenants' rents were often much higher (Mullins et aI, 1995).
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assumptions, are not in their interests. Last but not least, it is in tenants' interests for
investment expenditure to be maximised while rents are kept as low as possible.
This assumes that all of the above actors have equal access to and understanding of
valuation when in fact tenants are often kept at arms' length. Given the apparent complexity
surrounding valuations, tenants rely critically on independent advice to know what lies inside
proposals, yet it is almost impossible for them to make an informed decision (Gardiner et aI,
1991). This is because others have (and use) better access to information, especially in
LSVT where tenants are not in control of the new body (Bramley et aI, 1993). These
accounts of process ignore decision-making where subsidy is present.
DemonsuaUng Lack of OpposiUon
However, tenants have significant negative power through consultation and the ballot and
wise policy-makers anticipate or incorporate tenants' views as tenants who do not agree
with transfer proposals have and use their power to de-rail or veto council transfer proposals
through the ballot. Mullins (in Malpass and Means, 1993) shows that out of 30 ballots held in
England by the end of 1991, majority tenant support had only been demonstrated in 18
cases. Perry (in Wilcox, 2001) reports that by 1999 only 74% of ballots had been
'successful', leaving 26% as 'failed'. Understanding ballot failure tends to rely on anecdotal
reporting in the trade press, rather than research analysis. 
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Opponents to the early transfers objected to the removal of investment decision-making
from democratic control without increasing user control (Kemp, 1990). Later, in ERCF
transfer failure, delays and abortive discussions had their origins in technical, political and
organisational problems before and after ballot. In some cases, property conditions simply
were not bad enough or available investment incentives sufficient to justify to tenants the
disruption of transfer (Nevin, 1999). This reveals many dimensions of implementation failure
- poor causal theory, insuffcient resources, as well as stance-related, ideological opposition
raising questions about the balance of incentives needed to allow tenants to overcome
resistance.
Organised, ideologically-based opposition can be a key factor in ballot failure and brings
actors' values and stances back to our attention. Pre-emptive ballots were organised in the
early 1990s by tenants in London and in schemes affected by proposed compulsory
transfers (Kemp, 1990). By the end of that decade, opposition came from formal and
increasingly informal stakeholders including: staff - senior, junior or ancillary staff; tenants'
groups; politicians; the press. The spectacular success of a 'no' campaign can be seen
through the filter of one particular case (Hebden, 2000). An LSVT proposal was quashed as
a result of organised opposition from tenants, supported by elected members, and a hostile
press puttng out what Hebden saw as 'misinformation'. Arguably, the Defend Council
64 The Tenant Participation Advisory Service for England records some failures but not in any consistent way.
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Housing campaign group was becoming more active rather than less, which could be a
consequence of excessively tight processing.65
While opposition may be based on ideological principle, it can also reflect the failure of
those promoting the transfer to use the consultation process to communicate effectively.
Scottsh Homes' promotion of its own stock transfer, slick advertising techniques and
unbalanced promotion of transfer were seen to be counter-productive in securing tenant
support at ballot, arousing rather than assuaging suspicion (Taylor, 1999). Similarly a
government research report (in 1992) pinpointed one-sided messages from disposing
councils in England and later independent advice was recommended to counter unbalanced
communication (Mullins et aI, 1992; 1995). Subsequent guidance advised authorities to
appoint a 'Tenant's Friend' or Independent Adviser (Scottish Homes, 1992b; DoE, 1993;
SODD, 1996a).
Yet by the late 1990s, a consultant nursing bruises from failure to secure a 'yes' vote (and
thus access to government subsidy and private investment) still felt it necessary to promote
the importance of good communications (Furner 1999). Sellers needed to get the right
message to the right people at the right time, and use varying methods of communication in
order to win trust and counteract misleading and inflammatory misinformation from
organised opposition. Furner (1999) argued that public sellers, unlike private buyers, were
strait jacketed by their statutory responsibility to inform rather than persuade and so could
not retaliate against (or pre-empt) misinformation. Public actors were seen as untrustworthy
-"as though operating selfishly, while obeying rules requiring detachment and a moral code
(Hjern and Porter, 1981).
Timing
Initial research showed only a basic understanding of the stages of the process, especially
later beyond the ballot where litte is shown apart from 'the legal transaction' (CSL, 1992;
Gardiner et aI, 1991). similarly showed very litte beyond the ballot and central government
approval whereas research underlines the enduring and costly technical, legal and financial
complexities beyond the ballot stage (Audit Commission, 1993; Mullins et aI, 1995; DTZ,
2000).
Transfer is not a particularly quick fix. An interim report to the DoE in 1992 indicated 22
months as typical for developing transfer proposals from start to finish (Mullins et aI, 1992).
This was endorsed by the Audit Commission (1993) and in due course the existence of a
pipeline presupposed that the proposals could be successfully developed in a year.
Clapham et al (1991) suggested that it took some of the early Scottish cases up to four
years to achieve registration, a prerequisite for subsidy and borrowing. Proposals for urban
transfers with subsidy in England indicated 18 month timescales as ambitious (KPMG,
1996). Later reports showed ERCF negotiations taking up to three and a half years, before
65 Five ballots failed in one year (1998/9) affecting 15,000 homes including partial subsidised transfers in England. In at least
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decisions had even been taken about transfer of ownership and long before actual
investment contracts and tangible improvements were in place (Nevin, 1999). These
timescales are lengthy relative to electoral cycles and potential opposition.
At one level the process is merely a matter of administration. At another level, it reveals the
interplay of stakeholder interests, which are central to understanding power relations. The
literature permits us to interpret who drives the process and by what means. The onus is on
those promoting the successful disposal of the stock (acting as sellers or buyers) to
anticipate and satisfy the interests of others in the process, as a prerequisite to securing
their approval. The buyer and seller organisations were very often peopled by the same
individuals, at least in the early stages. This created potential conflict of interest when the
seller and buyer were represented by the same personnel, until procedures were developed
stipulating the necessity of separation of personnel beyond the feasibility stage (DETR,
1999).
Interpreting Policy Outcomes: Who Knew What?
Although rational models of policy making suggest monitoring and evaluation as standard
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984), it is not particularly clear who knows what the impact of
transfer has been overalL. Thus a civil servant could argue in favour of research into the
process 12 years of transfer after the event (Horsman, 2001) although by 2001 almost half a
milion houses had already been transferred.66
Although government has funded research both in Scotland and England, it has been partial
- concerned with streamlining the process (Bowen, 1982) and demonstrating tenant
satisfaction, to influence future policy rather than evaluation overall in relation to
objectivesP Does this mean the government thought the policy was working? This thesis is
not concerned to evaluate transfer but rather to examine why and how transfers have
happened. To that extent, comment on knowledge of policy consequences is warranted
here with a more detailed appraisal of the impact reported elsewhere (Taylor, 2000).
Good Enough Knowledge of Transfer
The existence of specialist trade press updates about completed transfers clearly does not
satisfy all policy information needs. The occasional and continued appearance of
Parliamentary Questions, requesting basic information suggests lack of awareness of policy
consequences. For example a PQ in February 2001 (no. 0814) triggered a simple list of the
names of councils who had transferred all their stock since May 1997, along with the
numbers of houses involved without context, commentary or comparison. The very need for
PQs to establish such basic information suggests lack of access by parliamentarians to
one case, tenants were reported to have rejected proposals for the second time (Hebden, 2000; Social Housing, 1999).
66 A year later, the relevant department still had litte analysis of trends overall though by that time it did have research
findings and recommendations DTZ 2000.
67 An extensive programme of research was under way in 200112 funded by other bodies on a range of dimensions.
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relevant data about changes in social housing, widely acknowledged to be highly significant.
Failed attempts at transfer are barely mentioned in the trade press and are not the subject
of government research commissions.
There is a gap between availability of data and publication, particularly in textbooks. In
1998, Harriott and Matthews' figures were three years old. Though the delay is lessening,
even in 2001 figures were still two years out of date at the point of publication. Textbook
publication cycles appear too elongated to provide any meaningful information at a time of
such rapid and extensive change and this is why we have to rely on primary sources such
as the trade press. The speed of change also focuses commentators' attention on the new
rather than analysis of patterns and trends, yet what analysis of such major changes is
possible without some trend analysis?
In the absence of accessible offcial data (until government started to make comprehensive
transfer listings available in England in 200168), independent sources assist understanding
of stock transfer to some extent. The main source of information for the trade press was
government data, supplemented by journalistic enquiries. However analysis was usually
limited to financial information and discussion, with political 'analysis' limited to editorial
comment on perceived trends. The absence of Scottish partial transfers in their dataset
could be attributed to the focus on ERCF funding and the lack of ERCF funding in Scotland,
but not of subsidy altogether (Taylor, 1996c; Taylor, 1998). Enquiries by the researcher
verified that the lack of coverage of Scottish transfer was partly because they were 'too
small and not really transfers anyway'. Besides, 'the magazine started long after the
Scottish transfers were underway and were too long ago for the data to be retrievable'.69
Nevertheless lack of official data on transfer in Scotland70 may have contributed to the
invisibility of Scottish transfers.
Although there have been transfers in Scotland, the primary preoccupation in the secondary
literature is with England and mainly with LSVT or whole stock transfer to new, large
housing associations, until recently conflating all types of transfers together. There is no
spatial analysis, even for England. The distinction between whole and partial transfers is
new and usefuL. However as long as the partial transfer phenomenon is inadvertently
defined as ERCF-funded, discussion of partial transfers with subsidy will exclude Scottish
small-scale transfers, even though - like the ERCF transactions - these were subsidised, as
later chapters wil show. If commentators in England, who dominate the UK publishing
market on housing, think of the transfer phenomenon as essentially about LSVT and ERCF,
then by definition - though without a formal definition as such - discussion about transfer will
exclude reference to Scotland. The exception remains Berwickshire, whose inclusion is
based on an assumed similarity with LSVT in England, though within a different institutional
68 The data are available on the DETR website - see Chapter Five.
69 Personal communication with the database manager and editor of Social Housing April 2001.
70 More recently Scottsh Homes transfers have been reported.
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framework. Bearing all these comments in mind, we can comment on evidence in relation to
government objectives, with reference to policy concepts.
Meeting Objectives
Diversity: Alternatives to Mass Landlordism?
Ministerial Tenant's Choice schemes may have been intended to increase diversity and
weaken tenant dependency but they were almost wholly unused (Tulloch, 1999; Murie and
Nevin, 1999). Key actors within the Housing Corporation (charged with promoting the
scheme) comprehensively thwarted its progress. Tulloch's reports of the difficulties faced by
one or two new landlord organisations created using Tenant's Choice, serves to emphasise
the dependence of successful implementation on the compliance of responsible offcials
(Hood, 1976; Sabatier, 1986). The scale of transactions was usually limited (via guidance
and consent between 1993 and 1997) to a maximum of 5,000 houses to any single landlord,
which could stil be mass landlordism. Though there is no published analysis of the
characteristics of English buyers, the stock is believed to have been sold to newly created
housing associations, later known as RSLs, very often staffed by the same people who had
managed council housing services prior to transfer (Mullins, 1996; 1999). This means
'transfer' usually refers by default to whole disposals, mostly without competition to large,
new bodies, which does little to challenge diversity. Perhaps the 5,000 limit provides
evidence of inadequate theory of cause and effect in structuring implementation: attempts to
create more diversity might have entailed a lower ceiling on maximum transaction size or
required whole stocks to be split regardless of size.
Subsidy might have brought more organisational diversity but post transfer monitoring
reveals litteJ1 English, urban, Labour council use of ideas about a new type of body - a
'local housing company' (LHC72), as a vehicle for regeneration arose from ideas originally
developed in response to criticisms of the association model in early transfers. These were
criticised for lack of democratic control of transfer landlords, as a maximum of 20% of the
places on the board of the new body could be council nominees (Bramley, et aI, 1993). By
contrast, an LHC allowed tenants to control approximately one third of the positions on the
governing body and the remaining two thirds to be split equally between the local authority
and the community (or independent parties with no local connection) (Zitron,1996; Nevin
1999).
The Housing Act 1996 allowed the Housing Corporation (in England only) to regulate a
wider range of bodies (including LHCs) - all called RSLs (Malpass, 2000) - arguably
negating the significance of the original distinction between LHC and housing associations.
The Housing Corporation was pursuing a new regulatory agenda for all associations in
England, at the very same time as stock transfer was adding to the size of the sector
overalL. Nevertheless, the new pressures introduced by complete debt financing resulting
71 See Chapter Five and Appendix Six on the monitoring of 'transfer' organisations.
72 LHC were developed with support from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Chartered Institute of Housing.
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directly from stock transferchanged the balance of emphasis of association activity (Mullins
and Riseborough, 1997).
The partial, ERCF-funded transfers in urban authorities are assumed to have moved to LHC
ownership (Murie and Nevin, 1999) whereas the trade press lists established housing
associations as among the buyers. This too may have produced more diversity of ownership
at the local scale though it must also have increased the stock holdings of those
associations. Recent trade coverage of mergers and group structures suggests if anything
that RSLs were becoming more like mass landlords (Social Housing, 2000; Malpass, 2000)
albeit suiting political objectives by virtue of not being in public ownership (Malpass, 2001).
In this respect, much depends on the structure of local management arrangements, both in
subsidised, partial transfers and whole stock transfers,?3 LSVT has contributed significantly
to the growth of the voluntary sector in England representing some 50% of the total growth
in the housing association holdings since 1988 (Mullns and Riseborough, 1997). This
impacts on the scale of the voluntary sector and its character but it does not provide
evidence of diversity.
Increased Private Investment
Private investment in English housing arising from transfer can be measured in billions of
pounds from new lending. New housing built by RSLs may be subsidised by equity release
arising from receipts in excess of debt. By March 1999, sellers (collectively) had 'useable'
receipts of £456m (Wilcox, 2000) for recycling in the area where the surplus arose. This
could be used for housing or other investment. Wilcox (2000) shows gross receipts ahead
of historic debts although the trade press shows individual councils (especially in urban
areas) increasingly (post 1999/ 2000) relying on support from central government to
extinguish historic debt. It is claimed that the beneficiaries of investment (from 'useable'
receipts74) were most commonly the council-sponsored RSLs and to a greater extent than
had been anticipated on the basis of formal commitments at transfer (Marsh and Mullins,
1998). This could be interpreted as supporting arguments (reviewed in Chapter Two) about
policy capture by street level bureaucrats and ostensible loyalists (Hill 1997a) and about
actors adapting their identities to changing conditions (March and Olsen, 1996).
Although there has been extensive private investment in English council housing, latterly
there has been a need to underpin this with public subsidy. While central government's
measure of borrowing (PSBR) benefits from receipts to local authorities, increases in
government revenue expenditure (not least on Housing Benefit) prompted the introduction
of a levy in 199375 and controls on rent increases. According to Wilcox (1994), even where
73 This area is not researched though some independent work was under way in 2002.
74 Surplus 'useable'receipts were left with some sellers in England once historic debt was paid off
75 The levy allowed a portion of any surplus receipt from an English LSVT transfer to be paid to the Treasury to ease the
impact of increased costs of Housing Benefit, due to rising rents and from 1993, rent increases were constrained (DoE,
1993). A short levy 'holiday' period was granted in November 1996, though the RPI +1% assumption remained: the levy was
reintroduced in March 1999 (Cowan and Marsh, 2001).
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a transfer required subsidy or a 'dowry', disposal could still be financially valuable to the
Treasury provided subsidy and increased Housing Benefit costs did not exceed potential
savings arising from debt payments, borrowing and VAT income. Mullins and Revell (1999)
raised further doubts about the affordability of rents and policy papers on rent control,
curbing future rent growth points to the salience of rents as an issue for central government
(DETR, 2000; Housing Corporation, 1999) but, again, the relevant figures are not readily
available. If there were targets for investment (or expenditure or savings), these are not
evident and so we cannot tell from published sources to what extent expectations have
been met. The apparent lack of monitoring is remarkable for such an important issue.
Better Services
While stock transfer outcomes are generally under-researched, satisfaction has been a
focus of commissioned research, arguably designed to comfort tenants due to be balloted
(Taylor, 2000). Surveys suggest that tenants (in England and in Scotland) are broadly
satisfied with services from new landlord organisations after transfer (Mullins et aI, 1995;
Graham et aI, 1997; Graham et aI, 1999).
Research for DETR reported high levels of satisfaction among tenants in six transfer case
studies in England (DTZ, 2000). In general, LSVT landlords compared favourably with
English local authorities and with the former council landlord, in relation to value for money
and management. Although repair services produced high satisfaction ratings among
tenants, transfer RSLs were deemed poor compared with traditional RSLs. Mullins and
Revell (1999) showed LSVT RSLs among the best performing RSLs in England. Though
Housing Corporation research claimed better performance among older transfer
organisations, Mullins and Revell (1991) pointed to higher standards being achieved by
RSLs emerging from later transfers (i.e. after April 1994). In some functions (such as rent
collection), the new landlords performed less well than councils generally. Distinctly
dissatisfied were new tenants of transfer landlords whose rents were significantly higher
than their neighbours, due to the policy of charging a premium on new tenants' rents,
relative to guarantees to their neighbours (Mullins et aI, 1995; Mullns and Revell, 1999;
DTZ, 2000). However their power to effect change was very limited.
More recent research on stock transfer in England has focussed on the outcomes of transfer
on strategic services such as housing needs assessment, planning, homelessness and
Housing Benefit administration (Aldbourne, 1997; Mullins, 1996; Brown with Taylor, 2001;
Shelter, 2001). These relate as much to council services to tenants and potential tenants as
they do to landlord services but the evidence about whether post-transfer services are better
is ambiguous.
Empowerment
The research literature does not usually address this theme directly. Clapham and Kintrea
(1994) revisited some of the original community ownership co-ops in Glasgow and the
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independent consultants explored LSVT staff experience post-transfer in the English
Midlands. While managers were reported to be more enthusiastic and dynamic post-
transfer, loss of staff morale seems to be a distinct problem lower down. Prior to transfer,
this was due to management failure to communicate effectively with staff in the run-up to
transfer, with potentially disastrous ballot consequences. Motivation and morale improved in
some cases after transfer but fell in others, due to a post-transfer anticlimax (Natrins, 1998).
Failure to deliver promises affected morale, arising from ineffective bargaining in valuation
(Natrins, 1998). Research on Scottsh Homes transfers sought to reveal employee
satisfaction in the new organisations. An otherwise uncritical report showed post-transfer
morale was poor, where buyers had agreed to over-optimistic valuations and unduly rosy
assumptions about the ease of establishing maintenance / construction contracts after
transfer (Graham et aI, 1999).
Research suggests that the initially disruptive impact of transfer on staff productivity has
been under-estimated although the consequences for staff morale are not explored. Studies
exploring organisational failure from a regulatory perspective similarly conclude that
problems can arise when stock transfer preparations are conducted in haste (Housing
Corporation, 1999). This points again to implementation deficit highlighting insuffcient time
and poor causal theory (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Sabatier, 1986).
Conclusions
In spite of the amount of activity and discussion around stock transfer, and in spite of the
enormous implications for council housing in future, there is surprisingly litte empirical or
critical research of the consequences. More has been written by way of political
commentary, polemic, or explorations of future possibilities (financial and organisational) to
counter anecdotal criticisms of current transfer practice, though these are not included here.
Much of the research was for policy rather than of policy, even when assessing policy
outcomes, even from independent research bodies. Research effectively ignores a lot of
activity and investment by the public and private sectors alike. With some exceptions, the
literature (and especially the more ephemeral material) is strong on policy rhetoric and
administrative process prescriptions, and moderate on outcomes, particularly tenant
satisfaction. The evidence is distinctly weak on local rationales, analysis of power relations
in the process and policy learning. Often the only 'evidence' on these issues are anecdotal
retrospectives on individual cases by the victorious, or by bruised victims.
Evidence in relation to government objectives is scant and ambiguous, and some issues are
diffcult to research without in-depth studies, which have been neither funded nor
commissioned. The weakness of monitoring suggests a lack of policy interest in the
consequences, perhaps due to lack of alternatives if research were to reveal problems. The
repeated focus of official research on tenant satisfaction appears to satisfy policy-makers'
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needs for assurance that the policy is working but it does not demonstrate evidence of
rational policy-making.
Most research which filters through to the secondary literature has been selective in
evaluating certain dimensions. Not all of the many dimensions to stock transfer (technical,
legal, organisational, political) have been equally addressed in research, though some
political issues have received prominence in commissioned research, due to the need to
persuade potential opponents and streamline the process. Research has often been
commissioned by bodies with some role in promoting or funding transfer activity, in
approving or regulating the emerging landlord bodies. Research commissioners tend to
pursue and use research to persuade such opponents of the merits of the case.
While some organisational issues have been researched thanks to regulatory and
researcher interest in organisational failure, the technical and financial issues have not been
subject to the same level of research on policy, and certainly not funded by public bodies.
The technical aspects of the process are less publicly contested, even though they are the
focus of critical bargaining and exchange with profound financial and political
consequences. Additional problems of commercial confidentiality and political sensitivity
arise in relation to the financial issues, with far-reaching policy implications. Academic
research has not challenged the policy or sought to monitor the impacts and consequences.
Although the Conservatives' desire to get rid of the state as a landlord was evident, their
chosen mechanisms to deliver specific policy goals were barely used. Instead local
alternatives were devised in England to accommodate producer rather than consumer
interests. While national objectives are often taken as the starting point for analysis, it could
be argued that whole stock transfer has been hijacked by local actors to achieve outcomes
which coincide with central government policy ambitions (previous and current) in respect of
ideology and financial arrangements. This may reveal invisible entrepreneurs at work
providing solutions to problems visible champions wanted to solve. Local responses to the
financial pressure from the centre are arguably pragmatic, with push and pull factors
carrying different weight or significance for different interests. These factors have been
negotiated between interests at the local scale, mainly through bargaining during the
process. The secondary literature is dominated by English experience based on selected
case studies of success stories of LSVT, yet it cannot keep pace with fast moving trends.
Part of this is inherent in publication cycles given the speed of change but underlying this is
a fundamental lack of access to and analysis of data, even in England. In effect, the
independent trade press provides 'facts' - though mainly about English large scale transfers
- and a degree of interested analysis. More useful information on the phenomenon exists by
virtue of trade press interest in the subject, than from academic policy-focussed research.
The secondary literature implies that transfer is about whole stock disposals in leafy
suburbs, failing to define, capture or explain the very limited, English distribution of the
phenomenon. The only Scottish transfer to gain attention in the UK literature (before the
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Glasgow transfer proposal in 1999) is Berwickshire, seen through an English filter, without
examination. Meanwhile subsidised partial 'transfers' are coming to be seen as part of the
patchwork of transfers in the English urban environment as 'ERCF transfers', while their
counterparts in Scotland for the last 15 years go largely unnoticed in spite of many
similarities (as Chapters Five and Six will show). The primary literature reveals a more
diverse picture of whole and partial transfers in both England and Scotland, which are
changing the nature of social housing provision. A common failing in the literature about UK
housing policy is thus the reversion by default to measures of volume, in England, even
amongst those who set out with broader ambitions.
Crucially, the literature and research is weak on why the transfers happened where they did,
even though authors point to the significance of local action driving the process. There is no
clear analysis of where transfers happened, how or why to aid our understanding of how
housing policy works in different parts of the UK. We do not understand why some councils
promoted transfer nor how many proposed transfers fell and why. Analysis of outcomes is
thus weak and exploration of rationales and motivations is limited. Although the focus of this
thesis is Scotland, opportunities to develop data on Scotland prompted a re-examination of
English transfers, drawing on primary data to establish which of the above questions could
be answered. The relative lack of analysis and definition on English transfers, beyond gross
totals prompted analysis of government records. The next two chapters analyse the
evidence for England and Scotland respectively, drawing out similarities and differences in
trends to move beyond impressions of spatial differences, to gain a better appreciation of
the distribution of transfers (see Chapter Five). Subsequent chapters investigate the
rationale and process issues in Scotland in relation to central systems, local decision-
making and action.
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Chapter Five
Variety in English Stock Transfer
This chapter examines transfer activity in England, which as seen in Chapter Four,
dominates the UK literature on stock transfer. Yet very little data analysis has been
published, even though it affects over half a million houses. This chapter discusses an
analysis of the data about stock transferred by 106 English councils over a period of 13
years. It reviews the volume and patterns of stock and transactions, their funding and
purchaser profiles, mainly using secondary government data on the transfer phenomenon
as observable 'facts' about the output of decision-making. The process of accessing data for
this research confirmed that there was no clear or common definition of a stock transfer and
that there had been very little monitoring of stock transfer, in spite of the possibilities offered
by limited data collection. Data are included up to March 2001 even though the period under
examination ends in May 1997, as they illustrate the emergence of different kinds of transfer
in England which provide useful comparison with the pattern in Scotland (Chapter Six).
Though they point to political paradoxes worthy of further analysis, these are merely raised
in this chapter and discussion is limited here to the period up to 1997 under the
Conservatives.
The analysis reveals two broad types of disposal: whole and partial, around which the
chapter is organised. Within the partial category there are two sub groups of cases
(c?nsidered separately): one with grant funding, the other without. The analysis reveals
substantial spatial and temporal variation in the characteristics of these different transfers.
The chapter finishes with a summary and discussion of types, timing and area distribution,
commenting on the issues and questions raised by this quantitative analysis in relation to
the conclusions in the literature. The chapter argues that failure to differentiate transfers
neglects important typological differences essential to understanding the essentially local
character of stock transfer both in England and in Scotland.
Data: Access and Analysis
Government data were supplied in 2001 and 2002, and supplementary inquiries were made
with other organisations76 to understand more about the ballot outcomes and about diversity,
through information on the distribution and characteristics of buyers. Original data collection
would have been unduly time-consuming and would have been unlikely to achieve a
sufficient sample to be of significance. Data are available consistently for all of the English
(recorded) transfers and although the range of dimensions is limited, it was the best that
could be achieved. Researchers undertaking secondary analysis of others' data need to
accept the limitations of 'good enough' data, collected for other purposes (Gilbert, 1995).
Appendix Six gives details of the approach to data collection, cleaning and analysis. This
76 National Housing Federation - NHF; Housing Corporation - HC; Tenant Participation Advisory Service - TPAS.
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chapter carries graphic illustrations derived from the data (with further Appendices, Seven
and Eight, providing summary tables of the data analysed by year, type, region and size).
S~nificance of Variabres
Government data cover a limited range of variables, mostly gross financial or volume
indicators77: while these may appear technical, they do have political dimensions. They
provide an indication of timing and terms of exchange for each completed transaction
representing episodes of decision-making by sellers, regardless of the scale of transfer.
Data also reveal interesting patterns about the financial terms of decision-making: gross
prices, grant, and borrowing, along with data on set-up costs and levies. Transfer requires a
seller with consenting tenants. The buyer borrows from a private lending institution. Where
the stock has a positive value, the loan first funds the price payable to the seller: where the
stock has a negative value, there is no price and there can be no receipt (Nevin, 1999).
Loans also fund repairs and improvements to the housing stock. Where there is a surplus
receipt (greater than debt), the seller can be due to pay a levy7B. The data reveal the prices
paid by buyers (gross receipts to sellers), the amount of grant payable by government and
the amounts borrowed by buyers from the private sector. Financial information is shown in
constant values at 2001 prices, unless otherwise indicated.
Although government data lend themselves to some analysis, no such analysis appears to
have been tackled. DETR staff were contacted in March 2001 to clarify a number of issues.
Among these was the question of what analysis of the data was undertaken by DETR or by
others known to DETR. Intriguingly, the DETR confirmed that 'they tend not to analyse the
data' and could not suggest others who did. Moreover, a senior official commented that
once the transfer was complete the department 'lost policy interest'. By March 2002, the
government still had no analysis of patterns of transferJ9 This raises interesting issues for
consideration about the policy process, to which later chapters will return.
Further information about the buyers was sought from the Housing Corporation (HC), a non-
departmental public body which regulates the new bodies on behalf of the government; also
from the membership / representative body the National Housing Federation (NHF). Both
were able to supply informal listings of 'stock transfer' associations with relative ease in May
2001 but neither list corresponded to the DETR list. HC capacity to extract this information
seemed based on chance.BO The HC list included 'LSVT' and 'ERCF' transfers but only to
newly registered RSLs. HC did not record ERCF transactions (to pre-existing bodies) as
77 The details are not identical but similar to the data published in the trade press.
78 The levy is 25% of the surplus receipt, payable to the Treasury, determined by a policy decision taken by the DoE in 1993,
and consolidated in the Leasehold Reform and Urban Development Act of 1993). There was a levy 'holiday' between
November 1996 and March 1999. It applies only in England.
79 Personal communication various: telephone conversation February 2001, email March 2001, chance contact with Contact
with the Head of the Community Housing Task Force (2002) at a professional conference. This triggered the department to
request access to the analysis reported here.
80 The researcher was advised that a senior clerical member of staff used her initiative to code the new RSLs, so as to be
able to respond to multiple enquiries.
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'transfers'. The NHF list provided contact information only, for just over half of the landlords
listed, mainly omitting reference to lacking bodies in receipt of ERCF funded transfers and
others post 1997. Again this raises interesting questions about the policy process.
Structure and Presentation of Data
The data are discussed here in terms of a summary of all transfers, followed by the different
patterns in different types of transfer: whole (also known as LSVT) and partial, often known
as ERCF transfers: 'partial' embraces transactions with and without grant. Where the whole
stock of a council has been sold at the same time, it is treated as a whole stock transfer,
even when the purchase was split between two buyers. Partial therefore means that the
authority retained stock in ownership and management after the disposaL.
The tables derived from the analysis are appended to support the argument made in this
chapter, with figures and diagrams mainly being used in the chapter to illustrate the
argument. Colours are used consistently in the various charts and graphs in Chapters Five
and Six, as shown in Table 8. Each section in this chapter reports by transactions and
volume, before examining the financial characteristics.
Table 8: Guide to use of colour in graphs and ilustrations
Dimension Colour Power to determine Issues
Transaction Light blue Council, subject to tenant Decision to sell: interests, incentives,
(completed) and Sec State consent stancel ideoloav, lack of opposition
Stock Yellow Council (seller), buyer, Partly history; partly decision-making
(volume) lender
Price Light green Seller, buyer, surveyor 1 Condition of housing and rent policy (NB
valuer, lender role of aovernment dept)
Lending 1 Purple Buyer, lender - depends Price and future investment needs
borrowing on price and investment
needs
Grant Orange Government Condition of housing and government
decisions to create incentives via ERCF
Debts Turquoise Given - historic History of investment and previous
redemption of debt
Levies (see Dark blue Central government sets Dependent on pricel value and
note 78) terms: calculated Qovernment decision-makinQ
Useable Dark green Calculated from above Consequence of condition, price and
receipts debt. Incentive effect on decision to sell?
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All Transfers to Date
It is useful to start with all transactions covering 13 yéars between 1988/9 and 2000/1 to
reveal increasing variety and volume from 1996. In all, 145 transactions were completed by
106 authorities, (with some conducting multiple transactions), representing more than one in
four authorities in England. This section focuses on a temporal analysis. A total of 575,626
houses were transferred over 13 years with almost 4,000 houses in the average transaction:
the amount of stock transferring annually fluctuated between 10,000 and 130,000 with the
greatest volume under a Labour government after 1997.
Volume of Transactions and Stock
The amount of stock transferred each year and the number of transactions per annum has
grown steadily over the years, though average transaction size varies according to a
different pattern. There are volume peaks (of over 40,000 units p.a.) in 1990/1 and 1995/6.
Annual transactions and the amount of stock transferred each year are shown in Figure 3.
By contrast, average transaction size starts off and ends up at a high level of 7,000 though
fallng to around 3,000 in the intervening years. Average transaction size (shown in Figure
4) indicates a shorter wave cycle, with different timing and average size fallng overall,
revealing quite a different story. The biggest average transaction waves peaked in 1989/90,
1992/3, 1996/7. In the suggested 'peak' years for overall numbers and transactions,
average transaction size was lower, indicating a larger number of smaller transactions in
those years, where grant is an issue (see below).
Figure 3: All Stock Transfers (England): Number OfTransactions And Dwellings Transferred Per Year
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Figure 4: All Stock Transfers (England): Average Transaction Size (Numbers Of Houses Per Year)
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Borrowing for Acquisition and Investment - an Incentive?
Sales have produced receipts of over £5 billion (at 2001 prices), raising double that amount
in private borrowing - over £10 billion: in other words, for every £2 lent by the private sector,
£1 goes to the public landlord for assets sold and the other £1 is invested in the housing.
However, the relationship between borrowing and acquisition changes from case to case
and over time. The data also show grant expenditure of over £0.5 bilion, after 1997/8.
Figure 5: All Transfers (England): Gross Prices, Grant And Borrowing (£ Millon) By Year
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Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
Examination of the data per unit (Figure 6) reveals an average price of almost £9,000 and
borrowing of over £19,000 (against average grant of over £6,000). Since these figures are
based on real values (at 2001), we can see that while the value of borrowing has remained
fairly steady since 1993, there has been a substantial fall in prices over the decade (over all
transfers). However the incidence of grants in the midst of the decline in average prices may
be significant. As prices are primarily relevant for those cases where there is a positive
value it wil be important to observe the relevant figures in the whole stock discussion.
Average grants appear low and dropped steadily and steeply after the first year.
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Figure 6: All Transfers (England): Unit Values (Price, Borrowing And Grant) £ Per House, By Year
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Receipts, Debt and Surpluses: More Incentives?
The price does not come to the seller in full as a receipt, stil less as surplus. Various costs
must be offset before the true balance can be calculated: these include (where applicable)
the set-up (or transaction) costs, the levy and redemption of historic debt. Some £2 billion of
historic debt81 was redeemed by transfer sales receipts (representing 40% of the gross
value), with set-up costs running one tenth (£0.2 billon). By comparison, the levy generated
payments to the Treasury of merely £0.3 billon, paid by less than one third of all transferring
councils,82 In gross terms, this left a 'useable receipt' of just over £1 billon but on average
less than one third of the gross price and only available for use by the individual recipient
(selling council).83 However the annual summaries in Figure 7 show marked disparities from
year to year and from case to case in the proportion of the receipt left to the disposing
counciL. In some years (prior to introduction of the levy), the 'useable receipt' amounted to
63% of the gross receipt, providing incentives to cash-strapped councils to realise capital
asset value, subject to tenant consent.
81 Figures from Wilcox, various - adjusted to 2001 values.
82 These only included councils pursuing whole stock transfers and are pursued further in that context.
83 No research has been carried out on the use of surpluses but it is thought that they are used for investment in housing and
other facilities, and to payoff other council debts.
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Figure 7: All Stock Transfers (England): Gross Receipts Compared With Gross Debts
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Tenant Consent
On average, three quarters (72%) of tenants took part in ballots about whether the transfer
in their area should go ahead - a civic participation rate to be proud of in England during the
1990s,84 Of these, just over half (56%) supported transfer, which counts as a majority
though it represents less than half of all tenants eligible to vote (41%).
Figure 8: Tenant Support In English Stock Transfers
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There were variations from year to year with 1992/3 a marked low point and a 'high tide' in
1996/7 (a year marked by fewer transactions). In some years, the majority is far from
convincing at less than 50% of eligible tenants in support: the rate of support does not
correlate to the size of the transaction. Figure 9 (below) shows average size dropping
significantly between 1992/3 and 1993/4 and again between 1996/7 and 1997/8. In the latter
84 It must be remembered that these are the completed - 'successful' - transfers: others fell at the ballot hurdle The ballot
success rate increased from one in three in 198819 to three in four by 1990/1 (Mullins, 1993). Other DTLR figures reported
verbally in 2002 suggest some 45 proposals failed at ballot (personal communication). No data of all ballots are consistently
recorded by any agency though TPAS collects some.
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case, grants were available to deal with lower value properties in partial transactions. In the
former case, the lower size may reflect one of the few government levers on transfer: limits
on maximum size (DoE, 1993). Transaction size exceeded 5,000 in the years before 1992/3
and after 1997. Cycles are considered again in the conclusions to the chapter.
Analysis of transaction size allows three groups of small transactions under 2,000 to be
distinguished (see Figure 9). Most of the small cases are partial, but not necessarily grant-
funded: most of the partial grant-funded cases contain fewer than 2,000 houses. Unit grant
seems to fall as transaction size increases, whereas borrowing is consistently high for
smaller transactions: this level of borrowing does not really decline until transaction scale
rises above 3,000 houses.
Figure 9: All Transfers (England): Price, Grant And Borrowing Per Unit, Analysed By Size Of Transaction
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Earlier graphs showed lending rising steadily in relation to acquisition costs, dipping in
1992/3 and again recently. This reflects two factors: 1) fallng average prices, affected by
the inclusion of lower/nil value properties from 1996 requiring grant or 'dowry'; and 2)
increased borrowing for investment. This gap becomes more relevant as more of the
borrowing is required to fund improvements and relatively less to fund acquisition (Social
Housing, 2000). These issues point to the presence of partial and grant-funded transactions
increasingly obscuring and confusing matters. This supports development of a more
differentiated picture.
Differentiating Transfer Types
The data show more transactions than councils, which confirms that some conducted
several transfers. When tagged with type of disposal (whole or partial) the data show that 98
councils disposed of all of their stock. In eight councils, the authority split a large stock
between two buyers, which were often labelled with the same name and either 'north' or
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'south'.85 However these are generally included in the category of whole stock transactions,
as conducted by the majority of disposing councils since the pattern of characteristics is
otherwise indistinguishable from single whole stock cases, though in two cases a smaller
portion of stock was transferred with grant to an existing buyer and count here as partial.86
In addition, 20 councils undertook partial disposals (some without grant funding). There are
marked variations between whole and partial transactions in terms of size, financial
characteristics, local incidence and political control at the point of transfer. Having seen the
impact of different types of transfer on the overall picture, it is opportune to examine
financial and other trends for these types.
Table 9: Whole And Partial Stock Transfer (England): 1988 To March 2001 Inc.: Headline Comparison
Whole % Partial % All
Transactions 104 72% 41 28% 145
Authorities 86 69% 20 31% 106
No. of houses 519,545 90% 56,081 10% 575,626
Gross price 1 receipt £m £ 5,016 100% £ 22 0% £ 5,038
Gross loan faciliies £m £ 8,944 89% £ 1,099 11% £ 10,044
Value of grant gross £m 0 N/A £ 522 100% £ 522
Ratio of loan: price 1.8 50 N/A 1.6
Average price £ 9,655 £ 1,623 £ 9,207
Average loan £ 17,216 £ 24,272 £19,351
Average grant £ 0 £ 12,458 £ 5,248
Average size of transaction 4,996 1,309 3,970
Levy£m £ 275 £ 0 £ 275
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
As shown in the table, whole, single disposals dominate the volume of stock transferred, of
receipts, of borrowing and of debt redeemed and useable receipts. There are only two
cases of grant funding in whole stock transactions. By contrast, partial transfers show
smaller scale transactions, a smaller volume of stock transfer overall, with smaller receipts
and a lot of grant funding, but with much greater borrowing.
The partial category includes a few councils disposing of housing in multiple transactions -
some with a positive value and others with nil value and with government subsidy. Figure 10
illustrates the overall amount of stock transferred over the years, showing a steady supply of
whole stock transfers over the years, with partial transfers emerging prior to 1997.
85 Some later spli transactions to two landlords appear as one transaction and so the numbers do not always appear to add
up.
86 Later under Labour, large disposals were not split in this way, nor required to be (DETR, 1999).
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Figure 10: All Stock (England): Numbers Of Transactions Per Category Of Transfer Each Year
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It is important to distinguish and analyse separately transfers with and without grant funding,
even though the numbers are smalL. The discussion which follows aims to show the different
patterns of transfer, following on from the map (overleaf) and headline level summary in
Table 9. It should be noted at this stage that comparing the distribution of councils in
England after reorganisation (Norton, 2001: 292) with those which undertook transfer,
reveals that only four of the councils completing transfer were in areas affected by local
government reorganisation, and all aftèr 1997. The analysis returns shortly to a comparison
of regional differences.
Whole Stock Disposals: 1988 - 1997
This section deals with disposals of whole stock up to 1997 only87, representing the vast
majority of cases in this period. This section discusses the financial indicators by volume
and unit value, as well as the spatial characteristics of this group of transfers. A later section
reviews these same characteristics in relation to partial transfer transactions completed post
1997. By the year to March 1997, there had been 58 transactions affecting a quarter of a
million homes, in single (or split) transactions of around 5,000.88 Almost all of the transfers
before March 1997 were whole as showed. Virtually all were in single transactions and the
buyers were all new Registered Social Landlords (RSLs). Analysing the size of different
cases shows that whole stock transfer rarely involves fewer than 1,500 houses: transfers
over 3,000 units are almost always whole single disposals.
87 It is worth noting that these would have been the cases of which policy makers in Scotland might have been aware in the
mid-1990s.
88 The figures show an increasing volume of stock in the whole stock category in the years under Labour, from 1998/9
onwards, consuming almost 50% of all the whole stock transfers since 1989 in increasingly large transactions. A total of 36
transactions involved more than 5,000 houses in any given transaction.
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Figure 11: All Stock (England): Distribution Of Sellers 1988 - 200189
. Partial disposal
Whole disposal
o
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001.
As Table 10 shows, almost two thirds of the selling councils were controlled by
Conservatives, which clearly dominated the first seven years of transfers. Until 1995/6, the
remaining nine non-Conservative authorities were generally politically split with many seats
held by Conservatives, independents or ratepayer associations.gO Authorities without overall
political control become increasingly important in transfer after 1995/6, which was a
significant year for local government reform in England. From this point onwards, authorities
held by Labour and / or Liberal Democrats also start to feature among the whole disposal
authorities, before 1997. In keeping with the amount of stock transferred, gross receipts and
borrowing increase steadily over time. The value of borrowing is £8.9 billon overall with one
fifth of this in the most recent year, rising steadily against prices over time. Variation in the
financial ratios in this type of transfer is limited by contrast with the pattern for other types of
transfer.
89 This map was produced by Dataspring services at the University of Cambridge using data supplied by the researcher.
90 This assessment has been made by reference to the Municipal Yearbook for the years immediately prior to transfer
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Table 10: Whole transfer (England) to March 1997
Year of number of No. of Average Conserv- Labour Liberal No Overall
transfer transaction dwellngs size ative Democrat Control
s
1988/9 2 11,176 5,588 2 0 0 0
1989/0 2 14,405 7,203 1 0 0 1
1990/1 11 45,552 4,141 11 0 0 0
1991/2 2 10,791 5,396 2 0 0 0
1992/3 4 26,325 6,581 3 0 0 1
1993/4 10 30,103 3,010 6 0 0 4
1994/5 13 40,510 3,116 10 0 0 3
1995/6 10 41,701 4,170 2 1 5 2
1996/7 4 20,479 5,120 1 2 0 1
All 58 241,042 4,925 38 3 5 12
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
The average (adjusted) price was over £11,000, peaking at £12,500 in 1995/6 but Figure 12
shows that borrowing per unit increases from rather low start, peaking at £25,000 per house
in 1995/6. This shows that the amount available for private borrowing started to fall before
the Conservatives left office91, with more borrowing funding investment than acquisition. The
relationship can vary substantially from case to case within any given year. The analysis of
cases by size shows the unit value dropping as transaction size increases.
Receipts were well ahead of debt and as unit prices were rising (from (1992/3, as shown in
Figure 13), so the value of the surplus increased though the pattern changed after 1995/6.92
The housing may have been worth more in the areas transferred post 1992/3 but it is more
likely that sellers had strong incentives to increase prices to maximise surpluses, in spite of
the levy. The only authorities to contribute to the levy were those disposing of their whole
stock (in single or split transactions) of whom not quite half (28) made a contribution. This
overall figure masks the fact that more than three quarters of councils paid a levy in the
years when it was payable (1993/4 - 1995/6 incl): most of those who paid no levy benefited
from the 'holiday'. As the levy is in effect a surcharge, it leaves a smaller 'useable receipt'
for the seller and arguably less incentive to selL. 93
91 The analysis of the period after 1997 shows a continued fall thereafter.
92 Later chapters show Robettson (Minster for Housing in Scotland from 1995) as aware of English stock transfer. This would
have been the period of which he would have been aware and might have supposed that the same terms would apply.
93 The levied authorities typically paid between 10% and 15% of the price to the Treasury.
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Figure 12: Whole Transfer (England) To March 1997: Price And Borrowing Per Unit
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Figure 13: Whole transfer England to March 1997: gross value, and useable receipts
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Voting patterns were fairly standard throughout the programme of whole disposals, as far as
successful ballots are concerned. However, the failure rate was rather high though no
figures are available to examine patterns. By contrast with partial transfers, there was
remarkably little case variation around the trend of 70% support. On tenant support, split
transfers showed a somewhat different pattern from whole, single disposals. The results of
ballots were more marginal for split transfers than for whole stock, even in the same year.
Less than two thirds of the tenants took part in ballots and a similar proportion (63%) voted
in favour. In some transactions, majorities were under 55% on low turnouts. Tenant support
for transfer declines with size, with falling turnout and votes in favour, producing a rate of
support among all tenants eligible to vote, under 48%.94
Regional Distribution of Whole Disposals and Sector Change Post- Transfer95
As the map on page 103 showed, the distribution of whole stock transfer to 2001 was
uneven across England. In three regions, the only form of transfer was a whole (or split)
94 This is a parlicularly strong feature of transfer post 1997.
95 The data are analysed by region using regional boundaries of the Housing Corporation - see Appendix Six.
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disposal: South East, North East and East (East Midlands). While whole disposals
dominated in the South West and West Midlands, councils in these areas also conducted
partial transfers. In one region - Merseyside - there were no whole disposals and in others,
notably London, whole disposals were in the minority. This provides evidence of variation
not present in the literature.
Figure 14:
All Stock Transfer (England) 1988 - 2001. Political Control Of Councils At The Point Of Disposal.
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Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001.
Whole Disposals Only
Almost a quarter of all stock transferred was in the South East, and all of it took the form of
whole disposaL. The volume of price / receipt and lending was highest in the South East,
which also accounted for the highest share of levy contributions and contributors, reflecting
high prices in this region. The spread of transfer across years was most even in the South
East, as is to be expected given the number of transactions there.
As the map above shows, most of the councils in this area were under Conservative control
and the rest were either Liberal Democrat or without overall control. By 1998, councils in the
South East controlled 110,000 fewer units than in 1991 with most of this moving to the RSL
sector via transfer: RSL stock was almost as big as the council sector by 1998.
Approximately half of the transfer RSLs still appear under the same name as the council
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which means that half have changed their name.96 Although transfer RSLs have grown
overall since transfer, at a rate of 6% in spite of losing stock through right to buy sales.
Meanwhile, some longer-established transfer RSLs have gained (up to 40%) and one
doubled in size possibly due to take-overs.
The North East region (including Yorkshire) was the largest region for volume of social
housing stock at 1991, but saw only four transfers and had the smallest volume of transfers
of any region apart from Merseyside. However, all were whole single disposals: transaction
size was quite large and useable receipts rather lower than average. Two of the disposals
were by Conservative-controlled authorities. All but one case fell after 1997.
The East (incl. East Midlands) is the third area of whole disposals only and had one
transaction each year from 1989 onwards, with the third highest average unit price. Most
RSL stock gains in the period are accounted for by stock transfer. Since then, RSL holdings
have grown and many of the earliest cases have expanded by up to 40% of their stock,
which may reflect housing investment using the surplus receipts arising from transfer (36%).
Nine out of 13 councils were under Conservative control, the remainder had coalitions.
Mixed Whole and Partial Transfers
The West Midlands region displayed a litte more diversity though dominated by whole
disposals. By 2001, there were 14 LSVT transactions by 12 authorities, plus three partial
transfers (two funded by ERCF). Transfers started in this area in 1991 gathering momentum
in the mid-nineties. At least half of the RSL growth in the area was due to acquisitions
through transfer. Average prices in this region were comparatively low. In addition,
transaction size is high, affected by a recent crop of transactions post 1997. This was also
the most diverse region politically, with most transfers conducted by Labour-held authorities
(seven) though almost as many (five) by Conservatives and four by councils with no overall
majority. This political profile was similar to that of the North West (below) which featured
many more partial disposals, often conducted by the same authority - Manchester.
In the South West, there appears to have been an early spate of transfer in the late 1980s
and early 1990s and then a gap before further transactions picked up in the mid-1990s and
again, more strongly, post 1997. Average transaction size in the South West was smaller
than average for all whole stock disposals. The selling councils display diversity of political
control. In the majority of cases (ten) there was no overall majority, and almost equal
numbers of councils under control of Conservatives or Liberal Democrats 'successfully'
promoted transfer. As in the South East, councils in the South West made a strong
contribution to the levy - possibly as a result of timing of transfer, low debt or high prices:
this area shows the second highest price per house. Councils' stockholdings were rather
small in any event but declined relative to the RSL sector: where councils controlled five
times the amount of RSL stock in 1991, by 1998 they had just over twice the volume and
96 Many now appear in the Housing Corporation register under larger group structures.
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most RSL growth in the South West has been through stock transfer. In addition, as with
other early transfers, the longest-established transfer associations have been able to
expand their stock, in one case trebling through take-over. The identity of RSLs remains
strongly associated with the name of the disposing council, though some merged or group
associations formed from rather small RSLs, especially in Somerset.9
The transfer of stock to bodies with the same name and of a similar size, arguably with the
same staff, does little for diversity in the pattern of ownership. Arguably this is as true in
split transfers where groups were subsequently formed bringing two buyers back into one
organisation.98 Arguably, the public sector monopoly is merely being replaced by a private
sector monopoly. Diversity outcomes may, however, be different in the case of partial
transfers to which we now turn our attention.
Partial Transfers - a late Development?
This section distinguishes between partial transfers in multiple small transactions by
authorities undertaking more than one transfer and transactions involving generous
quantities of dowry or grant funding. The latter is examined first as it is the largest group in
terms of numbers of transactions (decisions to sell) and stock (tenants to consent). Some
partial transfers fall before 1997, following subsidy preparations under the Conservatives, as
the rate of whole disposals was increasing. This timing will be seen to contrast with the data
for Scotland in Chapter Six. It is important to see the key characteristics of partial transfers
in order to consider possible explanations for their existence and for comparison with
Scotland. The balance between the amount of stock in the two streams (with and without
grant) is illustrated in Table 11.
Table 11: Partial Stock Transfer (England) To 2001: Summary Of Cases With And Without Grant
Overall: all partial With grant Without arant
Transactions 41 32 9
Councils 20 16 4
Stock 56,081 45,244 10,837
Value per unit £1,623 0 £2,060
Grant per unit £12,458 £11,546 0
Borrowino per unit £24,272 £18,390 £24,665
Loan to price ratio 12.0 NIA 11.9
Loan to orant ratio NIA 1.6 NIA
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
Grant-Funded Transfers
A total of 16 authorities undertook 32 transactions mostly over three years.99 The authorities
were either urban or metropolitan in London, North West, Merseyside and West Midlands.
97 Research is under way at present at the University of Cambridge analysing group structures.
98 Many of the buyers can be seen on NHF and Housing Corporation lists as being part of bigger group structures, an
increasing trend among RSLs in England (Social Housing, 2000).
99 One case in Tower Hamlets was deferred beyond the end of the ERCF funding period into 2000/1. It is excluded from the
rest of the analysis.
108
Most (18) were under Labour control or under some form of coalition (nine) with no overall
political majority. Six councils undertook several transactions while ten pursued only one.
Average transaction size was lower than for whole disposals: the average was less than
1,500 units, though steadily larger with each year that passed. This reflects evidence from
the data that although the number of transactions was fairly constant from year to year, the
amount of stock transferred per annum doubled in the second and third years, starting at
almost 9,000 houses in the first year (less than 12 months). Not only did average
transaction size increase, cases of partial grant-funded transfers display wide variation.10o
The smallest English partial transfers were more like the scale of operation in Scotland (as
the next chapter shows).
Government data show no indication of stock value and no prices were recorded by DETR
so it is assumed that there was no receipt to the seller. Nor is there any evidence of debt
repayment in these cases. The summary figures are shown in the following table.
Table 12: Partial Transfers (England): Grants And Loans Per Year
Year Trans- Stock Grant Loan Ratio of Grant per Loan value
actions £m £m loan to dwellng per
Qrant £ dwellnQ £
1997/8 9 8,577 £127 192 1.52 £14,773 £22,432
1998/9 12 17,828 £144 285 1.98 £8,091 £16,009
1999100 10 16,980 £198 290 1.47 £11,640 £17,082
2000/199 1 1,859 £35 33 0.9 £18,946 £17,751
All 32 45,244 £522 832 1.6 £12,458 £19,351
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
Using Grant as an Incentive to Accommodate Opponents?
Although the 32 transactions are mainly contained within three complete financial years,
1997/8 was not a full year as the scheme was formally introduced after the May 1997
elections. None of the grant-funded transactions went through under the Conservatives
although the earliest transfers involved preparation by sellers, buyers and central
government during the Conservatives' period in offce, only spending from 1997/8.101 A
consortium of councils under Labour control had been working with consultants KPMG and
a Conservative government, to produce solutions for increasing private investment in urban
housing with low or negative value (KPMG, 1996). The government established the ERCF
facility and budget in December 1995 leaving the form of the new landlord open to
prospective sellers and their partners (Murie and Nevin, 1999). The very different political
stances of such partners indicate some mutual partisan adjustment in a search for solutions.
100 The smallest transaction was of 515 houses in Lambeth, the largest in an estate in Manchester with 6,667 houses
(Manchester's only grant funded scheme). Inevitably, spending averages disguise wide variation per house grant values
between cases: for example, £3,000 (Manchester) and £26,000 (Lambeth).
101 In the case of Hackney, the council had been working with consultants FPDSavills to assess stock condition and value
(Social Housing, 2000), some time in advance of ERCF funding becoming available.
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Their strategy as reported by Nevin (1999), verges on rational policy-making. However, a
finite amount of money was eventually advertised as being available for a finite period, and
councils were required to bid competitively for resources.102 This indicates a process more
consistent with top-down, linear accounts of policy. This position also gave central
government considerable direct leverage over local councils' actions and decision-making.
According to offcial data, total funding (including grants and borrowing) in the end exceeded
£1.3 billon, including subsidy of £522 milion.103 When financial data are analysed by year,
as shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16, it becomes clear that the total volume of grant and
private borrowing increased, whereas average figures per house show grant dropping while
borrowing remains fairly constant. Average total expenditure per unit reached almost
£35,000. There was no receipt to offset historic debt or set-up costs. When approved grant
is calculated only in relation to relevant units in the grant-funded category, the average
comes out at £14,000 per house.10o
Figure 15: Partial Subsidised Transfers (England): Total Grant And Loans - Gross (£ Milion)
£3
£3
£2f2
£150
£100
£S
£-
100718 1mi 19æ
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
13Qa£m
rea et
201
.13rr
£m rea et
201
Figure 16: Partial Subsidised Transfers (England): Grants And Loans £ Per Unit
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102 The resources were to be administered by government rather than an agency. They were 'dowries' for negative valuation
and works prior to transfer, small regeneration schemes, set-up costs and a nominal contribution towards seller costs (Murie
and Nevin, 1999). Labour terminated the scheme in 1998 but previous commitments meant it ran unti/2000/1, showing two
years 'braking distance',
103 Murie and Nevin 1999 showed £319 millon as the planned figure.
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Partial Without Grant - What Incentive, Whose Initiative?
The possibility of partial transfers without grant does not emerge from the literature and
although small in scale is worth some attention here because it reveals the pressure on
some authorities to pursue transfer on other terms. Only four authorities undertook partial
transfers without grant, affecting just over 10,000 houses in nine transactions. This comes
out at an average of under 1,500 units - a very different pattern to the whole stock
transactions.
Table 13: Partal Transfers England (To March 2001) Without Grant
Year Transactions Stock transferred Price£m BorrowinQ £m
1995/6 2 2,894 £ 16 £ 49
1996/7 1 1,769 £ - £ 55
1997/8 0 - - -
1998/9 2 2,224 £ 1 £ 71
1999/0 3 3,288 £ 5 £ 74
2000/1 1 662 £ 0 £ 18
All 9 10,837 £ 22 £ 267
Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
Figure 18: Partial Stock Transfer (England): Price And Borrowing Per Unit - All Cases
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Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
The transactions started in 1995/6 before ERCF funding became available, and 2000/1,
spanning five financial years, but with only one or two a year, except in 1997/8. Collectively
they produced a receipt of £22 millon and managed to raise borrowing of £267million,
twelve times the value of the stock, but with a very different loan to price ratio from whole
stock transfer. Their inclusion in either whole or partial grant-funded disposals distorts other
averages. The amounts per unit come out at approximately £1,600 and £27,000 as shown
in Figure 18, though the average masks the fact that in some cases there was no receipt
and very high borrowing (£50,000). Values for the houses in this stream show a much
greater level of divergence than in whole stock transfer.
104 A high ratio of loan to grant indicates more private borrowing relative to grant. A low ratio indicates relatively high grant
expenditure.
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Who and Where?
With the sole exception of West Wiltshire, under control of the Liberal Democrats at the time
of transfer, the sellers in this category were urban, metropolitan or city boroughs under
Labour control: Walsall (West Midlands), Enfield (London). The other three authorities
undertook transactions of around 1,500 units. Only one raised a receipt. Two went through
before ERCF funding was introduced and the other (in London) coincided with ERCF. The
remaining transactions were Manchester's, mainly post 1997. Manchester City Council is
unique among transferring authorities for disposing of over 6,000 properties in no less than
six partial transfers in different estates, without grant. Three of Manchester's transactions
were in one year - 1999/00 - and Manchester also transferred over 6,000 houses in one
other transaction with grant (above). Manchester and Enfield were both in the KPMG
consortium (see above), before ERCF was established. Each of Manchester City Council's
transactions was to a different landlord, raising a gross receipt of £18 million and on
average nine times that amount in borrowing - £156 million, with no grant.105 The
Manchester case raises interesting questions about the pattern of incentives and behaviour
which determined such different terms of transfer.
Nine separate buyers were involved. Only one was listed by the Housing Corporation as a
'transfer' body because it was new. The other eight were large, regional housing
associations established long ago, some with roots in the nineteenth century philanthropic
or charitable voluntary housing movement. Some had very substantial reserves available for
regeneration, though offcial data recorded no funding other than borrowing and grant.106
Established associations in Manchester may have co-operated with the council by drawing
on reserves to assist regeneration.
Set-up costs per unit were in line with those for other transfers but represent a much greater
proportion of the price payable, which is already low. This had an adverse effect on any
receipt to the seller. No debt was redeemed by these authorities (Wilcox, 2000), leaving
sellers with larger debts to service from a smaller income base. This presents a very
different phenomenon and complement of incentives from whole or grant-funded disposals.
Perversely, ballot results showed considerably more support for these transfers than for
transfer generally. Average turnout (83%) and support (88%) produced support reaching
almost three-quarters (74%) of all tenants eligible to vote.107 This category contains a small
body of transfers in urban areas to existing landlords, both before grant funding was
introduced and while it was being made available to support other transfers by the same
seller in one case. They were properties with low values requiring considerable investment,
105 The average price was barely £2,500 and average borrowing over £27,000. Relevant debt on this stock is reported in
Wilcox (2000) to be of the order of £83 milion though the gross receipt (of £18 milion) cannot possibly meet this amount,
which means the council is now paying off the debt from a reduced stock.
106 Government offcials confirmed the only source of funding for partial transfer was ERCF but Social Housing (2000)
records some £84milion of reserves and other funding going into partial transfers without specifying whether these were
grant funded or not.
107 Support was only marginal (at 62% of eligible tenants) in Walsall with the first partial transfer in 1996.
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but they were grant-free, they did not raise generous receipts but extensive borrowing was
undertaken to support them.
Regional Distribution of Partial Transfers
The profile of the North West is very diverse with smaller than average transactions, low
prices and grants but at low levels, whereas a great deal of borrowing has been undertaken
with quite a unique loan: price ratio (7:1). The area distribution of this type of transfer shows
no particular pattern beyond the Manchester phenomenon in the North West. Indeed the
North West had precisely equal numbers of partial and whole disposals. Records of
ownership by transfer RSLs in the North West at March 2000 suggest there may have been
some demolitions. This may be a feature of all partial transfers. It is far from evident that
transfer redeemed debt or even produced surplus receipts in the North West. The summary
figures suggest that there was internal, undisclosed subsidy either by buyers or sellers or
both. In addition, these cases made an insignificant contribution to the levy so central
government has not benefitted either from receipts or revenue.
In contrast to neighbouring Manchester where partial transfers without grant were most
common, Merseyside was unique in pursuing only grant-funded partial transfers.
Transactions were few (four) affecting very few houses - 6,000 in alL. Even among the
grant-funded authorities, Merseyside is unique in having high grant and low borrowing, such
that the ratio of loan to grant is low at 3:2. In other words, transfer was levered by extensive
public funding.
Grant-funded transactions only featured among four of eight English regions where transfers
were pursued: these were London, Merseyside, West Midlands and the South West, in
descending order of magnitude. There are different measures of distribution, but London
consistently dominated with 66% of grant funding, 79% of borrowing and 55% of the stock
(see Figure 19). Eight London Boroughs transferred stock with ERCF funding, four with one
transaction each and four with multiples: Hackney undertook the greatest number with six.
Outside London, the largest number of transactions was conducted by Liverpool with three.
Various other metropolitan and urban councils, commonly in the north west of England, had
one each. As explained earlier, Manchester featured more prominently among the low value
transactions funded without grant. Total funding per unit was much higher in London than
elsewhere at £41 ,000. Some of this may be attributable to higher construction costs in the
capital or to significantly worse conditions than elsewhere, requiring greater investment. No
further analysis is available to indicate the pattern. Second highest overall spend per unit
(£23,000) is the West Midlands. The North West (in effect Manchester) was lowest at
£16,000 including only £7,000 grant per unit compared with the overall average of almost
£12,00 across cases in the other three regions.
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Figure 19: Proporton Of ERCF Subsidy Distnbuted Between Regions
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Source: analysis of data supplied by DETR, 2001
It is important to note at this stage that the London boroughs mainly appear in the category
of partial, grant-funded transfers: 26 cases of transfer affecting 53,000 homes. London saw
the highest levels of unit spending, a huge share of subsidy but with virtually no contribution
to the levy. This could be a consequence of more resources being earmarked for London, or
of more successful bidding by London authorities. The lack of non-grant-funded transfers
may reflect the political character of many Inner London councils in the nineties, but even
high profile Tory councils such as Wandsworth and Westminster were not among those
transferring. Two other transfers in London boroughs were suburban Bromley (1992/3), one
of the earliest and largest transfers to take place in England and Enfield (1996/7) (partial,
non-grant-funded). Prior to transfer, London was the region with the second highest
concentration of social housing stock owned by councils (Wilcox, 2000). During the nineties,
the London Boroughs lost almost 100,00 houses while RSLs grew by 60,000, much of which
is accounted for by stock transfer to existing landlords. The pattern will now be very different
within certain boroughs which have disposed of much stock either through whole or multiple
partial disposals.
Summary of Partial Transfers
Almost a third of all stock transferred was contained in partial disposals by authorities, many
via multiple sales. Partial transfers are similar in size at less than 2,000 units. Unit
borrowing is very significant but prices are very low where there is any receipt at alL. On
closer inspection there are two different types in operation, with extensive use of grant in
some regions (notably London and Merseyside) but not others (North West). One in five
sellers conducted partial transfers. Sellers are commonly councils in metropolitan and city
borough councils, predominantly held by Labour or where Labour was strong. They feature
in the later 1990s but do not coincide entirely with New Labour in central government. The
buyers were more often existing organisations and tend not to be listed by the regulator or
the NHF as transfer bodies: this in turn reinforces the sense in which transfers have come to
be seen as whole disposals to new bodies, though clearly other possibilities exist.
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Impact of Transfer on Social Housing Sector
Total housing stock in England grew overall by some 5% 1991- 1998 mainly through growth
in owner occupation (Wilcox, 2000/1). Meanwhile, council ownership of housing in England
fell to 3.3 million (16% of all housing) by 1998. Most of the decline in the 1980s can be
explained by the Right to Buy (Wilcox, 2000/1). While the RTB continued to operate in the
1990s, stock transfer has come to compete. At the beginning of the decade, councils owned
six times more rented stock than housing associations throughout England: by the end of
the decade, they only had three times more stock. This indicated as much reconfiguration of
the structure of social housing rather than its overall decline.
RSLs' overall stock grew from 400,000 houses in 1981 to 1,040,000 in 1998, an increase to
a mere 5% of the total stock. Yet almost half of the total increase appeared due to stock
transfer, two thirds in the period 1991 - 98, with significant variation between areas.
Uncertainty around regional definition changes interfered in some areas with a more
rigorous scrutiny of the regional impact. Nevertheless, the greatest changes were in the
South East, which also ended up as the region with the smallest proportion of stock in
council ownership (less than 10%). Just under half of the decline in council ownership of
housing can be attributed to stock transfer. Variations in regional stock change showed the
highest rate of change in the South (East and West), and the lowest rate in London and in
the north (East and West). In some areas, notably the North East and the South West (and
to a lesser extent the West Midlands), growth in association holdings comes mainly from
stock transfer.
Explaining Transfer from the Data?
This analysis shows clear differences in the characteristics of stock transfers over 13 years.
The temporal, spatial and financial characteristics of whole transfers, especially pre-1997,
are in marked contrast to those of the partial projects from 1995/6 onwards. This
emphasises the significance of critical junctures in policy and requires a reappraisal of the
nature of the phenomenon.
Typological variety?
As earlier commentators observed, the first batch of transfers (ie whole disposals) was
conducted primarily by Conservative-controlled authorities in the shire districts (Malpass and
Means, 1993). In the course of the 1990s there were fewer and fewer Conservative
controlled authorities and whole disposals were conducted in southern areas of England not
only by authorities controlled by Conservatives, but also by councils where electoral
representation of Independents, Ratepayers' Associations and Conservatives was strong,
even where there was no overall majority. As the decade progressed, whole disposals were
found in other areas of England, on a larger scale and promoted by authorities under even
more diverse political control, including Labour and Liberal Democrat coalitions. This
diversity and the fact that transfers have increased under Labour indicate that at the local
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scale it is more than just party ideology driving transfer. What the data do not and cannot
reveal is who is taking transfer decisions and why.
Regardless of political control, housing stock in whole disposals has usually been
transferred to new landlords specifically registered for the purpose of transfer and are noted
by bodies such as the Government's regulator and the membership body as 'transfer'
organisations. Most started with the same name and territory as the old landlord which
suggests that organisational interests were protected in the course of transfer. However a
different pattern of transfer emerged in the mid-nineties, under the Conservatives,
challenging the prevailing concept of transfer in the literature, as a whole disposaL. Almost a
third of all the transactions - representing episodes of decision-making - were promoted by
councils using partial disposals with very significant subsidy supporting transfers of stock in
poor condition in urban areas, as whole disposals continued apace elsewhere. Most of the
partial transfers were pursued by authorities controlled by Labour or, where there was no
overall majority, in coalitions with large numbers of Labour councillors. While these partial
transfers mostly went through under a Labour government, preparations and funding
commitments were made under the previous Conservative administration. Most sales were
made to existing rather than new landlords. While both whole and partial disposals are
known as transfers, they are rather different phenomena with different incentives, resource
flows and interplay of interests.
Temporal Analysis: Waves and Elections
This chapter shows distinct waves in the number of transactions, volume of stock,
transaction size, prices and borrowing though not always in the same cycle, and indeed
sometimes working in opposite directions. One possible explanation for four to five-year
waves is the general election cycle though there may be others. After all, the lead-time for
developing transfer (or stopping it in the case of ERCF funding) was seen to be in excess of
18 months - a very long time in politics. Pre-election (1992 or 1997), decision-makers
(officials and politicians) who were only partly committed to transfer might have made limited
preparations, suspending decision and action until the outcome of the election was known.
After the election, external pressures of under-funding would trigger a move to ballot. In that
sense, the rapid growth in transactions and stock after 1992 (and 1997) suggests that many
councils were already preparing for transfer. Given this long lead-time, transaction numbers
could be interpreted as falling in anticipation of elections. This may not be the only
interpretation.
Incremental elections in English local government mean that local initiative is affected by a
rolling programme of elections. It is only possible to speculate from the data whether the
cycle is electorally related and if so whether it follows elections or anticipates them: either
could apply. Some councils may have been waiting for better terms. Others may have tried
to get into the annual government-authorised pipeline while certain windows were open
(levy holidays for example). This might help to explain the larger number of transactions of
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councils with small stocks prior to national elections. The data do not readily help identify
who sought access to that pipeline, when or why.
Several factors could determine the timing of sellers' decisions to seek transfer.
Conservatives in control of local councils may have anticipated losing control either of local
or central government and may have feared that Labour councillors and Ministers would not
approve transfers. This would serve as an imperative to complete a transfer quickly, though
local government reorganisation may have affected some councils in the mid-nineties. The
absence of transfer in these councils suggests the possibility of overcrowded agendas in
some councils. This might also explain the dip in 199617.
Timing may also have been affected by less electorally sensitive matters. Councils facing
high rent increases would find it easier to make an argument in favour of safer rents (or
lower, guaranteed increases) and about stock transfer as a means of protecting the future
supply of local, social housing. Ballot activity in rural areas might have been less
ideologically contentious as the tenants' movement is much less well developed than in
urban areas (Cole, Reid et aI, 1999). Political demand for transfer may have coincided with
areas where demand for housing was more robust, giving lenders confidence in the long
term security of lending. Arguably, therefore these areas represented the best chances of
'success' from a number of perspectives.
It is easy to focus on the peaks of activity and pricing when it may be as relevant to focus on
the troughs and on absence of transfer. Some factors may have prevented more transfers
from taking place or on different terms. Growth in partial transfers is one obvious
explanation for falling transaction size from 1996. But there is no obvious explanation for the
fall in transaction numbers in 1996/7. Tenants could vote down proposals from councils and
arguably did so pre-1997, anticipating a possible change of government and thus change of
policy (though not borne out by subsequent events). The failure rate in the first three years
of the operation of the policy was rather high, even though a 74% 'pass' rate became the
norm. Again, details of applications to the government pipeline and of all ballot results might
show whether a larger number of transfers could have gone through had tenants been in
favour. This would help to assess what drives decision-making centrally and locally. In turn
this would allow an assessment of the extent to which the policy was top-down, though from
our understanding of the process of transfer (Chapter Four), policy makers at the centre do
not control all the critical levers.
Other factors may have impeded transfer or depressed the transfer market. These include
low pricing producing inadequate receipts, nervousness on the part of the lenders about risk
factors associated with more recent governance arrangements involving larger numbers of
tenants or council nominees on boards of management. Once again without understanding
more about failure (to promote transfer 'successfully'), it is diffcult to gauge why some
disposals succeeded.
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Price differences in whole disposals are interesting in terms of timing. Typical prices fell
steadily after 1995/6. The imposition of brakes on rent levels by central government after
1997 may have had a later, important effect on valuations but this does not explain the
earlier falL. Again we might speculate: the inclusion of tenants on boards of management
may have reined in the ambitions of managers to fund capital programmes from rent
increases. Lenders may have found that prices were rising too high in view of contemporary
discussions about falling demand for social housing. The condition of stock going into the
pipeline was a further five years older and with an even greater backlog of investment to
catch up on, depressing stock values. In other words, there could be technical and / or
political arguments behind these cycles: quantitative data only allow better questions.
Spatial Analysis: Significance of Poliical Control?
There are marked variations in the spatial distribution of transfers. Whole disposals were
concentrated in certain regions but amid greater diversity in other areas of England.
Portraying England as a whole based on restricted area profiles of whole transfer distorts
our understanding of the policy process and impacts. Whole disposals were pursued initially
in areas controlled by Conservatives, not limited to such councils. Following English local
government during the 1990s is complex, due to incremental reform, progressive rolling
elections and variable dates of changes of control. However, there must be more political
variety in the control of the councils involved in transfers later by the end of the century
there were fewer Conservative controlled authorities as the as 1990s progressed. The fact
that more politically diverse councils pursued transfers of different types indicates advocacy
coalitions and partisan mutual adjustment discussed in Chapter Two.
Only Merseyside had no whole disposals and only grant funded transfers. Given the politics
of Liverpool in particular during the nineties, it interesting to remember that tenant support
for transfer was higher in Liverpool than anywhere other than Manchester. The level of
support by tenants, almost especially in Merseyside, can be interpreted as an indication that
attachment to council ownership of rented housing is not the Deep Core belief it might be
assumed to be. In the West Midlands, North West of England and London, there was a
mixture of whole and partial disposals, though the balance varied from place to place.
Where the West Midlands was dominated by whole transfers, London was dominated by
partial grant-funded transfers. The North West saw all three types, but an unusual degree of
partial non-grant-funded activity. More partial transfers were under Labour or Liberal
Democrat control.
Outcomes and Central Government Objectives
Conservative government objectives were fourfold: diversity, increased private investment,
better services and empowerment. Greater diversity of landlords does not shine through
from the data available. Council housing managers seem to have merely reconfigured
themselves in the quasi-private sector, barely changing their organisations' names. Even in
supposedly split transfers, buyers can be seen to have merged after transfer or gone into
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group arrangements which offer limited scope for local decision-making. The partial
transfers offer more diversity of landlords at the local scale, although they existed already
and may be organisations which offer limited local or tenant input in decision-making. The
data here reveal nothing about service satisfaction or empowerment of tenants.
Evidence exists of private investment to the extent of £10 billion, yet the information
available to, or used by, the government and its agents about the impact of investment
seems limited and of doubtful accuracy beyond commitments at the point of transfer, which
could be rhetoricaL. About half of the total sum borrowed is paying off public sector debts,
leaving only £4 billion for new investment. While the gross receipt can count as a PSBR
gain, this is different from the real useable receipt at the local scale: this can only be
estimated and is shown here to be of the order of £1 billion, but only available to certain
councils, with a marked regional distribution. It is not clear what use has been made of such
funds.
Conclusions
Secondary quantitative analysis allows the characteristics of the phenomenon of transfer to
be identified as present but not as absent. The transactions alone show which bodies took
decisions and actions where, and only by default which others did not. The data do not
record, and therefore we cannot distinguish, those who tried and failed to achieve transfer
from those who ignored the 'policy'. If the policy was so compelling for those who
succeeded, why were there not more? If party politics was the explanation, then the
absence of more Conservative councils cannot be easily explained. The presence of a
completed transfer in only one in ten councils from 1988 - 1997,108 does not suggest an
effective top-down policy though there are traces of a top-down approach, notably in later
partial, grant-funded transfers. Mechanisms for delivering the government's objectives were
not strong: much was left to local decision-making and initiative. The analysis of
transactions points to the near certainty of partisan mutual adjustment between unlikely
alliances of interests with actors as diverse as councillors, staff, tenants, lenders, and civil
servants. How this happened remains a mystery without qualitative analysis, outwith the
scope of this thesis.
The analysis of English transfer data allows some interpretation of patterns and trends in the
outcome of decision-making and is an essential prerequisite for posing incisive questions
about the rationale and motivation behind transfer revealed by timing of decisions, location,
price, borrowing and impacts, including public cost. Such questions are only pursued further
in this thesis in relation to Scotland, the subject of the next chapter. This analysis helps to
reveal complexity and variation in stock transfer in England justifying better differentiation in
the specialist literature between types, phases and areas. 'Transfer' can thus now be seen
to include not only single transactions of the whole stock to one (or two) organisation(s) but
108 By 2001, it had risen to one in four with substantial change under Labour.
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multiple transactions to multiple buyers. The need to pay grant to some councils in urban
areas to support transfers emphasises the need for injections of funding for stock in poor
condition, and not just from private sources. This is relevant in a Scottsh context, as the
next chapter will show, challenging the prevailing assumption in the literature, that there has
been no stock transfer in Scotland outside Berwickshire.
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Chapter Six
Stock Transfer in Scotland
Earlier chapters showed that stock transfer in Scotland is largely eclipsed from literature
about housing in the UK. Where in England the focus on council transfers was mainly on
whole disposals of rented stock, partial transfers (mostly with grant) featured in the late
1990s under Labour. This chapter will show an entirely different pattern at work in Scotland,
arguably the reverse of England but with stock transfer nevertheless.
The chapter starts by highlighting the approach to data collection and analysis, which
includes reviewing definitional questions of what constitutes a stock transfer in Scotland.
The chapter then reviews what is known about transfers in Scotland, focussing on transfers
by local authorities (even though more stock has been transferred in Scotland by other
bodies such as Scottish Homes and the New Towns109), comparing these with disposals in
England.
While the focus of the thesis as a whole is on the Conservative period of government until
1997, this chapter draws on comprehensive data covering more recent years. This is
designed partly to show that grant funding continued beyond 1997, affecting stock in
transactions completed before 1997, but on a greatly reduced scale. Post-1997 data were
originally included on the same basis as the English data, to facilitate comparison although
the data for Scotland after 1997/8 were not intended to be explored for this thesis. The
relative absence of transfer after 1997 could be of significance insofar as the subsequent
lack of transfer may point to the significance of reorganisation in explaining transfer. Later
chapters return to this theme but for the moment, discussion focuses on the period to
1997/8 (inclusive), affected by decision-making before the Conservatives left office.
The data refer to cases where transfer was approved and recorded, thus excluding transfers
which were mooted but not pursued, or which failed. Failed transfers are mentioned in
Chapters Seven and Eight as they emerged from interviews and case studies. The data
permit an examination of who sold and bought which properties, where and when. This
shows many small partial disposals in Scotland from 1985/6 onwards, declining from
1995/6. Most voluntary sales were conducted by Labour-held authorities, in the urban west
of Scotland. Most have had the benefit of generous grant assistance but, perversely, at the
very time when English partial transfers were becoming grant-aided (from 1997), subsidy in
Scotland was falling away. While whole stock transfer dominated in England, only one
whole disposal took place in a rural district of Scotland immediately prior to reorganisation.
This chapter thus shows a Conservative government in Scotland subsidising mainly Labour
authorities to pursue small-scale disposals while only one local council, held by the
Conservatives, pursued a policy regarded in the UK housing literature as Conservative. Why
109 Based on full research database - see Appendix Eight.
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this should be the case cannot be revealed by a quantitative approach, which is best for
examining the evidence about the presence and characteristics of the transfer phenomenon.
Such an approach raises questions addressed in later chapters exploring how and why
transfers were conducted.
Data collection and analysis
Appendix Six covers data collection and analysis in more detail: it may suffice to say here
that the dataset reported here was eventually collated during 2001. The collation was
undertaken at the behest of the Scottsh Executive, when the poverty of data on transfer
was acknowledged.110 The dataset brought together primary and secondary sources. The
latter are mainly official data (ministerial consent or grant records, filtered and extended).
The former include primary data gathered by the researcher over the years, in the absence
of more comprehensive offcial monitoring. The most diffcult parts of the data exercise were
finding what stock had been transferred at all, and then securing data on public and private
investment as this information was not available in any single location. Surveys attempted
by the researcher (Appendix Five) had not enjoyed sufficiently good rates of return to
provide useful data overall but they were used to supplement gaps in the secondary
material gathered for the Scottish Executive. At July 2002, no attempt had been made by
the Executive to analyse the data (personal communication).
The dataset is designed to be comparable with English data as far as possible, in terms of
th!? names and status of sellers and buyers, the timing and value of property transactions,
the scale of disposal and the amount of investment from different sources. Financial data
are similarly converted to 2001 values, using a formula shown in Appendix Six. However,
no information was available on debt redemption by councils associated with stock transfer
and anecdotal knowledge indicates this was not significant during the period. However
Glasgow (the council which disposed of most stock) collaborated with the researcher in
1998 to establish the volume of its own disposal programme to date, solely because it
wanted to establish the scale of debt related to transfer. As the story reveals dimensions of
the policy process and vagaries of data collection by the largest seller, it is briefly related
here.
Glasgow District Council wanted permission to sidestep debt relating to housing no longer in
its ownership. By 1998, some 12,000 houses were thought to have been transferred, though
the figure could not be clearly established since its management information system could
only produce reams of meaningless print-outs with dates of construction, flat positions and
tenancy reference numbers. The stakes were high,111 so senior officials in Glasgow decided
110 The commission followed an unsuccessful research tender to disseminate information about stock transfer. The Scottish
Executive generated a summary leaflet from the DTZ Pieda report, to which the introductory chapter referred.
111 Assuming a debt per house of £9,230, (Scottsh Office Statistical bulletin HSG 1996/5 table 11) the relevant portion of
debt would have come to £120 million. This would have represented a saving of around 5% off the rent or 13% more
spending for the capital programme. GCC wanted to have the relevant portion of debt taken out of the HRA, either by writing
it off or transferring it to the General Fund.
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to put resources into identifying the numbers and precise addresses of houses transferred in
order to justify the relevant amount of debt. Glasgow Housing Department's strategy staff
threw resources into research using departmental records. They sifted through relevant
committee minutes from 1985/6 until 1998; they tied up references with the Housing
Department's property management information system; they checked council tax records
and the legal archive for details of prices, addresses and dates. However this merely served
to reveal further discrepancies. The Council then attempted to conduct a postal survey of
associations to confirm how much of the stock had been demolished since transfer,
incorporating questions on behalf of the researcher to minimise duplication. A poor
response rate to their survey reflected wider tensions between the council and the
associations at the time about proposals for a much larger-scale transfer (e.g. letters to
Glasgow Herald from Glasgow Forum of HAs, September 1998). In the end, local council
staff were instructed to make a visual check of which houses remained on the ground, and
check these off against schedules of stock thought to have been transferred.
This tale emphasises the difficulty for a major selling organisation to establish
characteristics of its own disposal programme, without a clear definition at the point of sale.
It does not support a rational view of policy with monitoring and evaluation following
implementation, but rather a mess of actions and decisions. The resulting information about
Glasgow is not available publicly but the council shared with the researcher their estimate of
transactions for each buyer in Glasgow and the total number of houses involved. No price,
investment or borrowing information was collected at that stage and, as far as possible, has
been extracted from Scottish Homes investment database, for analysis here.
Investment Information - Buyers and Funders
The primary source of investment data does not indicate a much clearer analysis or
monitoring of outputs. As Scottsh Homes (and its predecessor HCiS) was thought to have
allocated significant subsidy to refurbishing the transferred stock, the researcher had
previously attempted to establish how much had been spent to bring former council stock
across Scotland back into habitable use. It had never proved possible for Scottish Homes to
procure this information other than in 1998 as an estimated figure for programmed (not
outturn) investment, for the whole of Scotland without disaggregation (Taylor, 1998a).
In the absence of access to offcial data at a more local scale, the researcher attempted to
survey buyers (outside Glasgow) to ascertain levels of investment from public and private
sources. As a low rate of return undermined the value of this exercise too, later access to
Scottish Homes' original dataset on behalf of the Scottish Executive (in the spring of 2001)
was vitaL. Information was extracted about investment (and performance) from 1989
onwards, using file searches on electronic datasets of programmed112 investment each year
for each regional team (see Appendix Six). Although it was in the end possible to associate
investment information with other transaction characteristics (using postcodes and
112 Programmed investment refers to planned expenditure and subsidy levels rather than outputs.
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addresses), the data are not entirely robust, particularly before 1988 and after 1999. As a
result, the amount of subsidy discussed here tends to be understated (see also Chapter
Eight).
Definitions, Numbers and Ilusions of Accuracy
In March 1995, the Minister Lord James Douglas Hamilton confirmed in a written answer on
'Housing Stock Transfer' (PO 15815) that since January 1989 he had given consent to over
180 sales for 13,000 council houses to be sold to the private sector, mainly locally based
housing associations. A working paper on public sector stock changes (Scottish Homes,
1996b), showed 42 councils transferring 16,202 houses between April 1979 and March
1994.113 Two years later, some 23,000 houses were estimated to have been transferred,
based on an analysis of ministerial consent data to 1998 (Taylor, 1998a). These all seem
overestimated when compared with present data using a consistent definition of a stock
transfer, which suggest only 21 ,292 houses transferred until March 2001.114
Where discussion of English transfers had to accept the de facto definition of civil servants
recording data at the point of approval, in Scotland a definition had to be developed.
Informal understanding of the meaning of transfer was determined by various local
experiences of transfer practice, as much by New Towns and Scottish Homes as councils.
It has already been posited that at its broadest, 'transfer' refers to changes of ownership of
rented housing from a public landlord to another landlord. In ascertaining what was or was
not a transfer for the purposes of the data on transfer in Scotland, it was found in 2001 that
the Scottish Executive consent records of Scottish council stock transfer contained
numerous transactions which stretched that definition endlessly.115 Some sales brought in
handsome receipts; others niL. All of these possibilities and everything in between seem to
have been encompassed within the term 'stock transfer', underlining the definitional
weakness of offcial data and thus the clarity of 'transfer policy' intentions and mechanisms.
Data collection for the Scottish Executive, and thereby for this thesis, had to proceed with
greater definitional clarity about what is and is not a stock transfer. The researcher
encountered official resistance to constructing clear definitions in this area in 2001, for
reasons which may be related to the contemporary policy environment,116 However a
definition was agreed for the purposes of data collection only having been developed from
113 The paper drew on previously unpublished annual returns from local councils where no definition of transfer was given.
114 The sellers were mostly district councils prior to reorganisation (17 out of 56 before 1995).
115 These included disposals to developers and private individuals; untenanted housing prepared for demolition,
refurbishment and onward sale; land cleared of former council housing; pre-1919 tenements built by the private sector and
bought by councils under Compulsory Purchase Orders.
116 The ballot for the Glasgow transfer was impending at the stage of data collection and much effort was going into
gathering. and disseminating information to reassure tenants of the benefits of transfer. No clear agreement had been
reached at that point about how to resolve the problem of debt and it is easy to see how a clear definition which implied
subsidy or otherwise could have been unhelpful for government officials and ministers seeking maximum flexibility.
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interviews with key actors in 1998.117 Some transactions were excluded at this stage,
deemed inappropriate or invalid. An earlier working definition also included reference to a
capital receipt for the seller, but this has been omitted as it would exclude many transactions
deemed relevant on every other count. Moreover, as Chapter Five shows, not all transfers in
England produced a receipt to the seller. In all other respects the above definition would
also fit transfers in England. Thus 'stock transfer' in this chapter refers to cases which fit the
definition below:
Figure 20: Scottish Local Authority Stock Transfer - A Definition For Data Collection
1. the seller was
o a local authority
2. the property was
o built after 1919 by a local authority
o currently owned and managed by the local authority
o in varying conditions of repair
o available for letting, even if not currently tenanted to any
3. the buyer was
o a voluntary, private body
o established with not-for*profit objectives
o funded by private loans and public grant, to varying degrees
committed to continuing to let the properties after transfer
the transfer produced
the opportunity for private borrowing by the buyer,
with or without subsidy
Exclusions
Based on the above definition, transactions which were recorded as receiving ministerial
consent are now excluded for the purposes of this study if they were 'wrong' in terms of the
type of stock (e.g. first built prior to 1919, usually by the private sector); or buyer (e.g.
individual transactions regardless of who built the houses.118)
This has some quantitative significance. Prior to adopting the new definition, the database at
an earlier stage showed 25 district councils undertaking 'transfer' transactions, whereas only
17 local authorities were involved in the revised, narrower definition. Table 14 (based on
data to 1998) shows the authorities and types of disposals: dark shaded cells indicate that
the type of disposal was the only stream pursued. The light shaded cells show a range of
strategies in use by that authority. Out of the eight excluded councils, six undertook the
'wrong' type of disposal as their only strategy: two had a range of strategies. This is notable
117 The analysis of interviewees' responses to an invitation to define transfer generated contradictory dimensions (summary
reproduced in Appendix Two): some respondents did not regard partial transfers for regeneration purposes as 'proper stock
transfers', which could be indicative of the leakage of discourse about English whole stock disposals.
118 These were primarily destined for redevelopment primarily for owner occupation. They included an assortment of Tenant
Choice sales, Right to Buy sales and empty propert disposals of houses and other properties to individuals and developers,
al/ of which appeared on Scottish Offce records.
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because it shows the variety of disposal strategies used by local councils, under different
party control. Such variety of local action undermines the notion of clear top-down transfer
policy or strategy. This dispersed pattern indicates a degree of 'mess' at the local scale
perhaps in response to changing external circumstances. There does not appear to be any
clear or consistent policy in operation from the centre: if there was such a policy, it is not
manifest in outputs at the local scale.
Table 14: Scottish District Councils (Pre-1996) Involved In Stock Disposals
Name of district council to new HA to existing to existing 'Wrong' type
(Note 1) local HA national HA of stock
'Wrong' type
of buyer
Edinburgh
5 5
Angus
Argyll and Bute
Banff and Buchan
Berwickshire
Clydebank
Clydesdale -
Dumbarton
Dundee
Dunfermline -
East Lothian
Falkirk
Glasgow
Hamilton -
Inverclyde
Kilmarnock 1 Loudon
Kirkcaldy
Monklands -
Motherwell
Roxburgh
Strathkelvin
West Lothian
Totals 10 7
Source: research database at 1997
Note 1: The names of the authorities highlighted in bold on the right, are those authorities whose
disposals are included in this study as 'valid' transfers. The largest stream of 'valid' transfers were to new
housing associations.
There is no particular pattern in the exclusions, which mostly reflects the lack of consistency
in the data due to definitional problems. Twelve authorities were involved in sales to buyers
other than housing associations, more than any other type of disposaL. They produced a
receipt to sellers with wide variation in unit prices (from nil value up to £20,000). While there
may have been more transactions to the private sector, monitoring of such developments
was limited. Meanwhile transactions affecting some 600 properties were deemed the
'wrong' type of stock. These too produced receipts with wide variation in unit values (£1,600
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and £60,000 (sic)), though much information is missing. The wide range reflects the variety
of condition of stock, including some newly constructed housing for rent, transferred to
housing associations prior to letting.
Excluded transactions cover the period 1980-94, though key years during this period are
1984 (Duncan, 1991) and 1991/2. The fact that 1991/2 appears as a key year could reflect
enthusiasm for recording to show 'policy' success, or the consequences of a squeeze on
councils after 1987. Sales to the housing association sector were concentrated in the years
after 1989, which may mean that the consents no longer pick up the other cases or that
sales have ceased. Political control of the 'wrong' disposing councils varied widely, including
authorities under the control of Labour, Conservatives and Independents. But it is notable
that Labour-held authorities feature more strongly among the cases deemed to be valid
'transfers'. The councils excluded henceforth are Angus, Banff and Buchan
(Aberdeenshire), East Lothian, Falkirk, and Orkney (names of successor unitary authorities
shown in brackets). Fife (formerly North East Fife) appears later in this thesis for other
reasons, along with Scottsh Borders (not as Roxburgh but as Berwickshire). We can now
examine the various characteristics of the transactions for Scotland.
Transfers in Scotland
Having clarified what is (and is not) meant by stock transfer, we can now examine transfers
in Scotland. The summary in Table 15 shows seventeen authorities involved in 138
transactions between 1986 and March 2001.119 Appendix Seven shows detailed tables
generated from the database. Many councils only undertook one transaction while others
pursued severaL. This data does not of itself clarify whether the transfers were partial or
whole stock, although it can be seen from any statistical bulletin that every Scottish local
authority still had stock for rent in 2001.
Table 15: Summary of Scottish Stock Transfers 1986 - 2001
Transactions 138
Authorities 17
No of houses 21,292
Averaqe size of transaction 154
Gross price £79m
Gross loan facilities (estd) £75m
Value of grant £ 371m
Ratio of loan: price 1.0
Ratio of loan : grant 0.2
Averaqe price £ £ 3,689
Average loan £ £ 3,538
Averaqe grant £ £ 17,458
Source: research database at 2001
This would suggest that there was no whole stock transfer, whereas one small district
council in Scotland disposed of its entire stock prior to reorganisation into a larger unitary
119 The Scottish Executive leaflet shows 182 LSVTs affecting 21,537 homes. But without any breakdown.
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council, in a way that appears to fit the English understanding of a whole stock disposal.12o
This leaves all but one of the disposals as partiaL. Thus, in spite of its apparent absence,
there was stock transfer in Scotland as Table 15 indicates. A considerable amount of grant
was spent on transfers (£371 million) complemented by relatively low borrowing (£75
milion) in a ratio of 5:1. The receipts raised by transfer were also small, at £79 million. No
figures on debt redemption are available though on the face of these figures, it could be
argued that the private borrowing has funded payment to the local authority for historic debt
while subsidy was provided to invest in the housing stock. These characteristics are already
quite different from England, particularly the small scale of receipt and borrowing against
high levels of subsidy and small transactions. Analysis of the English data was inductive,
extending our understanding of transaction types, their political geography and timing. A
more deductive approach has been imposed on the Scottish data, partly in view of the
apparent consistency of type (small, partial disposals), and the concentration among a
smaller number of councils. The basis of presentation is therefore not identical, though it is
suffciently similar to allow some useful comparison. To explore the Scottish picture in more
detail, temporal and spatial dimensions of the data are examined to reveal when stock was
sold, by whom to whom, and where. All council transfers are included throughout the
discussion, unless specified otherwise.
When? Timing of Transactions and Investment
The annual distribution of transfers is perhaps the most interesting feature, in terms of
timing of decisions and actions. It is especially interesting relative to the picture in England.
The following figures show the volume of transactions and stock, followed by average
transaction size for Scottish transfers.
The figures show transactions starting in 1985/6, two years before the 1988 legislation. The
numbers rose to a peak in 1993/4 remaining high for a couple of years before falling away
again. One might suppose that if transfer were policy and a success, the rising trend would
have been sustained. The steep fall in transaction numbers (and therefore of stock volume)
after 1995/6 therefore seems strange. There was considerable similarity in the pattern of
transaction numbers and stock size (Figure 23). The discrepancy was in 1995/6 which can
be explained by the Berwickshire case, which accounted for 2,000 out of the 2,500 houses
transferred that year. Otherwise the volume of stock similarly rose and fell, with average
transaction size rising fairly steadily from 100 to 200, with peaks of 300 in 1988/9 and
1995/6, considerably smaller than even the smallest English partial transfers.
120 The area concerned is Berwickshire which has one transaction accounting for 2054 houses (all of the stock of the district
council). The seller's identity appears under Scottish Borders Council, though Scottish Borders Council retained 8,000
houses in ownership and management unti/2003.
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Figure 21: Scottish Local Authority Transfers: Number Of Transactions By Year 1986 - March 2001
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Figure 22: Scottish Local Authority Transfers: Amount Of Stock Transferred By Year 1986 - March 2001
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Figure 23: Scottish Local Authority Transfers 1986 - March 2001: Average Transaction Size
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The government's leaflet (Appendix One) showed the average size of transfer to be 239, but
figures from this dataset - including Berwickshire - show the average to be even smaller at
154. Over half of all cases (53%) involved fewer than 100 units of housing,121 affecting less
121 The very small size of the transactions contrasts not only with England at the same time but with the scale of disposals
under discussion in 2001/2: e.g. the Glasgow debate in 2002 was about more than 80,000 houses.
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than a fifth of the stock transferred but a disproportionate share of the subsidy (30%). The
largest share of subsidy went to slightly larger transactions (between 100 and 250 units).
Figure 24: Scottish Local Authority Transfers - Analysis Of Size
share of borrowng ~~w: - C fewr than 100
I i I I I
share of grant 11
. fewr than 250
I I I I I
share of receipt 1-
I I I I I
C fewr than 500
share of stock numbrs --
I I I I I I! fewr than 1000
share of transactions ii
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
. moe than 1000
Source: research database at 2001
The next size of transactions (250 to 500 units) comprised less than a fifth of the total
transactions (17%) with over a third of the stock but only a quarter of the subsidy. This
shows that subsidy share dropped as the scale of transaction increased. The largest case
involved more than 2,000 houses in Berwickshire, but the second largest is in Dumfnes
involving only 395 houses. Like other larger transactions it fell post-1997, and was a partial
transfer without subsidy. This raises questions about whether more disposals were taking
place to larger bodies over time, as a means of reducing subsidy or in response to fallng
subsidy.
Resources
Figure 25: All Scottish Local Authority Transfers 1986 - March 2001: Receipt Grant And Borrowing-
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The financial analysis reveals no investment for stock transferred after 1998, though these
may have been designed not to receive subsidy (Dumfries and North Lanarkshire).12
122 As ministerial consents did not record borrowing, as there was no grant from which to estimate borrowing, there is no
information about how much borrowing followed the disposal. The valuation and business planning methods were different,
more in line with discounted cash flow.
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Though subsidy data were associated with particular transactions, it is acknowledged that
this may not be entirely robust due to data problems. Investment data could not be identified
for most of the early transfers (prior to 1988), and for a smattering of cases during the
1990s. Subsidy appears to be allocated to stock transferred in the late 1980s and early
1990s several years later. This is partly explained by 'braking distance' or administrative
lead time to process grant. Another explanation is that insufficient grant was earmarked
soon enough to support the pipeline of transfers. The apparent lack of subsidy on later
transfers could reflect lead-time problems, but changes in systems, calculations and
priorities may be a better explanation.
Analysis of resources by year (Figure 25) shows variation and peaks in grant spending
accompanied by very low but rising levels of borrowing, while receipts (prices) also appear
low, relative to subsidy. There is significant variation in the relationship between these
characteristics over the period, to which later chapters will return in pursuit of an
explanation. Receipts seem fairly steady in gross terms, rising slightly in the mid 1990s
(and reflecting the growth in volume shown above). Borrowing starts off very low and rises
steadily, though dropping like a stone after 1995/6. Until 1989/90, the transactions seem to
bring in double the value of subsidy relative to receipts, whereas within a couple of years,
receipts have dropped and subsidy has risen.
HAG spend appeared boosted between 1989/90 and 1994/5. Two particular years - 1992/3
and 1994/5 - show very high spending, but followed by a steep decline to 1987/8 levels
when transfer 'policy' became officiaL. As the opening summary table indicated, the most
revealing aspect of the financial arrangement was the very low level of private borrowing
relative to subsidy. Nevertheless, in gross terms the relationship was changing: by 1995/6,
receipts, subsidy and borrowing were almost equal, though arguably distorted by the
Berwickshire case. However by 1995/6 subsidy had fallen, remaining steady thereafter while
borrowing fell further.
Figure 26: Ratio Of Subsidy To Borrowing In Scottish Council Transfers 1987/8 -1999/00
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For now we can note from Figure 26 (above) that subsidy consistently outstripped private
borrowing by 4:1, rising to 8:1 over the period. Arguably this was the reverse of policy
intentions: the ratio was designed to start high and falL. Moreover this is very different from
the picture reported for England (Chapter Five), indeed, almost the reverse. Chapter Eight
returns to the critical question of whether anyone was aware of this trend and whether any
action was taken as a result.
The pattern per house (Figure 27) shows a steep rise in unit subsidy in 1989/90, fallng
away steadily thereafter. The privately-funded Berwickshire phenomenon explains the
interrupted pattern in 1995/6. Even allowing for missing data, these figures both show
borrowing increasing as grant declined, but only very slightly. More importantly, overall
investment per unit appeared to falL. This could be interpreted in many different ways. It
could mean that housing in better condition was targeted for transfer, requiring less
investment. It could be argued that private funding per unit could not be raised above a
certain level and to achieve (or demonstrate) a desired leverage rate, the subsidy had to falL.
The data only allow speculation and the posing of questions, to which further chapters
return.
Figure 27: All Scottish Local Authority Transfers 1986 - March 2001: Grant And Borrowing Per House At
2001 Values
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There was no advertised pipeline of transfers in Scotland as such, though - as Chapter
Eight will show - decisions were made in central government and in Scottish Homes about
the volume of subsidy available. Decisions about how much grant to allocate to particular
cases were made at a local scale within Scottish Homes, within a framework of targets
agreed or negotiated at the national level (Robertson, 1992). On the other hand, decision-
making about sales lay with the councils and tenants, but was probably linked to the
availabilty of funding in the event of sale. One might speculate about whether the volume of
stock transferred by councils led to the allocation of subsidy, or whether the availability of
particular amounts of subsidy had an incentive effect on the development of transfers at the
local scale.
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Figure 28: All Scottish Local Authority Transfers 1986 - March 2001: Temporal Distribution Of
Transactions And HAG Spending On Transfer
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Figure 28 shows the annual distribution of transactions and funding, showing transactions
mostly ahead of funding especially in later years, but funding ahead of transactions in
1989/90 and 1993/4. Funding falls sharply in 1995/6 accompanied by a fall in transactions.
This pattern could be interpreted to mean that Scottish Homes funding decisions commonly
followed council decision-making and created its own pipeline of demand for funding, until
resources were cut in 1995/6.
Qualitative analysis of interview and documentary material helps to elucidate the extent to
which one drives the other. Chapter Eight therefore explores two issues: firstly, whether the
fall in gross resource allocation from 1995/6 was part of a general decline or specific to
stock transfers; and secondly, the extent to which government was aware of the outcomes
or uses of resources.
Who sold?
The sellers were 17 councils, shown in their present form as unitary authorities (see note
114): most unitary councils have not transferred stock in their own right,123 and the only four
authorities to do so after 1996 were Glasgow, North Lanarkshire, Angus and Dumfries &
Galloway. The latter only conducted transfers after reorganisation. Although most of the
period after reorganisation falls strictly outwith the period under examination in this thesis, it
would be foolish to ignore the paucity of transfer by unitary authorities. This would suggest
that some aspects of reorganisation not only interfere with presentation of data but more
importantly affect the declining supply of stock for transfer. Later chapters return to this
question.
123 With comprehensive reorganisation of local government over the period under examination, the researcher had to decide
both how to analyse and present the identit of councils (as sellers). A decision was made to opt in favour of the post-1996
identities partly for ease of data collection in 2001. Many unitary councils appear by virte of their predecessor authori(ies)
and as a result of boundary changes, a few transactions now appear as disposals by another authori: for example,
Glasgow transferrd stock in Cambuslang before 1996 - this case now appears under South Lanarkshire.
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As Figure 29 shows, Glasgow dominates the picture in terms of share of transactions (74),
stock (11,796), receipts (£42 million) and grant (£207 million). Its share of the total picture is
fairly constant at around 55% of every dimension, leaving other councils to share the
remaining 45% of transfer activity. West Dunbartonshire (formerly Clydebank and
Dumbarton) accounts for 7 - 8% of the activity. Dundee's share of stock transfer is fairly
even at 4 - 5 % though its receipt is relatively low.
By contrast, some of the other authorities' share of transfers varies depending on the
dimension examined. Edinburgh, for instance, has quite a large share of the transactions
(10%) and of the grant, but the amount of stock transferred is rather small (3%). This
indicates a large number of small transactions with high levels of subsidy. North
Lanarkshire's share of the stock is high relative to its share of receipts and transactions,
indicating large transactions and low value.
Figure 29: Scottish Local Authority Transfers - Sellers: Share OfTransactions
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Scottish Borders (represented by one large transaction - Berwickshire), stands out as
accounting for a relatively large share of the stock transferred, of receipt and borrowing, but
not of grant. As discussed above, some other disposals appear to have no grant, notably
Argyll and Bute and Dumfries and Galloway. Some of these cases may have received
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subsidy but it could not be traced in the investment information (e.g. Argyll 1993 - 5). In
other cases, (e.g. North Lanarkshire or Dumfries and Galloway 1999/00) the transaction
may have taken place after the decline in grant allocations for former council stock. These
cases may be comparable to the partial transfers in England without grant. The value of this
stock is very low at less than £500 per house.
Political Control of Sellers
The political control of the selling authorities is fairly consistent, with the majority being
under Labour control at the point of transfer. They include Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee,
East Ayrshire, Fife, Inverclyde, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, South Lanarkshire, West
Dunbartonshire and West Lothian, or their predecessor councils (Table 16 on page 136).
Quantitative data on transfer cannot begin to explain how consistently Labour-held councils
were involved in voluntary sales of housing under a Conservative government, given the
atmosphere of relations with central government at the time. Such issues are explored
further in later chapters, along with the connection with reorganisation which increasingly
appears significant as a possible factor in the decline of transfer.
Table 16: Transferring Councils Before And After Reorganisation: Political Control
Political control in:
Name of district 1984 1988 1992 1996 Name of unitary council
council
SNP Angus *
Argyll Ind Ind Ind NOC Argyll & Bute
Berwickshire Cons Cons Cons NOC Scottish Borders
Clydebank Lab Lab Lab Lab West Dunbartonshire
Clydesdale NOC Lab Lab Lab South Lanarkshire
Dumbarton Lab Lab Lab Lab West Dunbartonshire
NOC Dumfries & Galloway *
Dundee Lab Lab Lab Lab Dundee
Dunfermline Lab Lab Lab Lab Fife
Edinburgh Lab Lab Lab Lab Edinburgh
Glasgow Lab Lab Lab Lab Glasgow
Hamilton Lab Lab Lab Lab South Lanarkshire
Inverclyde Lab Lab Lab Lab Inverclyde
Kilmarnock Lab Lab Lab Lab East Ayrshire
Kirkcaldy Lab Lab Lab Lab Fife
Monklands Lab Lab Lab Lab North Lanarkshire
Motherwell Lab Lab Lab Lab North Lanarkshire
Perth & Kinross Cons Cons Cons Lab Perth & Kinross
Renfrew Lab Lab Lab Lab Renfrewshire; East
Renfrewshire
Strathkelvin Lab Lab Lab Lab North Lanarkshire
West Lothian Lab Lab SNP Lab West Lothian
Source: Municipal yearbooks various.
* Unitary authorities which pursued transfer though none of its predecessors had done so
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There were five authorities not held by Labour, including Angus, Argyll and Bute, Dumfries
and Galloway. Two others - Perth and Kinross and Berwickshire - had Conservative
majorities at the time of transfer but took quite different approaches. Perth and Kinross
made 8 disposals between 1988/9 and 1994/5 affecting 272 houses to the same fully mutual
co-operative, new in 1988. The receipt to the council came to approximately £176,000, but
the disposal levered in grant of £12 million and private borrowing of £3.5 million for one
estate on the outskirts of Perth City. This council gave permission for its data to be modelled
by a study on stock transfer, designed to look at scope for transferring stock to a new form
of landlord, called a Local Housing Company (Bramley et aI, 1993). Such bodies were
meant to provide more council control over governance after transfer. The council took no
further action after publication of the report. Perth and Kinross remained a unitary authority
at reorganisation and came under the control of the SNP at the 1995 elections. It pursued
no further transfers.
As mentioned already, Berwickshire - by contrast - sold all of its rented housing to a newly-
formed housing association in a single transaction in August 1995, after a widely publicised
ballot in October 1994. Berwickshire Housing Association raised almost £13 million through
private borrowing, which was paid to the council, extinguishing its housing debt, before the
council was reorganised into the new unitary council, Scottish Borders (with effect from April
1996).124 This transaction was pursued as a case study.
Table 17: Scottish Local Authority Transfers: Value Of Subsidy Per House
Local authority Total estimated Notes
investment per
unit based on
original stock
transferred
Angus £ 73,741
Argyll and Bute £ 54 limited trace of subsidy
Dumfries and Galloway - believed not to have subsidy
Dundee £ 9,883
East Ayrshire £ 18,248
East Renfrewshire £ 40,341
Edinburgh £ 75,093
Fife £ 23,777
Glasgow £ 23,722
Inverclyde £ 14,744
North Lanarkshire £ 20,150
Perth and Kinross £ 67,225
Renfrewshire no subsidy traced
Scottish Borders no subsidy given
South Lanarkshire £ 19,377
West Dunbartonshire £ 24,176
West Lothian £ 59,659
Average £ 22,385
Source: research database at 2001
124 Scottish Borders council balloted its tenants about whole stock transfer in autumn 2001, with a positive result
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Argyll and Bute appears as successor to two neighbouring districts under the control of
various groupings, though not necessarily party affliated: Argyll and Bute DC was
predominantly independent, whereas Labour held Dumbarton DC, until the mid-1990s. The
transactions were very small at 44 and 52 units in Garelochead (Argyll) and Helensburgh
(Dumbarton) in 1992/3. Subsidy cannot be traced for either, and valuations per house
display wide variation.
Two non-Labour councils fall outwith the study period. The Dumfries and Galloway disposal
was undertaken by a rainbow coalition in 1999/00, affecting an estate of almost 400 houses
in Dumfries, in need of modernisation, for which the council received the princely sum of
£104,000, less than £300 per house and no subsidy. The buyer was an association based in
Ayrshire and recently established following New Town stock transfer in 1995/6. The only
SNP-held council to transfer stock was Angus in 1997/8, affecting 70 houses in the town of
Arbroath to a pre-existing local housing association with a substantial portfolio. It brought a
receipt to the council of £420,000 and the association was able to lever in grant funding in
excess of £2 million, complemented by estimated borrowing of £0.8 million.
Table 17 shows the wide range in values of subsidy per house around a national average of
£17,000. Though Edinburgh appears high, on closer scrutiny this could be due to difficulties
in associating subsidy data with particular schemes and numbers of units. This may have
resulted in some double counting, though the data for Edinburgh have been re-examined
closely to find such errors and none could be traced. This could reflect a lack of consistent
policy monitoring, a different approach to transfer in the capital or higher levels of subsidy in
some areas - of which Edinburgh is one. Angus, Perth and Kinross and North Lanarkshire
had similar levels of subsidy per house. Overall however, there is wide variation which may
be related to the position of the disposal in terms of timing (see above): this suggests that
the patterns may be less random than these figures suggest. Chapter Eight will examine
whether patterns of decision-making differ at the local scale.
Who Bought?
A total of 66 buyers were involved in acquiring stock from councils in Scotland. Just over
half of these (35) took one transaction only, and most of the sellers who only conducted one
transaction used an existing body to acquire the stock. Most of the buyers who made one-
off acquisitions already existed prior to the transfer, though some, particularly in later years,
had been created (or expanded) to receive stock transferred by other landlords, including
New Towns and Scottsh Homes. However, they mostly operated at a local scale, with only
four national or regional associations involved in local authority stock transfer. There is
limited difference between local and national bodies in transaction size.
Just under half (29) of the buyers took stock in the remaining 103 cases in multiple
transactions. Most undertook 3 or 4 purchases, though the largest number of transactions to
anyone buyer was 8 in Perth to Fairfield Housing co-operative. Most of those who took
multiple transactions did not exist prior to the first transfer and were created to receive the
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stock. Some of the new landlords were very small, and at the point of gathering the dataset,
a number had ceased to exist, having been subsumed into larger bodies or changed their
name to accommodate mergers with other small new associations. Most of those who
remain are small, with fewer than 750 units in ownership at 2001.
Table 18: Scottish Local Authority Transfers: Status Of Buyers. Single Or Multiple Transactions
Sellers Buyers
Repeat Established
buyers bodies
All New, only including
transactions one newly
purchase formed
landlords
Angus 1 0 0 1
Argyll and Bute 2 0 1 1
Dumfries and Galloway 1 0 0 1
Dundee 6 1 1 4
East Ayrshire 1 0 0 1
East Renfrewshire 1 0 0 1
Edinburgh 14 3 9 2
Fife 4 1 2 1
Glasgow 74 19 45 10
Inverclyde 2 0 0 2
North Lanarkshire 8 0 4 4
Perth and Kinross 8 1 7 0
Renfrewshire 1 0 0 1
Scottish Borders 1 1 0 0
South Lanarkshire 3 1 0 2
West Dunbartonshire 10 3 5 2
West Lothian 1 0 0 1
All (%) 138 (100%) 29 (21%) 74 (54%) 34 (25%)
Source: research database at 2001125
Out of Glasgow's 74 transactions, over half of the acquisitions were made by bodies already
in existence. Most of these were created for earlier purchases of council stock. Less than a
third of the disposals were to one-off buyers. Pre-existing community-based associations,
originally set up for neighbourhood renewal in inner city Glasgow, were barely involved.
Arguably transfer has had an impact on the nature of the housing association sector (as
indicated in Figure 30. With a stock of 140,000 houses in 2000, acquisition of 21,000 from
councils represents one in seven houses. However, the impact from other streams of
transfer (particularly from Scottish Homes) represents nearer one in three houses. In
Glasgow, where most of the transfers took place, as at 1997 the council still owned 43% of
the stock as against 16% owned by the association sector (Taylor, 1998b).
125 The four selling councils highlighted in bold are explored as case studies.
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Figure 30: Proporton Of Housing Ownership By (Transferring) Councils And Associations: Scotland,
1997
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Source: Taylor 1998a adapted
Where Were The Transfers?
A 'regional' pattern emerges from these characteristics. The data were coded to indicate the
region in which the buyer associations operated in the year 2000,126 as a means of
associating grant with particular transactions (see Appendix). In Scottish Homes areas of
Glasgow / North Clyde, and the North East (almost exclusively Dundee), most transactions
were to buyers in multiple transactions. By contrast in the South West (76%), most were on
a larger scale to one-off buyers. Two thirds of the stock transferred in Lothian and Borders is
accounted for by Berwickshire alone, which means that the average transaction size (187) is
virtually meaningless, as other transactions in Edinburgh were very small indeed.
The area distribution of the transfers appears rather even until the subsidy values are
examined. Table 20 shows the value of subsidy per house to be markedly lower in Lothian
and Borders: once again, Berwickshire skews these values. When Berwickshire is
discounted, the value of subsidy per house appears to rise to £43,000 in Lothian and
Borders.
126 There were seven districts unti/19961 and then four, which are used as the basis of discussion here as they were used
as the basis for finding investment data by associating relevant grant information, taking the various regional, annual HAG
targets. It cannot be taken as a hard and fast indication of region in terms of decision-making or policy, due to the various
changes in the regional structure of Scottish Homes over the decade but three patterns hold broadly true. See Chapter Eight.
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Table 19: Scottish Local Authority Transfers 1986 -2001: Regional Distribution Of All Transfers By
Volume
Scottish Homes Regions Numbers of Amount of Average
transactions stock transaction
transferred size
GlasQow and North Clyde 86 12,881 150
Lothian Borders, Forth Valley 16 2,987 187
North East 19 1,540 81
South West and Ayrshire 17 3,884 228
All 138 21,292 154
Source: research database at 2001
In terms of geographical spread, most of the sellers are located in central Scotland,
predominantly in the west. Glasgow clearly dominates on all dimensions but surrounded by
authorities that pursued at least some similar types of transaction. Indeed, the only authority
adjoining Glasgow not to have conducted transfers is East Dunbartonshire (formerly
Bearsden and Milngavie) and parts of Strathkelvin, perversely areas in which Conservative
support was above average.
Table 20: Scottish Local Authority Transfers 1986 - 2001: Regional Distribution Of All Transfers-
Proportion And Value Of Subsidy
Scottish Homes Regions Share of Share of Share of Subsidy per
stock receipt subsidy house
transferred
bv councils
Glasgow and North Clyde 60% 61% 68% £ 19,696
Lothian Borders, Forth Valley 14% 20% 11% £ 13,652
North East 7% 3% 7% £ 17,425
South West and Ayrshire 18% 16% 14% £ 13,999
All 100% 100% 100% £ 17,644
Source: research database at 2001
Excepting Berwickshire, there are no transfers in remote or rural Scotland, north (beyond
Angus) or south. This suggests transfer in Scotland as a predominantly urban phenomenon
mainly in the west of Scotland, as the distribution in Figure 31 suggests.
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Figure 31: Scottish Transfers: Distribution of Partial and Whole Transactions
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Case Study Areas
Four sellers were selected as case studies. The four areas are Glasgow, Dundee, North
Lanarkshire (mainly Motherwell) and Berwickshire. Glasgow was clearly the largest seller,
the greatest subsidy beneficiary by volume, and resulting in the largest proportion of
housing owned by other social landlords. While Glasgow was characterised by a series of
disposals, often multiple disposals to the same body originally created to acquire stock, in
other areas the pattern has varied. Glasgow is included as a case study since it appears to
be the earliest seller and thus a possible policy originator, as well as the largest seller.
Dundee is included as a case study since it produced some of the smallest and earliest
transactions, though not sustained beyond 1992, and with very low receipts to the counciL.
Both Glasgow and Dundee sold mainly to new bodies, though some have resulted in
subsequent mergers, particularly in Dundee.
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North Lanarkshire is included as it (or three of its four predecessors) undertook a variety of
partial disposals across the period to different types of buyer - new, regional and national,
with and without subsidy. North Lanarkshire pursued transfer after reorganisation, as well as
taking over from a number of district councils which had pursued different strategies. The
focus in North Lanarkshire pre-1996 is mainly on MotherwelL.
Finally, the case studies include Berwickshire as the only whole disposal in Scotland
completed in August 1995, which clearly shines through the data (in Table 21) as a large-
scale phenomenon, and very different from all the others, not only before 1997 but for the
next four years under new Labour.
Comparison with England: Types of Transfer
An examination of the total picture in each country (Table 22) shows almost the same
number of transactions over the period, though over a slightly longer period and starting
earlier in Scotland. Although fewer properties were sold by fewer councils in Scotland,
Scottish sellers represent a higher proportion of all councils. In that sense it is a more
widespread phenomenon than in England. However, the disparity in transaction size is
marked: hundreds of properties compared with several thousands.
Table 22: Summary Comparison Of All Council Stock Transfers In Scotland And England
Scotland All England All
Transactions 138 145
Authorities 17 106
No. of houses 21,292 575,626
AveraQe size of transaction 154 3,970
Gross price £m £79 £ 5,038
Gross loan facilities £m (estd) £75 £ 10,044
Value of arant £m £371 £ 522
Ratio of loan : price 0.8 1.6
Price per house £ £ 3,689 £ 9,207
Loan per house £ £ 3,538 £ 19,351
Grant per house £ £ 17,458 £ 5,248
Source: research database at 2001
Figure 32 confirms more disposals taking place sooner in Scotland but affecting very little
stock relative to transfer volumes in England. This would suggest that attention in the
literature defaults in favour of volume output of houses affected, rather than on episodes of
decision-making, which determine the transactions. Without diminishing the importance of
the scale of population affected, volume is not the only relevant criterion of significance.
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Figure 32: Timing Of All Stock Transfer Transactions. Scotland And England
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The disproportionately smaller scale of transfer in Scotland is confirmed by volume financial
indicators, whereas unit indicators reveal more interesting disparities. Prices are much lower
in Scotland, indicating lower values, though the loan:price ratio is not very different, masking
the meaning of that relationship. Borrowing per house in England outstripped that in
Scotland, while grants in Scotland were considerably ahead of grants in England: over
£17,000 per house (even though not all relevant data could be established), compared with
just over £5,000. Despite the very high grant level per house, and the relatively higher public
cost accompanied by very limited private borrowing, overall unit funding in Scotland was
less than in England.
Chapter Five distinguished different types of transfer (whole and partial, with and without
grant), but there has been less variety in Scotland in local authority stock transfer. There is
known to have been only one whole disposal in terms of pre-1996 local government
boundaries, leaving the remaining 137 cases as partial disposals by authorities who
remained as landlords. The majority of these were partial, grant-funded disposals, even
though subsidy data cannot be traced for alL. Only two partial transfers are known not to
have involved any grant funding; both fall outwith the period of study (post-1997). This
means that Scotland's partial transfers are characterised by multiple disposals, often to new
bodies: whereas in England, the partial transfers profile is of pre-existing bodies taking
multiple transactions, while whole disposals go to new bodies. It is worth comparing further
the different types of transfer north and south of the border.
Whole Stock Disposals
Berwickshire can be compared with its English whole disposal counterparts, but only up to a
point, as the volume indicators are meaningless. The transaction was small by comparison
with English averages, though there were many on this scale in England. More useful
information per house shows a lower value than the average for England and markedly less
borrowing.
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Table 23: Comparison of whole stock disposals in Scotland and England
Scotland England
(Berwickshire) (averaQe)
Transactions 1 104
Authorities 1 86
No of houses 2,054 519,545
Size of transaction 2,054 4,996
Gross price £0.013 m £5,016 m
Gross loan facilities (estd) £0.015 m £8,944 m
Ratio of loan : price 1.2 1.8
Price per house £6,493 £9,655
Loan per house £7,300 £17,216
Source: research database at 2001
Though not shown in the table, the Berwickshire transfer went through in a year when prices
and borrowing were reaching an all-time peak in England. In the Berwickshire case,
borrowing barely exceeds the price, which indicates substantially less additional investment
post-transfer. Such price comparisons would have been a source of some embarrassment
to the Scottish Offce, as the English whole stock transfers were producing valuations of up
to £9,000 per unit in the mid-1990s. Another source of embarrassment was the fact that of
six Scottish authorities under Conservative control until 1995,129 Berwickshire was the only
one to pursue transfer to completion. Wigtown District was the other council which went to
ballot in 1995, but most of its councillors were Independent (Municipal Yearbook, 1994) and
the result was unsuccessfuL. Although there were not many Conservative-held councils, it is
significant that only one produced whole stock transfer. How this came to pass is explored
through two of the case studies in Chapter Nine.
Partial Transfers
Examination of the headline comparators for partial transfers only still reveals many
differences and few similarities (see Table 24). Though a similar number of councils were
involved, three times more transactions were conducted in Scotland, on a smaller scale
judged by average transaction size.
The receipt achieved in Scotland appears four times greater per house, resulting in a larger
scale of receipt overall, though still small at £79 million. Subsidy (per unit) in Scotland was
greater than in England though by a smaller margin than the total picture suggested
(£19,000 compared with £12,000). The greatest disparity was found in private borrowing
where English buyers had levered in an average of £24,000 per unit (1997/8 - 2000/1) as
compared with barely £4,000 in Scotland (1986/7 - 2000/1), though as Chapter Five
showed, there were pronounced regional variations in England. Even recent transactions do
not reveal the level of borrowing achieved in England, which shows divergent subsidy
regimes for ostensibly similar purposes.
129 Others between 1992 - 1996 include Eastwood, Stirling, Bearsden and Milngavie, Kyle and Carrick, and Perth and
Kinross.
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Table 24: Comparison Of Partial Disposals In Scotland And England
Scotland England
Transactions 137 41
Authorities 16 20
No. of houses 19,238 56,081
Averaqe size of transaction 140 1,309
Gross price £ 65 m £22 m 
Gross loan facilities (estd) £ 60m £1,099 m
Value of grant £ 371 m £522 m
Price per house £ £ 4,106 £1,623
Loan per house £ £ 3,135 £24,272
Grant per house £ £ 19,321 £12,458
Ratio of loan : price 1.0 50
Ratio of loan: qrant 0.16 2.1
Source: research database at 2001
Another critical difference affecting partial transfers lies in their timing. While some English
councils (Manchester) pursued partial transfer before 1997, most waited until grant was
available. No money came through the Housing Corporation and in the end a special form of
subsidy (ERCF) with competitive bidding was created for the purpose of partial transfer by
urban English authorities. By the time this grant came into operation, the Conservatives had
left office, and in Scotland the amount of grant going into partial transfers appears to have
plummeted just as the English equivalent was coming on stream. Figure 33 and Figure 34
show the extent and scale of transactions in Scotland before the incidence of partial
transfers.
Figure 35 shows the grant and borrowing achieved per unit by all partial transfers each year
in the two countries. It shows that grant in England in the late 1990s did not achieve even
50% of the peak level in Scotland, though ERCF funding started at approximately similar
levels for that year. Figure 35 shows that as grants became available in England, they had
almost disappeared in Scotland. Borrowing started at a considerably higher level than was
achieved at any time in Scotland. It should be remembered that the figures for England in
1995/6 are all partials, and so include cases where there was no grant. English experience
suggested bottom-up, needs-led policy development (KPMG, 1996). Chapter Eight seeks to
establish the existence of any exchange of views between government departments in
Scotland and England about subsidy mechanisms or levels.
147
Figure 33: Comparison Of Partal Disposals In Scotland And England: Timing Of Transactions
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Figure 34: Comparison of partial disposals in Scotland and England: volume of stock per year
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Figure 35: Comparison of partial disposals in Scotland and England: grant and borrowing per unit
£45,000
£40,000
£35,000
£30,000
£25,000
£20,000
£15,000
£10,000
£5,000
£-
li Grant per unit
Scotland
.. In j L I-~. -11. L 1- iii I-.- . . I. m 1111 L,
~ Grant per unit
England
. Borrow ing per
unit Scotland
. Borrow ing per
unit England
co co 0 C\ "' co co 0
~
co Ol
~
Ol
~ ~
0i' m .. M m
co co co Ol Ol Ol Ol Ol
Ol Ol Ol Ol Ol Ol Ol Ol
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Source: research database at 2001
148
This brings us back to the question of how and why decisions were made to complete these
disposals on these terms, with pronounced differences in timing, scale of disposal,
relationship between subsidy and borrowing. Quantitative data allow such questions to be
posed but not answered, whereas a qualitative approach permits further exploration.
Conclusions, Comparisons and Paradoxes
The researcher has made many different attempts to access relevant information on
Scottish transfers over the years, with varying degrees of success, partly dependent on the
policy climate, and partly dependent on the researcher's relationship to it. Recent success in
accessing data for both England and Scotland has provided the opportunity to establish and
analyse the data on a comparable basis for the first time. The experience of creating a
dataset has inadvertently revealed the lack of priority in central government in monitoring
the outcomes or impact of policy in this area, contrasted with the priority attached by recent
governments to promoting transfer. Although the abstract definition (developed here for the
purposes of data collection) applies equally to transfers in England and Scotland, their
features are quite different when examined at the local scale. While the phenomenon of
transfer exists in Scotland, and more than just in Berwickshire, transaction characteristics
have been critically different in terms of scale, timing, receipt value, levels of public subsidy
and private borrowing. Overall, Scottish transfers were earlier, smaller and more numerous,
producing lower receipts, and levering in much lower levels of borrowing relative to very
substantial public subsidy controlled by a government agency.
Transactions were spatially concentrated in urban Scotland and dominated by Glasgow,
with Labour-held authorities featuring strongly among the sellers from the earliest
transactions in the mid-1980s. Meanwhile some areas of Scotland saw no local authority
transfer activity at alL. The dominance of Labour-held authorities among sellers in Scotland
contrasts with the political diversity of sellers in England.
While partial transfers represented one third of the transactions in England, they clearly
dominated in Scotland. Although marked differences remain, the main point of comparison
is with partial transfers. Such variation points to different decision-making at the centre and
at the local scale, not generally explained or reflected in the housing policy or specialist
transfer literature. The term 'transfer' may thus have different meanings in different places,
and may indicate the differences in motivations, rationales and driving forces at this scale.
Further work is required to explain why the pattern is so different from England and within
Scotland, particularly at the same time.
As with English whole disposals, many of the buyers have been new, but mostly on a very
small scale in Scotland, with stock holdings of hundreds rather than thousands, in
neighbourhoods rather than districts. It has only been in later years that larger, existing
bodies acquired stock, on a larger scale and with reducing levels of subsidy - in some cases
none at alL. Gross subsidy grew between 1990 - 1992 and then even more quickly between
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1993 - 1995, though spending fell away equally sharply from 1995/6. The distribution per
house shows a steadier decline in the level of funding from public sources, with continuously
low levels of private borrowing. The data here merely record an estimate of that decline
without providing any opportunity to explore the reasons, which require different methods
and further analysis. Quantitative data point to some of the characteristics and only help to
define questions for further investigation, since they do litte to explain the reasons behind
the differences, whether between different councils or in relation to England.
Arguably partial transfer in Scotland and England has depended on the availability of grants,
though whether the grants followed the transactions or vice versa is not entirely clear and
may be different in the two jurisdictions. The literature on the ERCF programme indicates
competitive bidding for a finite amount and period of funding preceded by research and
preparation, almost in tune with a rational, deliberate approach to policy-making. No such
deliberation is evident in the case of Scotland and funding appears to follow transactions,
until 1995.
Whole transfers dominated in England whereas they are barely evident in Scotland,
prompting some further questions. Why did certain authorities pursue certain kinds of
transfer path? Why was Berwickshire the only whole disposal in Scotland given that there
were more Conservative authorities in Scotland prior to reorganisation in 1995/6?
In terms of temporal patterns, Scottish local authority transfers started earlier than in
England with the creation of new bodies to take stock from councils and access grant
funding. Setting Berwickshire aside, three phases may be identified from the data: the first is
the pilot phase preceding the establishment of Scottsh Homes in 1988; the second is policy
roll-out 1988 - 1995, characterised by increased volume of transactions and funding; the
third is post-1995 - policy free-fall - where both transactions and funding fell suddenly even
though this was the year in which central government start to promote large-scale transfer
with some vigour, post-Berwickshire. These conclusions raise as many questions as they
answer.
In view of the probable lack of political appetite for transfer, how and why has there been
any transfer? What was the role of Scottish Homes (and before it HCiS) in supporting
transfer? Did council transactions create a pipeline of demand for subsidy, or vice versa?
Was transfer in Scotland dependent on subsidy and if so, to what extent and why? Why did
transfers and grants fall away in 1995/6? Which stopped first - transactions, grants, new
registrations, or some other dimension or factor? Who stopped what, and why? Was it
deliberate, in full knowledge of the consequences? Who took what decisions or actions?
Why did a Conservative government allocate subsidy to landlords in parts of Scotland to
achieve disposals on a smaller scale and on different terms, while facilitating or perhaps
acquiescing in self-financing transfers in parts of England? What other factors might have in
the decline of transfer in Scotland from the mid-1990s? Was reorganisation of local
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government a factor or is there some relationship with other streams of transfer active in the
mid-1990s. The following chapters address these issues.
Documentary and interview material in later chapters seek to establish whether transfers
were generated (and fell away) in response to the availability of resources allocated by the
centre. Case study material in Chapters Nine and Ten pick up different approaches to
transfer and explore further the interface between local and central decision-making in
producing transfer (and non-transfer) outcomes. Four of the case studies are referred to
above, along with a fifth case in Stirling, an authority under Conservative control between
1992/3 - 1994/5, known to have broached a number of different transfer possibilities with no
tangible outcome. This inclusion of non-transfer by a sympathetic council will permit an
examination of the factors at the local scale, contributing to the presence and absence of
transfer at different junctures before 1997.
Subsequent chapters will thus explore the factors contributing to the incidence of transfer in
some places but not others, as a means of unravelling the origins and terms of policy,
actors' rationales, and relationships between actors. Possible explanations for these
patterns will draw on competing theories reviewed in Chapter Two. These will include the
origins and development of policy (rational, controlled/able from centre, or bottom-up); policy
intentions at different scales (connections within UK system at different levels - central and
local); effect of wider factors such as institutional change, and finally the decisions, actions
and motivation of key actors (administrators or politicians) at different scales. First Chapters
Seven and Eight use documentary analysis supplemented by interview material, to examine
both the housing system before transfer started and a range of legal and other rule and
resource changes.
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Chapter Seven
Changing the Policy and Legal Framework
Previous chapters showed various types of voluntary transfer in Scotland and England as
outcomes of change between 1986 and 1997. The remaining chapters set out to explore
how and why some Scottish councils transferred housing over this period while others did
not. The machinery of government in Scotland tends to be documented at a broad level,
without detail connected to particular policy domains. Housing was an important area of
work within the Scottish Office and yet it could be difficult to establish how policy was made.
Determining just what is happening to Scottish public sector housing is not
as easy as it might appear
Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell1991 :175
This chapter aims to provide a detailed account of changes in housing policy, drawing both
on documentary analysis and interviews with key actors, mainly at the centre, or at least not
bound to particular locations. This chapter and the next use interviews conducted with a
range of senior managers, administrators and politicians (see Table 25). The interviews
were mostly carried out during 1998, a year after the end of the period under scrutiny. The
approach to these interviews is discussed in Chapter Three and basis of the questions is
covered in Appendix Four. Further, the chapter is supported by a chronology of relevant
events between 1985 and 1997, mainly at the level of Scotland but also drawing on wider
events of significance in a UK or European context (see Appendix Three).
This chapter is one of two which examine the housing system, focussing on the period up to
1997 under Conservative governments. Both are consciously organised around a series of
headings relevant to the institutionalist perspective, namely rules and procedures. This
chapter is divided initially into two parts: the first reviews the 1985 context revealing the
pressures on council housing as a result of changes made from 1979 onwards affecting
council housing, the voluntary sector and government agencies. The second part examines
the most formal of rule changes from 1985 onwards, legislation introduced by central
government changing the rules underpinning and structuring local decision-making and
action about council housing. Finally the chapter examines the effect of these changes,
considering to what extent they explain the presence and absence of voluntary transfer in
Scotland.
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This chapter argues that while the institution of council housing was already under resource
pressure at 1985, housing legislation provides a far from satisfactory explanation for
Scottish council transfers. The chapter reveals the extent of disruption caused by legislation
on local government reorganisation and New Town wind-up, which affected local decision-
making about transfer. The specific housing changes determined at the centre merely
provided a framework for action. The opportunity to legislate was used to change the
permissive framework surrounding council housing without directly affecting stock transfer.
Later chapters pursue other forms of rule changes and the preferences and interests of
actors at the centre. First, it is useful to review the context at 1985 for the council, voluntary
and government sectors, in that order.
Context at 1985
Any account of policy has to make decisions about the significance of particular events. In
UK housing policy literature, 1988 is often taken as the start date for changes in the socially
rented sector (Malpass and Williams, 1997; Harriott and Matthews, 1998) because of
legislative changes introduced in that year, at the beginning of the Conservatives' third term.
While the timing of enactment is a common reference point, arguably legislation merely
consolidates ideas already forming outside Parliament. In that respect, 1985 is used as the
starting point for this chapter, since that is the year when Glasgow is documented as making
the first move towards disposals of tenanted rented housing to alternative landlords (Ospina,
1987; Clapham, Kintrea and Whitefield, 1991). Moreover, it falls at the end of the
Conservatives' second term of office in central government, preceding preparations for the
general election of 1987.
Scottish Council Housing
By 1985, local authorities had become established in the form given to them by the 1974
reforms, with 53 district and three island councils carrying the housing function and regions
performing social work, education and infrastructure services. Part of the rationale for
having district councils in the 1970s had been to retain local focus on housing issues
(Paterson, 1973). Housing thus came to be, and be seen as, the dominant function of the
district councils (Ferguson, 1984). By 1978, councils in Scotland housed the majority (54%)
of the population (Currie and Murie, 1996:58). The perception of the housing function was in
turn dominated by the landlord role: the focus on 'enabling' and 'strategic' functions was to
come later. However housing policy had undergone changes over the 1980s which could
best be described as 'decremental involving a slow but steady reduction of the role of local
government in housing' (Midwinter et aI, 1991 :179)
The development of council housing had enjoyed popular support in alleviating poor living
conditions earlier in the century (CoSLA, 1987a). However, the management of council
housing was being criticised by local tenants' groups, consumer lobby, right wing politicians
and academic commentators (Rodger, 1989; Currie and Murie, 1996). Criticisms ranged
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across a number of issues including lack of choice, political patronage,133 poor service and
poor standards. This was the climate in which the government set out to change the
institution of council housing. While the RTB changed important property rights underpinning
that institution (Lane and Ersson, 2000), other less visible measures were also introduced
and we can examine councils' access to and use of resources for housing, to understand
the context for transfer in Scotland.
Resources: Rental Income and Repairs Expenditure
Scottsh councils were believed to keep rents low especially when the majority of the
electors were council tenants (Shelter, 1981). In the early 1980s, unemployment was
relatively lowand most tenants paid their own rents: most did not require assistance,
although there were welfare benefits including rent rebates for those on supplementary
benefit (Aughton and Malpass, 1994). Council revenue budgets were heavily subsidised
until the Conservatives came to power in 1979/80: rent paid by tenants comprised less than
half of gross housing revenue, the rest being made up of subsidy from two sources.134
Authority to use either lay with the Secretary of State.
The incoming Conservative government programme included better targeting of resources
and more freedom for the individual (Thatcher, 1993). Thatcher claimed that 'conditions of
dependency were strongly present' in Scottish council housing (Thatcher, 1993:619). In
relation to council housing, government policy meant home ownership through the right to
buy (RTB) for sitting tenants. 'Better targeting of resources' was designed to improve
housing quality and increase value for money though in practice it meant cutting back on
public spending (Malpass and Murie, 1993). Government policy reduced revenue subsidy
allocations from both sources and constrained councils' capital borrowing capacity.
Unlike their English counterparts, councils in Scotland were relatively free to borrow to
undertake new capital investment. As a result, much of the work to existing property which
might have been regarded as ongoing maintenance and thus funded out of revenue, was
left to build up and then capitalised (Stanforth et aI, 1986). Council discretion on such
matters declined as the centre increasingly restricted capital borrowing by local authorities,
intensifying the erosion of local government autonomy over its finances (Gibb, Munro and
Satsangi, 1999). Poor standards were partly a consequence of poor construction but also of
poor management and maintenance. By the mid-1980s, the twin culture of minimising rents
and capitalising repairs had become embedded, leading to physical deterioration of housing
especially in peripheral council estates resulting in very poor living environments
(Robertson, 1992). Routine government statistics only monitored expenditure on repairs and
133 Widespread political patronage by councillors in the allocation of housing was identified long ago as a problem requiring
remedial action (Cullingworth, 1967). Councillor involvement in allocations was still acknowledged by councilors themselves
as a feature of housing in the late 1990s, though by then deplored as such (Winters, 1998).
134 1) locally generated rate funds (Rate Fund Contribution); 2) central government subsidy Housing Support Grant (HSG).
based on an annual calculation, linked to interest rate movements (Currie and Murie, 1996).
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maintenance from 1987/88. However, it was 1991 before surveys showed the extent of
disrepair nationwide (Scottsh Homes, 1991).
'Targeting resources' meant central government cutting back on funding to those it saw as
not in need. Applied to housing, this meant removing blanket subsidies to council tenants,
though not removing local subsidy entirely (Balchin 1995; Gibb, Munro and Satsangi, 1999).
In withdrawing support (via a mixture of legislation and administrative controls), central
government was able to force local authorities to cut service costs or increase rents. Figure
36 shows the value of the consolidated rent account for Scotland between 1979/80 and
1985/6, the decline in the value of subsidy from the centre and in rate support. The chart
shows how gross rental income increased steeply over this period while stock numbers
were falling, although in 1985 rents were still subsidised to some extent.135
Figure 36: Scottish Local Authority Rents and Subsidies: 1978/9 To 1985/6 (£ milion)
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Source: Scottish Office Housing Statistical Bulletin HSU 5 June 1988 - current prices
Data on rental trends were not routinely collected at this time for government statistics.
However, a special statistical bulletin compared public landlords' rents and the relationship
between rents and earnings (see footnote 135). Most councils in Scotland raised rents to
replace loss of subsidy. Analysis of average rents for each of the 56 local authorities (1982
- 1986), reveals most of the highest rent councils under Labour control, and the lowest not
usually under Labour control. This suggests very varied and perverse local responses to the
centre's withdrawal of subsidy. 136 These are not entirely explained by reference to political
control and suggests that while central government controlled some critical levers, it could
not determine their local impact.
135 Rents increased by 12.5% in 1985/6 (Scottish Office Statistical bulletin HSIU29). The 'other' category is rental income for
garages and commercial premises associated with housing: it remains fairly constant throughout.
136 Scottish Offce Statistical Bulletin HSIU 29, July 1987 shows Aberdeen, Dundee, Cunninghame, Renfrew and Inverclyde
consistently charged the highest rents over the period. Wigtown, Stewattry, Argyll and Bute, Berwickshire, Roxburgh,
Western Isles, Lochaber and Edinburgh charged the lowest rents. These councils were not usually under Labour control.
Conservative-controlled Eastwood was in the interesting position of statting in the lowest quattile and finishing in the highest
between 1982 and 1986 while Labour Clydebank moved in the opposite direction.
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More and more tenants depended on benefit to pay the rent.137 Following reform in 1982,
councils became responsible for administration, generally in housing departments
((Malpass, 2000; Bines et a/1993; Scott et aI, 1993) with the DSS reimbursing the costs of
administration and most of the subsidy. While the scheme was identical for tenants
throughout the UK, the details of the financial settement for the subsidy between central
and local government differed north and south of the border. The perceived inequity of
Housing Benefit subsidy had critical importance in triggering some early transfers by English
authorities (CSL, 1992; Mullins et aI, 1993).138
Right To Buy
Rising rents triggered the Right To Buy (RTB) in the best stock. Following the Tenants
Rights (etc) (Scotland) Act 1980, many councils had seen their stock being depleted as
public sector tenants took up the government's generous purchase discount schemes, with
rising rents becoming more expensive than mortgage costs (Malpass and Murie, 1993). It is
well established that the most attractive properties were the first to be bought, leaving
councils with more properties in lower demand areas already by the mid-1980s. Councils in
Scotland were allowed to use receipts to fund capital works to remaining rented housing, 139
providing them with perverse incentives to sell more. By 1985, some 6% of Scotland's public
housing had been sold through the RTB140 and since the stock was not being replaced by
new building or acquisition, public landlords' share of Scotland's expanding housing stock
was falling.14 As Figure 37 shows, independent landlords start to feature in the statistics as
housing associations become active. Local impact was variable: in some authorities, the
percentage of RTB sales by 1985/6 was as high as 20%, exceeded only by the rate of sale
in certain New Towns. By contrast, RTB rates were very low around 4% or less in other
authorities, notably those which were urban, densely populated and with greater levels of
deprivation and where the council owned and managed over 60% of local housing (CoSLA,
1987a). Examples of such areas include Motherwell, Glasgow and Dundee.
137 Throughout the UK, economic change was producing closure of traditional sources of employment, job losses and
increasing numbers of people on benefit, with the result that overall public expenditure rose as Department of Social Security
(DSS) and welfare budgets escalated to compensate for cuts elsewhere (Balchin, 1995). As council rents rose, there was
increasing dependence on rent rebates to pay the rent, especially among people affected by job losses.
138 In particular the English local authorities were bound from 1992 onwards to offset any surplus on their rent account (with
rent levels in effect set externally by the DoE) against the costs of subsidy at the local level (Aughton and Malpass, 1996).
139 The average RTB valuation in 1985 was £19,279 with 47% discount reducing the price payable still further, so that by the
mid-1980s, average prices after discount were running at £11,000 for flats and £17,000 for houses (Scottish Homes, 1996).
These compare with average dwelling prices in 1980 and 1985 of £21,754 and £26,941 (Scottish Office Statistical bulletin
HSU to).
140 Scottish Offce Statistical Bulletin HSIU 19Q3 (85).
141 RTB sales by local authorities were running at around 15,000 per annum until 1981/2, but rising to 77,000 per annum two
years later, in 1983/4.
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Figure 37: All Scottish Housing Tenure at 1975, 1980, 1985
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Political Control and Central-local Relations
By 1985/6, although the Conservative Party held power in Westminster, it was losing
influence in Scotland generally and especially in local government. A small and declining
number of local councils in Scotland were under Conservative control. In England too, the
rolling system of one third elections meant that every year fewer local councils throughout
Britain were controlled by Conservatives (Seldon and Ball, 1994).
The early 1980s were characterised by confrontation between central and local government
with local councils - as creatures of statute - subjected to continuing restrictions on their
activities, politically, constitutionally and financially as the state became more centralised
(Jenkins, 1995). As Chapter Four argued, there was limited opportunity to win debates with
government and especially with the PM, even though the Scottish Secretary of State's de
facto role often protected Scotland (Midwinter et aI, 1991). Local government felt
increasingly emasculated, treated as outsiders in the policy process and bypassed in favour
of the new flexible voluntary sector. A bunker mentality contributed to stimulating guerrilla
warfare and street level bureaucracy so that whatever the rhetoric of opposition to
government policy, certain key councils - including Glasgow - had to become more
inventive at exploiting and subverting the government's priorities. As future chapters will
show, key council actors became more amenable and adept at accommodating their stance
and adjusting to the availability of resources, to address pressing problems of under-
investment. In housing, a multiple pincer movement from the centre - involving restrictions
on borrowing, withdrawal of subsidy, decline in service, rising rents and loss of stock under
the RTB - left a higher proportion of council housing in poor condition. Perversely the loss of
stock through the RTB increased pressure on budgets, removing the most potentially
profitable stock from the asset base.
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Voluntary Sector and Government Intervention
The voluntary housing sector consists mainly of housing associations. Although this form of
organisation had existed since the 13th century in England (Malpass, 2000), associations
received a major boost due to the funding consequences of the 1974 Act (Great Britain).
This introduced very significant levels of subsidy (Housing Association Grant - HAG) and
marked the establishment of the Housing Corporation in Scotland (HCiS - see Central
Government below) for funding and regulation.
Capital grant funding (HAG) allowed associations to develop new housing or to refurbish
housing in poor condition. Around 95% of eligible costs could be subsidised, supplemented
by private borrowing142 (Armstrong, 1984; Robertson, 1990). For much of the period from
1974 to 1986 there was broad agreement to a 60:40 split in Scotland between two headings
of the Traditional Programme: area renewal and special needs (Robertson, 1990).143 The
associations through which area renewal funding was channelled were mostly community-
based housing associations (CBHAs).144
Mutuality was a strong feature of Scottish associations by contrast with the housing
association movement in England whose roots were more constitutionally charitable as well
as philanthropic in nature (Armstrong, 1984). These committees comprised residents and
other volunteers, who paid and directed professional staff to manage high value renewal
contracts, funded by HCiS. The concept of CBHAs had emerged from a demonstration
project in Govan in the early 1970s.145 Armstrong (1984) argued that the 1974 Act owed its
existence and form to prior experimentation in Govan, spawning a new wave of
neighbourhood housing associations, even before the Bill received Royal Assent. Even
more CBHAs were established after 1974, in a series of run-down inner city areas of 19th
century private tenemental housing. Working in incremental problem-solving partnerships
with the council, HCiS promoted the housing association model among local communities
displaying features from the implementation programme structures model (Hjern and Porter,
1981). Initially they employed development staff on their behalf and many of the personnel
employed in the new associations moved freely between the Corporation and the voluntary
sector, then and since, creating stable producer and informal social networks (Rhodes,
1997), frequently bypassing the local authority.
In 1985/6, after ten years of operation, most of these associations typically had fewer than
750 houses and were small by comparison with their English counterparts. They were very
142 HAG was a government subsidy established in 1974, calculated as a proportion of eligible costs and complemented by
borrowing from the private sector initially counted against the PSBR.
143 Area renewal was mainly targeted on 1 gth century private tenemental stock, initially in inner city areas in Glasgow and
the west of Scotland (Robertson, 1990). By contrast, the prevalent form of special needs investment was new construction
spread throughout Scotland, benefiting Glasgow only in a small way.
144 The researcher worked as Director of such an association 1982 - 1988, participating in the Glasgow 
and West of
Scotland Forum of Housing Associations.
145 The project involved a team of architects employed through the Department of Architecture of the new University of
Strathclyde and supported by individual council offcials (Ospina, 1987; Armstrong, 1984). The leader of the demonstration
project went on to manage the new Housing Corporation operation in Scotland in 1974.
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closely bound to tightly defined neighbourhoods, with strong local membership. Although
there were geographical limitations on their scope, they became involved in aspects of area
regeneration beyond physical housing matters providing a distinctive, attractive and tested
model of housing ownership, both alternative and complementary to the council.146 The
associations were represented by a federated membership body or producer network
(Rhodes, 1997) covering the whole of Scotland, Scottsh Federation of Housing
Associations (SFHA). Staff and local committee members formally lobbied and informally
influenced the HCiS and the Minister over the amount and distribution of funding and policy
affecting associations, and - unlike CoSLA - served as an insider group (Lynch, 2001).
Associations in Glasgow and the West of Scotland were strongly represented.
Although associations were voluntary bodies and constitutionally controlled by local
residents (often a majority of tenants), they were subject to extensive central government
intervention and regulation, affecting capital subsidy and revenue arrangements.
Independent Rent Officers set 'Fair Rents', with no clear criteria beyond reference to other
local rents and crucially without reference to local supply and demand. Anticipated rent
levels, set by Rent Officers, were used to calculate the amount of capital grant required from
HCiS (Robertson and Taylor, 1993). Further, in order to be eligible to receive HAG from
HCiS (Development Funding), associations had to be registered and demonstrate to HCiS
(Registration and Monitoring) that their operations were satisfactory. If an association got
into financial diffculties additional Revenue Deficit Grants were payable by HCiS.
While bipartisan support facilitated the rapid growth of the movement, Labour and
Conservative ideology did not conceive of the 'legitimate role' of housing associations in the
same way. While associations were ostensibly voluntary, their actions were substantially
controlled by the state due to dependence on high levels of government grantcoupled with
the rent-settng mechanism and detailed, regular supervision by a government agency
(Back and Hamnett, 1986). Parallel to but not compensating for cuts in local authority
budgets, were increases in allocation of subsidy to housing associations, with increasing
access to the inside track through tight networks with actors holding multiple roles (Back
and Hamnett, 1986; Davies, 1990). Growth in registrations and stock of small associations
under tenant control/influence was actively promoted by governmental agencies, notably
HCiS, working in partnership at the local scale and the new bodies found favour with many
people.
These factors emphasise the receptive and pragmatic climate for the housing association
model at that time in Scotland. In exchange for resources, associations were largely free to
get on with the job on the ground, within a framework of rules and resources determined at
the centre. This reveals the control of the dominant coalition over critical resource and
146 In Glasgow alone, over 25 associations were registered between 1974 and 1984 (Armstrong, 1984), quite unique in aUK
context in terms of size, scale, speed of growth and success (Davies, 1990). Within a decade, the associations had
succeeded in rehabilitating over 10,000 inner city tenemental properties, channelling investment in the city's housing by £185
million (Armstrong, 1984), to considerable acclaim (Maclennan and Brailey, 1983; Keating, 1988; Ospina, 1987).
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regulatory levers, leaving implementation capacity and action at voluntary, ground level with
room for experimentation (Rhodes, 1997; Hill, 1997a).
Central Government
Central government in Scotland operated through the various departments of the Scottish
Office, although these had not changed significantly since the 1930s (Parry 1987). McCrone
lends weight to Kellas' description of the Scottsh Office as a 'semi-state', claiming the
relative administrative autonomy of decision-making by the Scottish policy community
(McCrone, 1992). In Scotland, he argued, this sustained the distinctiveness of separate
institutions and relationships, used for influencing bargaining and thus policy outcomes. This
resonates with the Moore and Booth concept of a 'politically negotiated order' of decision-
making which emphasises corporate consensus, in a manner 'deeply at odds with the tenets
of Thatcherism' (McCrone 1992:144).
In 1985/6 the main department responsible for housing matters was the Scottish
Development Department (SDD) within the ministerial portfolio for Housing, Education,
Fisheries and Sport. However the Industry Department also held responsibility for certain
housing issues. In particular urban regeneration lay within the portfolio of the Minister for
Industry and Economic Development, along with responsibility for all New Town functions,
including housing (Parry, 1987; Midwinter et aI, 1991). Though the housing portfolio was
much coveted, the range of responsibilities within the typical Scottsh ministerial portfolio
was such that
... Scottish ministers, when not taking their lead from Whitehall
departments may be more dependent on civil service advice than their
counterparts in England who are more specialised..
Midwinter Keating and Mitchell 1991: 61
In the early 1980s, the Minister for Housing (etc) in Scotland was Malcolm Rifkind MP,
under Secretary of State George Younger, whom Rifkind replaced from 1986 (Midwinter et
aI, 1991). While Younger was decent and paternalistic (Thatcher, 1993) even 'conciliatory'
towards councils, Rifkind was seen as 'bold' and 'aggressive' (Midwinter et aI, 1991 :95). The
former PM saw Rifkind as 'eloquent, but highly strung' and 'unpredictable', and not really in
tune with her radical approach (Thatcher, 1993: 621). Yet many interviewees saw Rifkind as
well-disposed to housing associations because they were seen to have a fresh approach
and were popular with tenants: he rewarded their behaviour with resources, via HCiS.
Ancram, appointed as Housing Minister in 1984, was similarly well disposed to associations
for their community links.147
The SDD was responsible for planning, local government, roads and transport (Midwinter et
aI, 1991), along with housing for which there were three divisions:
147/nterviews with Dyer, Mils, Hastie and Miler, 1998.
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. Division One - local authority housing and the Housing Revenue Account
. Division Two - the Housing Corporation, housing associations and private sector renewal
. Division Three - Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA), shared with the urban programme in
the Industry Department
The counterpart in Whitehall for the SDD was the Dept of Environment (DoE). There is little
to document the relationship between parallel departments in Whitehall and St Andrew's
House. The Scottish Office was permeable compared to other parts of central government:
Given the absence of ministers in London for most of the week, most
contact tends to be with the Edinburgh civil servants. The smallness of the
Scottish political arena means that personal acquaintance is easier and civil
servants may be more accessible than their Whitehall counterparts...
weaken£ing) political control
Midwinter Keating and Mitchell 1991: 77
Scottish Offce staff could experiment and operate differently on the margins of policy
(Midwinter et aI, 1991). The Scottish Office could be relatively autonomous, particularly in
relation to council housing, while other aspects of housing policy were only semi-
autonomous148 (Parry, 1981). Midwinter et al (1991) promote a concept of 'concurrent
policies', where principles are uniform but implementation is 'separate' (author italics): this
issue reappears in the next chapter. Perhaps the defence of Scottish interests is the primary
function of the Scottish Offce and more important than responding to Scottish wishes.
Moreover, as Midwinter et al (1991) suggest, the ambivalence inherent in the relationship
with Whitehall can be attributed both to independence from UK or England on many policy
matters and contrasted with resource dependence. These almost cancel each other out.
Financial management within the Scottsh Office was the responsibility of the Principal
Accounting Officer (PAO), with a Principal Offcer (PO) located within each spending
department, accountable both to the Under-Secretary of that department and to the PAO.
The SDD PO incumbent in the early 1980s (Mills), went to London and came back in 1984
as Under-Secretary for the Scottsh Development Department, consistent with the
observation that promotion was virtually impossible without having spent some time in
Whitehall (Midwinter et aI, 1991). In that capacity, he came to be responsible for
negotiations about Glasgow's community ownership proposals in 1985. The PO had
responsibility for liaising with counterparts in other spending departments in England and
Wales. In that capacity, Mills recalled negotiating along with his 'old friends', to secure
Treasury agreement to treat housing association borrowing as outwith the PSBR, an idea
which had apparently arisen during the mid-1980s when civil servants were seeking to
persuade lenders to relax restrictions on lending for RTB purchases. This information
cropped up in answer to a question about the interviewee's role in transfer.149 This rather
148 Arguably this was true in the mid-1980s though separate changes in personal housing-related subsidies (Housing
Benefit) constrained the autonomy of the Scottsh Office in later years.
149 Interview with Mills, 1998.
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casual account of an episode of vital decision-making about the underlying structure of
resource rules reveals the significance of informal networks within government formed by
budget maximisers, without reference to politicians. Though the ideas may not have been
conceived with stock transfer in mind, they nevertheless had a significant bearing on
subsequent developments in creating opportunities for increasing private funding (Gibb et
aI, 1999).
Government Agencies
Arguably, ad hoc agencies were seen as a way of bypassing local government and
opposition to implement programmes (Rhodes, 1997). A proliferation of such bodies
reflected lack of trust in local government particularly in urban policy, especially in Glasgow
and created the opportunity for shifting policy in the direction desired by the centre without
central government having to become involved in details of implementation (Midwinter et aI,
1991). Two such bodies are important in housing: the Scottish Special Housing Association
(SSHA) and the Housing Corporation in Scotland (HCiS).
Housing Corporation in Scotland (HCiS)
The Housing Corporation in Scotland (HCiS) was part of a GB-wide quango, the Housing
Corporation, which operated in England, Scotland and Wales. 150 Its powers were defined by
legislation dating back to 1974 with roles in: 1) development funding; and 2) supervision and
monitoring of housing associations. The Housing Corporation was managed by one London-
based board with two Scottish representatives and a Scottish Advisory Board of three, used
as a sounding board for the Scottish programme.151 A dual system of accountability was in
place (to London and to Scottish Ministers). Funding was channelled through the Scottsh
Block grant and the Scottish Housing Minister approved the amount and use of money
allocated in Scotland (Currie and Murie, 1996). Scottish Office Development Department -
Division Two (see below) supervised administration of the HCiS, with a system of double
scrutiny until the mid-1980s.152
The main board in London ultimately controlled decisions about the registration and
supervision of housing associations. However Scottish operations were often 'at odds with'
operations in England. The main Board had been resisting attempts to register a number of
small associations (in rural Scotland) and, through informal visits, expressed disapproval of
the way money was being spent. This prompted Dyer (a former Progressive councillor who
became Conservative in 1974) to use his access to and influence to encourage
Conservative Ministers (including Ancram) to remove Scottsh operations from London's
150 The HC did not operate in Northern Ireland.
151 The Scottish members were John Richards (architect) and lan Dyer (Interview Miller, 1998). Dyer was a solicitor, law
lecturer and Conservative councillor in Glasgow post 1974 and also a founder member of Pollokshields HA.
152 Interview Miler, 1998.
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control. 153 This action reveals some of Dyer's behaviour as a policy entrepreneur, to which
we shall return later.
Scottish Special Housing Association: SSHA
The SSHA was a Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) with roles as a landlord and
developer throughout Scotland (Rodger, 1989). It was established in the late 1930s and had
a board appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland. SSHA was used by Government
as a vehicle to assist councils with local housing problems (Begg, 1995). Over the decades,
they assisted with relocation of miners (Fife), the development of the oil industry
(Aberdeen), the management of renewal and urban regeneration projects. By 1980, it was
the second largest landlord in Scotland with 110,000 houses in ownership at its peak.154 By
the mid-1980s, a large proportion of these had been bought by sitting tenants and, using
other sales schemes, RTB sales were running at nearly 16% against a Scottish public
sector average of 8% (Scottish Homes, 1996).
Although SSHA had been active in development of new and refurbished housing for many
years, it had a reduced capital programme by the mid-1980s for its own stock. Yet it was still
acquiring stock from Glasgow city council, for example, in Glasgow's east end regeneration
initiative and in Castlemilk (Robertson, 1992; Begg, 1987). A review of the SS HA anticipated
imminent insolvency because the SSHA's per house debt burden was mounting (Scottish
Office, 1985). The problem stemmed from failure to use receipts from house sales to
redeem historic debt: instead these were being used to fund new investment. Although
senior managers and Board members in SSHA enjoyed the confidence of Ministers until
1985/6, recent appointees were thought to be personally unpopular with the Minister
(Rifkind) who later became Secretary of State. Antipathy was based on objections to
...high-handed paternalism, perceived managerial incompetence, complacency
and a preoccupation with status.
Interview Dyer, 1998
Dyer claimed that SSHA bureaucrats were 'discombobulated' by later proposals to legislate
SSHA out of existence and sell its assets (SOD, 1987a).
Both the HCiS and SSHA were creatures of statute and had local operations in similar areas
but they were not known for collaboration at this or at the national scale (Robertson, 1992;
Edwards and Yanetta, 1994). Rather, disagreement and conflict marred relations between
them at the local level (Robertson, 2001). The relationship was not helped by the fact that
the two agencies were managed by separate divisions of the SDD and the situation was
further exacerbated by the 1987 proposals to form a new body - Scottsh Homes - to
replace them (SDD, 1987a). This is examined further in dealing with the Housing (Scotland)
153 Interview Dyer, 1998.
154 Glasgow District Council was the largest with 180,000 houses to rent at its peak of ownership.
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Act 1988 and other legislation, which housing literature often takes as the critical reference
point for change.
Legislative Change to Scottish Housing: 1987 -1997
Chapter Four has already made clear that the 1988 Housing Act is generally taken as the
point of departure for stock transfer policy in the UK context (Kleinman, 1993; Kemp, 1990;
Harloe, 1994). However this is not the only legislation, still less the only form of rule change
relevant to transfer. Moreover the Scottsh legislation is different in important details from
the English legislation. Although the premise of the argument in this thesis is that institutions
(broadly defined) may be important, it is not presumed that legislation is necessarily the
most important aspect of institutions. Given that the legal framework for stock transfer is
largely permissive (Mullen, 2001), councils can, but are not required to, transfer stock.
We can now examine a series of broad and specific changes in the period from 1986 to
1997, focussing on the legal framework of powers and rights. Following an institutionalist
approach, the behaviour of the various players in the case study areas (explored in later
chapters) is structured by these rules (Lane and Ersson, 2000). So it is essential first to
understand the framework in which these actors were operating. This is not to suggest a
priori that the structure or system of rules is more significant than local actions, merely that it
is more helpful first to examine the structure and circumstances they shared and consider
how well these were understood by the players on the national stage.
Several pieces of legislation affected housing during the period (Mullen, 1992; Currie and
Murie, 1996). These included:
It Housing (Scotland) Act, 1987
El Housing (Scotland) Act, 1988
It Housing Act, 1988: some parts affected Scotland
It Enterprise and New Towns Act, 1990
El Local Government etc (Scotland) Act, 1994.
Some other contemporary legislation is of lesser relevance, curtailing aspects of councillor
intervention in allocations, introducing a tenants' right to manage or creating the basis for
community care.155 Other legislation in the list above affected the development of transfers
in different ways though the link with the New Towns is not fully accounted for in the
literature. These Acts profoundly affected the institutional framework and the rules
governing their powers and duties, though other types of rule changes (in Chapter Eight) will
come to be seen as important.
155 Local Government and Housing Act, 1989, Social Security Act, 1990, National Health Service and Community Care Act,
1990, Local Government Act, 1992, Leasehold Reform and Urban Development Act, 1993 A Scottsh Office paper (SOOO,
1996a) contains a schedule of relevant legislation - some of which was not accurate. It is shown at Appendix Nine.
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Housing Scotland Act 1987
This Act responded to Scottish Law Commission recommendations to consolidate housing
legislation. It did so in 16 separate parts affecting a wide range of matters, including the
ownership and management of housing in public ownership, demolition, homelessness,
grants to private owners and arrangements for compensating owners of defective housing
(Mullen 1992; Himsworth, 1994). Yet it was to be substantially amended within a year.
Part 1 confirmed the powers (and some duties) of local authorities in owning and providing
and managing housing, derived from legislation from 1945 to 1980. It confirmed councils'
powers to own housing and land and (in section 12) permitted disposal of housing or land
(by sale or lease). Permission was subject to the consent of the Secretary of State who
could attach conditions, but there were exceptions to the requirement for consent. For
example, no consent was required where the housing (or land) was sold to a sitting tenant,
or was not held on the Housing Revenue Account (HRA), or was on the HRA but empty for
a long period or was difficult-to-Iet. Himsworth concluded that:
... before 1988 the necessary legislation was in place to enable but not
directly to compel local authorities to accede to the government's wish to
see a major diversification of tenure. ... Government had to act in the
knowledge that only those authorities ideologically aligned with itself (ie.
very few in Scotland) would respond enthusiastically to encouragement
towards diversification. Most authorities would be unlikely to volunteer
disposals beyond the small numbers ... which might suit them...
Himsworth, 1994: 148
Government financial measures and the war of words would make it 'diffcult for some
authorities not to 'volunteer' some disposals in order to finance their remaining operations'
(Himsworth, 1994: 148).
Housing (Scotland) Act, 1988
A White Paper, 'Housing: the Government's proposals for Scotland', promised to
... give people a wider choice of housing/ improve the supply and quality of
that housing,' encourage greater individual responsibility for, and control
over, the conditions in which people live,' and to provide a means for dealing
with residual problems of homelessness
SOD, 1987b: 1
Its stated objectives were in most respects compatible with contemporary English proposals,
but with important differences in the mechanisms created by legislation. Common
government objectives were to:
El encourage the spread of home ownership;
4& revitalise the private rented sector;
4& encourage public sector housing authorities to change and develop their role,
4& focus the use of scarce public money more effectively.
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While the objectives for Scotland and England were similar, Robertson (1992) argued that
there was a difference in tone: the language of the Scottish objectives was more muted,
after a hostile reception to aspects of earlier proposals. Where the English legislation
created compulsory transfers to Housing Action Trusts (Institute of Housing, 1988; Malpass
and Means, 1993), there was no such compulsion in Scotland once the disposal of SS HA /
Scottish Homes stock was abandoned (Robertson, 1992). Moreover the Local Government
and Planning Act 1989 (drawing on the 1987 White Paper for England) introduced a new
financial regime for local authority both in terms of capital and revenue (Bines et aI, 1993).
In relation to the third objective in the Scottish White Paper, there was no reference to 'stock
transfer' or 'community ownership' as such. There was, however, a commitment that the
Government would assist authorities wishing to reduce the scale of public provision, as well
as giving new rights to tenants to 'take the initiative' by choosing from an increasing range of
alternatives.
The White Paper did propose the establishment of Scottish Homes, more diverse rents (to
cover the basic costs of management and maintenance with Housing Benefit continuing to
provide support) or improvements to urban environments and to rural housing. Perhaps
inevitably, not all of these proposals came into the 1988 Act, whose three parts covered:
a) The establishment of a new agency (Scottish Homes);
b) New forms of tenancy (assured and short assured); and
c) New rights for tenants (Tenant's Choice).
Although the latter provisions were the most controversial (Midwinter et aI, 1991), none of
the proposals was particularly warmly received (Robertson, 1992). The proposals passed
into legislation in the teeth of opposition at Westminster, where the Conservatives held a
minority of Scottish seats and with some concessions having been made. The most notable
of these concerned the withdrawal of proposals to dispose of housing owned by the SSHA
(Robertson, 1992).
Scottish Homes
Part 1 of the 1988 Act defined a role and powers for Scottish Homes, replacing HCiS (as
funder / enabler / developer and regulator) and SS HA (as a landlord and developer). The
landlord role was the most controversial feature of the Scottish Homes proposals, even
though the transitional character of the role was not in the end a legal requirement
(Robertson 2001; Taylor, 1999). The new agency was 'designed to help obtain the
maximum benefit from the new framework' (SDD, 1987b). It was given the status of a Non
Departmental Public Body (NDPB) under the control of - and with a board appointed by -
the Secretary of State for Scotland. Former Housing Minister, Michael Ancram, claimed that
the Housing Corporation had been 'too tied to London'. After losing his seat in the General
Election that year, he was placed on the Board of the new body: Rifkind apparently placed
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him there in an effort to 'maintain continuity and momentum of policy' .156 His subsequent
involvement in the controversy about the Waverley Trust acquisition of Scottish Homes
stock (NAO, 1994; Committee of Public Accounts, 1994) confirms the maintenance of
continuity. Ancram eventually secured a seat in Devizes (Wiltshire) in 1991/2.
The creation of Scottish Homes was designed to bring financial support and supervision of
the voluntary sector (HCiS activities) more effectively under the control of the Scottish
Office, like the SSHA. It could be argued that Scottish Homes was one of the specifically
Scottish agencies popular with the Scottish Office, which Midwinter et al (1991) maintain
were designed to help implement programmes where local councillors could not be trusted,
with the great merit of government action at one remove. Although Scottish Homes' own
stock disposal programme would be a good candidate to investigate such an argument, that
is not the focus here. Nevertheless it is difficult to avoid reference to Scottish Homes stock
transfers (to which we return shortly).
Assured Tenancies and Tenant's Choice
The second set of provisions changed property rights with a new set of form of tenancy for
all new housing association and private tenants. It was called the 'assured' tenancy,
replacing the 'secure' tenancy created in 1980. This was designed to make private lending
to housing associations more attractive by making repossession easier (Robertson, 1992).
It also removed the Right to Buy for 'new" tenants (Himsworth, 1994). Although debates
then ensued about what constituted anew tenancy, the absence of right to buy was part of
the pull of stock transfer at later stages. 157
Finally, Part Three created the framework for the Tenant's Choice provisions and
arrangements for approving landlords for the scheme. Though the Scottish legislation
shared the same principles as its English counterpart (see below), Tenant's Choice was an
area where the terminology - indeed, the position of the apostrophe - denotes quite
different meanings. As mentioned in Chapter One, the Tenant's Choice provisions in
Scotland gave each tenant the individual right to require their landlord to sell their house to
another landlord, provided it was 'Approved' by Scottsh Homes. Controversy centred on the
absence of a requirement to ballot (Midwinter et aI, 1991), though as an individual right a
ballot would not be relevant.
Though the White Paper came out in November 1987, its preparation had involved Housing
Minister, Michael Ancram, before he lost his seat in the General Election of May that year. In
1998, Ancram claimed he was not against council housing per se. He was more interested
in creating communities on a scale where people felt in control of their lives and in
accessing private investment for housing. Ten years later, he had no recollection of the
156/nterview Ancram, 1998.
157/nterviews Oyer, Find/ay and Jones, 1998.
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Tenant's Choice provisions for Scotland and deferred to the civil service. Asked about these
very provisions, the relevant senior civil servant revealed:
... Tenant's Choice was seen as a way of doing, em..... actually I've forgotten
how it worked - I think they could go to Scottish Homes if they wanted
(sic) It was basically an English idea and we were already going down our
own track by then. They also came up with HA Ts but we did not want to do
it like that. Money comes into it as we could only afford a certain rate of
transfer - the point is we were already doing transfers anyway, at the
bottom of the market and they were coming on stream quite smoothly
before the Act.
Interview Mills, 1998.
At the time, Scottish Homes was seeking to dispose of its own stock, not buy up council
stock. This suggests a local adaptation, perhaps a deliberate dilution of a big idea from
England, or perhaps it shows an example of concurrent policy (Midwinter, et al 1991).
Where Tenant's Choice was seen at the time as being of great potential significance (as
English discussions leaked into Scotland), there was virtually no take-up among council
tenants in Scotland (Tulloch, 1998). The Housing Corporation's war of attrition similarly
obstructed local attempts to use Tenants' Choice provisions in England (Tulloch, 1998).158
The local government response to the White Paper and Tenant's Choice was hostile
(CoS LA, 1987 various). Council representatives were 'manning the trenches' in preparation
for a Conservative onslaught on housing as local government representatives feared that
the Tories would legislate to remove council housing altogether. Yet CoS LA's Housing
Convenor at that time also claimed the Tories knew nothing could change unless the
councils wanted it to.159 A senior civil servant similarly acknowledged (though referring to a
later period) that government could not make transfer happen, merely encourage it.
People think - legislation first, but that's not true in Scotland
Interview Ewing, 1998
The CoSLA Convenor reported that there had been no will or enthusiasm even among Tory
councils for major changes to council housing. He even claimed Ancram had commented
privately to him that he was not really keen on stock transfer but he had to do it.160 Ancram
did not use his interview to make any such claim. He did give considerable emphasis to the
importance of psychological ownership, on a small scale around 400 households, similar to
158 Scottsh Homes tenants in Grampian used them to create fully mutual co-ops, seiviced by a staff group who formed a
private management company. It should be noted that the provisions in Scotland remained on the statute book until 2001
though they could be suspended during voluntary transfer discussions. They came to be controversial in the Borders
between 1999 - 2001, as individual council tenants were encouraged to move ownership of their homes to Waverley
Housing. In 1996 Tenants' Choice provisions were repealed in England.
159 Inteiview Lee, 1998. Robet1 Lee was a Labour councillor for Fauldhouse, the only West Lothian DC ward in which
transfer took place (in 1987) (Duncan, 1991). Cllr Lee was Convenor of CoSLA's housing commitee in the late 1980s / early
1990s.
160 lnteiview Lee, 1998.
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the scale of the first co-ops although having left office he helped develop the Waverley
proposals on a larger scale affecting 2,000 properties.161
Ewing stressed that Ministers moved relatively freely around the Scottish policy community
as argued by Midwinter et al (1991), and Ancram may have talked to Cllr Lee in these terms
in the 1980s, but intending to engage his trust, assuage concern and defuse vocal
opposition. An alternative explanation is that Lee changed his stance after the event, to
accommodate his actions. By 1993, West Lothian council was controlled by the SNP and
Lee's role in the intergovernmental network was over shifting his allegiance away from
CoSLA. Meantime, the Labour councillor had become Board Chairman of Weslo, one of the
first Scottish Homes transfer vehicles. In this capacity he found himself speaking on
conference platforms next to Conservative ministers, extolling the virtues of stock transfer
as the best thing since council housing. This would fit with his retrospective claim that
transfer was a council idea.162
None of this evidence reveals the Housing Scotland Act, 1988 as critical to stock transfer.
Indeed, many disposals called 'voluntary transfers' were already complete by 1988
(Robertson, 1992).163 Robertson refers to transfers being negotiated throughout Scotland,
and to a crucial new requirement, under the 1988 Act, to demonstrate lack of tenant
opposition. This refers to the GB legislation to which we now turn our attention.
Housing Act, 1988: Power by the Back Door?
The Act in England also created assured and short assured tenancies, along with
permissive and compulsory transfers (Tenants' Choice and Housing Action Trusts164
respectively) (Institute of Housing, 1988). The provisions covered much detail about ballots
and processes. By contrast with Scotland, Tenants' Choice in England carried a
requirement to consult tenants about collective transfers. Tenants were to be 'liberated' by
the Housing Act 1988 to form new organisations or nominate other landlords to relieve
councils of housing ownership (Institute of Housing, 1988) though this barely happened
because the policy was thwarted from the inside (Tulloch, 1998).
161 The Waver/ey transfer was extremely controversial in the ear/y 1990s. Waverley was an independent Trust with a tenant
majority, which contracted with a staff-controlled housing management company for service provision. It took over housing
previously owned by SSHA and factored by Roxburgh DC, amid allegations of insider dealing, conspiracy and corrupt
practice by council and government officials in league with former Minister Ancram. Later two offcial enquiries investigated
the allegations.
162 Interview Lee, 1998.
163 The disposals to which Robertson refers include many sales to private developers, now excluded from the definition of
transfer.
164 Nicholas Ridley Secretary of State for the Environment, described HATs as the 'cutting edge of the Government's inner
city regeneration drive' (quoted by Karn in Malpass and Means, 1993, p74). Yet this review of HATs shows how ideas from
Whitehall antagonised local people to the extent that the proposals were diluted to placate local opinion. The HAT model has
not been replicated nor was it held up as a success story.
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Buried among the schedules to the Housing Act, 1988 (for Great Britain) were clauses
affecting the powers of the Secretary of State for Scotland in giving consent to council
disposals of housing. An Information Paper (SDD, 1988) pointed out that these were late
amendments at House of Commons report stage and the provisions only came into effect in
February 1992 (Mullen, 1992). Under Part V: Miscellaneous and General, were clauses 133
- 135 in schedule 16165 which amended the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, providing as
follows:
The Secretary of State shall not give his consent if it appears to him that
majority of the tenants to which the application relates do not wish the
disposal to proceed; but this does not affect his general discretion to
refuse consent ... on any other ground
Housing Act 1988: sch 16: sch 6a.parag 5 (1)
These were said to be designed to 'strengthen the reassurances to tenants that their
housing will not be sold to an unsuitable landlord' (Institute of Housing 1988: 74).
Himsworth (1994) reported consent and consultation as two of four key changes made in
this way by the Housing Act, 1988: the others affected the right to buy and subsequent
disposals to others. The Secretary of State had to take account of matters such as control or
influence of the council over the prospective purchaser, its possible monopoly at the local
scale and the terms of the sale (Himsworth, 1994). The Secretary of State was also given
powers under the Housing Act 1988 to direct use of receipts from sales. The requirement to
consult was framed in such a way that ballots should be 'normal practice' even if not a
statutory requirement as such (Himsworth 1994:149). Although the collective consultation
provisions did not directly affect Scotland, contemporary English experience of pre-emptive
balloting in Torbay (Tulloch, 1998) had a profound effect on underlying thinking and was
reflected in belated amendments to Scottish legislation.
Just as the framework for council housing was permissive and discretionary, so too the sale
of stock affecting sitting tenants was also largely permissive (Mullen, 2001: 49). Most
interviewees for this study claimed that the 1988 legislation was not particularly relevant:
either transfers were already happening:166 and/ or other factors were cited as more
important, such as regulation practice, funding and the establishment of Scottsh Homes per
se.167 Only former Minister Robertson thought that the 1988 legislation had a significant
effect, by concentrating minds.16B
165Draft guidance about stock transfer (SOEnD, 1996) refers incorrectly to these provisions and direct local authorities to
schedule 17 which is in fact about codes of practice governing English council financial arrangements.
166 Interviews Hastie, Smith, 1998.
167 Interviews Dyer, Ewing, Miler, Rendle, Breslin, 1998.
168 Interview Robertson, 1998.
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Arguably, before the 1987 elections, the Scottish Office merely intended to consolidate
powers in what became the 1987 Act, without anticipating further changes. Meanwhile
Ridley's 1987 manifesto proposals introduced the possibility of Tenant's Choice (Thatcher,
1993). In 1988, the Scottish Office used the opportunity of parliamentary time for housing
legislation in Scotland to create a new Scottish body for regeneration and private
investment, without thinking through how it might deliver other changes. As a result, it ended
up making late amendments to the UK (predominantly English) legislation determining
crucially that tenants would have to be informed and consulted at the local scale and to be
shown not to oppose proposals. By contrast, earlier transactions in Glasgow had no ballot
(Clapham et aI, 1991) and in some cases not even a show of hands at a meeting, even after
1988.169
The introduction of a requirement to demonstrate lack of opposition was to become critical
later but in other respects, the assortment of legislation reviewed above does not suggest
government (in Scotland at least) having a clear agenda for, or ideas about how to achieve,
local authority stock transfer using the 1988 legislation.17D Although important rules affecting
the process of decision-making about transfer were being amended, it is not evident that
they were clearly conceived or managed through the legislative process. Rather we see
messy post hoc retrieval of rule changes, resulting in some understandable lack of clarity at
later stages in the policy process, in determining what provisions actually governed stock
transfer. In addition, we have to consider other legislation of the period.
Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act, 1990
Although the New Towns Act does not usually figure in transfer discussions or significantly
among listings of relevant housing legislation, it may have some significance. The New
Town Development Corporations were always intended to be temporary, so wind-up was
inevitable even if the terms and timing were not. Wind-up affected a range of functions
including the ownership and management of 30,000 homes left after extensive house sales.
The responsible department (Industry Department for Scotland - IDS) issued a White Paper
in 1989 - 'The Way Ahead'. The next year's Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990
gave a timetable for wind-up and showed housing associations as the key alternative
landlords for the rented stock relying on voluntary mechanisms prior to statutory wind-up.
There was no commitment to ballot, nor even to obtain tenant consent and while transfer to
councils was discouraged, it was not ruled out (Muirhead, 1997). Guidance on the disposal
of housing stock (prepared by Scottsh Homes staff) was issued in 1992, followed a year
later with details of the financial arrangements (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth DC Housing Plan,
1994) though by this time councils were facing comprehensive reorganisation. Chapter
Eight considers further changes affecting the implementation of the New Towns Act and
169 Interviews Hastie, Smith, 1998.
170 Most respondents (central and local) did not see the 1988 Act as especially significant.
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explores its coincidence with reorganisation and with Scottish Homes transfers representing
a critical juncture further destabilising Scottish housing.
Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1994
The timing of local government reform emerges from earlier chapters as potentially
significant and perhaps more than merely coincidentaL. A senior civil servant volunteered
certain factors as critically significant in explaining transfer blockage:17 resource problems
and ideological resistance were two of the three key obstacles to whole stock transfer: the
third was reorganisation. Although reorganisation does not feature in the literature about
housing stock transfer, its significance is explored in this thesis, starting here with the
legislation.
Reform was first mooted in Scotland in 1991, with consultation about the principle of reform
into single tier authorities, about which there was an appearance of consensus (McVicar,
Boyne and Jordan, 1995). Thus within a year, a further consultation paper was published by
Allan Stewart (Minster for Local Government under Secretary of State, lan Lang) (Scottish
Offce, 1992). It mooted different permutations of functions and boundaries, reflecting
ministerial uncertainty, even conflict, about the models of reform and the possible number of
unitary authorities (65, 15, or 32). The Conservative Party in Scotland was split into three
camps on the issue of reorganisation pursuing localist, strategic and managerialist models
of reform: the latter model triumphed, occupying the middle ground (McVicar et aI, 1995:6).
The proposals were contested by opponents on grounds of alleged gerrymandering, lack of
independence and lack of moral authority for constitutional reform.
Reform was required in order to allow services to be delivered more efficiently, by enabling
others to provide them. However, the final proposals accepted that councils should be large
enough to remain as direct providers for some services (McVicar et aI, 1995). While
organisation of housing services was important in the 1974 reforms (Scottish Office, 1992),
it was not critical in determining the future shape or size of local authorities in Scotland
(Stoker, 1996). The advantage of the new unitary authorities would be to bring housing,
social work, education, roads and transport together under the same authorities, resulting in
improved co-ordination (Scottsh Office 1992). In the light of increasing diversity of housing
tenure, the role of local authorities was changing to become more 'strategic and enabling',
requiring a planned, co-ordinated response to assessed needs. Larger authorities would be
better placed to exercise enabling functions particularly if the council's jurisdiction
corresponded with local market areas.
17 Interview Ewing, 1998.
17
Moreover, it was thought that the larger authorities would decentralise management.
Increasing efforts have been made in recent years to make the delivery of
housing services more accessible to the customer through the
decentralisation of housing management functions. It is expected that the
new councils will continue these trends.
Scottish Office 1992: 9
Even though the 'enabling role' was commonly understood by opponents in councils to
imply disposall transfer, this extract suggests that even in 1992 central government
envisaged local authorities continuing as landlords.
Reform proposals for Scotland (and Wales) were comprehensive (unlike England where
reform was partial and incremental (Norton, 2001 )). The 1994 Act produced a total of 32
authorities, including the three island councils, which were already single tier bodies. It
brought together 53 districts and nine regional councils into 29 new authorities. Twelve of
the new councils were based on the old districts, four on the old regions and the rest (13)
were partly aggregated districts (some with changed boundaries) and partly disaggregated
regions - notably Labour Strathclyde (Midwinter, 1995), with some joint 1 shared board
arrangements (Lynch, 2001).
Political Control
Although there were charges of Conservative self-interest in decision-making about
reform,17 these were not borne out by electoral outcomes. In 1994/5, seven districts were
under Conservative control.173 Some may have been only nominally Conservative since the
party had mobilised Progressives and Moderates in the 1960s to stand on a Conservative
party ticket (McCrone, 1992). Five of the new Scottsh unitary authorities were based on
these districts: the Conservatives did not win control of any of the five new authorities in the
1995 elections (Scotsman, 6/4/95) leaving the party further embarrassed with only 11.5% of
the vote (Lynch, 2001).
By 1987, Conservative support had already dropped to 24% in Scotland, from a peak of
around 50% in the fifties (Thatcher, 1993). Since this was well below English levels at the
time, it served to reinforce the image of the Conservatives as anti-Scottish (Midwinter et aI,
1991). They already had a wafer-thin majority in Westminster and by 1992, merely 11 MPs
in Scotland. Midwinter et al (1991) claim that the Conservatives were already treading warily
after their Scottish losses in the 1987 general election, even though their majority in
Westminster had allowed them to take more radical action, for instance to introduce the poll
tax (Butler et aI, 1994). At the local scale, Conservative councillors in Scotland were not
172 Failure to establish an independent boundary commission allowed opponents to claim the proposals were being
manipulated to suit the government (McVicar et aI1995).
173 The seven councils were Stirling, Bearsden and Milngavie, Kyle and Carrick, Moray, Berwickshire, Eastwood and Perth
and Kinross (Scotsman 6 April, 1995).
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necessarily as ideologically minded as national representatives. Indeed, Ancram and
Robertson claimed that Conservative councillors were often not persuaded of the merits of
Conservative Central Office policy about housing and frequently sat stony faced through
speeches at Scottsh party conference.174 This betrays more than a residue of 'reluctant
collectivism' (George and Wilding, cited by Kemp, 1990).
landlord Characteristics: limited Consistency
There was no consistent pattern to the characteristics of the new authorities (Stoker, 1996):
while some of the unitary councils were too small to be economic, many were very
substantial organisations (Lynch, 2001). In terms of council housing ownership, more
councils became larger landlords as a result of reorganisation, while fewer councils had less
than 5,000 houses - as shown in Figure 38.
Figure 38: Scottish Local Authorities: Size of Landlord Operations
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The balance of council ownership of housing was rather different in 1995/6 from a decade
earlier (see Table 26). In 1978, more than half the population was housed in council
housing. By 1995, not one council owned a majority of housing. Currie and Murie (1996)
show wide variation in the housing stock owned by the new councils. Glasgow was the
largest with 129,240 houses (46% of the local stock) and Orkney the smallest with 1,241
(14%). Eleven councils owned more than 20,000 houses and seven of these were Labour-
controlled, with between 20% and 49% of the stock in their area, a form of mass landlordism
(Cole and Furbey, 1994).
Perhaps the most important feature of reorganisation was its disruptive effect on local
government operations. Reorganisation deliberations were crucial (not just parallel or
coincidental) in triggering questions within the Scottish Office in 1992 and 1993 about what
174 Interviews Ancram, Robertson, 1998.
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role housing was to play.175 Although Ministers did not take the opportunity to make radical,
mandatory changes to the housing function, nevertheless they wanted to challenge
councillors to think about whether they really need to be involved in minor local details,
(such as window replacement contracts), rather than big strategic issues. Yet as Chapter
Six showed, the government's agency Scottish Homes made substantial subsidy available
to facilitate partial transfers in the early 1990s, while LSVT was under way in England.
Table 26: Scottish Unitary Councils - Volume and Proportion of Stock Owned at 1996
(In Descending Order of Local Ownership)
Name of authority Council Houses Other No of
housing as owned by the socially households
% of total council rented stock (nearest 000)
stock nearest 000) as % of total
Glasgow 43 124 16 273
North Lanarkshire 43 54 7 126
East Ayrshire 40 19 6 49
Falkirk 38 23 5 61
Moray 37 8 3 33
West Dunbartonshire 37 15 7 39
Clackmannanshire 35 7 8 19
Inverclyde 34 13 5 37
South Lanarkshire 33 40 4 123
North Ayrshire 33 19 5 68
West Lothian 33 19 7 58
Dundee 33 24 8 72
Fife 33 42 4 140
Aberdeen 32 30 10 92
East Lothian 31 11 11 35
Renfrewshire 31 23 8 72
Dumfries and Galloway 30 14 3 62
Shetland 29 3 2 8
Midlothian 28 8 14 31
Stirling 24 8 3 33
South Ayrshire 24 11 1 46
Highlands 22 20 3 81
Angus 22 10 4 44
Aberdeenshire 18 17 2 92
East Dunbartonshire 18 7 3 40
Scottish Borders 18 9 11 45
Perth and Kinross 18 11 3 63
Argyll & Bute 16 7 5 37
Edinburgh 16 32 6 192
Western Isles 15 2 1 11
Orkney 13 1 6 8
East Renfrewshire 12 4 2 32
Source: Taylor, 1998b
Note predecessors of councils highlighted in bold had conducted transfer before April 1996
The incoming authorities faced such a broad range of challenges that Kerley et al (1994)
anticipated that it would be several years before things setted down. There was extensive
movement of staff between authorities reducing scope for continuity and in 1998, managers
175/nteiview Robertson, Ewing, 1998.
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reported many pressing concerns (Taylor, 1998b). Local government funding in the wake of
the poll tax left central government largely in control of local government spending (Lynch,
2001 ).
The financial problems affecting council budgets176 were considerable, even with transitional
assistance. Moreover, capital controls continued to restrict borrowing (CIPFA, 1997).
Preparations for the new bodies were not well advanced in some areas where councils
facing unwelcome (dis)aggregation had opted not to co-operate with each other. It was often
former regional council personnel who took control politically and administratively in 1995/6,
even in new councils based on old district boundaries, which contributed to downgrading the
status of housing in organisational terms (Taylor, 1998b).17
Reorganisation: an Opportunity for Transfer?
By October 1995, during the shadow / transitional year, the new Minister Raymond
Robertson argued in a speech to the professional body that:
...local government reorganisation is (sic) an opportunity to ask fundamental
questions about the role of local authorities in the housing field in the
future.... Attracting private investment into regenerating our housing stock
must be a key objective... an important facet of the government policy to
encourage greater diversity of social landlords in Scotland has been the
transfer of public sector stock to new landlords. ... Stock transfer
immediately removes investment in council housing from the constraints of
public expenditure controls ... and can potentially secure a substantial
capital receipt from which any surplus after repayment of outstanding debt,
can be reinvested
Robertson: 1995: 8
Robertson was a Minister in Forsyth's Scottish cabinet from July 1995. McVicar et al (1995)
show Forsyth against creating fewer, larger authorities yet Scottish local government reform
in Scotland had produced both small uneconomic councils and left some large municipal
monoliths. Leaving more small authorities in place might have allowed more whole stock
transfer by 'Iocalist authorities sympathetic to a Conservative Scottsh Office promotion of
transfer178: some might even have been won by Conservatives. A consultant adviser to
tenants on stock transfer issues argued that many of these 'Iocalist' districts actively
considered transfer before the 1994 Act, albeit not always productively.179 The councils who
considered whole stock transfer before 1994 were not overtly Tory even though some -
including Berwickshire - were nominally under Conservative control. They were more
176 Social work and education were the biggest spenders in the new authorities. Housing budgets (HRA) were ring-fenced
and as a result, housing could be ignored, initially. Later the relative comfort of the HRA soon became an attractive target for
other departments to 'supplement their resources' (Taylor, 1998b) and this factor becomes an important obstacle post 1997.
17 In former districts, financial pressure was especially extreme.
178 Though acceptance of the more overtly ideological stance in the e promotion of the LSVT 'policy' from the centre became
by 1995/6 could not be taken for granted.
179 One (Wigtown) actually conducted a ballot in 1995, which aroused 75% opposition on a high turnout.
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'county' in style, more concerned about protecting local identity and a cosy relaxed rural way
of life. However they were not particularly strategic in deliberating about or promoting
transfer, and some of their approaches were beyond inept, 'just plain daft.18o
Larger post-1995 unitary councils (often Labour-controlled) were ideologically ill-disposed to
the larger scale transfers,181 though many of their predecessors had been pursuing small-
scale transfers with subsidy. Chapter Six has shown that very few unitary councils (outside
Glasgow) pursued transfer after reorganisation. Financial incentives were receding (as
Chapter Eight will show), though disarray among sellers may have prevented use of
available incentives: few were in control of their existing operations, still less in a position to
think about future strategy (Taylor, 1998b).
By 1995, the opportunity to legislate to require change in housing had passed. Former
Minister Robertson claimed in an interview for this study that had the Conservatives been
returned in 1997, they would have required councils to cease to be landlords. On the other
hand, his predecessor and senior colleague, Ancram was sanguine that making transfer
compulsory never had been and never would be on the Tory agenda: he conceded, though,
that it might have been 'tempting to scare recalcitrant opponents'.182 The civil service thought
mandatory transfer would never have been seriously considered by Conservative Ministers
because two principles were sacrosanct: first, council housing belonged to councils not the
government; secondly, transfer affected tenants' homes - not just houses.183
Conclusion - Relative Insignificance of legislation?
Documentary evidence and key actors suggests that we have to look beyond the 1988
legislation for explanations about the origin of transfer. By 1985, the institution of council
housing was already constrained by the withdrawal of revenue and capital resources and
from changes to property rights, weakening subjective attachment to and objective quality of
housing in that tenure. Right to Buy legislation was prized as a great success by the
Conservatives, whereas many of the resource changes were achieved more through use of
financial and administrative measures and created an incentive structure which stimulated
sales, with variable local impact. While central government controlled critical levers, it could
not control nor did it monitor their consequences. Central government relations with local
councils were poor and confrontational, though perhaps not as bad as in England. The
Conservatives controlled fewer Scottish councils before 1995 and none thereafter, so its
natural allies were limited. However, some councils - notably Glasgow - responded to the
decline in power by engaging in practical partnership with government, its agencies and the
growing voluntary sector, adjusting its action to available resources.
180 Interview Smith, 1998.
181 Interview Ewing, 1998.
182 Ancram was a senior British Conservative party figure, soon to be Chairman in 1998.
183 Interview Ewing, 1998.
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Ministers controlled and reduced major flows of subsidy to the council and voluntary sectors,
but in the latter case rather indirectly until 1988. While councils were being pushed to the
outside, associations were becoming insiders, rewarded with burgeoning government
subsidy, notably in Glasgow and urban Scotland. This gave rise to a new form of
neighbourhood housing association working in tandem with councils in former private
housing, and to great acclaim from the mid-1970s. The Thatcher government in Scotland
used legislative time and opportunity to merge two problematic government-controlled
agencies in housing. The intention was to get one out of insolvency and bring the other
under Scottsh control, removing the anomaly of finance from Scottish budgets being
managed from London.
Arguably the most significant mandatory legal change was structural reform overhauling
local government and its funding. However, just as the consolidating housing legislation did
not challenge but codified the fundamental tenets of municipal housing provision, so local
government reform left untouched the essential powers of councils to own and manage
housing. The pursuit of greater efficiency via local government reorganisation, required the
sacrifice of other goals by acquiescing in continued direct housing provision and in effect cut
across the stock transfer agenda. Although throughout the 1990s, Ministers encouraged
councils to leave direct provision to others and concentrate on enabling, relevant legislation
permitted local authorities to remain as landlords. Ministers came to pursue the enabling
role of councils in housing more aggressively after reorganisation.
Perversely, such legislation may have done more to obstruct than promote stock transfer.
Without a push for local government reform in the early 1990s, more of the smaller district
councils might have taken whole stock transfer further. Nevertheless, the association of
transfer with Conservatism and the unpopularity of Conservative ideas in Scotland at that
time might still have served as a brake on active political promotion and in the end they
might have stumbled over the limits of policy read-across from England. The spatial
boundaries of councils shifted, in some cases dramatically, yet in spite of considerable
disruption, the institution remained 'safe'.
Mechanisms to ensure delivery of government housing policy objectives were limited to
encouraging rather than requiring the disposal of council housing. Although SSHA
(Scotland's second largest landlord) was dismantled, the provisions for mandatory disposal
of its stock were in the end withdrawn, perversely retaining a state agency among the
largest public landlords in UK. Public tenants were given new rights of choice but these
were barely used. Instead, almost all transfers were conducted via block sales supported
by subsidy. The Scottish Office may have achieved some improvements in the supply and
quality of housing, delivered increased choice by virtue of creating new bodies under tenant
control. It may even have increased individual and collective responsibility over former
council housing - but not widely, nor directly as a result of legislation. Indeed, examining the
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legislation reveals nothing about the role of subsidy and the pattern of incentives used by
councils for small-scale transfers.
Permissive legislation leaves less formal mechanisms to policy actors to achieve central
government aims. The existence of transfer as a policy objective can only be inferred, from
the first and third of the government's objectives. Yet interviewees at the centre regarded
the 'policy' of small scale stock transfer as successful in delivering regeneration, albeit at a
high cost. This suggests they were able to distinguish between policy as formal objectives
(in the absence of overt transfer policy documents or legislative mechanisms) and actual
practices on the ground - decision and actions, even by those who claimed ideological
opposition to transfer.
Legislative change had limited direct impact on council stock transfer in Scotland. Formal
changes comprised consolidating legislation, new specifically Scottish provisions affecting
individual property rights (RTB and assured tenancy) and institutional arrangements for
housing. Crucially, transfer was not a legal requirement before or after 1988 and there is no
evidence so far of legislative measures making a particular contribution to the presence of
transfer: rather, top-down policy (via local government reform and New Town wind-up) may
have contributed to its absence. To test the adequacy of institutional theory, we have to
search other sources of rules such as financial and administrative measures - guidance,
procedures, circulars and statutory instruments and resource incentives for further evidence.
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Chapter Eight
Using Resources to Achieve Change
If the legislation only helps to explain the absence of transfer, other rules may provide clues
to the presence of transfer. This chapter therefore adopts an institutionalist approach to
scrutinise less formal rules and procedures as well as incentives affecting the allocation and
distribution of resources for housing investment in Scotland between 1987 and 1997.
Changes of rules and practices provide a framework of incentives and constraints on
behaviour, affecting actors' capacity for action. They effect subtle changes to underlying
rules about access to and use of resources, influencing regulation and the climate of
opinion. The behaviour of supporters and opponents is explored in subsequent chapters on
local action.
Processes of decision-making and lines of authority and accountability were less than
crystalline. Rules and procedures were retrieved from guidance, circular letters and
statutory instruments from government and Scottish Homes. Rule changes connect
strongly with resources and so national level resource allocations (determined by central
government) are included here. The chapter covers some ostensibly technical but politically
important details underpinning transfer, while emphasising such issues as tenant
consultation, valuation, connections with other policies and, most critically, the basis on
which housing resource flows were organised. It seeks to bring out where responsibility for
decisions lay and what led to them, rather than engage with the content of those decisions.
Like Chapter Seven, this chapter draws on documentary evidence interspersed with an
understanding of perspectives gleaned from analysis of interview material with actors at the
centre. This has been particularly important in view of the lack of clear public documentation
in some critical areas.
The chapter will argue that public rather than private resources were critical in facilitating
small-scale transfers in Scotland, while they lasted. It will be shown that this flow was due to
a combination of ministerial priority in allocating public resources to the voluntary sector
generally and politicians' acquiescence in the distributive actions of those responsible for
managing Scottsh Homes' operations in regulation and investment. It will show that the
drop in council transfers in the mid-1990s can be explained variously, by the withdrawal of
financial support, by decisions at the centre to cut back on registrations and intervening
factors from the wider policy environment.
Throughout this period, changes originated from the government's agency, Scottish Homes,
and from two Scottish Office departments - Development (SDD) in 1988 and 1996 and
Industry (IDS) 1988 to 1994. In presenting the account here, headings are based on
guidance and information sources primarily but not exhaustively in chronological order of
appearance (rather than thematically) in order to explain rules at the relevant juncture.
Appendix Three shows the strict chronological sequence of events. The chapter starts with
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the Scottish Office Information Paper and works through resource allocations to councils
and Scottish Homes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, before examining the leakage from
New Town and Scottsh Homes transfers. Later government guidance is considered along
with decisions affecting the new unitary councils' debts, valuations and access to borrowing.
Voluntary Transfer 'Information Paper'
The primary source of procedures for transfer was an Information Paper (IP), issued by the
Scottish Office in September 1988, three months before the Housing (Scotland) Act and
Housing Act received Royal Assent (SDD, 1988). The paper was entitled 'Voluntary
Transfer'; the first time that community ownership was offcially referred to as transfer in
Scotland.184 Without defining transfer, the paper referred to it as 'a disposal for which the
Secretary of State's consent would be required', under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987,
amended. It emphasised the technically 'voluntary' aspect of stock transfers as 'block sales'
rather than Tenant's Choice. The voluntary element applied to the landlord rather than the
tenant. An Information Paper is scarcely a robust source of policy, yet the best clue can be
found in the accompanying letter, stating (author's underline and brackets):
The government is sympathetic in principle to authorities disposing of their
housing stock as long as the disposal takes place on the right terms. The
guidelines attached have been prepared particularlv with larqe scale
disposals in mind but the general principles set out apply where appropriate
to all sales of council housing other than those initiated by tenants under
the Right to Buy or Tenants' (sic) Choice. Each application will be considered
on its merits.
Source: SDD, 1988
The IP focussed on a range of issues. Tenants' interests were to be fully taken into account
and in particular, one of the most significant requirements stipulated demonstration of lack
of tenant opposition, though with no requirement for a ballot.185 The IP also exhorted
avoidance of monopoly, increased competition, the need to meet ongoing council
obligations and indicated terms of sale including use of receipts.
New landlords would have to be independent from the local authority, able to demonstrate
stable and responsible long-term commitments to providing rented housing and good
service. In order to avoid monopoly and to promote competition and choice, there was an
expectation that disposals should be to more than one purchaser, particularly in disposals of
5,000 or more houses.
184 According to one of the researchers involved in the Scottish Offce evaluation (Clapham et aI1991), Community
Ownership was always a marketing term. 'It was never referred to as stock transfer in Glasgow. The policy of transfer really
emerged, it was certainly not for trumpeting from the rooftops' (Personal communication with Keith Kintrea, 1999).
185 As Chapter Seven showed, this was inserted belated as a retrospective amendment to the Housing Scotland Act 1987. In
England at that time there were changes to the normal understanding of a majority. After infamous attempts in Torbay to
ensure that anyone not voting in a ballot was assumed to be in favour of the proposal, such an interpretation of 'a majority
not opposed' was soon dropped in England (Karn, in Malapss and Means, 1993; Tulloch, 1998).
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This ceiling was bizarre given the size of most of the 56 district councils' stock holdings at
the time and the pattern of disposals already underway by large authorities, which seldom
exceeded 500 houses. Indeed, the IP introduction even acknowledged active consideration
of partial sales for regeneration purposes. 186
A single paragraph entitled 'Other Financial Factors' indicated in dense, technical language
the basis of valuation (as in the Right to Buy).187 It showed how receipts from disposals
should be treated and how they would affect councils' revenue and capital arrangements.
Receipts could be used to enhance new borrowing by recipient councils, but apparently
contradictory decisions allowed different arrangements for stock transferred to Scottish
Homes (sicJ.188 The guidance conceded that some sales would have negative value and a nil
receipt. While any receipts from positive value sales could enhance a council's borrowing
capacity, negative value sales would reduce it. In addition, councils could expect to receive
more revenue subsidy (HSG) if their average debt increased as a result of the disposal.189
There was no mention of receipts being used to payoff councils' debts, which was curious
given the rationale for closing down SSHA, due to insolvency from failure to use receipts for
that very purpose (see Chapter Seven). In contrast to the emerging arrangements in
England (Aughton and Malpass, 2000), government in Scotland was dangling resource
incentives to councils to maximise positive receipts for capital borrowing and revenue
subsidy purposes.190 Availability of capital subsidy from Scottish Homes to improve council
built stock (i.e. associations) was not mentioned in the IP though we may assume that
council decision-makers would have known about it. This subsidy would have further
reinforced incentives to selL. The issue of capital subsidy is discussed further under the
Scottish Homes development funding arrangements (below).
The Information Paper was the only government statement of 'policy' on voluntary transfer
in Scotland until draft 'Guidance' was issued in 1996. It did not show how whole or partial
stock transfers might be conducted, or funded, nor did it engage with the problem of debt. In
these respects it was hardly 'policy' in Hogwood and Gunn terms. It attempted to influence
local authority disposals with few rules and requirements, while alluding to incentives
running counter to the wider policy of cutbacks. This does not indicate a clear policy
programme so much as rules emerging to structure existing practice (Hills, 1997a; Sabatier,
1986 - see Chapter Two). We return shortly to investment incentives and later to
186 CIPFA 1994 show 21 out of 56 councils having a stock of fewer than 5000 houses: see Chapter Seven for a breakdown.
187 See valuation in Chapter Four. This was the original method in use for decades - market value subject to tenancy. In this
case the value could be adjusted downwards, if necessary to reflect the existence of sitting tenants.
188 Glasgow District Council was at that time transferring ownership of 1000 houses in Windlaw, Castlemilk to SSHA, soon to
become Scottsh Homes (Robertson, 1992). This was unique. This provision was made- somewhat perversely - just as
Scottish Homes was being created, with the government having recently climbed down on proposed compulsory disposals of
former SSHA housing.
189 Such an increase would result from the total debt being spread over a smaller number of houses and would be relevant to
calculations about rents.
190 Councils would have been aware already of the steady cuts to revenue statement at face value.
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subsequent, revised government guidance in Scotland, but first we need to examine central
government constraints squeezing council finances.
Less Subsidy and Borrowing for Councils, Higher Rents
Under the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, the Secretary of State controlled council
borrowing consent by means of Statutory Instruments. Gross housing consents were made
up of net capital consent to borrow, dependent on a specified level of 'useable' capital
receipts (CIPFA, 1997). Failure to bring in target receipts meant a reduced capital
programme: the corollary was that a council could increase its capital programme by
increasing receipts from asset sales (mainly RTB).
The Secretary of State also had power to vary revenue subsidy, using an arcane annual
calculation (CIPFA, 1997). While in 1986 many authorities' rents were still subsidised,191
further incremental restructuring of council housing finances over the period meant that
fewer councils received subsidy with each year that passed (CIH, 1995).192 Moreover local
authorities' rent accounts were 'ring-fenced' under the 1987 Act, (Himsworth, 1994)
requiring an account (called the Housing Revenue Account - HRA).193 Rents rose steadily
ahead of inflation over the period 1985/6 - 1996/7 partly because of the withdrawal of
subsidy, partly because of ongoing investment and partly because revenue costs were
spread over fewer houses due to house sales (CIH, 1995). Higher rents in turn stimulated
more sales which further exacerbated councils' financial problems and repair costs on the
remaining stock were often above average.
After reorganisation, only three authorities received revenue subsidy at a cost to the
Scottish Office of £19 million in 1995/6 (CIH, 1995). Each of these was rural with much
higher than average outstanding debts to be serviced. In the case of the highest, Shetland,
debt was £21,000 per house compared with the national average of £6,000 (Scottish
Homes/ CoSLA, 1998). Thus by 1995/6, rents alone paid for housing services - costs of
management, maintenance and debt servicing. However, the proportion of tenants receiving
financial support through Housing Benefit was increasing.194 Across the UK, HB costs were
rising (Aughton and Malpass, 1994) as more tenants became eligible and rents were
increased to pay for repairs no longer funded from capital borrowing (Gibb, Munro and
Satsangi, 1999).
Local authorities' capital funding stood at £147m p.a. in 1987/7, having fallen from £200m in
1983/4 (CoSLA, 1987b). Meanwhile, more capital resources were being allocated to the
191 Two sources: 1) Housing Support Grant (HSG) from central government and 2) from the Rate Fund Contribution RFC-
see Chapter Seven.
192 Many still received HSG for subsidy to hostels for homeless people.
193 The HRA could only contain income and expenditure on council rented stock.
194 Housing Benefit is an income subsidy payable to tenants, administered by local authorities. In Scotland 95% of the costs
of HB are financed direct to local authorities by central government - DSS (now Dept of Work and Pensions) - outside the
Scottish block. Data on local incidence of HB is weak.
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voluntary sector in the form of subsidy, rather than consent to borrow. This was a key
component of the funding framework for small-scale transfers. Scottish Homes' resources
were considerable relative to those of all the Scottish local authorities taken together and its
preferential resource position was among the contested and resented aspects of its
existence. Taking 1989/90 as an example, programmed Grant-In-Aid (GIA) (for housing
association development) amounted to £229m.195 In later years, as shown in Figure 39, GIA
was to remain steadily ahead of councils' capital borrowing consent (HRA) except in 1995/6
when council borrowing consent increased to accommodate housing acquisitions from the
New Towns:
Figure 39: Scottish Housing Expenditure By Central Government And Local Government (£millon)
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Thus, while appearing to offer more subsidy (per the Information Paper), the effect of
government action was to cut it back steadily. Former Minister Ancram was sanguine, even
enthusiastic, about reducing general subsidy to councils at that time since in his view most
tenants did not need assistance. He and his colleagues had succeeded in reducing central
and local subsidies to council housing, leaving the Scottish Offce to redistribute the
'savings'.196 Similarly, a senior civil servant pointed out that the Scottish Office had used
various 'wheezes' in the past using alternately net and gross measures while RTB receipts
were rising: this had helped divert resources to health and other council budgets.197 The
Treasury was unaware of the impact, and did not claw resources back until several years
later when it became concerned about Ministers 'going native' .198 Redeployment of
resources previously available for council housing elsewhere within the Scottish block grant
was evidently politically instigated and quietly administered without being open to debate.
195 £229m represented 57% of the total Approved Development Programme ADP of £385m including private borrwing
Scottish Homes, 1989.
196 Interview with Michael Ancram, MP 1998.
197 Interview with Harold Mils, 1998.
198 Interview with Michael Ancram, MP 1998.
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Development Funding: Scottish Homes' Powers, Systems, Resources
Scottsh Homes was the source of complementary guidance, resources and regulation
affecting regeneration by associations purchasing council stock. It inherited extensive
powers from its predecessor (HCiS) to fund associations using Housing Association Grant,
run on a separate basis from England from 1989.199 Moreover as a regulator, Scottish
Homes could register and supervise housing associations (to which the next section
returns). Its fluctuating objectives included contributing to tenure diversification and
improving the quality of Scottsh housing and its management (Scottish Homes, 1992b).
Overall funding came from government through GIA, supplemented with sales receipts from
1990/1 (Robertson, 1992; Robertson, 2001 ).200 Receipts became more significant and
problematic as later sections will show.
While Scottish Homes' resources were considerable,201 tracking their flow was and remains
unnecessarily difficult: many of the dimensions changed in structure and terminology
incrementally between 1989 and 1997 and output reporting was weak. Many factors were
among aspects of policy reviewed in Chapter Two dealing with implementation and power.
These include: roles and responsibilities in organisational structures; visible and invisible
champions; vertical and horizontal interdependence of networks; the structure of the
programme and competition for priority; decision-making about the level of resources
overall, their distribution and use, affecting subsidy rates and private funding leverage;
communication and compliance in implementation; knowledge about and capacity to act on
trend/performance information; the distinction between 'programmes' (i.e. plans and targets)
and outturn. These are central questions in this thesis, establishing who made decisions,
who took action and who was thus in control.
Resource Allocation - Whose Decision?
The size of Scottish Homes programme overall (though less than 5% of the Scottish budget)
had to be a Ministerial decision since GIA was voted expenditure (Scottish Office, 1997b).202
199 Scottish Homes increasingly referred to leverage rather than HAG targets as it balanced different forms of subsidy of
which HAG was only one - albeit the largest. Following the creation of Scottish Homes separating HCiS from Housing
Corporation in London, increasingly separate arrangements were emerging regarding housing association funding north and
south of the border. The terminology remained the same unti/1996 when the English grant was renamed. Structural changes
in 1988 affected procedures for calculating HAG across the VI( arising from financial reforms designed to increase the
private funding contribution. The pressure would have to produce more output for less public money everywhere, but by
different means. Scottsh Homes had an array of other less numerically significant funding instruments for other providers.
Where HAG was in excess of 90% at the start, it was set to fall though not as fast as in England at the same time.
200 In addition, rental income covered costs of managing Scottish Homes' own stock. GIA also covered corporate costs.
201 Relevant documents include annual Programme Announcements, Annual Reports and occasional Investment Bulletins.
Few show trend information or outturn against programme. The data analysed below are based on data supplied in June
2002 by Scottsh Homes' successor, Communities Scotland and converted to constant values (see Appendix Six).
202 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library2/doc14/iiy-00.asp
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The ADP was usually announced publicly in April of each year for the year ahead, though
notified three months in advance with forward commitments indicated at the same level two
years ahead (Scottish Homes programme announcements - successive years). It was
mainly distributed via housing associations for development spending. While glossy
programme announcements showed the Minister setting the overall amount, the headings of
expenditure and the priority attached to each, senior staff accounts differed about the
balance of responsibility and discretion for the distribution of Scottish Homes' funds.
According to the Finance Director,203 decisions about resource distribution were made by
Development staff. However the senior Development Manager claimed that the Scottish
Offce 'called the shots': the Minister decided the allocation and overall priorities while staff
in local offces merely gave project approval to particular projects.204 An offcial report
showed that Scottish Homes had to submit proposed expenditure plans by February each
year for the following financial year 'for Ministerial approval' (SODD 1996c: 29). The
Department could then monitor monthly returns of cash spent, copies of Board papers and
mid-year requests to vire expenditure between programme headings, 'noting' programme
variations. In spite of the bland conclusion that performance was 'generally good', the report
reveals a lack of departmental confidence in its knowledge and control of the agency's
activities. Scottsh Homes was
...not formally required to seek the Department's approval when it wished to
change budgets... in practice changes of this nature are notified.. (in future)
it is recommended that any changes.... should require Departmental approvaL.
Source: SODD, 1996c: 30
Proposed targets were also submitted by Scottish Homes 'for ministerial approval' although
after seven years (sic) of Scottish Homes' existence, the Scottish Offce noted that targets
should in future be submitted at the same time as the programme, so that Ministers could be
'aware of proposed outputs when approving the inputs' (SODD, 1996c: 30).
Decisions affecting local projects were made by local staff determined within overall subsidy
allocations and by the subsidy or leverage target (which varied over time and according to
the type of project and area). Targets included leverage and the level of income from
receipts (RTB and increasingly LSVT). The spending divisions (notably development)
depended on these, as figures later will show. Programme announcements showed explicit
targets for bringing down subsidy rates and increasing the contribution of private finance to
housing investment - Le. 'leverage'.205 Chapter Seven showed how negotiations with the
Treasury before 1987 allowed the private borrowing element in housing association capital
programmes not to count against government borrowing. This had an important impact on
leverage thinking as an array of instruments with varying levels of subsidy could attract
203 Interview with John Breslin, 1998.
204 Interview with Jim Hastie 1998.
205 See footnote 199.
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private funding to a greater or lesser extent. Later sections show the effect of these targets
on different projects and areas.
Although the Conservatives had a reputation for cutting housing funding, the manager
responsible for Scottish Homes Development Division for most of the period was staunch
and vocal in crediting Conservative Ministers' generosity in the late 1980s and early 1990s
(while contrasting them to Forsyth and to Labour post 1997):
We need to be fair to the Tories and Lord James especially. ... The
credibility of Tory government went when he left, if you analyse the facts
and the results, you could see what Lord James actually did HAG did not go
down. He pushed HAG to Community Ownership. HCiS grant had never gone
above £150m in Scotland, but development-funding rose to £300m and one
year peaked at £325m under Lord James. Community Ownership got a
regular £30m a year and it benefited estates right across urban Scotland
to do regeneration. Housing was given gradual increases in funding - it was
important to plan it sensitively and be able to rely on it coming.
Later
Community Ownership was evaluated far too quickly, but it expanded with 15
new registrations in the first couple of years, just look at growth in
resources.... 1988 - 95 was in my view the most sensible gradualist
acceleration of well-thought through programmes and new drives for estate
regeneration: Lord James and Rifkind saw transfer as a part of that. It was
not a thing to sing and dance round table about with councils, though....
Besides, Rifkind endorsed model of 50% public tenure in estates, so he was
not anti council housing as such.
Interview Hastie, 1998
These quotes provide evidence of the pragmatic and stealthy accommodation of Ministers
to what implementing officials were able to deliver on the ground. The manager's reiterated
emphasis also indicates the importance of ministerial support (visible championship -
Kingdon, 1995) to the person responsible for development resources and the loyalty of the
invisible entrepreneur to a Minister acknowledged to be easy to ridicule because of his
rather ponderous style in public policy debates. Lord James Douglas Hamilton was
considered by many interviewees to be 'very friendly to housing associations' though also a
man who was fond of 'funny litte schemes like restoring empty houses above shops'.206 The
Development Manager reported that he was 'personally happier with the content of policy
then than now (1998) or under Robertson ... (who was) the worst housing minister ever'.207
Arguably the accommodation and sponsorship achieved with the earlier Minister had
evaporated on Robertson's appointment in 1995. While this senior offcial recognised the
206 Interview with John Breslin, 1998.
207 Interview with Jim Hastie 1998.
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previous minister's contribution, it could be argued that the allocation decisions were as
much the Development Manager's as they were the Minister's. At the very least, he
concurred with the agenda and was thus a compliant offciaL. Though, as one of his deputies
commented about other changes affecting the structure of the development programme,
'Jim (Hastie) must have been a fan, otherwise it would not have happened'.20B In other
words, what this official did not like did not materialise. Arguably, it suited his interests for
ministerial decisions to prioritise housing funding via HCiS and later Scottsh Homes.209 This
points all the more clearly to the Development Manager as an invisible champion (Kingdon,
1995). More widely, the pattern of decisions suggests a high degree of vertical
interdependence (Rhodes, 1997) though not necessarily compliance of implementing
officials (Sabatier, 1986) given later Scottish Office concern about lack of transparency.
Resource Distribution Priorites: Types of Project
Scottish Homes' first Strategic Investment Plan had announced the new structure and
priorities of the Approved Development Programme (ADP). It envisaged support to 20 new
and existing bodies, to deal with refurbishment of 70% of the 1,500 houses reported to have
been acquired by associations from councils between October 1987 and 1989.210 It
envisaged a similar rate of acquisition of council property in future 'with a corresponding
increase in investment' (Scottish Homes, 1989: 4). HCiS funds went on area renewal or
special needs between 1986/7 - 1988/9 with some new additional resources to support
Community Ownership (Robertson, 1992). In addition to the Traditional Programme
inherited from HCiS, new headings received further significant funding in 1989/90.
The new programme headings were listed in the following order of priority with Community
Ownership (coloured gold in the charts) listed third:
. Partnership Areas via New Life for Urban Scotland;211
. Low cost home ownership;
. Community Ownership;
. New Powers;
. Traditional Rented Programme;
. Own stock.
Source: Scottish Homes, 1989a
Spending was to be distributed as shown in Figure 40, though the data are planned /
intended rather than outturn. The Community Ownership and Partnership share of funding
grew fairly steadily throughout the early years to 1992/3 along with other new categories, at
208 Personal communication with development staff in the course of establishing Scottsh Homes' use of development
resources over the 1990s.
209 See Chapters Nine and Ten about the development of the Glasgow community ownership proposals. The Development
Manager was also closely involved in these.
210 Data in Chapter Six show more than 2,500 houses having been acquired over the two years in question.
211 There were 4 major urban centres: Castlemilk, Glasgow; Wester Hailes, Edinburgh; Ferguslie Park, Paisley; Whitfield,
Dundee. The sponsoring department for New Life was IDS under Minister AI/an Stewart.
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the expense of the 'Traditional Programme'.212 Though the bulk of resources went on
housing association developments for rent, Ministers were reported to like the emphasis on
home-ownership.213 This was to prove significant in interpreting 'leverage'.
Figure 40: Scottish Homes ADP: Distribution of Development Spending 1989/90 .1992/3 (£ millon)
£350
£300
£250
£200
£150
£100
£50
£-
a ..
~
C' oq
~
õ -. Ct.. N
Cl Cl Cl Cl
co Cl Cl Cl ClCl .. .. .. ..
..
. Traditional rented
programme
oNew Powers
OLCHO
. Partnership
o Community
Ow nership
Source: Robertson 1992, adjusted to 2001 values
The structure of the new ADP was soon reviewed, arguably to introduce greater rationality
into annual expenditure and to 'target resources more closely on needs' (Scottish Homes,
1989b; 15). A change of expenditure categories eventually materialised in 1992, after
lengthy negotiations (Scottish Homes, 1992c). This may have resulted from organisational
restructuring, following a change of Chief Executive in 1991. The new structure based on a
first tier functional division,214 was designed to improve consistency, strategic direction and
management of the various functions. For example, the role of Initiatives was to conduct
disposals to bring in receipts while the task of spending the programme fell to Development.
The new ADP structure showed more clearly what kind of areas and types of suppliers were
to benefit from investment. None of the new spending categories referred to transfer as
such, nor to community ownership.
212 The Traditional Programme declined in value although its beneficiaries had been promised in 19861 that resources for
former council housing refurbishment would not compromise existing commitments (Robertson, 1990). It ceased to absorb
all spending frm 198516. Its share fell from 82% in 1989/90 and 72% in 1988/9.
213 Interviews with Breslin and Hastie, 1998.
214 Scottsh Homes' first structure was based on geographical divisions (North, East, West, Central) to create opportnities
for flexibilit and innovation at the local scale. In 1992 a functional structure was brought in to achieve consistency between
areas and to allow staff to specialise in particular areas of work - such as development funding.
190
..
According to the new breakdown, relevant categories were referred to as Partnership Areas,
Outer City, SURls, which comprised approximately 24% of all spending 1992-7:
. Partnership Areas: as above
. Inner City
. Outer City: this effectively replaced Community Ownership - also coloured gold
. SURls (small urban regeneration initiatives)
. Urban Areas
. Rural Areas
. New Towns
. Various other
Source Scottsh Homes, 1992c
The post-1992 annual programme exceeded £300 million in real terms for five years (1993/4
- 1995/6 (incl)) with a steep fall a year later. Figure 41 shows the distribution.
Figure 41: Scottish Homes ADP: Distribution of Development Spending (Outturn) 1992/3 -1997/8 (£
millon)
£4
£4
£3
£3
£200
£2
£100
£100
£0
£-
Dct
11-
IilUfw
lutfw
DSJ's
o lmeat
1 Pap fw
D01Oty
C'
§
O'
-.
~
O'
O'
LO
~
O'
(0
~
O'
O'
r-
~
O'
T"
co
~
r-
O'
O'T"
Source: Communities Scotland, 2002 adjusted to 2001 values
Resources allocated to Partnership declined steadily over time, befitting a time-limited
programme. Spending on SURls and Outer City spending held up relatively well, arguably
protected while other spend categories bore the brunt of cuts after 1996. The restrained
tone of the 1996/7 programme announcement showed protection of funding to the Outer
City, maintained just below 1995/6 levels:
.... This recognises a critical stage of regeneration reached by the network
of housing associations and co-operatives established in Glasgow, Edinburgh
and Dundee and the landbank (sic) of unimproved stock hit by the 1996
freeze.
Scottsh Homes 1996: 8
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Presumably the freeze referred to ice rather than funding and refers to tenanted, former
council stock.
While the structure of the ADP remained constant after 1992, revealing the breakdown of
funding beneficiaries over time, comparison before and after 1992 is problematic because
the categories were different. It could be argued that this was designed to make it harder for
others to monitor trends and would have the merit of breaking producer attachment to
particular parts of the programme.
Balancing Subsidy, Private Funding and Competition: Whose Decisions?
Subsidy for refurbishing former council housing was administered as part of Scottish
Homes' normal development funding role (inherited from HCiS). As before, associations had
to be registered and had to demonstrate feasibility and produce cost plans before receiving
subsidy but the terms on which HAG was available changed incrementally (More, 1993).
Subsidy levels and grant rates started off higher in Scotland than in England215 and resulted
in a less steep decline because Scottish Homes was allowed to achieve overall leverage
through a mixture of schemes with different subsidy rates.216 Other types of projects
received subsidy but at much lower rates,21 with the result that HAG-funded projects
remained generously subsidised, especially in the Glasgow area (Table 27).
Table 27: Scottish Homes Regional HAG (%) Targets: 1989/90 -1999/0
Scottish Glasgow & Lothian North & South West Average for Overall
Homes North Clyde Borders & East year leverage
reriion (1) Forth Vallev tarriet
1989/90 71 Nla
1990/1 71 Nla
1991/2 71 Nla
1992/3 91 59 73 92 79 Nlk
1993/4 93 81 87 91 88 66
1994/5 94 71 65 88 80 63
1995/6 90 75 51 88 76 60
1996/7 92 48 59 85 71 56
1997/8 86 79 59 80 76 Nlk
1998/9 79 58 60 78 69 Nlk
1999/0 72 58 44 65 60 Nlk
Average 83 67 65 80 74
Source: research database, 2001: (1) though these figures were used as the basis for the database, they
use the post 1997 definition of a region following Scottish Homes' third restructuring in nine years.
District staff were instructed to work on the basis of local HAG targets from 1992/3, although
differentiated targets were not publicised for another four years (in 1996/7).218 Areas varied
215 See footnote 199.
216 HAG rates dropped from 95% to 75% in Scotland compared with 90% to 45% in England (More, 1993; Harriott and
Matthews, 1998). Ministers supporting owner occupation were happy to acquiesce in spending being used for that purpose.
217 For example Low Cost Home Ownership.
2181nteiview with Hastie, 1998.
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significantly in terms of priorities, amounts and type of spend and - as the table shows -
subsidy rate. Managers' performance was assessed on their ability to meet these targets
which might have had an incentive effect on project decision-making. Even in 2002,
however, available outturn data did not reveal what leverage was actually achieved.
Management of the differential between leverage and HAG left huge discretion in the hands
of Scottish Homes development personneL. The gap between the highest HAG rate and the
leverage rate for the year is pronounced and Table 27 shows Glasgow and the South West
enjoying much higher rates of HAG than Dundee and Lothians. This may reflect the
outcome of internal competition for control of resources (Robertson, 2001), though it may
also have had an incentive effect on decision-making by some councils to undertake partial
disposals to access this generous subsidy.
Though overall leverage targets were set by the Scottish Offce, government tended to
endorse Scottish Homes' recommendations, without active ministerial intervention or
direction before 1996 (SODD, 1996c). Yet the 1996/7 programme announcement pointed to
the HAG targets as the most challenging ever:219 where they had stood at 77% in 1993/4,
they were targeted to fall to 68% by 1996/7. Figures in Table 27 suggest higher HAG targets
being circulated internally in some areas. The text of that announcement betrayed
restrained protest at the rupture in established practice, curbing the bureaucrats' freedom.
Moreover area programmes suggested very different local priorities, as though two sets of
policies were running in parallel.220 Where Highland and South West Scotland emphasised
rural housing and community care, urban teams prioritised estate regeneration. The total
Outer City programme was £43m in 1995/6, of which Glasgow was to take £34m with
Lothian, Tayside and Highland sharing the rest. Small town renewal (SURls) took £22m,
mainly on Clydeside (£11 m) and Lanarkshire, with a litte in Tayside and Ayrshire. It has not
been possible to establish definitively how these distribution decisions were reached.
Who Knew and Controlled Programme Outturn?
It has been unnecessarily difficult to establish definitively Scottsh Homes' use of these
resources over the period. Information was not structured to allow consistent monitoring by
others before and after 1992/3, perhaps deliberately. While programme plans were
published annually, outturn data was seldom published and annual announcements showed
single year figures with slightly different measures from year to year.
219 Scottish Homes programme announcement 1996/7 - published April 1996.
220 There were seven districts between 1992/3 and 199617. Glasgow, Tayside, Clydeside, Highlands, Islands, South West,
Lothian and Borders, Lanarkshire. Each programme announcement after 1992 showed plans and priorities for the year
ahead with a breakdown of the programme by type of project.
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The departmental review even suggested
... it would improve consistency if Scottish Homes profiled its planned
performance by quarter and showed actual performance against plan.
SODD, 1996c: 30
Having funded Community Ownership, Scottish Homes was unable to quantify how much it
had invested, for what output in terms of number of registrations or number of tenants
affected. In 1998, Scottish Homes Performance Unit was asked to confirm spending on
council stock transfer. Staff could only estimate spending between 1989/90 and 1996/7
(Taylor, 1998a) without being able and/or willing to make breakdown available by type, age
or location of housing or unit costS.221 The differences in available figures are marked, with
clear implications for assessing policy outputs. Scottish Homes' inability to produce such
data until recently reveals the difficulty of monitoring spending. A Scottish Office Review of
Scottish Homes' performance cited programme input figures rather than outturn, and
inaccurately. It was unable to point to evidence for its conclusion that 'private sector
leverage was achieved across a range of grant regimes' and that 'from 1989/90 to 1993/4
Scottish Homes has generally performed well' (SODD, 1996c: 24). Although Scottish
Homes received considerable funding, the performance review by the sponsoring
Department (SOEnD / SDD) revealed limited knowledge of and control over its agency's
activities.
The researcher was only able to access outturn figures in 2002, several years after the
operation of the policy and under a different government. Data showed that regeneration of
former council housing was an important strand in each of these programme categories
though total spend in these areas included more than transfer. While spending overall fell
after 1996/7, the categories supporting effective transfer subsidy may have been protected.
A comparison with the database reported in Chapter Six indicates data capture of as little as
40% of spending on estate regeneration in former council estates, with the gap between the
two sources widening over time. The differential may reflect changes in definitions or in
policy. This may mean that not all grant spending on 'transfer' was captured for the
researcher's database, and policy or definitions may have been changing during this time
towards demolition of empty council housing and replacement new building by associations,
replacing rehabilitation of tenanted properties. Such expenditure was not placed on the
database.
Chapter Six showed per unit grant falling after reaching up to £70,000 per unit,22 An
anecdote may help to explain why per house expenditure started to fall, revealing policy by
221 The request was to support an article commissioned by Scottish Homes for publication by Scottish Homes about its own
spending. It showed spending of £381 millon (current values). Analysis of outturn data (Outer City, Partnership and SURfs)
now shows spending closer to £839 million adjusted (89/90 - 97/8), compared with £220 million in the same period.
222 Inteiview with Hastie, 1998
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accident (Kingdon, 1995).223 A research report to Scottish Homes claimed unfair HAG
distribution favouring Glasgow (More, 1993). In response, the Board requested internal
trend analysis in 1994 and 1995. Board members picked up on one case among a range of
actual approvals, showing a Community Ownership project in Drumchapel costing £76,000.
Although it turned out this could be justified on grounds of remodelling needs, the 'damage'
was done and the message stuck that Community Ownership was expensive. This may
have impacted on resource allocation, as well as registration thinking (to which we return).
Within rules governing HAG, the administration arrangements left huge discretion and
project control with implementing officials. Although Scottish Homes resources were clearly
made available to support small scale council transfers from 1988/9, there were no
published estimates of the scale of the demand for renewal of council housing, nor any
published proposals of the resources required and over what timescale. There were no
targets for acquisition, improvement or demolition, nor any anticipation or assessment of the
magnitude of the problem of debt rising relative to value. Yet the Development Manager was
able to recite from memory the annual amounts and breakdown years later (see quotes
above). Arguably, since it was his programme, the less others knew, the easier it would
have been to maintain control over action without argument or scrutiny. This points to further
evidence of the invisible entrepreneur at work and, as the next section shows, an agency
with incentives to recycle its own transfer receipts into investment.
Depending On Transfer Receipts
The experience of small-scale council stock transfer was to 'inform Scottish Homes' strategy
for its own stock' (Scottish Homes, 1989b: 3), but arguably not in the way that materialised.
Figure 42 shows the pattern of spending of the development programme to date, with clear
growth in the total programme (shown in navy/ red) and rising actual receipts (shown in
blue/ green) running at 22% of the total programme value overal1.224 The pink broken line
reflects the assumed amount of GIA from the Scottish Office, calculated from the other two.
We can now see assumed GIA rising steadily until 1994/5. Receipts were still rising when
GIA was cut. The further fall in GIA in 1996/7 reflected a ministerial decision, for the first
time, to use receipts entirely for debt redemption, holding the GIA at the same level
(Scottish Homes, 1996e). Having expected two years' warning of changes to programme
funding, development interests within Scottish Homes were appalled at the 1996 cuts:
The tragedy was when Forsyth came in. ... housing and regeneration fell off
the agenda when Lord James left. The focus moved to education and law and
order and the cut in Scottish Homes' budget is there for all to see the year
after Forsyth took over.
Interview Hastie, 1998
223 Personal communication with development staff (2002) in the course of establishing Scottsh Homes use of development
resources over the 1990s.
224 Outturn data supplied in 2002 by Communities Scotland - not previously published. A later section comments on access
to data by the Scottsh Office.
195
Figure 42: Scottish Homes Resources 1989/90 -19910 £Milion
£450
£400
. Total ADP
£350
£300
£250
. Total
£200 " Receipts
£150
£100
assumed
£50 GIA
£-
~
N
~
~
~
~Q2
co a; in in ~
Source: Communities Scotland, 2002: adjusted to constant values at 2001
Development spending grew until 1995/6 as gross receipts were rising, but Figure 43 shows
the increasing importance of Scottish Homes own stock transfer ('LSVT') to investment as
RTB share of receipts declined.
Figure 43: Value And Source Of Receipts To Scottsh Homes £Million
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This serves to confirm that Scottish Homes' own disposal programme was never very far
away from policy-making. This part of the account reveals the perverse and contradictory
implications of rule-changing by different departments of the Scottish Office, by no means
rational policy-making. It could be argued that bureaucrats were making 'policy on the hoof'.
A retired civil servant (who had claimed previous wheezes with net and gross measures)
was asked about resources for council transfers. He was sanguine about juggling between
budgets in the early 1990s:
We had enough when we started but (later J there was not nearly enough and
a backlog of transferred stock started to pile up. Later things became
complicated by the insolvency of Scottish Homes as a result of selling its
own stock. This hit the Scottish block and there was not enough to go
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around given other pressures like health where there were real increases in
commitments. So any cuts had to come from discretionary programmes
including housing, and especially capital programmes.
Interview Mills 1998
Even though they are not the primary focus here, a detour into Scottish Homes and New
Town transfers is required as these affected the atmosphere and expectations surrounding
local authority transfers, especially around the mid-1990s.
New Town Wind-Up: Leaky Decision-Making
Chapter Seven has already referred to the legal requirement for New Town wind-up from
around 1992. This created a chain reaction: while councils were being encouraged to sell
their stock to associations (SDD, 1988), Scottish Homes sold its stock to associations, but
not to councils (Taylor, 1999a). Meanwhile the timetable for statutory wind-up of the New
Town Development Corporations became entangled with local government reorganisation
(Muirhead, 1997). AIan Stewart (Minister responsible for New Towns, Industry and Local
Government) eventually conceded in February 1994 that local authorities could bid for
rented housing in the Scottish New Towns (Good lad and Scott, 1996). His decision followed
a concerted campaign waged by a coalition of New Town tenants, councils (prospective
buyers) and opposition MPs - to allow councils to bid for New Town stock. Decisions would
ultimately be subject to majority ballot and councils reaching a minimum / reserve price
(Muirhead, 1997). In May that year, the timetable for winding up the New Towns was
brought forward to 1996, arguably to suit the timetable for local government reform
(Muirhead, 1997): Allan Stewart was responsible for both programmes.
Tenant ballots were held in a climate of controversy, expensive consultation, competition
and abortive business planning, with three sets of ballots in summer 1996 (Muirhead, 1997)
after the new unitary authorities had taken over. In all five towns, the majority of tenants
voted in favour of their local authority.225 As a result, Muirhead concludes that between 1994
and 1996 (thus increasingly close to a General Election), New Towns transferred more
houses to five local authorities,226 than local authorities elsewhere transferred to housing
associations in total from 1985/6. He further concluded that although government had
considerable control over the situation, policy aims were not achieved. Drawing on
Hogwood and Gunn (1984), Muirhead catalogued implementation failure, including
extensive chains and networks, too many intervening variables, insufficient time, poor use of
resources, lack of agreement about objectives and poor process. Such plentiful policy deficit
could only spill over.
225 Two housing associations won ballots: Almond in Livingston and Irvine in Irvine.
226 Cumbernauld (Nonh Lanarkshire), Kirkcaldy (Fife), West Lothian, Cunninghame (Nonh Ayrshire); East Kilbride (South
Lanarkshire). Names of unitary councils are shown in brackets. The total number of houses affected was approaching
30,000 though late RTB sales reduced the stock actually transferred. In some cases associations bought newly built housing
prior to occupation and others experimented with trickle transfers. In one ballot area in Cumbernauld, the council did not
offer enough and the stock defaulted to Scottish Homes and issues remained unresolved in autumn 2001.
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As Figure 39 indicated earlier, councils borrowing consent increased at that time to
accommodate the acquisition of New Town stock. The fall-out was very significant politically
and financially. A senior civil servant from SDD (not IDS) was almost intemperate in
claiming that allowing the New Towns to sell to local authorities was
...a disaster - one of the worst things to happen to Scottish housing. It cost
us £200m and the opportunity for a positive PSBR effect was lost.
Interview Mills, 1998
New Town housing disposals were referred to as 'housing stock transfer', though this both
confused and complicated matters, with different understandings of 'stock transfer' leaking
from the New Towns to Scottish Homes and to local authorities. The fall-out was to generate
demand for Scottish Homes' tenants also to be able to 'transfer' to their local authority,
arguably the very opposite of what government intended. New Town disposals
fundamentally affected the wider political climate surrounding 'transfer' in the two years
preceding the General Election in 1997.
Wider Environment for Generating Receipts
Many factors may have affected Scottish Homes' transfers including leakage from the New
Town climb-down and positive pro-council majorities. While Scottish Homes enjoyed an
expanded GIA to fund new associations to take over council stock, it was also promoting
voluntary disposal of its own rented stock (Scottish Homes 1992; Taylor 1999; Robertson
2001). Figure 44 shows Scottish Homes transactions increasing as local authority numbers
declined.22
Figure 44: Numbers Of Stock Transfer Transactions By Scottish Local Authorities And By Scottish
Homes
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In the absence of any statutory requirement to dispose, Scottish Homes was 'diversifying' its
stock to other landlords 'at a pace with which tenants were comfortable' (Scottish Homes,
227 There were 51 transactions, affecting 23,579 tenants I homes bringing in receipts of £188 millon. The average price of
£7,990 per house (adjusted) is in line with English whole stock transfer valuations at the time.
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1992a: 18). Transfer was emphasised in each successive strategic plan (two in one year,
1992). From 1992, a dedicated staff group228 promoted disposal within rules provided in a
manual (Scottish Homes, 1992a; Scottish Homes, 1997c). Analysis of the documentation
surrounding the approval of their transfers229 suggested that staff enjoyed considerable
discretion in determining terms of transfer, even though the framework appeared to be very
tightly prescribed. Ballots were the norm and increasingly in the run-up to 1997, it became
harder to win ballots as the failure rate increased in spite of strong strategic pressure to
deliver receipts (Robertson, 2001).
As a rule, transfer was without subsidy (Scottish Homes, 1994) which meant that the
acquisition had to be funded entirely by borrowing, usually private. By 1998, the basis of
valuations in housing was changing in response to the first disposal to Waverley230 (NAO,
1994; CPA, 1994) and in view of emerging practice in England (DoE, 1993). Scottsh
Homes' Director of Development claimed that the Waverley controversy put a 'real
dampener' on stock transfer generally and brought about a more elaborate process of
information and decision-making than he thought necessary. Changes brought in
...a visible series of checks and balances. Lord James had to change the
approach in the Scottish Office to make sure checks and balances were
there and working. He came under a lot of pressure from the Opposition on
this issue. The mechanics slowed down the approach to privately funded
transfers.
Interview Hastie 1998
The policy framework was consolidated in a series of local strategy statements aimed at
tenants and prospective bidders (Scottish Homes, 1993-5). The pace of transfer by Scottish
Homes increased steadily over the period from 1992 producing acute growth in gross
transfer receipts. In spite of internal opposition to transfer,231 receipts for transfers were
starting to flow and were needed to bolster the ADP.
228 The responsible department was called the Initiatives Unit, in the 'Operations' Division from 1992.
229 Analysis was undertaken as part of the preparation of a database on transfer in Scotland for the Scottish Executive. See
Appendix Six.
230 See footnote 161. While Waverley was being set up, there was a protracted correspondence between Scottish Offce and
Scottish Homes officials about how to handle the gap between the historic book debt and the value of the stock to be
disposed: interview, Breslin 1998. The Scottish Office argued that HAG should be used to plug the gap, but Waverley could
not receive HAG as it was not a registered housing association. The eventual decision to accept a lower value and a different
valuation system set a precedent for all subsequent transfers by Scottish Homes.
231 Interview Breslin, 1998.
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Development interests within the agency had very one particularly powerful advocate.232
Though the Development Manager saw 'tenure transfer' as a distraction from regeneration,
he acknowledged that
Scottish Homes wanted to diversify ownership and management in line with
modern Social Democratic thinking. ... and hijacked private funding issues
for transfer because it needed to do something about funding its own stock.
Interview Hastie, 1998.
However receipts represented a source of income to his programme since (as the previous
section showed) the ADP depended heavily and increasingly on receipts. This shows the
underlying problem of rules concerning public spending and borrowing constraining scope
for action even for powerful actors, producing unintended consequences.
Strategic Importance of Receipts: A Double-Edged Sword
While delegating more authority to Scottish Homes regarding its own transfers, reflecting the
strategic importance attached to delivering receipts, the Scottish Office also acknowledged
that
Consideration would need to be given to the long term funding of the
development programme before Scottish Homes meets it strategic
objectives of disposing of the remainder of its stock. The position
regarding capital debt also needs to be considered given that capital
receipts are not currently used to pay outstanding debt on housing which is
sold
Source: SODD, 1996c: 20
The Scottish Offce had already needed to bale out SSHA in 1986 (SODD, 1985) and
Scottish Homes as early as 1992 (SODD, 1996c: 41) yet the 'arrangements' for including
receipts from house sales 'as an element in overall resources' was shown to be 'well
established' .
Through such arrangements tight targets can be set for receipts from R TB
and stock transfer which can act as an incentive to effective processing.
Source: SODD, 1996c: 20
Such complacency is not easily explained. Scottish Office behaviour could be interpreted
as leaving the Treasury to pick up the pieces. Perhaps mischief over receipts could be
blamed on others, a case of policy managers preferring not to know what was going on in
their name (Brunsson, 1989). Equally it could reveal the Scottsh Offce putting on a brave
232 Hastie (see Chapter 7: Table 1) was cited by a range of different respondents as well-connected and pivotal: in
galvanising tenants to form new associations, securing Ministerial support for resources, persuading Board members,
spending budgets and influencing people. Though rather coy about the significance of his own role, he acknowledged his
contacts ranged widely though he preferred not to front ideas in the community as his entire demeanour would diminish the
credibility of his ideas about regeneration 19 (which reinforces his potential status as an invisible champion (Kingdon, 1995).
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face after being rumbled. In acknowledging that within 18 months its agency could be
'technically insolvent' (page 40), the Scottish Office report defensively highlighted the
importance of receipts233 to the ADP (page 37). There were three options, one of which
included repaying outstanding debt from the receipts, but it was merely noted that these
options would be kept 'under constant review'.
The text of the report provides a clue to the opaque internal pressures between the agency
and its paymaster about where the money was coming from. It also shows clearly that at
the highest level from at least October 1995 (when deliberations on the report ended), the
government was aware of impending financial pressure. Yet Forsyth and Robertson (who
came to offce in July 1995) agreed to a further year's spending of Scottish Homes' receipts
in April 1996 (for 1996/7), the same year in which they cut GIA and in which stock transfer
guidance to local authorities was issued, just as the new councils finally took over. This
underlines 1995 and 1996 as critical years, not just because of ministerial personnel
changes.
By 1996, the spillover of controversy affecting various aspects of New Town and Scottish
Homes transfers served to make 'stock transfer' in general highly contentious.234 The term
'stock transfer' started to convey more ideological than pragmatic connotations to the
advocates of council housing. Although senior staff were credited with recognising the
benefits of transfer, the wider political climate was far from conducive to local authority
managers raising the possibility of transfer with councillors or with tenants, had they wished
to do so. A civil servant recognised that managers might even resist placing transfer on the
agenda, as
... it would have betrayed ideologically impure thoughts.
Interview Ewing, 1998.
Many interviewees at the centre regarded ideological resistance (from councils) as a
powerful obstacle to larger scale transfers, though without recognising the council or
tenants' perception of the government's proposals as ideologically challenging.
In any case, local government reform presented more pressing concerns (as shown in
Chapter Seven) and as the Tories lost ground nationally, increasingly there was a feeling
that at a future general election, the Labour white knights would win and 'save the day'.
Even the former Minister (Robertson) claimed a sense of impending election defeat in
233 The report claims receipts were running at 25% though outtum for the year shows receipts representing 41 % of GIA in
that same year - a bumper year - bringing in £112m.
234 Public Accounts Committee enquiry into Waver/ey (the first transfer) (1994); National Audit Office investigation into
Waver/ey (1994); a Scottish Grand Commitee debate (February 1996); media coverage in press, radio and television current
and consumer affairs; an increasing number of ballots with majority votes against transfer; a vociferous, if often ill-informed
resistance campaign from tenants through the Freedom of Choice campaign, supported by local authorities and certain
opposition MPs (Labour and SNP).
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1995/6.235 By 1995, the benefits of small-scale transfer were waning as funding declined, the
political atmosphere became more tense and criticism increasingly hit new small landlords
registered by HCiS / Scottish Homes. These changes emphasise the absence of a stable
climate (Sabatier, 1986).
Registration of New Landlords
Scottish Homes inherited the HCiS role of issuing advice to tenants forming steering groups
to become prospective landlords, containing criteria which had to be satisfied before
registration could be recommended to the Board. Procedures were inherited to the letter
from the predecessor body Housing Corporation until a formal review in 1994 effectively
changed the basis of registration.236 Until 1988, registration and supervision (R&S) staff had
reported directly to the London-based board of the Housing Corporation whereas their
development colleagues reported to a Scottish committee. HCiS development staff prepared
groups for registration: the anecdote at the time was that they formed co-ops around people
standing at bus stopS.237 Though almost certainly apocryphal, this notion is emblematic of
the informal, pragmatic bottom-up spirit in which co-op development was tackled literally at
street leveL.
Applications were tightly controlled initially. Senior civil servants and Ministers were involved
in early registration applications liaising with staff and the Chair of HC Scottish Board
because of the significance of the new initiative.
There were lots of registrations: even before the pilot was over fin 1989)
we knew there would be more to follow.
Interview Hastie, 1998
HCiS created a manual, but it eventually proved 'too cumbersome'.238 Most new registrations
went through without demur; some applications were 'deferred for further development'
though they could have been turned down outright236. According to Miller, registration got
harder once Scottsh Homes was established. Paradoxically, this tightening was due to
increased local interest: while the Housing Corporation Board in London had only two
people from Scotland, Scottish Homes' entire board was local, even including some former
co-operative members and former Housing Minister, Ancram, who for a time took an active
interest in the subcommittee for registrations.239
235 Interview, Robertson 1998.
236 Interview Mifer, 1998.
237 Interviews with Hastie, Smith, Bryden, McLeish 1998.
238 Interview with Miller, 1998, manager in charge of registration between 1986 and 1988.
239 Interview with Rendle, 1998, manager in charge of registration after 1988.
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Emerging Problems
Problems only emerged later.24o It was Scottsh Homes' Board, rather than the Housing
Corporation, which reined in new registrations and prompted mergers. Management and
viability problems were already surfacing among small associations from 1991 onwards and
it was becoming increasingly difficult to register new associations with confidence. Miller and
Rendle both reflected that the difficulties were related largely to size and could have been
foreseen, but were not. The fact that the money might run out was evidently not anticipated
though with hindsight such small bodies were bound to run into problems. However at the
time, everyone expected the money to continue to flow and the co-ops were expected to get
bigger'.241
Moreover the workload of registration and monitoring staff had increased significantly242
(SODD, 1996c) without commensurate increases in funding. Greater competition for
funding, lower HAG targets and pressure on the ADP from 1995/6, contributed to reduction
of support for new registrations. Over the years, the climate became less tolerant of high
cost schemes for rent, which had been the basis of planning assumptions for many of the
transfer schemes now owned by small associations in former council estates. As a result, by
1997 Scottsh Homes reported that over half of all associations in Scotland were unable to
break even on development (Scottish Homes, 1998b).
Staff interviewees in Glasgow, Dundee and Motherwell revealed ground level awareness of
increasing pressure even in 1994.243 The tightening rate of public subsidy to increase
private finance leverage meant that acquiring landlords were perceived to need reserves to
contribute to the regeneration schemes targeted for transfer.244 Small, new bodies could not
make such a contribution and were inherently more dependent on public subsidy. Though
reserves were not previously required, external pressures were changing the financial
environment for decision-making about resources and registrations.
Registration criteria were already being interpreted more stringently a year before formal
review. Tenants were being encouraged from as early as 1992, to agree to transfers to
existing bodies.243 Had transfer been instigated merely months later in 1994, disposals
would have been to larger, established local associations rather than newly created bodies.
However the formal criteria for registration only changed in 1994 following consultation
about Scottish Homes' relationship with housing associations (Scottish Homes, 1995b). This
was to promote greater self-reliance, more competition and better value for money,
coinciding with changes to accounting standards, not dissimilar but also not identical to
240 Some Community- based housing associations got into difficultes over membership and staffng: R&S staff worked hard
to maintain a positve public profile for associations to avoid any wider adverse fall-out.
241 Interview Míler 1998.
242222 associations were registered in Scotland with almost 55,000 houses at Apri/1993 - barely 3% of the nation's housing
stock (Scottish Homes, 1994). Yet this represented a 38% increase from 1989.
243 Interviews Mulholland, Forbes, Anderson, 1998.
244 This proved to be the case in the English ERCF transfers a few years later.
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changes in England (Malpass, 2000). The consultation proposed linking development
funding to performance and a grading system designed to increase financial institutions'
confidence and comfort in lending to associations (SODD, 1996c). Arguably these changes
were primarily about satisfying lenders of the robustness of the regulatory regime in respect
of Scottish Homes' own stock disposals.245
Consolidating Practice
Registration systems changed very litte between 1989 and 1997: revisions were policy
statements backed with earlier draconian powers.246 In this sense, the change of rules
shown in the documents was a less formal consolidation of emerging Scottish Homes'
practice. By contrast, the 1996 Act in England changed the legal framework of regulation by
the Housing Corporation. Crucially however, standards and expectations changed.247
Performance expectations increased the annual burden of planning and reporting, hittng
small associations hardest though most associations protested that the requirements were
excessive.
While new registrations in the late 1980s and early 1990s were mainly council stock transfer
recipients (SFHA Federation Focus - various; Scottish Homes Annual reports various), new
registrations from 1994 show a sharp decline248 (Scottish Homes, 1997a). As the bureaucrat
controlling the later registration valve, Rendle argued that this merely coincided with a
reduction in development funding. He had never been aware of any future 'pipeline' of
transfers from his development funding colleagues. This indicates a lack of co-ordination
between the different interests in Scottish Homes about the registration and organisational
implications of the community ownership 'programme', even though they were inextricably
connected.
Arguably the will to channel development funds to new small organisations was 'known' not
to be sustainable but more powerful advocates and alliances at the political and
administrative levels effectively won the argument. Formal written policy changes agreed by
the Board in 1994/5 were presaged by the behaviour of registration and development
personneL. Here too, the rules merely consolidated emerging patterns of decision and
action.
The decision to curb registrations of new bodies certainly preceded the decision to cut the
ADP taken (winter 1995/6) by Raymond Robertson under Secretary of State, Michael
245 These were fully financed by private borrowing though this had become difficult to establish, as lenders were wary of
government proposals for funding housing associations. Many respondents commented on this including civil servants,
Ministers and Finance staff.
246 Such powers included appointment of new committee members or - in extremis - take-over of the associations'
undertakings.
247 Standards (the basis for future monitoring) were overhauled in a joint exercise with the representative body (SFHA) in
1993/4, suggesting insider involvement or incorporation of the representative body.
248 Other than to support Scottish Homes own transfers.
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Forsyth.249 Tighter registration was foreseen at the time small-scale transfers were
introduced but resource cuts were not anticipated. Forsyth and Robertson were reviled for
taking harsh spending decisions,25o whereas the groundwork and basis for these decisions
had already been laid due to the actions of budget maximisers inside Scottsh Homes.
Arguably, Ministers inherited a plethora of problems, not least of which was reorganisation.
They retrieved the negative consequences of previous political and administrative
negligence by visible and invisible champions.
Pushing Whole Stock Transfer on to Council Agendas
New draft procedures for council stock transfer were issued in Scotland in May 1996
(SODD, 1996a), within 12 months of the new Minister's appointment and only one month
after the new councils took over. By May 1996, Scottish housing policy was diverging from
policy in England, Scottish Homes transfers were well under way,251 some New Town ballots
were complete and others pending, the Berwickshire transfer was complete and the ADP
had been cut. Moreover, a General Election lay a year ahead. There were thus many
crippling constraints in the wider environment.
Guidelines had been available for some time to a handful of councils actively considering
transfer252 but on a confidential basis as circulation was severely restricted. There was no
consultation about the draft with authorities as a whole, nor with the professional body and
tenants' organisations, though agreement on objectives would have been unlikely in the
climate surrounding reorganisation and other transfers. Commenting on the prior lack of
guidance, Ferguson reported the Scottish Offce view that there was 'no need':
... as no LSVT has taken place there has been no need to develop guidance to
cover issues such as the deployment of receipts.
Bramley et aI, 1993: 24
The Draft Guidance fundamentally changed the basis of Scottish council transfers. It
overturned most previous local authority practice in terms of scale, purpose, characteristics,
funding and arrangements for tenant advice and information. Indeed the only constant
element was the requirement to demonstrate that a majority of tenants was not opposed
(SODD, 1996a). The Guidance acknowledged both the small scale of activity and the
previous regeneration focus of council transfers in Scotland. It referred also to Scottish
Homes' experience though the New Towns were not mentioned.
249 Robertson was Minister for Housing Fisheries, Sport and Education appointed in July 1995, with no prior ministerial
experience.
250 Interview Hastie, 1998.
251 According to the database over 14,000 houses had been transferred in 35 transactions across Scotland.
252 Personal communication and interviews: Ewing, Jones, Smith, 1998. Consulted authorities included Berwickshire and
Wigtown.
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Arguments advanced for transfer (emphasising whole) were based on three factors:
a) tenant satisfaction (referring to English government funded research);
b) increased investment from the private sector, for improving existing conditions and
prospects of new construction;
c) opportunity to focus on the enabling role.
Strategic Option Appraisal guidance had been issued by the Scottish Office in 1993, but
local authorities were not required to pursue this approach to resource planning. Option
Appraisal would not have been a priority for many councils preceding reorganisation.
Councils were not expected to collect information about transfer or plan programmes
themselves until 1996.253 Councils were now invited to develop a future stock strategy and
incorporate it into their annual capital planning discussion with government, though is it not
evident that the Scottish Office itself took a strategic approach, as we shall see shortly.
Councils were asked to consult the Scottish Office about proposals affecting more than
1,000 houses (rather than the previous figure of 5,000), even though many new unitary
landlords were now much bigger than their district predecessors.
Meanwhile in England, the DoE in London had by 1996 issued waves of guidance, following
consultation and research,254 clarifying and refining the terms on which council housing
could be transferred to the voluntary sector to allow faster implementation, minimising
reinvention of the wheel at the local scale. ERCF funding had been made available and
limited legislation had been introduced by government changing some of the terms affecting
transfer in England255 (Mullen in Cowan and Marsh, 2001; Malpass, 2000) yet with no
equivalent in Scotland. Legislation in 1996 allowed Local Housing Companies to be
established within a revised regulatory framework as alternatives to housing associations
(Zitron, 1997; Malpass, 2000).
Robertson liked what he had heard in England about local housing companies:256 he saw
them as offering private investment potential, releasing public funds for other things. At this
time, the only private investment avenues open to him were for housing, not for other
matters in his portfolio such as education.261 Robertson maintained in 1998 that his officials
advised him against pushing for local housing companies in Scotland. He thought his
253 An annual voluntary return on house sales (S3) was adapted in 1993 to show Tenant's Choice and 'other sales'.
Authorities were expected to record addresses, numbers, whether the stock was on the HRA and the level of receipt, as well
the name of the buyer.
254 Preliminary guidance came out in 1988, revised guidance in 1993 following consultation, research on completed transfers
commissioned and published (1992 and 1995), revised guidance issued annually from 1995.
255 Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 introduced the notion of an annual programme of
consents and a levy to offset Housing Benefit spending. The Housing Act changed the governance arrangements and
introduced the term RSL to include Local Housing Companies( see Chapter Four).
256 The LHC was a new organisational vehicle designed to break the mould of housing associations, by making the transfer
recipient more acceptable to local authorities (see Chapter Four). It became strongly associated with ERCF funding in
England and thus with partial regeneration transfers though this was not how the Scottsh Minister viewed it.
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officials were too 'thick with' housing associations and viewed their advice with suspicion but
could achieve nothing. Though the Housing Act 1996 provided for a revised regulatory
framework in England, Scotland's arrangements were not touched. In the end, the Minister's
ideas for local housing companies were left as options in the 1996 draft.
Process Complexity and Organisational Priorities
An array of implementation problems (Chapter Two: Table 1) reveal that the Scottish Office
did not know or understand what they were introducing with the 1996 guidance, though
there were some crude carrots and sticks, with inadvertently more of the latter. With almost
50 pages of unfamiliar instructions and concepts, the draft Guidance conceded that
'negotiating stock transfer is an intensive, time-consuming and complex process' (SODDa,
1996: 3). A flow chart was therefore provided to show what needed to be done (see Chapter
Four) at least showing tasks specified in the correct sequence (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
Scottsh Office staff support was offered to assist in developing proposals. Still, a flow chart
and advertised complexity were hardly selling points given the timing in relation to
reorganisation.257
Moreover council managers were faced with extensive preparations for Compulsory
Competitive Tendering (CCT) of housing management services, deferred beyond the
English councils' timetable, precisely due to reorganisation (Taylor, 1998b). In this respect,
by releasing councils from requirements to prepare for CCT if they pursued stock transfer,
(SODD, 1996a: parag 80) the Guidance dangled a weedy carrot just out of councils' reach.
Authorities wishing to avoid CCT entirely would have had to countenance whole (rather than
partial) stock transfer - an excessive ideological shift for most. If a case study of
Clackmannanshire has any value beyond itself, political acceptability of transfer to a LHC
was low in the year before a General Election (Thirkettle, 1996: 48). The notion that new
staff and councils might prioritise an ideologically unwelcome policy of a dying government
was rather fancifuL.
Knowledge I Understanding of Value and Debt
The guidance proposed new ideas about valuation, expertise in financial management,
business planning and risk management in borrowing. There was no reference to subsidy,
instead councils were encouraged to access computer-based financial models, supporting
new valuation methods.258 The section on funding opened with the simple statement that an
...acquiring landlord is responsible for raising from the private sector the
necessary funds for transfer.
Source: SODD 1996a:23
257 See Chapter Seven: in the aftermath of reorganisation, some councils did not even know how many houses they owned
nor where up to 18 months after the event, due to poor information systems and staff movement/turnover. Moreover the
SODD was barely in a position to assist with only 2.5 staff working in the relevant section.
258 See Chapter Four.
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Most councils responded to a survey259 (for this study) enquiring about their response to the
guidance, the valuation model and capital constraints (below). Within nine months of the
guidance being issued, only three had examined the model for themselves, though some
were interested in illustrative modelling for their authority, available from the researcher
(Taylor, 1997). Most showed valuation falling short of historic debt.260 In 1996 government
had no information on possible valuations relative to debt in Scotland. Indeed, valuation
estimates of Scottish councils' stock were only commissioned four months after the
publication of Draft Guidance. The commission sought to address the value of partial
transfers covering different stock types and conditions in three sample authorities. A
confidential report by consultants to the Scottish Offce revealed a substantial shortfall, only
made public after the General Election (Anderson, 1997).
Robertson had neither ministerial nor housing experience. First elected in 1992, he had a
very small window of opportunity to make a mark, unless re-elected. With experience and
information from the floor of the House of Commons, his transfer sources and contacts were
mainly English.261 On this basis he thought that transfer automatically produced a receipt
and surplus though by 1998 he knew this was not necessarily valid in Scotland.262 The
former Minister remembered being acutely conscious of needing to be careful with stock
transfers, in view of English experience. With prompting, he recalled that this involved
increased Housing Benefit costs, although he was not aware at the time that these problems
did not apply in Scotland, due to different legislation and financial structures affecting local
authorities in Scotland and England. He had only become aware of differences several
months after taking office, and critically after failing to use his early days for what he saw as
a vital opportunity to push hard on local authorities to transfer their stoCk.261 That perception
was not shared by most other respondents.
Robertson confirmed that he 'inherited the debt problem' though his predecessor had not
been unduly concerned about it. In 'getting on top of his brief', Robertson had asked
questions about certain expenditure flows in housing. Civil servants' answers revealed
revenue subsidy (HSG) to three rural authorities with unusually high debts and a general
discussion of councils' debt. However, officials advised that to calculate the value of stock in
relation to debt would have been 'too difficult' and in any case, only a few authorities - such
259 The survey was conducted in January 1997, nine months into the financial year. See Appendix Five.
260 By September 1996, claims of significant potential receipts were circulating without foundation, prompting the researcher
to make some estimates, subject to many assumptions with political implications. Calculations by the researcher were made
public at a professional conference (Taylor, 1997). They showed only five authorities in Scotland with a positive valuation
and close to covering their outstanding debt, by very small margins. Even with significant rent increases the number of
authorities generating a net receipt was small, without delivering significant investment, which would have been the intended
rationale for transfer. See also footnote 265.
261 Interview Robertson 1998. Robertson was MP for a constituency in Aberdeen where there had been no council, New
Town or Scottsh Homes transfers by 1995, although Tenant's Choice had been used on Scottsh Homes stock in Aberdeen
without controversy about ballots as decision-making was individual.
262 Berwickshire had produced a small surplus receipt of less than £1 milion (less than 10% of the value). This contrasts with
the evidence in Chapter Five, which showed that by that time surpluses for English authorities were running at double the
value of the stock.
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as Glasgow - would incur a shortfal1.263 Though Scottish Office Ministers were dependent on
civil service advice, in this case it was without proper foundation in its competence.264 During
1996, civil servants floated the possibility of being able to make a one-off payment of £180
million to the HSG recipients only, by 'commuting' the debt, in other words absorbing it into
general government borrowing. This would have been at Treasury expense without affecting
the Scottish Block, while releasing £19 million annual revenue subsidy for other purposes.
Council officials and civil servants exchanged correspondence without making progress by
May 1997.265
Target Receipts and Debt Repayment: Sticks to Challenge Non-Decision-
Making?
Setting target receipts was one of the Minister's claims to success. Explicit transfer targets
would focus minds in the new councils.266 In December 1995 authorities were, as usual,
notified of their capital allocation for the coming year, consisting of borrowing consent based
on an assumed level of receipts, with a breakdown now showing explicit assumptions of
receipts from stock transfer and land sales. In their first year, 1996/7, the new unitary
councils were expected to generate extra receipts, use part of the receipt for debt
redemption (below), while maintaining capital investment in the stock. This proved to be a
perverse mixture of incentives, without government control of the relevant levers.
While setting the target was easy, achieving it was not. The transfer receipts target was £17
million. A Parliamentary written answer showed a nil receipt from stock transfer for every
Scottish council, whereas each had at least some RTB sales receipts and land sales though
reduced from previous years.267 Correspondingly, borrowing fell, eliciting howls of protest.
Where Chapter Six shows receipts of £14 million in 1995/6 (with Berwickshire accounting for
almost 95%), seven transactions in 1996/7 (of which six were in Glasgow) produced
receipts of only £3 million against a target of £17 million.
The annual borrowing consent announcement in December 1996, was also an opportunity
to require local councils to use part of their capital receipt to redeem outstanding debt.
Following signals to this effect in a St Andrew's Day speech by the Secretary of State, a
263 Interview Ewing 1998.
264 Modelling by Anderson, 1998; CoSLA / Scottsh Homes, 1998 showed that the debt shortall was of the order of at least
£2 billion across Scotland affecting most authorities. This was based on conservative assumptions about future income and
expenditure. This knowledge was not available to most central or local government personnel until early1997, other than via
the researcher. Any council seeking to establish this information would have had to incur considerable costs in
commissioning stock surveys and valuations.
265 In England, similar efforts were made in relation to the authorities (especially in London) in receipt of subsidy (other than
for Housing Benefit). This issue was of considerable interest to HSG authorities and especially to offcials in Shetland
(personal communication). The general problem was only resolved in September 2001 though no resolution had been found
for the Shetland case even by October 2002 after investment of considerable time and effort through the NHP programme.
266 Interview with Ewing 1998.
267 Parliamentary Question no. 10697: January 1997 - half year data to October 1996. RTB receipts to councils overall had
been running at an average of £250 million annually between 1988/9 and 1994/5 (PQ 813 March 1997). Unpublished Shelter
figures in January 1997 indicated that by the year end receipts overall would be running at barely 50% of government
estimates, while RTB sales would be down (38%) to £113 million, land sales would be down by 74% and stock transfer
would stif produce a nil receipt.
209
letter to council Chief Executives stipulated 25% of capital receipts to be used for debt
redemption. This was to rise to 50% and 75% in later years, further squeezing resources
available to local authorities for investment and constraining councils' housing finances.
A survey for this study produced responses from 24 out of 32 councils, of which seven
indicated general or specific plans for transfer (Table 28). The general commitments
included plans for the following year (Shetland, Argyll and Bute, East Lothian, Stirling).
Specific plans usually referred to pockets of low demand or poor quality stock in need of
investment (Edinburgh, North Lanarkshire, Dumfries and Galloway). While Angus was
opposed to transfer, it was willing to demolish council housing for land sales. If the targets
were meant to have an incentive effect, they did not succeed as the remaining authorities
indicated it was 'not policy' or they had 'no plans' to transfer, or did not answer the
questions. Forcing agenda-setting was not an evident success.
Ministers deliberately squeezed councils, instructing actions in the full knowledge of the
potentially detrimental effects on short-term investment. It would be important to achieve
higher investment in housing long term but not from public funding, given competing
demands (from health and education) on limited Scottish Office resources. According to the
Minister, the long-term pay-off of more housing investment would have to come from private
sources via LSVT. A civil servant confirmed that while targets were not expected to achieve
anything that year, their short-term merit lay in increasing the chances of specific discussion
of transfers in councils when the borrowing consent was notified to the relevant council
committee. He alleged that even previously sympathetic council offcials had not put
transfers on the agenda, as this was an item which might create difficulties for them. The
new council officials were seen as concerned not to give the impression that they were
pushing transfer in case it was construed as them 'feathering their own nests'.268 There had
been allegations of that sort leaking from the English experience (Gardiner, 1991). Ewing
recognised that whole stock transfer had been more of a top-down approach, but not a very
successful one, partly because the Scottish Office could not 'crack the financial problems'
surrounding debt for an important handful of cases.
By 1996, the potential incentive effect of targets was eclipsed and attempts to counter non-
decision-making by councils had litte or no effect. The ideological objectives of transfer
were not shared and there was litte attempt to engage with opponents. Instead, action was
taken to constrain them as a means of forcing change. There was a lack of resources and
positive incentives, partly through civil servants' failure to grasp the nature of the problem
and identify a solution,269 though the Conservatives almost certainly would not have
welcomed the implications of a debt shortfalL.
268 Interview Ewing, 1998.
269 Interview Jones, Findlay, 1998.
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Table 28: Scottish Local Authorities - Responses to Target Transfer Receipts
Name of authority Stock % of total Response to government policy Subsequent action (Scottish
Transfer receipts (guidance and targets) Parliament, 2000) 270
target £m target
Aberdeen 1.1 7% Whole stock option appraisal
from 1997
Angus 0.3 8% Policy of clearing sites and selling Ministerial consent for one
empty - not transfer transaction 1997/8
Argyll and Bute 0.2 6% All sales vacant land to date. Whole stock option appraisal
Planninq to sell off 1930s housing from 1999
Clackmannanshire 0.2 6% Whole stock option appraisal
from 1998
Dumfries & Galloway 0.5 7% 400 planned: in need of £5m Ministerial consent for one
investment transaction 1999
Dundee 0.8 13% No plans Whole stock option appraisal
from 1997
E Ayrshire 0.7 12% No plans
E Lothian 0.4 9% Stock option appraisal planned for Whole stock option appraisal
1997/8 from 1997
East Renfrewshire 0.2 13% Partial stock option appraisal
from 1997
Edinburgh 1.2 9% 1,500 houses in low demand in Partial stock option appraisal
Niddrie: need £30m. Expect £0.8m from 1997
receipt in 1998
Falkirk 0.8 10% Under discussion No bid for NHP
Fife 1.4 8% Allowing £1 m provisionally next Partial stock option appraisal
year but no specific plans from 1997
Highland 0.7 7% No specific plans Whole stock option appraisal
from 1998
Midlothian 0.3 10% No plans
North Ayrshire 0.6 12% Not policy to transfer
North Lanarkshire 1.9 10% 641 units planned. Built 60s in low Ministerial consent for one
demand transaction 1998
Perth & Kinross 0.4 9%
Scottish Borders 0.3 8% Whole stock option appraisal
from 1998
Shetland 0.1 6% 2400 (all) houses for 99100: Whole stock option appraisal
complex debt issues to be resolved from 1998
South Lanarkshire 1.4 8%
Stirling 0.3 7% Committed to examine in 1997 Whole stock option appraisal
from 1998
West Dunbartonshire 0.5 12%
West Lothian 0.5 8%
Western Isles No plans Whole stock option appraisal
from 1998
Source: survey of councils January 1997. NB no councils reported receipts
270 One of the earliest actions of the New Labour government was to use additional CSR resources to establish the
conditons and value of the stock. Most authorities bid for resources.
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Evidence here indicated that Ministers not only depended on civil service advice (Midwinter
et aI, 1991), but arguably to the extent that they legitimised civil service action. Ministers'
ideas were frequently bypassed;271 officials were anxious not to disrupt the politically
negotiated order incorporating producer networks (such as Scottish Homes and SFHA).27
Robertson was not amenable to accommodating previous practices and alliances and
challenged the status quo as an outsider, but even he could not get past his own officials.
The compliance of implementing offcials thus could not be taken for granted. Though less
quiescent Ministers post-1995 found officials challenging, in housing circles it was the
politicians who were seen to have exacerbated matters. Crucially the Scottish Office overall
did not adequately understand factors affecting their own policy ambitions and the impact of
the wider policy environment: reorganisation caused disruption, with consequences for time
and organisational resources critical to implementation. Moreover the government had poor
credibility and faced defeat in the impending election. Councils thought they could sit
transfers out, not anticipating more of the same after the election.
Conclusions
Critical junctures in Scottish transfer practice were only partly due to the timing of General
Elections and not particularly to the timing of legislation. Different problems were identified
and solutions found at various stages. In 1986, the problem for councils was shrinking
resources with creative solutions being found to exploit government resource preferences.
By allocating resources, Ministers had the opportunity to pursue their ideological goals and
address management scale and quality in some housing estates. Early decision-making
provided the Housing Corporation with resources to encourage councils to transfer stock, as
Ministers exercised powers (already in place) to constrain councils' finances. The incentive
mechanisms existed already, only the resources were new. The intended framework in 1988
for using receipts was intrinsically flawed and ultimately contradictory because, overall,
government wanted public borrowing reduced. Ultimately debt due to recycled receipts
came to be seen as the problem in 1995.
The early 'policy' of transfer was not trumpeted or advertised and operated more by stealth,
using resource incentives. Such resources were critical to partial transfer in Scotland,
though not overtly promoted in documentation. Responsibility (and/or credit) for resources
lay with the mutually convenient alliance of Ministers and bureaucrats between 1987 and
1995. While Ministers approved the gross amount of grant to Scottish Homes, they
acquiesced in its distribution based on decisions made and actions taken by quango
bureaucrats within a loose framework of priorities, within which leverage was key. Leverage
was a radical and creative departure from previous Scottish and contemporary English
practice. Bureaucrats were able to exploit ministerial preferences for owner-occupation,
271 Interview Lee, 1998.
272 Interview Robertson, 1998.
212
providing solutions to problems the bureaucrats wanted to solve while using internal
resource distribution mechanisms to protect subsidy to preferred projects.27 This provides
classic evidence of invisible entrepreneurs assisting visible champions.
Latent conflict about small-scale transfers was defused by stealthy resource incentives,
contrasting sharply with covert and overt conflict over Scottish Homes and New Town
transfers respectively, especially from 1991/2. Scottish Homes early secretive approach to
circumvent transfer opposition backfired with the Waverley controversy, later compounded
by New Town experience. Legislation requiring New Town wind-up and promoting
independent landlords as the new owners, overturned councils' inheritance expectations.
Frustration produced direct public confrontation as incompatible stances were adopted by
government and an alliance of opponents. In eventually conceding to councils the chance to
become landlords, Ministers undermined their colleagues' housing policy ambitions, with
adverse political and financial fall-out for the government's overall objectives. However,
Scottish Homes in turn could not back off from transfer out of the public sector because
receipts from private funding were needed by budget maximisers in Scottsh Homes to
satisfy other criteria including leverage. By 1995/6, this pressure led to overt conflict using a
war of words very often in the glare of publicity, very different from the stealth and secrecy
of the original approach and in the end producing failed ballots. Transfer practice by Scottish
Homes and the New Towns also created financial problems, initially ignored, but later
undermining availability of resources which had been critically important to partial transfer in
Scotland. Stealth was not the hallmark here.
Though political personnel changes in the July 1995 reshuffe appear responsible for
removing resource incentives (subsidy), this is not the sole explanation. Government had
already politely highlighted opaque decision-making about resources and lack of Scottish
Offce control of Scottish Homes' operations. Scottish Office Ministers were formally
responsible for resource allocation but they did not have adequate output information and
only limited control over inputs and targets. A nominally congratulatory report signalled
dangers in the informality of practices, highlighting mounting concern about Scottish Homes'
potential insolvency. Such practices were waiting to be reined in by July 1995. Regulation of
new landlords also played a more significant role than has been credited in the past, initially
supporting and later constraining small-scale transfer. Potential problems were overlooked
initially in the interests of promoting ideas which visible champions preferred. Various
factors contributed to the consolidation of practice emerging from the early 1990s, leading to
tighter control of registration. Factors included emerging problems in small organisations,
personnel changes and ultimately lender concerns about the regulatory framework, arising
from Scottish Homes' own disposals. Regulatory changes created impediments for
sustaining community ownership.
273 By contrast, in the ERCF programme in England there were formal policy targets for partial transfer subsidy, administered
by the government department itself.
213
The year 1995 was thus a critical date primarily because of the convergence of regulatory,
financial and political pressure, preceding significant political personnel changes. Pressure
on public resources was resisted outwith ministerial circles as ideological and even agency
officials reviled the new ministerial team, arguably for challenging established producer
interests. Yet hard decisions about resources were overdue - mainly about Scottish block
spending priorities, housing debt and receipts. Dry outsiders, with a different and radical
ethos, actively and publicly promoted a policy of transfer and sought to change aspects of
the rules. They stopped short of promoting legislation, but changed less formal rules,
tightening constraints on councils already in organisational disarray. If the changes were
designed to produce transfer, they were flawed technically and politically. Civil servants did
not understand how the technical pieces of the jigsaw fitted together, in spite of their
continuity and experience. Not only was there little co-ordination with colleagues in England,
there was little evidence of technical or political co-ordination with colleagues within the
Scottish Office. Neither Ministers nor civil servants had an effective solution to the problems
of debt which they had highlighted and neither anticipated the knock-on consequences of
wider policies on large-scale transfer. Moreover timing was poor because of the climate of
confrontation surrounding transfer, reorganisation chaos in councils and an impending
election. This study reveals little evidence of rational or strategic policy-making by
government in terms of targets, resources, implementation and monitoring.
Different ministerial preferences were exploited by budget maximisers in Scottish Homes
with support from civil servants in the Scottish Office. Ancram's interest in targeting
shrinking public expenditure to bolster communities and experimentation, allowed pilot
schemes to get off the ground, though ultimately his ideas proved unsustainable
organisationally and financially in a more stringent economic climate. Lord James was
friendly and accessible but easily exploited over leverage rates, to satisfy his interest in
owner-occupation schemes of marginal consequence. While resources were relatively
plentiful under his jurisdiction, the invisible champions quietly and stealthily achieved
community ownership in heartlands of latent opposition in urban Scotland, producing partial
transfers. By contrast, Robertson challenged vested interests, cutting public spending to
increase private funding for social housing. No transfers were achieved by virtue of his
confrontation, shattering cosy alliances and even provoking vitriolic responses from the
budget maximisers. Arguably, problems had built up before he came to office. He merely
took hard decisions, prioritising other programmes. However, the radical minister lacked
invisible champions, resources and understanding. He could not obtain compliance from his
officials or councils, which were prepared to suspend decision-making to the end.
Overt conflict about transfer elsewhere was ultimately counter-productive to the
government's later objectives for whole transfer. Diversionary tactics with judicious use of
resources allowed potential conflict to remain suppressed. This chapter shows the
importance of government resources in facilitating transfer, from a top-down perspective.
However it does not confirm transfer policy as linear, top down or rationaL. In examining
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local action through case studies, Chapters Nine and Ten examine the process and power
relations to establish the extent to which resources and other factors were important at the
local scale in suppressing latent conflict between central government and its opponents over
stances about council housing.
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Chapter Nine
Local Actors: Pressures and Motives
Examining action at the local scale can reveal the impact of resources and other factors on
decision-making and action. A case study approach brought forward information and views
about the way in which five different councils approached the issue of stock transfer. These
included partial, grant-funded transfer by three Labour-controlled councils at different
stages; one whole transfer; and an example of aborted transfer or non-transfer, in spite of
two efforts to establish initiatives.274 Both of the latter involved councils under Conservative
control between 1992 and 1995. Where the data in Chapter Six referred to the five areas
under the name of the unitary authority post-1996, Chapters Nine and Ten refer to
Motherwell and Berwickshire rather than North Lanarkshire and Scottish Borders. In the
latter case, this is required in order to distinguish the old district council from the shadow
unitary council.27 In addition, North Lanarkshire council had four predecessor district
councils but only one (Motherwell) was the focus of qualitative examination.276
The rationale for the selection of case studies was outlined in Chapter Three along with a
discussion of the issues involved in interviewing key actors. While the case studies are not
intended to be representative, and are consciously probabilistic in approach, they satisfy the
criteria for the 'disciplined-configurative' type, by virtue of systematic data collection and
analysis. This should mean that they have nomothetic value, Le. beyond the cases
themselves. This approach brought out the basis of temporal and spatial differences and
similarities in stock transfer. The case study material primarily supports this and the
following chapter and both are supported by Appendix Ten, which summarises the scale
and timing of action in each case.
Qualitative data for the case studies was gathered primarily by means of semi-structured
interviews with actors at the local and national leveL. Appendix Four contains a schedule of
interviewees showing their names and profiles organised by role type: councillors, senior
staff (seller), tenants and buyer staff. The interviews were semi-structured, using a common
schedule of questions. Reference is also made to primary documents such as feasibility
studies, information to tenants, newsletters, local strategies and published sources (where
available). Table 29 shows the interviewees to which the chapter refers.
274 Reference to completed and aboned transfers avoids 'success' or otherwise as this would imply some form of evaluation
of the outcome which is not the purpose of the exercise.
275 Its successor Scottsh Borders - as a shadow council - sought to obstruct the Berwickshire transfer at the eleventh hour
in August 1995. NB Glasgow, Dundee and Stirling became unitary authorities.
276 The four were Motherwell, Monklands, Cumbemauld and Kilsyth, and Strathkelvin (pan). Nonh Lanarkshire was one of
the few councils to conduct transfers (without subsidy) shonlyafter 1997 as a result of preparation immediately following
reorganisation.
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Table 29: Interviewees' Capacity and Reference Points
Name Role type Buyer name (HA) Referring to seller(s) I
area(s)
Anderson Buyer (staff) Rutherglen Glasgow
Dhir Southdeen Glasgow
Forbes Ormiston Dundee
Jones Berwicks Berwicks
Mulholland Forgewood Motherwell
McDermott Stirling Stirling
Crookston Blairtummock Glasgow
Bryden Buyer (tenant! Southdeen Glasgow
Muir member) Forgewood Motherwell
McLeish, Mulligan Blairtummock Glasgow
Comley Seller (staff) Glasgow
Rodgers Glasgow
Breslin Glasgow
Rowbotham Dundee
Whitefield Motherwell
Wiseman Seller (elected Glasgow
Dyer members) Glasgow
Luke Dundee
Harding, Scott Stirling
McLaughlin Motherwell
Findlay Berwicks
Mills Central! various277 Glasgow, Dundee
Ewing Berwicks and others
Ancram Glasgow
Robertson 8erwicks and others
Hastie Glasgow
Miller Various
Rendle Various inc Berwicks
Lee Various
Smith Glasgow, Berwicks and
others
Source: qualitative interviews, 1998.
This chapter reports in turn on the origins, imperatives and rationales for each of the five
(prospective) sellers in Glasgow, Dundee, Motherwell, Berwickshire and Stirling. It also sets
the scene for each of the five councils. It is complemented by a further chapter which
examines the key actors in each area, their stances, action and capacity, and sources of
opposition, prior to exploring the role of networks and other mechanisms for accommodating
others' stances. This chapter refers back to the specialist policy literature whereas Chapter
Ten draws on policy theory. The chapter is organised by the five seller areas before moving
on to a more abstract discussion of the themes raised by the case studies.
277 See Chapter Seven for details.
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Origins, Imperatives and Rationales
GlasgoW278
The junction between central and local policy-making in Glasgow merits detailed attention
as this is arguably where transfer started. At the time, no one wanted to claim responsibility
for the development of proposals (Smith, 1986) and government-commissioned research
could not pinpoint who was responsible (Clapham et aI, 1991). A senior manager argued
that it was impossible to disentangle whose idea it was because of the close working
relationship between members and officials.279 While genuine collaboration may have been
a crucial factor in the success of the proposals, there could be other reasons for masking
the origin of ideas (to which Chapter Ten returns). This section shows how a coalition of
interests was vital in presenting the case and arguing for resources.
A radical appointment was made by the Labour administration in 1983, replacing the retiring
Director of Housing. The new Director, full of reforming zeal, soon seconded staff to explore
and develop new ways of increasing investment into council housing, given the
government's preference for funding the private sector.
Before the election in 1983, most spending was cash limited, but the
Chancellor took some areas off ration - especially non HRA spending for the
private sector. That prompted Glasgow to have a bonanza of private grants,
though Edinburgh missed its chance. ... There were fertile minds in Glasgow
in the Housing and Finance departments where they conceived the
possibility of diverting resources into council stock if they transferred the
ownership to tenants, because, you know, the legislation referred to
'persons: This broke down the wall between HRA and non-HRA.280
Interview Mills 1998
Severe problems of under-investment had been building up (Clapham et aI, 1989) with
several thousand properties requiring modernisation. The newly elected political leaders of
the Labour council in 1984 convened a group involving other political parties.281
Representing the Conservatives was lan Dyer, former Vice Chair of the council's Housing
Sub Committee and Housing Corporation Scottish Board member. He had been active in
supporting the development of management co-ops during a previous Conservative
administration in Glasgow and was keen to consider how co-operative principles might be
extended.282
278 The main sources for this case study include staff and committee members in three associations; staff and elected
members of the council; civil servants and agency offcials (HCiS and Scottsh Homes) and an independent adviser. The
case study also draws on the government's interim and final evaluation report on Community Ownership.
279 Interview Comley, 1998.
280 The HRA was an account only for income and expenditure relevant to council housing: the non-HRA was everyhing else
and thus the private sector.
281 Interview Wiseman, 1998.
282 Interview Oyer, 1998.
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Tenant management co-operatives had already been tried and tested with some success in
the Glasgow context,83 In addition, many housing associations had successfully
regenerated inner city neighbourhoods with assistance from the Housing Corporation. The
council therefore came up with an idea to create ownership co-operatives, which would be
funded by central government grants to the private sector, topped up with private loans. The
organisations would get tax relief but the residents would still be tenants and thus eligible for
rent assistance (Nicholson et aI, 1985).284 The concept had the early informal backing of
senior staff and certain key elected members cutting across party affliations, but support to
approach tenants had to be secured more widely among the ruling Labour group against a
background of overt hostility from the trade unions (Smith, 1986).285 Discussion took many
forms: 'secret' meetings in councillors' homes, city centre bars outside working hours and
later more formally at Labour Party meetings in wards and constituencies.286
Research staff were commissioned to produce a paper on the socialist credentials of a
concept called 'Community Ownership', as an alternative to council housing, to make it
palatable to backbencher Labour members (Nicholson et aI, 1985).287 The Labour group was
initially split but a slightly larger sub-group - with more control over key committee positions -
was in favour on an experimental basis.28B Some key personnel influenced thinking: they
included a former Housing Convenor and a handful of councillors able to talk about their
experience of associations in the inner city.2B9 This helped to convince, reassure and calm
down anxieties in the outer city, 'critical to softening people up within Labour group'.290 In the
end, the Labour party embraced it as their idea.291
283 Interviews Dyer, Wiseman, 1998.
284 Rebates are now known as Housing Benefit: see Chapter Six.
285 Interview Mils, 1998.
286 Interview Wiseman, 1998.
287 Personal communication Kintrea, 1998.
288 Interview Wiseman 1998. One group took an ideological statist line parallel to Liverpool's stance on council housing at the
time. The other took a partly pragmatic stance informed by community development thinking.
289 Interview Wiseman, 1998. John Kernaghan was of the personally powerful and influential individuals credited by
Wiseman and Dyer with persuading fellow backbenchers. He was senior having been Housing convenor in the late seventies
and early 1980s Another was John Ross who was deputy convenor of Housing under Bailie McLean, Ross was thought as
more likely to be trusted by Scottsh Offce.
290 Interview Hastie, 1998.
291 Interview Comley, 1998.
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While the Community Ownership paper emphasised investment overall, it was tenant
demand on the ground that clinched where the opportunities were taken. Staff had been
given freedom in late 1984 to develop pilot projects on a limited scale.292 Proposals were put
to tenants in seven areas, consciously targeted due to promises previously made and the
likely reception from tenants. An important factor was the suitability of the area for
investment: while they needed some refurbishment, they were not necessarily the areas
with the worst housing conditions (Clapham et aI, 1989). Tenants were offered control of
new bodies which, it was thought, could access grants aimed at the private sector.
Central government officials and ministers recalled first hearing about this idea from
Glasgow in 1985, in one case from offcials,293 in the other from tenants.294 They were initially
sceptical of the council's proposals and rejected them for a mixture of reasons involving
money, control and accountability (Smith, 1986; Clapham et aI, 1989).294 After months of
negotiation and lobbying, the government surprised the council in 1986 with an alternative
proposition of new, additional funding for three groups channelled through the government's
agency, the Housing Corporation (Clapham et aI, 1991). Although technical grounds were
offered for the change, the amendments had distinct merit from a central government
viewpoint, in distancing the council from administration and in deploying an existing
mechanism and a government agency for administration.
Small-scale transfers to co-ops was a growth from thinking both about
management co-ops and about private sector grants. Ideas have their time
- Calvay was just a test case. We knew Raymond and Jim,295 so it seemed
appropriate to direct the activity to them. There was an energy about
housing associations and some fear about letting Glasgow ¡council) get too
involved. So Ancram agreed to offer Calvayand the others on certain terms
...HAG.
Interview Mills 1998
Neither Smith (1986) nor Clapham (1991) could pinpoint just how the HCiS became
involved nor how HAG came into the picture. Asked whether HCiS had suggested the HAG
alternative, this civil servant confirmed that he had
... toured the city a bit with Raymond and chewed over possibilities then, you
know, while out and about. Lots of ideas were being chucked around. The big
issue then was to get Glasgow to agree to the HAG part of the proposaL. We
¡Scottish Office) saw this as something new and we were keen for it to
work, so connected into it and exploited the precedent of the CBHAs. .....
292 Interview Comley, 1998.
293 Interview Mils, 1998.
294 Interview Ancram, 1998.
295 Raymond Young and Jim Hastie, senior offcials of the HCiS at the time. Young managed the Scottish operation overall
and Hastie managed the Glasgow operation in particular.
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It seemed like the right idea at the time. It was just a pilot, you know, a
device to assuage concerns.
Interview Mills 1998
Asked about his involvement in the development of ideas in Glasgow, the HCiS
Development Manager emphasised both registration and development aspects:
I'll give you a straight answer: under statute, the new co-ops had to be
registered So from when co-ops were steering groups, we (HCiS) had to go
out and liaise with them. We had seed corn grants to give out. ... I needed to
make sure that support was there and resourced It was also very similar to
the development of CBHAs in previous decades. ... We had to create new
landlords in Glasgow, so we had to get residents to understand what they
were taking on, not just transfer but longer-term issues about conditions
and regeneration. fit was about) deplorable housing conditions ... not
diversification for its own sake. ....
... The view was taken by HCiS and represented to government was that
improvement grants would not be enough. ... (the proposed) £10,000 per unit
was not nearly enough: it would not have produced sufficient diversity of
ownership or stock needed to make the overall scheme work long term and it
was too important to get stuck at that stage. Also, given previous council
large-scale modernisation, we were very keen to parcel it up into smaller
phases to make sure the same kind of problems weren't repeated So we
argued to the Scottish Office that they should be spending more.... In end,
they could have done it a lot cheaper but without diversity. ....
Later he added
... The Board (HCiS) was for keeping going in inner city in Glasgow and west
of Scotland generally, but public sector estates were The Problem to tackle.
We had to forge a role for associations to stay involved in development.
Otherwise, the only contentious issues (were) about the level of decoration
in tenement closes - piffling stuff by comparison with scale of the challenge
from conditions in the public sector.
Interview Hastie, 1998
The government alternative, using HAG for just three areas, came to be known as Phase 1.
Phase 2 re-emerged in a form closer to the original council proposal, only months later, for
three areas excluded from the amended proposals (Clapham et aI, 1989). The tenants'
groups had continued to lobby vigorously for the original proposal, on one occasion
ambushing the Minister.296 They eventually won the opportunity to be registered, to receive
private grants (though on a lesser scale) and with private borrowing guaranteed by HCiS.297
296 Interviews Ancram, Bryden, 1998.
297 Although the government was keen to see increased private lending, many interviewees (Ancram, Rodgers, Breslin,
Hastie) commented on the lack of appetite from lenders.
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Considerable effort went into briefing and training tenants' representatives to take control of
co-operatives.298 By 1988, most of the six were on site, four years after discussions started.
An interim (government-funded) evaluation of 'Community Ownership' (Clapham et aI,
1989), showed the costliest option was to do nothing; the most 'cost-effective' regeneration
'solution' was to demolish and rebuild; Phase 1 (using the HAG vehicle) was the most
expensive method of refurbishment. Before 1989, HCiS had already been approached by
councils beyond Glasgow seeking funds for deteriorating council housing but faced
resistance from traditional clients (via SFHA) in diverting resources (Clapham et aI, 1989).
However, by 1991 (as shown in Chapter Eight) HAG for Community Ownership had become
a line in HCiS and later Scottsh Homes' ADP allowing such funding to be rolled out
throughout Scotland. Community Ownership was no longer just a pilot. Appendix Ten shows
the extent to which Glasgow used this line of funding to support the transfer and
improvement of around 12,000 houses.
Driving forces for transfer were thus mainly external to the council though they catalysed
change through internal responses. Some councillors and officials were in favour of
Community Ownership because of its potential to harness the enthusiasm and knowledge of
local people consistent with tenant management co-operatives and community-based
housing associations.299 However most saw the primary impetus as coming from the
squeeze on resources under the control of central government. In this sense there was a
political reluctance within local government to claim responsibility for the idea of Community
Ownership even though the outcomes were commonly regarded as successful on political,
financial, social and physical grounds. Local committee activists accepted that community
ownership had not been their idea to start off with,300 though the co-operative body and the
practice of community ownership had become 'theirs' in the process of transfer. Many
expressed the view that tenants were willing to go along with anything which produced
money for investment in their housing, wherever it came from. 301
External validation of ideas was also important in clinching the proposed changes. The
council commissioned an independent Inquiry into Glasgow's housing, chaired by Sir Robert
Grieve. Two years after internal negotiations got under way, the Inquiry reported in 1986,
recommending diversification of ownership (and management) of the city's 170,000 houses.
The Grieve report specifically recommended the
...gradual transfer (sic) of parts of the local authority housing stock to ...
new agencies..(at a rate) reflecting demand on the ground and the success
of the early programme. ..
298 Interview Hastie, 1998.
299 Interviews Dhir, Bryden, McLeish, Mulligan, Comley, Rodgers, Wiseman, Mills, Hastie, Miller, Smith, 1998.
300 Interviews Bryden, McLeish, Mulligan, 1998.
30/lnterviews Dhir, Comley, Rodgers, Wiseman, Hastie, Miler, Smith 1998.
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The council should be prepared to transfer overall up to 25% of its stock
over the next 10 years, higher in peripheral estates.
Grieve, 1986: 8
It is important to note that the report used the term 'transfer' rather than dispose of or sell
and the term Community Ownership did not feature at this stage.
Staff of the buyer, seller and funding organisations were clear that transfer to community
ownership was the only real option in response to the constraints on council resources.302 By
contrast the Minister of the time saw the moves not as primarily financial but as facilitating
community empowerment first and improving quality of the living environment second.303
This emphasis tended to be a solitary perspective. Central government had ultimate control
over the aggregate resources of the council and of HCiS/ SH. Arguably in this respect they
had provided a driving force for change without consciously or deliberately providing agency
or clear objectives as to what should, or would, come out of the pressure. There was no
programme of action until 1989, coinciding with the completion of interim research.
Dundee
What Dundee created was neither 'stock transfer' nor Community Ownership but 'co-
operatives' and Dundee respondents did not agree that they followed Glasgow's transfer
example.304 Some estates were barely 10 years old in 1984 and already displaying signs of
severe social and physical decline.305 This had prompted earlier attempts - largely
unsuccessful - to arrest decline in Whitfield and other peripheral estates in the city
(Rowbotham, 1991). Moreover, Dundee as a whole was experiencing falling housing
demand due to population loss though the council did not readily grasp the strategic
significance of the city's decline in the 1980s. Indeed, it was only addressed consciously in
the late-1990s, with a strategy for extensive demolition and tenure diversification in poor
estates.306
The potential for increasing tenant involvement in housing provision gathered political
support in the early 1980s, after years of neglect and non-decision-making. A senior
councillor thought that offcials had been instructed to work in partnership with tenants all
along, and that councillors would never have discouraged tenant involvemenp07 However
the Director of Housing in Dundee reported the political climate in the mid-1980s as having
only just become receptive to tenant involvement, after elected members adjusted to
302 Interviews Anderson, Dhir, Crooks ton, Comley, Rodgers, Breslin, Mills, Hastie, Miller, Smith 1998.
303 Interview Ancram 1998.
304 Interviews Forbes, Rowbotham 1998.
305 Interview Forbes, 1998.
306 Interview Luke, 1998. This has important implications for the definition of transfer. Dundee may have been transferring
housing due for demolition and rebuilding at one stage, later transferring cleared land. One would count as transfer, the other
not.
307 Interview Luke, 1998.
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housing associations complementing the council's renewal activities in the inner city. 308
Moreover, some councillors had been impressed by housing co-operatives in London and
Liverpool in 1986.309 Yet two more years (1986-88) were spent trying - unsuccessfully - to
secure Labour Group permission to promote co-operatives among tenants. In the end,
tenants made the first move.
The Convenor of Housing from 1987 was the Labour councillor for Whitfield.310 Tenants
living in Ormiston (Whitfield), had established a Peoples' Action Group (OPAG) in 1983,
partly for social/community purposes. It was Whitfield tenants who first approached the
council,311 early in 1987, to put pressure on the council to act to deal with dampness and
social problems in system-built flats. A Technical Feasibility Study referred explicitly to
Dundee as Phase 3, referring to Phases 1 & 2 in Glasgow (Hutcheson, Fisher and
Campbell, 1988).
Parallel to bottom-up community initiatives in Dundee was the new government's flagship
initiative, New Life for Urban Scotland (Scottsh Office Industry Department, 1988). The
former Minister recalled seeing evidence of regeneration in Dundee through tenure
diversification and remodelling of public sector estates.312 This visit was organised for the
Minister and Scottish Homes' board by the Director of Housing, and it succeeded in
overturning local Scottish Homes staff recommendations against investing in council
housing.313 In the end these factors contributed to the designation of Whitfield, Dundee as a
Partnership Area in 1988, which carried additional resources for Partnership Areas (as
discussed in Chapter Eight) for housing and other aspects of policy (Scottsh Office, 1995).
Though this was portrayed as a parallel initiative contemporary with the Glasgow initiative,314
this evidence suggests that Glasgow got there first, at least in laying groundwork to secure
the resources and providing a modeL. Nevertheless the Dundee example shows some
convergence in thinking among tenants and government.
All respondents emphasised the importance of investment opportunities, latterly through
Scottish Homes, not least relative to the restricted opportunities for investment through the
counciL. This provided the centre with a top-down facility for responding to bottom-up
pressure on resources, albeit created in turn by the centre. Arguably, creating bottom-up
308 Interview Rowbotham, 1998. He returned to Dundee as Director in 1986 having previously been Assistant Director of
Housing between 1974 and 1983.
309 Interviews Rowbotham, Forbes, 1998.
310 Interview Luke, 1998.
311 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
312 Interview Ancram, 1998.
313 Interview Rowbotham, 1988.
314 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
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pressure was critical, as the offer of resources from the top would not have been sufficient
without ground-level demand.315
Demand for renewal was forcefully articulated and pressed by affected residents, living in
some of the worst social conditions in the city. This provided the council with the opportunity
of a group with whom to work. In addition to there being an objective need for action, the
need was expressed forcefully from the bottom up by local people, without necessarily
anticipating transfer as an outcome.
There was evidence of a track record on the part of local and voluntary groups in the city
through the work of the tenement rehabilitation associations, of which the city was proud,
and with some councillors represented on the committees of those bodies. Councillors
visited certain peripheral estates to inspect the conditions in which their council tenants
were living. This was compelling in changing the minds of some elected members
previously opposed to any form of sale of council housing and tipped the balance in favour
of any form of investment, in the event via co-operatives.316 The senior housing official's
personal commitment to tenant participation and empowerment was important, though
claimed more by that individual than recognised by other respondents. His personal
commitment to co-operatives may have been a driving force, regardless of population loss
or poor conditions.
Motherwelf317
In Motherwell, the origins were slightly different again, both with regard to the timing of
action and the terminology and meaning of terms. Motherwell DC was arguably typical of
the broader Lanarkshire picture of housing provision with massive council-built estates built
by traditional Labour authorities, stil predominantly owned and managed from one
centralised council office in the main town with little or no participation by tenants.
Motherwell respondents all agreed that the areas eventually targeted for transfer were the
'worst of the worst' living conditions in the district, whether measured by physical or social
criteria.318 The main purpose of transfer was to achieve improved standards of living and
quality of life for residents, in ways which could not practicably be achieved through council
spending.319
The Director of Housing took a report to committee in the late 1980s, highlighting 'difficult-to-
let' housing, referring to a number of areas of council housing which later became subject to
transfer as a means of achieving regeneration with appropriate scale and timing.32o Tenants
315 Interview Forbes, 1998.
316 Interview Luke, 1998.
317 North Lanarkshire.
318 Interview Mulholland, Muir, Whitefield, McLoughlin 1998. Monklands council took a similar approach, directing its
energies to estates where demand was low and conditions were poor.
319 Interviews Whitfield, McLoughlin, 1998.
320 Interview Whitfield, 1998.
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in several areas were approached about forming co-operatives from 1989 onwards. The
areas were identified by the council and advice and support was funded by Scottish
Homes.321 Gowkthrapple (Wishaw) was one such estate, system-built, constructed in the
1970s and already physically degraded and in low demand. Forgewood (Motherwell) was
another area, with over 1,000 households, a slum clearance scheme from the 1930s, visible
from the main London to Glasgow railway line. Consistent with New Life for Urban Scotland
(Scottish Offce 1988), economic regeneration dating back to the mid-1980s focussed
mainly on tenure diversification into owner-occupation (Duncan, 1991 ).322 Physical
regeneration by the council focussed on the most externally visible parts of the estate. At
the early stages, there was no discussion of alternative landlords and tenants stuck in the
'back end' were extremely frustrated at the lack of council action to deal with cold, damp
homes.323
Senior staff for the housing co-ops in Motherwell argued that part of the purpose of partial
transfer was to extend effective decentralisation of management as well as ownership from
the council, quite apart from any physical improvement.24 This issue was echoed by the
Convenor (in 1998) from the same area who claimed, significantly with hindsight, that there
needed to be a new way of working: the 'traditional high-handed council approach to
regeneration would have been unhelpful'.325 Co-operatives under local tenant control, then
being promoted by the emerging Scottish Homes, represented just such a new way. There
was a fashion for co-ops around 1988: the lack of co-ops in Lanarkshire merely increased
the pressure to create the first one. Registration thus represented something of a trophy or
scalp - to be able to claim the credit for setting up a co-op in the deepest, darkest municipal
strongholds.326
Motherwell respondents indicated one main theme, resources, though as in Dundee there
were two facets. First was the fact that the council no longer had access to sufficient
resources to meet tenant demands for improved conditions; second, however cynical or
crude an incentive, money was available through Scottish Homes Community Ownership
(and later the SURI) budget to improve run-down council housing. Apparently of secondary
importance was respondents' recognition - with hindsight - that the council housing
paradigm was dead or dying. Co-op staff argued that Scottish councils were unable to
manage decline partly through weak political leadership within authorities and partly
because they were 'under-resourced managerially'.327 Politicians recognised that the council
321 The researcher worked freelance 1988 - 1990 and was commissioned by HGiS/ Scottish Homes to talk to tenants in a
number of estates in Motherwell, Bellshil, Wishaw, Goatbridge and Airdrie. She eventually developed proposals with tenants
in Gowkthrapple, where the reception to proposals was suffcient to mature into a co-operative.
322 This refers to low cost home ownership (LGHO) promoted by the council in tandem with private developers to sell empty
housing for renewal and sale.
323 Interview Muir, 1998. The 'back end' refers to the least visible housing, furthest from the main road.
324 Interview Mulholland, 1998.
325 interview McLoughlin, 1998.
326 Interview Smith, 1998.
327 Interview Mulholland, 1998. Mulholland had previously worked in various local authority housing departments.
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was not best placed to achieve tenant-sensitive regeneration.328 Tenants needed to 'move
on' and stop expecting the council to do things for them.329 In that sense there was an
appetite for change, which was recognisable after the event even though it was not
expressly articulated at the time. Arguably this was as important as resources even though
respondents pointed to the latter.
Berwickshire'30
In Conservative-controlled BDC, the impetus for transfer of the whole stock came from a
perception shared by the outgoing Director and the Convenor of Housing that it was not
economic or practicable to retain housing in council ownership in future.331 The stimulus was
threefold: partly it was about responding to threats to local identity arising from local
government reorganisation; it was partly about access to future capital resources and partly
a long-standing revenue budget problem. After 1980, the council had continued to build new
housing for rent, which it then had to sell to sittng tenants at a discount. This was already a
problem before the cost floor rules were relaxed. From 1988, recently built or modernised
housing could be sold at considerable financial loss to the council, providing disincentives to
undertake any new capital investment.332 Before 1988 the price could not go below a fixed
level nor below the outstanding debt. After 1988, a house could be sold at less than the
historic debt even if it had received investment during the five years preceding sale
(Himsworth, 1994). This provided disincentives to investing in housing which might be sold.
Between 1985 and 1995 the council had had to sell 25% of its housing stock - 500 units in
alL. The incoming Director of Housing claimed Berwickshire's rate of loss through the RTB
was consistently ahead of the national average. This problem was especially evident in
councils (such as Berwickshire) where the pace of RTB sales was strong. There was little
economic sense in the council replacing sold housing and there was no other locally
controlled landlord body to provide new housing in the area. Sales left a rising debt with less
rental income to service it, thus puttng upward pressure on rents, which had started
relatively high in the early 1980s but fallen behind as others increased.333 The consequences
of this problem had been evident to certain people in the council from the late 1980s
onwards but without the will to find a solution. The Director of Housing was alleged to have
328 Interview McLoughlin, 1998.
329 Interview Muir, 1998.
330 Earlier referred to as Scottsh Borders. A member of the staff of the former district council legal services was not
permited by her new employer (Scottsh Borders Council) to speak on the subject for this research. Other sources who
referred specifically to Berwickshire were the Minister (Robertson), his civil servants and an independent adviser who had
worked on the Berwickshire proposals. Their comments are included in the case study. Material has also been drawn from a
postgraduate dissertation on the approaches to valuation in Berwickshire (Tulloch, 1997).
331 Interview Findlay, 1998.
332 Interview Jones, 1998.
333 See Chapter Seven.
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plugged the idea of stock transfer for some five years before the council took it seriously in
1992.334
Curiously, it was the return of the Conservatives nationally at the 1992 General Election that
convinced local Conservative members and officials of BDC of the need to act to preserve
local control of rented housing.335 Prior to the election, central government had proposed
reform of local government, prompting fears about loss of local identity. The 'Keep
Berwickshire Local' campaign initially enjoyed support at the highest level, having been
instigated and launched by the Lord Lieutenant, with housing an emotive issue embedded
within local identity debates. The government's 1992 proposals for unitary authorities
affected Berwickshire by combining it either with its Labour-controlled neighbour along the
coast or with its Borders neighbours. Neither of these was palatable to Berwickshire
councillors, catalysing detailed consideration of transfer proposals. Later, Berwickshire
tenants became concerned that if transfer did not succeed they would be punished by the
new council landlord for considering removing the ownership of their homes from the
council.336 Whole stock transfer (already working in England) appeared the best solution to
the problem of protecting a local supply of affordable rented housing for local people.
Promotional literature highlighted local autonomy and safeguarding tradition as the primary
issues in Berwickshire (BDC, 1994; BHA, 1994).337
Moreover, the Conservatives' national re-election in 1992 portended further cuts in
resources to councils and further interference in local government activities.338 These
concerns were borne out by such actions as the extension of CCT to white collar activities
including housing management and later further cuts in capital allocations to local
authorities. This convinced some housing professionals in (and beyond) Berwickshire that
(whole) stock transfer was the way to preserve good quality rented housing.339 Their
awareness of stock transfer was informed by the trade press and professional conference
coverage of developments in England. Thus, in September 1992 the councillors accepted
senior staff recommendations to investigate alternative options for managing local rented
housing, including stock transfer.
Although Berwickshire council was nominally 'Conservative' it is not clear that this was
particularly significant in this instance. The overt political dimension was rather limited:
although some Berwickshire actors were well connected politically, their actions were not in
334 Interview Jones, 1998. Jones came to Berwickshire as the Chief Executive designate of Berwickshire HA as well as
Director of Housing of Berwickshire DC. He had no prior association with the area and was attracted by the opportunities
contained within a managerial post outwith council influence, under community control.
335 Interview Findlay, 1998. Findlay was first elected as a Conservative councífor but during 1994 defected to the SNP over
reorganisation and high handed treatment of local councils, leaving the Conservatives without overall control of Berwickshire.
He remained active in the voluntary housing movement through his role in Berwickshire and did not stand for election to the
new authority in 1995.
336 Interview Findlay, 1998.
337 Interview Smith, 1998.
338 Interview Findlay, 1998.
339 Interview Jones, 1998.
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concert with government policy as such. The 'need' to protect local control was a response
to unwelcome reform of local government. Indeed, there was little actual assistance from
central government to make stock transfer happen, even when local councils wished it. 340
In the minds of local actors, the imperative for whole transfer stemmed from frustration at
the inability of the council to meet local needs as they presided over a continuous
haemorrhage of housing into private ownership under the RTB, though houses were often
later sold as holiday homes. The catalysts were twofold: the opportunity to see examples in
action in England to which the decision-makers could relate; and reorganisation of local
government. If frustration pushed control of council housing out of the local authority, what
pulled them into the housing association sector was the local appetite for (and perception of
opportunities to continue) building as a housing association. It was hoped that they might
enjoy HAG support from Scottish Homes, though HAG was already under pressure and - as
it turned out - BHA was not prioritised by Scottsh Homes.341
Although the perception outside Berwickshire was that the council - ostensibly
Conservative-controlled - was pursuing a Tory ideological agenda, there was little evidence
of ideological zeal in the interviews for this study. The imperatives were protection of local
autonomy and tradition. Local accountability was the element which clinched tenant support
in the ballot. Reorganisation and the cumulative effect of under-resourcing were more
significant as driving forces than anything arising from the 1988 Act in the attempt to
preserve locally rented housing.342 However the 1988 Act was significant, not particularly
because of any mechanisms it introduced leading towards whole stock transfer, but in
marking a change of culture in local authorities.343 The Tenant's Choice device changed the
council housing mindset, not just in Berwickshire. Its main effect was to make managers
think differently about the way in which they viewed tenants, driving them to become more
aware of and sensitive to consumers' needs and aspirations.344
Stirling
While Berwickshire was the first council effectively to change the meaning of stock transfer
in 1995, Stirling was among the first councils to move away from stock transfer as partial
Community Ownership, in the aftermath of the 1992 elections. Stirling witnessed three
abortive attempts to establish a stock transfer in a matter of months following a
Conservative take-over of control of the counciL. The first of three initiatives was promoted
by Conservative councillors who courted tenant activists in a Labour ward. The second was
a middle-level staff initiative not supported by the ruling Conservative group. The third was a
rather murky proposal from senior staff affecting the whole stock.
340 Interview Findlay, Smith 1998.
341 Interview Jones, 1998.
342 Interview Findlay 1998.
343 Interview Jones, 1998.
344 Interview Jones, 1998.
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Control of Stirling council was hotly contested in the 1980s and 1990s, with both parties
winning equal numbers of seats in two successive administrations. A cut of the cards
determined the control shift from Labour back to the Conservatives in 1992. Stirling was
thus one of only six councils under Conservative control in Scotland and Stirling was very
much in the spotlight because of the prominence and radical views of local MP Michael
Forsyth, re-elected in the same year with a 'wafer-thin' majority (Major, 1999). Forsyth had
been Education Minister in the Scottish Offce under Younger and became Scottish Party
Chairman in 1989. Until his appointment as Secretary of State for Scotland in July 1995, he
had been a Minister in the Home Offce. Referring to Forsyth as the 'Demon King', the
former PM observed that Forsyth's problem was that he always looked as if he was plotting
even when he was not (Major, 1999; 425). This polarised local opinion on issues such as
privatisation.
The Stirling Conservatives' 1992 manifesto committed them to making the council more of
an enabling body and they immediately embarked on establishing competitive tendering of
in-house legal services. The leader, Cllr Harding, was especially keen for Stirling council to
become a radical authority, 'ahead of the pack'. He claimed to have been long aware of
housing stock transfer from Conservative party conferences, though the Housing Convenor
was only alerted to transfer at a conference of the housing professional body in 1991.345
The purpose of the first (partial) proposal was to transfer a few hundred houses in one of the
poorest, most exposed and most visible areas of Stirling town. The Housing Convenor and
Leader of the council promoted the idea of transfer in one particular area of Stirling in
support of tenure diversification, demolition and redevelopment for sale. This was similar to
initiatives elsewhere in Scotland at that time. Although there were two local housing
associations already operating in the area, the aim was for a partial transfer to a new body
to 'avoid the possibility of a new monopoly'.346 Councillors took senior staff and tenant
activists to visit various alternative landlords in Scotland and England to examine
possibilities. They abandoned the idea just weeks later, after tenants' representatives
responded with hostility to informal discussion about transfer.347
Within weeks, a second initiative surfaced proposing the formation of a new body as a
transfer vehicle for partial transfer. The proposal, called Cathedral Housing, carne from
individuals including two members of the council staff. This improbable alliance came from
the Master and Factor of a local ancient charitable trust (seconded from the council's legal
department). He had been a trade union shop steward and an outspoken employee.348 He
developed ideas in partnership with two colleagues from the housing department. One was
an Area Manager in the rural hinterland, the other a backroom administrator. The Cathedral
345 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
346 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
347 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
348 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
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protagonists came together largely by chance, prior to the election of the Conservatives.349
They claim to have shared a desire to break the stranglehold on professional and tenant
power throughout the council by Labour councillors - even though one of the protagonists
was a member of the Labour Party. They were already discussing the implications of the
1988 Act in private, informal ways through chance and casual meetings. Encouraged by the
Conservative leader of the council (Harding), whom they met on his own, they prepared a
business plan and notional valuation covering almost 2,000 houses in rural Stirlingshire.35o
Their stated intentions were to provide benefits to tenants in improved services and in
creating opportunities for local control. Investment was only relevant to the extent of
safeguarding the existing stock. Their proposals indicated a net surplus receipt to the
council (Cathedral Housing, 1993). They presented proposals to councillors but within a few
months their ideas had been rejected by the politicians.351
A third proposal was explored discreetly by senior staff of the council, it was claimed,
without the councillors' knowledge.352 This proposal allegedly involved negotiations with an
unmistakably private (for profit) landlord - Quality Street - about the future ownership and
management of the entire stock of the council - then over 9,000 units.353 It was not possible
to access the protagonists of this proposal nor to gain access to written copies of their
proposals although they were circulated widely and among council staff at the time, on a
'samizdat basis. Thus two of Stirling's attempts were about partial transfer with different
purposes from different sources, without Scottish Homes or HAG support. The most
potentially radical, affecting the whole stock, was the least traceable.
For councillors the motive was political - to achieve practical as well as ideological
manifesto commitments. The leader in particular wished to stand out for innovation and
political courage: he boasted in concluding the interview that the Stirling councillors did not
talk to their counterparts in other councils as they were 'too radical for the rest of them'. Both
councillors conceded that the proposals were in some ways too radical even for their own
traditional party colleagues in Stirling council.354
Investment was a secondary driving force for councillors who saw private investment,
underpinned by rental increases, as the basis on which to proceed. By contrast they saw the
receipt from housing stock transfers as creating the opportunity for investment in non-
housing activities - such as a new swimming pool for Stirling. The Cathedral proposal was
driven by a desire to improve services for tenants and retaining stock for rent outwith the
349 Interview McDermott, 1998.
350 Interview McDermott, 1998.
351 Interview McDermott, 1998. Costing of the proposals had been carried out without technical assistance and would have
been seriously flawed.
352 Interview McDermott, 1998.
353 Interview McDermott, 1998.
354 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
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Right to Buy, rather than investment for stock in poor condition.355 There was no evidence of
serious or competent financial modelling in any of the Stirling initiatives. There was no
mention of the 1988 Act as galvanising Conservative councillors into action. If anything they
blocked staff moves catalysed by the mindset changes arising in the aftermath of the Act.
Local government reform did not feature in Stirling.
355 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
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3
Spatial, Temporal or Typological Variation?
The origins of transfer thinking were slightly different in each seller's case in terms of when
the idea was first put forward, what led to it and who proposed it. Table 30 summarises the
key events in the policy environment in relation to decision-making (OM) and transactions
(TO) in the five case study areas. It is an indicative rather than exhaustive summary and
suggests that the terms of transfer proposals differed, partly due to timing, and partly to
political control. Table 30 clearly shows Glasgow emerging as a seller before other councils
and preceding the 1988 Act by several years. Chapter Six already demonstrated Glasgow's
scale to be vastly different from any other council in Scotland, revealing phases of rule
development and policy roll-out. Bargaining between the government, Glasgow District
Council and the government's agency (HCiS) finally culminated in extra resources being
allocated to the government's agency. Chapter Eight has shown how these resources then
became part of the ADP of HCiS (later Scottish Homes) and made available beyond
Glasgow on the basis of rules developed in the Glasgow context,56 Glasgow's use of the
resources was the most sustained and consistent.
Dundee and Motherwell followed later with sporadic rather than sustained programmes of
transfer, though actors in Dundee claimed that their ideas were developed in parallel to
Glasgow.35? Interpretation could place Dundee in either the rule development or roll-out
phase (Chapter Eight). The rationale in Dundee was poor conditions requiring investment,
though the Director's aspiration for greater tenant involvement could have been a factor, not
least leading to the programme being referred to as the 'Dundee co-ops' rather than
'Community Ownership' or 'transfer'.358
In Motherwell, the problem to be solved was first signalled as 'difficult-to-Iet' housing and
linked with transfer as a solution following rule development. By 1992, funding for
Motherwell came through a stream for urban renewal.359 Thus small-scale completed
transfers emerged on the agenda steadily from 1986 increasingly determined within a
framework of rules. By 1995/6, transactions were falling away, even in Glasgow.
Imperatives to transfer were generally external to councils, though catalysing different
responses. Community Ownership appealed to some because it could harness the
enthusiasm and commitment of local people,360 in which case, the quality of the living
environment was a lower priority. Since central government controlled overall council
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resources, councils were required to consider alternatives: almost all other respondents saw
the government squeeze on council resources and the search for alternative investment
demand as the overriding imperative. While English authorities were similarly squeezed at
the same time, the response from them was different. Transfer into Community Ownership
was the only real option for investment in Scotland,361 certainly assessed in relation to
restricted council spending opportunities. Bottom-up demand for tangible improvements was
fuelled by dissatisfaction with under-investment, articulated - often forcefully by affected
residents in estate-based groups living in some of the worst conditions in urban Scotland.
HAG subsidy provided a facility for responding to this pressure. Dissatisfied residents
provided councils with the opportunity of a group with whom to work and develop ideas and
organisations for action.362 However crude an incentive, the opportunity for tenants to take
control and secure resources worked in response to bottom-up pressure: without prior
pressure on council resources, these incentives to transfer would not have been sufficient.
Deliberations about transfer started post-1992 (after the local and central government
elections) in the larger scale completed and abortive cases (Berwickshire and Stirling). In
Berwickshire the motive was to maintain local control over community assets, with a ballot
(October 1994) before the unitary council elections and completion of transfer the following
August.363 In Stirling two partial initiatives failed to secure support. The first came from
Conservative councillors shortly after their election; the second proposal came from staff six
months later, and died, somewhat perversely, due to lack of poliical support.
Conclusions
The case studies reveal a lack of formal policy as documents or deliberative decision-
making, contrasting with the importance of action in the form of bargaining by local sellers
and buyers. The first episode of partial transfer in Glasgow was characterised by protracted
and contested decision-making both at the street level and in the corridors of power. Ideas
were developed from the bottom up from 1984, responding to earlier pressure from the
centre. Though Labour-controlled Glasgow's innovation of Community Ownership was
acknowledged as being in line with Conservative government policy (Clapham et aI, 1991),
it would be more appropriate to portray the situation in 1985 the other way around, with
356 Many projects took over five years to produce results although in some cases tenants and steering groups were promised
action within months or a couple of years at most, usually contrasted with the years they were assured they would have to
wait before the council might invest. Such delays reflect both the later slowdown in Scottish Homes ADP generally and the
time it took to prepare new bodies to be ready for multi-milion pound development contracts.
357 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
358 Dundee actors indeed regarded 'transfer' as what Scottsh Homes and the New Towns did with their housing stock, and -
by 1998 - what they were contemplating doing in making use of New Housing Partnerships funding.
359 Small Urban Renewal Initiative - a category of funding outwith the four cities used for renewing town centres and
peripheral estates. SURls were unique to and developed by Scottsh Homes developed in the aftermath of Scottish Office
proposals for urban Scotland.
360 Interviews Ancram, Rowbotham, Luke, 1998.
361 Interviews Forbes, Mulholland, McDermott, Muir, Rodgers, McLaughlin, 1998.
362 Interviews Anderson, Dhir, 1998.
363 Interview Findlay, 1998.
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government responding to a window of opportunity. Rather than government initiating or
leading policy, 'policy' clarified in 1988 can be seen as a consolidation and extension of
emergent practice originating locally amongst political opponents. The Glasgow experience
was, arguably, seminal for the rest of Scotland with councils in Dundee and Motherwell (and
other areas) following suit at different junctures, to exploit public resources not otherwise
available to local authorities.
Similarly the first whole transfer, initiated and completed by a nominally Conservative-held
authority, shows a prolonged and fraught transaction process. Berwickshire council
encountered obstacles and delays from other councils and from Conservative central
government. Completion was achieved in spite of the absence of a published framework.
Stirling broached a series of hybrid partial, non-subsidised transfers and achieved none.
While the imperatives were broadly common, the case studies show various catalysts for
local authority transfer at different critical junctures. These include legislation, elections and
resources. Legislation came in the form of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1988 and the Local
Government (Scotland) Act, 1994; elections to local and central government especially in
1992; extension of urban programme funding for housing through Partnerships, and SURls.
Finally, visual evidence had a catalytic effect particularly on politicians, by allowing them to
see how bad certain conditions really were and firing their imaginations about alternative
possibilities.
The case studies allow the different imperatives, catalysts and rationales to be revealed
among the partial and whole stock transfer sellers and buyers in different areas. This
chapter shows Labour-controlled authorities pursuing partial transfers on a small scale from
1986 until 1995 to access public investment. Other councils, not under Labour control, were
pursuing other forms of transfer for a variety of reasons, including private investment. The
imperatives for transfer were about investment and local control in some form in all five
cases. Traditional investment routes through borrowing were increasingly constrained
affecting either existing rented housing or the new supply. Opportunities for increasing
investment were identified either from public resources, eventually via HCiS/ Scottsh
Homes, or from private sector borrowing. While public resources were significant, as in the
case of Glasgow, Dundee and Motherwell, access to private borrowing featured in the
Berwickshire and Stirling cases. Public resources were available on a scale which only
permitted partial transfer. Applying those resources to particular areas took place at the
behest of the council, responding to tenant demand.
Local control was the other driving force. While tenant empowerment was a government
objective from 1987, it was not understood as putting tenants in control of landlord bodies.
In any event, moves to increase tenant control in Glasgow and Dundee predated central
government policy and chimed with pre-existing tenant participation policy and practice. In
Motherwell, the council only promoted tenant control as a means of accessing resources,
once these were available and as long as they did not threaten the core of council housing.
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Until 1992 at least, local control in Glasgow, Dundee and Motherwell was interpreted at the
level of neighbourhood and thus on a very small scale affecting only hundreds of
households at a time. The later cases of Berwickshire and Stirling show an increase in
scale to the level of districts affecting thousands of households. Later experience of partial
transfer in Glasgow and Motherwell also showed an increase in scale and changes in
assumptions about the scale of the new landlord body. Local control as an issue was both a
threat and an opportunity: the threat came from the prospect of loss of control to larger
bodies; the opportunity came from greater delegation of control.
Although resident tenacity was crucial, stock transfer was the product of converging ideas
and pressures. Already this tale brings out the importance of the informality of connections
between senior officials and politicians in developing ideas at a critical juncture mid-way
through the Conservatives' second term. To explore this further we have to examine the
roles and action of key actors, opponents and networks in the next chapter.
237
Chapter Ten
Mutual Adjustment and Accommodating Opposition
Having seen the imperatives and rationales revealed through the case studies, we can now
consider the patterns of local action within the framework of rules and resources affecting
voluntary transfer in the period between 1985 and 1997. This chapter focuses on the
process of making policy - the 'how' rather than the why of policy. Processes can be flimsy
but this chapter attempts to ground the more nebulous dimensions of the policy process by
focussing on power, influence and capacity for action. It draws extensively on case study
interviews leading into a more abstract discussion about the relevance of policy theory
concepts at the local scale. These concepts include actions, the capacity of different groups
of actors and the basis of their power to effect change. Lastly the chapter examines actors'
networks and mechanisms for accommodating alternative views, drawing on concepts of
advocacy coalitions and programme structures. This analysis draws on behaviourist
approaches, reviewed in Chapter Two, drawing out themes in relation to policy concepts.
The schedule of interviewees in Chapter Nine also pertains here.
The chapter distinguishes between process as decisions, as formal approvals and action
required as a prerequisite to taking decisions. The interests and actions of council staff are
not generally accounted for in the literature other than as agents implementing elected
politicians' decisions. This approach allows their behaviour to be brought into the picture.
This chapter shows that throughout the period, local offcials were responsible for initiating
or blocking particular transactions. At the early stages of both small- and large-scale
transfers, local actors did not necessarily have the active support of central government.
Indeed, the behaviour of central government officials and politicians frequently bordered on
obstruction by virtue of delays and lack of response to council proposals.
This chapter argues that local action was not necessarily ideologically driven. Rather, in
view of the ideological tensions surrounding transfer as possible privatisation, especially
post-1992, proponents worked quietly, emphasising the tangible benefits of transfer.
Alliances of professional staff, elected politicians and tenants were instrumental/critical in
delivering transfers on a small scale. Staff may not have had formal power to achieve
change but their power to initiate, influence and implement was highly significant in driving
and blocking change to the institution of council housing.
The chapter first reviews the case study material on key actors, opponents and networks for
each of the five seller areas in turn, referring to the five areas by their pre-reorganisation
names, like Chapter Nine.364 A subsequent section revisits the process of transfer from the
specialist literature, drawing together strands from the cases and showing the importance of
offcials in setting agendas, generating alternatives and delivering outcomes. The final
sections examine the power of offcials at different stages and the use of networks, drawing
364 Glasgow, Dundee, Motheiwell, Berwickshire and Stirling.
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on fluid concepts of programme structures in relation to partial transfer before offering
conclusions about the pivotal role of officials in brokering adjustment and accommodation.
Key actors
This section refers to those individuals responsible for initiating and bargaining about
transfer in local areas. The next section brings forward evidence about those who opposed,
blocked or thwarted transfer proposals and the third considers the networks and
relationships.
Glasgow
Four actors stand out from the interviews as key to action in Glasgow, especially in the early
days.365 What united these individuals was their ability to move freely between different
layers of decision-making at the centre and in the locality, in the latter case, neighbourhood
level, and between politicians and officials. The first was a second tier offcial of the council
(Theo Crombie), regarded as a highly creative and lateral thinker; and the second was a
Development Manager in Scottish Homes (Jim Hastie). They were reported to have
complemented each other well in stimulating ideas, developing broad and detailed
strategies and in their capacity to deliver action. The third (Ian Dyer) was a legal academic
and senior Conservative councillor (former Moderate) who was regarded as pivotal in
having access to the Minister, being on the Scottish board of HCiS and in sharing some of
the new thinking within the Labour Party. A fourth was a local tenant committee member
and activist from Calvay (Frances McCall).
McCall's importance was consistently identified by respondents as promoting tenant control
in former council housing.366 The Scottish Office valued her background and role as a
tenant. She was also courteous and pleasant to deal with.367 Her reward was an
appointment by the Conservatives to the new Scottish Homes Board in 1988 for which she
was vilified by her 'constituency', for selling out - incorporation by another name.368 She was
well liked because she had tremendous credibility, skills and qualities. She was regarded as
dignified and forthright while respectful of Scottish Office sensibilities.369
All voluntary actors responded individually to resource pressures and opportunities and
though they were technically free to walk away from the proposals, the incentives for better
housing were too great to be readily or easily dismissed. In this respect, committee
members told stories which emphasised their own activism - collectively as well as
3651nteiviews Bryden, Comley, Rodgers, Breslin, Wiseman, Dyer, Mills, Ancram, Hastie, Miler, Smith, 1998. In Dyer's case,
the respondent also referred to the importance of his own role, which most other respondents could not or did not do. This
could be interpreted as self-congratulatory but his position and access to insiders was important and others confirmed his
significance in securing agreement to certain proposals at a critical early stage before 1988.
3661ntelVews Dhir, Hastie, Miler, 1998.
367 Inteiviews Hastie, Mils, Ancram 1998.
368 Inteiview Hastie, 1998.
369 Inteiview Hastie 1998.
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individually, revealing the extent to which they 'owned' and even drove developments.37o
Yet local activists in Glasgow identified their own staff members as key actors rather than
themselves. Staff, along with the technical consultants - often young architectural firms -
were seen as instrumental in 'making things happen'. Residents were also able to identify
the key personnel in HCiS / SH, as individuals rather than for their position. Although
quango staff had been seen as restrictive and controlling at the time, staff in the buyer
organisations acknowledged the benefit of central intervention and decisions, though only
with hindsight, years later.371
Dundee
It was tenant activists and staff who drove and won the case for improvement resources.372
In the initial stage, tenants catalysed contact with the council, since the senior official
recommendation to approach tenants was not supported at first by politicalleaders.373
Central government actors were not cited as key, though the Minister remembered
supporting developments in Dundee.374 Senior politicians and Scottish Homes executives
actually overturned regional officials' decisions not to fund the Dundee co-ops. A visit to the
areas at the instigation of the council's Director of Housing was instrumental in changing
minds. Without central political intervention, resources might not have directed into former
council housing in Dundee but no politician claimed in this study to have initiated this
injection of funds. Though certain individual councillors thought they were instrumental in
changing minds within the Labour group and in driving ideas forward, politicians generally
did not feature strongly as key actors. The councillors simply withdrew opposition to the
development of co-operatives.375
Motherwell
Key actors identified by Motherwell respondents were individual committee members, with
certain individuals providing crucial local leadership. Respondents also emphasised the
crucial nature of the dynamics of interaction between those individuals and with other
actors. Tenants and the local authority personnel saw the tenants as pushing for change
though without any clear endgame. However, council staff brokered the solution to physical
degradation. The Director of Housing used the phrase 'convergence emerged'.376
370 Interviews Bryden, McLeish, Mullgan, 1998.
371 Interviews Anderson, Dhir, Smith 1998.
372 Interview Forbes, 1998. Tenants' later aspirations to power beyond housing issues could not be satisfied. These included
a greater role in the local Partnership organisation and control over community facilities and economic development.
373 Interview Luke, Rowbotham, 1998.
374 Interview Ancram, 1998
375 Interview Luke, Rowbotham 1998.
376 Interview Whitefield, 1998.
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Respondents also identified Scottsh Homes local staff as key in 'making things happen',
through their contact with individuals and groups and in more formal settings.377 Not least
among these factors was their ability to deliver a programme of expenditure. Those named
in Scottsh Homes ranged from Regional Director to local Development Project Manager,
varying according to the respondent's level and the timing of their involvement.
Officials were generally emphasised as more important than elected members, although the
councillor saw his own role as instrumental in changing the minds of technical and
managerial staff and of tenants in support of regeneration initiatives.378 Key officials were
more often part of quango or voluntary bodies and of firms of technical consultants than of
the local authority, perhaps reflecting their greater capacity to deliver. The key staff
appointment to one of the co-operatives was successful in completing the programme within
a reasonable timescale and retaining organisational continuity. Another appointment was
allegedly problematic due to managerial incompetence in co-ordinating relationships and
programmes.379
Berwickshire
BHAs Chief Executive was pivotal by all accounts, including his own.38G Although he was not
known in the local area, he succeeded in winning tenants' confidence. Leadership and
tenacity was highlighted by various respondents as important in achieving the transfer, both
in terms of gettng the matter on council and wider professional agendas and in
implementing specific decisions.381 However transfer could be a lonely path to tread,
breaking new ground without much support and some overt hostility (see Opposition).
The conviction and personal commitment of key actors from Berwickshire about the merits
of transfer helped drive things forward. BHA's Chief Executive learned that the behaviour of
individuals mattered more than roles, structures or procedures.382 The council Leader was
well connected to the higher Conservative Party echelons, although views were mixed about
whether his connections produced any tangible benefit. He was not a visible champion,
rather he kept a low profile, smoothing and 'softening' with judicious 'quiet words'. He did
not force the Conservative 'group' on Berwickshire council to take a formal position on stock
transfer.383 Pragmatism was his trademark, even to the extent of retaining his former Vice-
Convenor (and Chair of the Housing Committee) within discussions about transfers even
after the latter resigned from the Conservative Party to join the SNP in the spring of 1994.
377 Interview Mulholland, Muir, Whitefield, 1998.
378 Interview McLoughlin, 1998.
379 Interview Mulholland, 1998.
380 Interview Jones, 1998: Jones came to Berwickshire DC in 1993 as Director of Housing and Chief Executive designate of
BHA, in the event of transfer.
381 Interviews Findlay, Jones 1998. Jones put himself forward within the professional body as Chair of the Scottsh Branch of
the Chartered Institute of Housing and spoke at many public events promoting transfer.
382 Interview Jones, 1998.
383 Interview Findlay, 1998
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The council Leader's main achievement was to frustrate Berwickshire council's Chief
Executive's attempts to stall transfer, by threatening to block the latter's early retirement
plans. 384
Stirling
Key actors in Stirling include those who tried to make things happen, without necessarily
succeeding, though no actors stand out as having capacity to move stock transfer proposals
forward. Others who opposed proposals were 'key' in terms of blocking proposals, though
not in any concerted way. They are covered under Opposition below.
A few councillors and staff pushed proposals into the public domain without securing wider
support. They were not necessarily 'of a mind' with each other and tended to develop
proposals in isolation, giving and receiving mixed messages.385 The convenor and leader
had not really worked together on the development of the proposal from the earliest days.
The Tory party group in Stirling was not renowned for internal unity, with warring factions
reported to be divided overtly about policy, reflected in control of council positions, but also
about personal style and on grounds of gender.388
The styles of the elected and official proponents obstructed a joint approach. They
described each other five years later (1998) in less than complimentary terms, each
questioning the others' credibility and revealing the extent of mutual distrust. One of the
Cathedral protagonists had previously stood as regional council candidate for the Labour
party. This increased the suspicions of certain members of the Conservative group that they
were being ambushed.387 If this reflects how they behaved towards one another at the time,
it is not surprising that they did not reach agreement.
Stirling Council's Chief Executive was alleged to have made contact with alternative
landlords without councillors' agreement and over the heads of housing officials, though
such proposals sank without trace. He was also credited with blocking others' proposals and
it is to opposition we now turn.
Opposition
Glasgow
Respondents cited few opponents, until probed. Then, opponents were identified as the staff
of the housing department both formally as a trade union interest group and informally.
While formal bodies publicly defended council housing on ideological grounds, certain
individuals spread misinformation locally about Community Ownership proposals, referred to
384 Interviews Findlay, Jones, 1998.
385 Interviews Harding, Seott, MeDermott, 1998.
386 Interview MeDermott, 1998.
387 Interview Seott, 1998.
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as 'scare-mongering'.388 Occasionally, managers were positively obstructive though these
were in the minority; most local council managers were actively supportive.389 In some
areas, local councillors were initially hostile though having taken time to come round,
became firm supporters of their local co-operative or housing association.390
Tenants in some areas resisted transfer or failed to respond to initiatives. They were simply
excluded and their areas dropped from the programme.391 Only one area (Springburn) was
cited as having rejected proposals at an advanced stage of planning, due to a brief
campaign by tenants supported by a Communist councillor.392 No ballot was held and in
1991, an internal council report shows no reference to ballots (GDC, 1991), whereas two
years later 'action progress' reports referred to tenant majorities being achieved in all ballots
(GDC, 1993). If support was not forthcoming, the project was aborted. Although opposition
alliances could have been formed, crucially opposition to 'Community Ownership' was rarely
organised.
Dundee
Certain councillors were vehemently opposed to the co-ops idea, seeing the proposals as
the latest replacement for the RTB. Such opponents included a later Labour Convenor of
Housing, during his youthful first term as the elected member for an inner city ward.393
Opponents also included SNP and Conservative councillors who persistently opposed the
councils' co-op proposals even after the Labour Group as a whole was persuaded, following
tenant pressure and estate visits.394
The Dundee Federation of Tenants was vocal in publicly opposing the growth of cO-OpS.395
However, affected tenants were not opposed to transfer to co-ops: especially before 1989
(when most Dundee transfers were conducted), ballots were not held thus providing no
mechanism for articulating or recording opposition. Very often too, the housing proposed for
transfer was empty, making a nonsense of conducting ballots.396 One transfer was
effectively delayed by active and vociferous tenant opposition organised by one forceful
individual in Beechwood and elsewhere, by people living in reasonable housing with nothing
to gain from investment following transfer and by community development activists.397 As in
Glasgow, those areas were simply excluded from subsequent access to investment
opportunities. The council also volunteered to give tenants affected by transfer the right to
388 Interview McLeish, Mullgan, 1998.
389 Interview Bryden, 1998.
390 Interviews McLeish, Bryden, 1998.
391 Interviews Rodger, Smith, 1998.
392 Interview Smith, 1998.
393 Interview Luke, 1998.
394 Interview Luke, Rowbotham, 1998.
395 Interview Forbes, Luke, Rowbotham, 1998.
396 Interview Forbes 1998.
397 Interview Forbes, 1998.
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return to a council tenancy within a year if they were not satisfied with new arrangements. It
is not known to what extent this facility was ever used but its very existence may have
served to assuage any tenant anxieties.
Certain senior council staff were increasingly unhappy as more co-operatives were
established.39B Even though the scale of developments can be seen now to be fairly
insignificant, they believed that their jobs and role were under threat from transfers,
exacerbating the impact of the Right to Buy. They could not challenge the policy publicly for
two reasons: it was led from the top and any challenge to authority was unacceptable;
moreover, it was not politic to challenge policy ambitions for tenant empowerment. However,
such staff became responsible for commissioning and engaged inexperienced and hostile
in-house consultants which they foisted on tenants' groups. Their actions were either inept
or obstructive.399
The 1988 Act may have served as a focus for later opposition to more transfers to co-ops,
since the term 'stock transfer' started to come into use with a meaning closer to privatisation
than regeneration, with which the Dundee co-ops were associated.40o This was partly
leakage from England and partly from Scottish Homes' stock transfers. Later, effective
resistance to further transfer to co-operatives, if not opposition as such, came from Scottish
Homes who became progressively less amenable to registering new small bodies and
prompted some to merge, as discussed in Chapter Eight.401
Motherwell
Although some tenants did not like the transfer/co-operative proposals, there was no
evidence of concerted opposition. In any event, Motherwell DC was not prepared to push
tenants against their will:402 so opponents in Bellshill and in parts of Gowkthrapple were
merely left out of subsequent developments. A few tenants (3% in Forgewood) who voted
against the proposals used opposition as leverage to get a move (or 'transfer') out of the
area altogether.403 The legacy of poor tenant participation practice in Motherwell left a lack of
trust between landlord and tenants, yet latent hostility to new ideas from tenants was
defused by the prospect of investment.404 Without such tangible incentives, distrust would
have frustrated a transfer proposal from the council.405
While Scottish Homes staff were seen as key proponents who made transfer happen, their
zeal risked antagonising tenants and staff. This bordered on generating opposition,
398 Interview Rowbotham, Forbes, 1998.
399 Interview Forbes, 1998.
400 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
401 Intervew Forbes, 1998. This is consistent with a subsequent move in 1996 by one of the largest associations in England
to take over a small neighbourhood association in Dundee, to the concern of other agencies in the city.
402 Interview Whitefield, McLoughlin, 1998.
403 Interview Mulholland, 1998.
404 Interview Whitefield, 1998.
405 Interview McLoughlin, 1998.
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evidenced by the challenge faced by co-op staff following through on commitments made by
Scottish Homes in order to secure support at meetings to unrealistic timescales or
standards.406
By the mid-1990s, opposition to transfer within the council group was informed and
therefore confused by different 'stock transfer' developments in the nearby New Town of
East Kilbride.407 Some saw stock transfer as a threat and were only reassured by the small
scale of proposed operations. Others saw the promotion of a co-op as the council
acquiescing in a Tory privatisation exercise.408 In the end, the political case was won on
pragmatic grounds since there was not enough money for the council to act and transfers
took place in wards of some of the most senior committee chairmen and in Forgewood, the
ward of a Communist councillor, without his opposition. Such pragmatism was easier to
achieve in a larger authority such as Motherwell since small-scale threats could be argued
to be less significant relative to the overall remaining stock.409 Latent opposition from staff
concerned about possible job losses arising from larger-scale transfers was mitigated by
relief at losing a management headache.41o Staff seemed content not to oppose the sale of
estates in poor condition, where there was palpable tenant support.
Berwickshire
Within Berwickshire council, councillors who did not actively support the transfer did not
oppose it overtly either. Arguably they could not think of good reasons to argue against the
transfer.411 By contrast, there was effective obstruction by central government and senior
council officials, which made the transaction take longer, as much due to incompetence as
conspiracy. However government personnel were not supportive. Even though Scottish
Office support was expected, no actual assistance was offered and some obstruction was
encountered. Although in the mid-1990s, government ministers exhorted stock transfer in
occasional speeches, there was no published policy framework, no procedures, no
assistance with funding information or campaigning. Active support was absent: the seller
instigated many meetings in an effort to solve some problems and the Minister (Lord James
Douglas Hamilton) 'stuck to his script' and did not 'inspire confidence' about his
understanding of the issues, while officials sat at meetings without comment, taking notes.
Central government machinery ground very slowly, with lengthy investigations of valuation
issues, because of concerns allegedly coming from the Treasury.412
4061nterview Mulholland, 1998.
407 Interview McLoughlin, 1998.
408 Interview Whitefield, 1998.
409 Interview Whitefield, 1998.
410 Interview Mulholland 1998.
411 Interview Findlay, 1998
412 Interviews Findlay, Jones 1998. The Minister who approved the disposal was Raymond Robettson who replaced Lord
James in July 1995, following a Cabinet reshuffle placing Michael Forsyth in charge of the Scottsh Offce.
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The Berwickshire actors received the distinct impression that the Scottish Offce offcials did
not really want the transfer to happen. The proposals were unique in Scotland and therefore
highly visible and correspondingly risky. It is relevant to note here that official investigations
into Scottish Homes' transfer to Waverley were under way during 1993/4 (National Audit
Offce, 1994; Committee of Public Accounts, 1994) and may have generated undue
sensitivity in Scotland about transfer generally. There was also some concern that there was
public money at stake: the existence of extensive restrictions governing procedures and
outcomes by the DoE and later SODD, indicated deep resistance to transfer within the
Scottish Office. 413
Seller staff who obstructed transfer were mainly outside the housing department and senior,
from the Chief Executive down. It was perceived that since housing represented the core of
the council's business, without housing (construed solely as the landlord role) there would
be nothing left of the council.414 Opposition was arguably as much administrative and
territorial as political or ideologicaL. Uniquely, opposition in Berwickshire was also organised
but rather belatedly and, ultimately, ineffective. In Berwickshire, the local impetus for
transfer had been galvanised by a desire for local control, in the context of disquiet about
loss of local identity resulting from reorganisation:415 initial transfer sceptics were brought
into the fold by arguments that transfer would preserve local control. Latent opposition from
tenants on issues involving rights, security and rents was defused by virtue of the
information given to tenants and the way in which the association sought to show explicitly
the position under both regimes. BBC Radio Scotland ran a live discussion programme prior
to the ballot (October 1994). While it generated very little interest among tenants, all of
whom were invited to the debate, it elicited a wider response beyond the authority.416 A vocal
objector turned out in fact not to be a Berwickshire tenant, but a Labour party activist from
East Lothian. Most tenants ignored the meeting and later voted quietly and overwhelmingly
in favour of transfer (Tulloch, 1997).
However legal opposition after the ballot was conducted - in the glare of publicity - by the
assembled politicians of the new unitary Scottish Borders council, administered stealthily by
413 Interview Jones, 1998. This issue may relate to English concerns in 1993, discussed in earlier chapters, about increased
Housing Benefit commitments to the DSS and thereby the Treasury, because of different arrangements for Housing Benefit
subsidy in England. The Minister who took offce in 1995 felt that Scottish Office offcials had not understood the differences
in these arrangements, arguably because social security was a Whitehall function and not under the jurisdiction of the
Scottsh Office. The lack of communication mechanisms and effective co-ordination before 1994 would have helped such
misunderstandings to develop.
414 Interview Jones, 1998
415 Berwickshire DC was marked as a candidate for merger with East Lothian DC or with other Borders councils (Scottsh
Office, 1992). The latter option was eventually proposed in the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Bil, 1993.
416 The programme was a BBC Radio Scotland Speaking Out debate in Duns (council HQ). The assembled audience in
Duns that night was mainly officials and poliicians from the local areas and beyond (including the researcher), emphasising
its resonance beyond Berwickshire (personal observation).
246
senior corporate staff.417 The outgoing Borders Regional Council co-ordinated opposition
with the outgoing district councils in the Borders and their mutual successor/shadow council,
supported by the local (Liberal Democrat) MP.418 This included a campaign in national
newspapers claiming money-wasting.419 The shadow council took QC opinion on whether
Berwickshire was acting outwith its powers, with the consequence that the seller spent
further resources to reassure itself that there was no legal impediment to transfer. Late
obstacles were overcome due to the determination of buyer personnel and their legal
advisers, though at a high price, affecting final transaction costs and thereby the remaining
surplus for investment (Tulloch, 1997).420
Surface relations between offcials were perfectly amicable421 whereas the councillors who
had been elected to the new authority (especially former district councillors) used the
Berwickshire transfer as a good issue on which to jockey for political position within the new
Scottish Borders CounciL. Although public opposition had the appearance of a united
campaign against the Berwickshire plans, the controversy was a casualty of factional
infighting between former district and regional councillors over senior positions in the new
counciL. In the end, district councillors lost out to former regional councillors for most of the
key positions. Another explanation for the heightened atmosphere was that the Borders had,
somewhat surprisingly, become the focus of tension around government housing policy due
to local repercussions of the controversial Waverley transfer from Scottsh Homes.422
Stirling
Those who took blocking action to transfer proposals included 1) local tenants who rejected
councillors' transfer overtures 2) the Chief Executive of the council and 3) Conservative
politicians. Overt opposition came from tenant activists who were closely identified with the
Labour party although there does not appear to have been a concerted campaign. Tenants
elsewhere were offered incentives to pursue stock transfer. It does not appear that there
was any effort to use such 'carrots' in this case, indeed, councillors claimed in 1998 that
417 Interview Findlay 1998. A legal challenge was mounted from the spring of 1995 starting before the shadow council
elections. The new council sought to use the Local Government Act 1994 to obstruct progress. Further delay might have
allowed the new council to take a decision to stop the transaction, although civil service correspondence with other councils
at the time showed that decisions about housing stock transfer were specifically excluded from a general requirement to
consult the new councils about contractual commitments. it is all the more perverse that the Scottish Borders council went on
to be among the first to promote transfer under Labour's New Housing Partnership programme after 1997. (Press coverage
Feb - August 1995).
418 The Borders MP was Archie Kirkwood, Liberal Democrat, while a Liberal Democrat authority (NE Fife) had similarly
pursued transfer from 1993, employing consultants, consulting staff and tenants and assisting registration of a new landlord
vehicle. The proposal eventually ran into the ground, partly because of the hostile poliical climate preceding reorganisation
(Khan, 1996; correspondence between Scottsh Homes, central government, council press releases, commitee reports).
419 Interview Findlay, 1998.
420 Interviews Findlay, Jones, 1998.
421 Interview Jones, 1998.
422 Latterly, Waverley encouraged council tenants to transfer the ownership of their homes to Waverley using the individual
transfer mechanism of Tenant's Choice. This provoked the new council itself to explore stock transfer post 1997 and it was
the first Scottsh council to ballot all its tenants about a proposed transfer, though this was mired in controversy and failure to
deliver in 2002, over 12 months after the ballot.
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incentives were not relevant or required.423 This reading seems to have been based on
contemporary English rather than Scottish experience.
Covert opposition came from senior staff. Although councillors regarded this individual as
being with them rather than against them, another respondent alleged that the Chief
Executive used position power, expertise and threats to prevent politicians' transfer ideas
being developed.424 Opposition also emanated from traditionalists within Conservative ranks,
in the form of lukewarm acquiescence in the first partial proposal and later failure to support
the Cathedral proposals. The Cathedral protagonists later regarded the bulk of councillors
as not having been prepared or 'softened' for transfer ideas and unable to see possible
benefits.425 This reveals the crusading council leader's lack of followers. The Conservatives'
paper majority over Labour (through the Chair's casting vote) meant that the leader could
not deliver without greater support, 426 which he conspicuously failed to garner.
Councillors claimed that middle and junior staff were set against transfer;427 by contrast, the
Cathedral protagonists claimed that junior staff and unions privately welcomed the
proposals,428 whereas managers thwarted further progress.429 Staff views were never tested
but these different stories again serve to highlight the gulf and lack of common ground
between key protagonists.
Networks and Critical Relationships
Glasgow
Although there were formal producer networks in later years, particularly once the co-ops
established their own grouping within the SFHA, there were many informal professionally-
based networks in the city, not usually based on the professional body but more in the
nature of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1986). Staff moved freely from council employment
to the new landlords, between the landlord organisations and from the landlords to Scottish
Homes Development Division.430 Sometimes this was promoted or at least facilitated by
Scottish Homes, in order to diffuse lessons and experience.431 Some of the networking was
role-based, but individual commitment counted for a lot. The ethos of the Glasgow
association movement was that staff and committee members mixed freely, including
informally. It was therefore not unusual for discussions between a landlord body to start or
423 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998. Conservative councillors used similar tactics of offering to fund Feasibility Studies as
elsewhere. In this case, tenants were not impressed.
424 Interview McOermott, 1998.
425 Interview McOermott, 1998.
426 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
427 Interviews Harding, Scott, 1998.
428 Intervew McOermott, 1998.
429 In the case of the second proposal (from junior staff) a report from the evaluation panel (comprising senior staff) showed
that insuffcient work had been done and more policy development was required.
430 Interview Ohir, Smith, 1998.
431 Interview Hastie, 1998.
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finish in the pub, to thrash out awkward problems.432 Some committees tackling problems of
deprivation ran a gauntlet of abuse after meetings from drug dealers and local
criminals/vandals.433 Such difficulties faced by staff and committee creating new bodies
meant that bonds were formed in adversity.434
Staff in housing associations occupied pivotal positions and roles. They had to liaise with
senior managers in the council, with committees and tenants, with consultants and builders,
with Scottish Homes and with lenders. Occasionally, acting in a representative capacity,
they 'took on' central government, notably in the early problem-solving days. Their
effectiveness depended in large measure on their competence in networking and so
depended on their personal attributes as well as their role.
Dundee
The Director of Housing was the primary contact with a variety of political and official actors
in central government up to and including the Minister, particularly in the developmental
phase when there was a need to secure new, external resources. Later, lower-ranking
offcials were deployed to run with systems and approaches developed by the Director's
coterie. The commitment of such lower ranking officials could not be guaranteed.435 The
teamwork relationship or 'spark' between certain officials was highlighted as a crucial
component in 'making things happen'.436 There was a commitment to solving problems in a
pragmatic way and a success in finding the 'line of least resistance'. The Director's acolytes
were known locally as the Marx brothers:437 they were union activists and all were strong-
mÎnded individuals who subsequently left the council for managerial posts in the voluntary
sector. They enjoyed seniority and the effective power to 'deliver' as well as having ease of
communication through frequent contact, reinforced by informal networks.438 Co-ordinator
posts in the new co-ops were advertised internally within the council and one key actor was
effectively headhunted, disregarding the formalities of council recruitment policy.439 He later
succeeded in building effective working relationships between the council, consultants and
tenants. Informal networks seemed important both for key actors working in the voluntary
sector and in the counciL. Some close friendships preceded the formal relationships, some
grew out of working relationships surviving subsequent job moves.
432 Interview Anderson, Rodgers, Smith, 1998.
433 Interview Bryden, 1998.
434 Interview Crooks ton, McLeish, Mullgan, 1998.
435 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
436 Interview Rowbotham, Forbes, 1998
437 This epithet refers to the position in the trade union NALGO at the time as well as personal charisma and a strong sense
of humour.
438 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
439 Interview Forbes, 1998.
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A less successful appointment underlined the importance of the attitude, outlook and
personal commitment of individuals in pivotal posts to achieve success.440
Motherwell
Though there were connections at the political level, the main relationships were between
the staff of the council and of the new body, particularly around sorting out valuation/price
problems. Contact was at a high level in the early development phase in Motherwell, even
though this occurred some time after Glasgow and Dundee had become established and
arguably policy had been rolled out. The main initial lines of communication were between
the council's Housing Director and Scottish Homes Regional Manager and between the
Assistant Director of Housing and Principal Offcers in the Scottish Office (Development
Division). Once a pattern or procedure was established, senior staff drew back other than
for troubleshooting purposes.441 Once projects were underway, relatively junior Scottish
Homes offcials had contact with senior managers and elected members of the authority and
with the staff and committee of the new body. New committee members liaised to a limited
extent with their counterparts elsewhere via SFHA.442
Berwickshire
Since Berwickshire was one of the few remaining Conservative councils in 1992, there could
have been opportunities for strong connections with central government but it is not evident
that these were useful, or used. This is all the more surprising given ministerial exhortation
to councils to divest themselves of their landlord role at reorganisation. Instead,
Berwickshire actors created networks with actors in England to assist their own progress
since there were few others in Scotland examining these proposals.443 This particular
transfer shows many linkages with developments in England in terms of policy learning by
Berwickshire people, by virtue of the appointment of an Independent AdviserlTenants'
Friend and the appointment of legal and policy consultants already active in England.444 The
'downside' of the legal expertise was the tendency to presume that what happened in
England would also apply in Scotland. This proved not to be the case, not least in terms of
conveyancing. The new association 'felt dependent on the consultants and on English
experience'.445 This too had a real cost: the London-based lawyers' lack of expertise in
Scottish conveyancing, contributed to delays and increased transaction costs (Tulloch,
1997).
Evidence of linkage with England also comes from the misunderstanding amongst Scottish
Offce offcials about the different local government subsidy and social security financial
440 Interview Forbes, 1998.
441 Interview Whitefield, 1998.
4421nterview Mulholland 1998.
443 Interviews Findlay, Jones, 1998.
444 Interview Smith, 1998.
445 Interview Jones, 1998
250
arrangements north and south of the border. The former Minister claimed that transfer had
not been pursued more vigorously in 1995 for fear of stumbling into pitfalls already identified
in England, implying 'read -across'.446 By contrast, his senior civil servant argued that in the
case of stock transfer there was not generally a 'read-across' from English experience.447
Wigtown was the only other Scottish council mentioned in the interviews, having sought to
learn from Berwickshire to promote its own version of whole transfer.448 No 'meeting of
minds' between Berwickshire and Wigtown was evident from respondents in this study, nor
does there appear to have been any contact with other Scottsh local authorities known to
have been considering whole stock transfer prior to reorganisation at the time (Khan, 1996).
Councillors sought to use existing local Scottsh networks, beyond housing transfer to help
establish the association by promoting its interests in the lending and political worlds. They
brought in as Chair of BHA's steering group someone who could 'soften up' possible
contacts via a prestigious Edinburgh golf club. This venture was reported to be more
successful financially than politically.449
Stirling
What stands out in the Stirling case is the weak and poor dynamics between the various
actors. There was little trust or respect between the players and it was commonplace that
the prevailing culture permitted senior staff desks to be raided for sensitive papers which
were then copied and replaced as though nothing had happened.450 This reveals a culture of
covert communication, profound and pervasive distrust.
Another feature is that the crusaders polarised opinion, failing to anticipate the extent of
opposition to their ideas. Being convinced themselves of the merits of their proposals, they
were unable to see how they might be viewed and made no attempt to bring potential
opponents 'on board'. Councillors who might have had privileged access to Scottish Office
Ministers and could have been critical in forging a policy framework, were unable to
establish and pursue clear goals. Their attempts to get a transfer going lacked focus.
While the same role elements were present as in other case studies, no single incumbent
provided a Iynchpin. Many competing vested interests were present and different channels
of communication were open simultaneously: these contributed to the problem of mixed
messages. The Stirling case reveals that transfer was in the minds of many protagonists but
446 Interview Robertson, 1998. Read-across refers to the application of policy ideas from one jurisdiction in another and
requires a high degree of understanding of the legal and political context for policy operation. Such understanding mayor
may not be present (Dolowitz, 2000). It is not quite the same as 'concurrent policy' (Midwinter et aI, 1991).
447 Civil service understanding of the problem did not shine through: see Chapter Eight regarding the 1996 guidance and
debt issues.
448 Interview Smith, 1998. Unlike Berwickshire, the Wigtown proposals seemed to be based on raising rents as high as
possible to secure the maximum possible receipt and therefore surplus while at the same time promising lots of new houses.
The ballot revealed 75% opposition among tenants.
449 Interview Findlay, 1998.
450 Interview McDermott, 1998.
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the various attempts at transfer were fundamentally inept and there was no compelling case
to overcome latent conflict and negative power. There were tensions within the ruling group,
overt hostility between ideological opponents including Labour councillors, tenants and staff
with no evident willingness to accommodate each other for some greater good. There were
no incentives and the window of opportunity was restricted. Councillors sought success
through radical ideas but were not prepared to risk promoting an idea which might faiL.
Process, Stances, Action: A Spectrum of Support and Opposition
Having established various actors' behaviour from the case studies, we can now examine
actors' roles more abstractly in relation to a notional process. According to the specialist
literature, the process preceding a disposal decision contained five different levels of formal
decision-taking/approval. These lay with: the regulator, the council (seller), tenants, central
government and the lender (Chapter 4, Table 2). Even that simplified process was rather
technical in detail and can be abstracted into a number of activities prior to decision-taking,
following a logical sequence as shown in Table 31.
Table 31: Revised process - stages
Stage Activity
Initiation Original proposal about particular proposals for body of stock. Agenda settng. Requires
confidence and leadership. Action focus
Response Stance-based reaction without much deliberation. Resistance can completely block further
progress at this stage. Action if not decision as such
Persuasion Where response at least neutral, development of details about the case and focus on
aspirations to be met. Larqelv informal and action-based
Bargaining Negotiation around terms and conditions affecting proposed transaction: feasibility, cost
benefit analysis, valuation, business planning, funding. Early episodes show bargaining to
develop rules. Later episodes show baraainina within rules
Approval The most formal type of decision-making: regulator, seller, tenants, central government,
funder(s)
Transaction Administration of the legal and financial terms of the sale
Implementation Co-ordination of resources in new organisations
Source: Audit Commission 1993; adapted arising from analysis of qualitative interviews, 1998
This process assumes support at the various stages or at least that opponents can be
'brought round'. It presupposes that the process is linear to a degree, though also iterative
since some stages overlap slightly and boundaries can be blurred. This may help to explain
not only how items reach the local agenda, with policy-makers having to anticipate the
wishes of those formally responsible for approval at later stages, it may also explain why
some proposals fail and how non-decision-making and inaction work.
The specialist literature showed various stakeholders adopting different stances about
transfer and so we move on to examine degrees of support for transfer, placing different role
groups on a spectrum. The above sequence is later revisited to explore the mechanisms for
accommodating incompatible stances, regardless of outcome. All the stakeholders
(tenants, staff, councillors) were directly affected by transfer proposals in some way, with
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housing representing a form of shelter, employment or (resource) power. The evidence here
suggests that, to a greater or lesser degree, every individual in each transaction had power
to shape proposals. The contribution made by each incumbent varied, although undoubtedly
the most consistently pivotal role was that of the co-ordinating official acting for the buyer,
who served as a critical valve. Power to achieve change partly followed the capacity defined
by the role, also partly relying on the preferences, behaviour and relationships of the
individual incumbent. The rest of this section groups different stakeholder types under three
headings: proponents, lukewarm support and opposition.
Proponents and Supporters
Most respondents cited others as being key to the process. Modesty may have prevented
respondents from seeing their own role as key.451 Identifying key actors clearly depended on
the respondent's contacts and networks, but most emphasised the importance of officials
(invisible entrepreneurs) more than elected members (visible champions) (Kingdon, 1995).
Nevertheless, stances reported after the event are open to charges of (undiagnosed)
revisionism.452 Since the initiators of proposals were predominantly staff, the next sub-
section therefore examines their views, as well as those of representatives, paid and
unpaid, who were instrumental in getting transfer on to local agendas.
Local Government Staff - Agenda-Setting Sellers?
Judging by completed transfers, senior housing officials were key to getting transfer on the
agenda, regardless of the scale of transaction. They were vital in nurturing projects by
securing resources and support, path-clearing inside organisations and in making sure
transactions ran smoothly (Bowen, 1982). 453 It could be argued that their interest derived
from their need to solve local problems resulting from under-investment, regardless of policy
labels. As Chapter Nine showed, they believed that transfer was worth support because it
brought additional investment454 though tenant involvement/empowerment and local control
were the imperatives for some.455 Crucially, in order for them to convince their elected
members of the merits of the case, they had to be convinced themselves.
Typically it was senior council staff who brokered local solutions in general terms in
conjunction with Scottish Homes' managers, later delegating implementation or roll-out to
middle and junior staff. Contrary to expectations it was sometimes union activists who were
active as individuals in persuading, bargaining and implementing new forms of collective
ownership (see also Opposition below).456 Promotion of initiatives by senior officials
451 Intervew Whitefield 1998.
452 Chapter Three discussed this issue in some detail.
453 Interviews Comley, Rodgers, Dyer, 1998.
454 Interviews Comley, Rodgers, Wiseman, 1998.
455 Interviews Jones, Rowbotham 1998.
456 Interview Crooks ton, Forbes, 1998.
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enhanced the credibility and status of proposals with tenants and junior staff.457 Later roll-out
phases involving less senior staff had lower chances of success.458 More importantly,
absence of senior support was fatal to a proposal, as evidenced by the second attempt in
Stirling. If senior officials needed the confidence of knowing that they could deliver the
policy, it could be argued that in Stirling officials lacked confidence in new politicians (whose
influence was precarious and might be short-lived). Ultimately, as in Glasgow,459 managers
had to know that they could bring politicians round.
In Berwickshire, the key actor was the senior staff member both as a role and as an
individual incumbent,46o Success, even for the replacement Director, a newcomer to the
area, lay in his ability to bring and keep people 'on board' and to protect valued assets
under local control. He squared interests within the council (persuasion, bargaining,
transaction) while employed by the council, 461 and later, as Chief Executive designate of the
new housing association, he had a powerful vested interest in making the new enterprise
work (transaction and implementation).462
Buyer and Government Agency Staff - Compliant Implementing Officials?
Officials employed by the government agency, voluntary bodies463 and firms of technical
consultants, were regarded as key actors more often than their local authority counterparts.
It could be argued that this merely reflects the greater capacity of their organisations to
deliver the new resources as part of the solution, but this would be to underplay the
importance of individual incumbents' behaviour and aptitude. Staff, technical consultants
and government agency personnel were seen as the key actors,464 instrumental in 'making
things happen'.465 Even agency staff were cited as individual incumbents, not just for their
role.
In small-scale Scottish transfers, the organisations were mainly new, with new staff, not
merely the old council with a different name. In whole transfer, even new organisations with
the same staff were more likely to be seen as the 'new council'.466 In a new buyer
organisation's life, people who prepared and trained committee members were important in
persuading and bargaining about transfer.467 In Community Ownership many such staff were
457 Interviews McLeish, Mulligan, Muir, 1998.
458 Interview Wiseman, 1998.
459 Interviews Comley, Rodgers, Breslin, 1998.
460 Interview Findlay, 1998.
461 The roles were separated after the ballot when other council offcials became more significant - see Opposition below.
462 Interview Jones, 1998.
463 Many of the staff in housing associations had previously worked in local government.
464 These were reported often to be young staff in new architectural practices making a name for themselves though some
respondents argued that they captured the process for their own ends and attached more importance to buildings than to
people and communities.
465 Interview Findlay, 1998.
466 Interview Jones, 1998: tenants reported after transfer that the new council was better than the old council.
467 Interviews Hastie, Smith, 1998.
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women, younger, educated and with relevant experience in development and working with
resident volunteers, also often women. The informal and professional support networks of
associations (co-ordinated under the auspices of SFHA) were harnessed to steer tenant
steering groups in the 'right' direction. Some needed a lot of support from professional staff
to satisfy the funding and regulatory agency of the future sustainability of the new landlord
bodies.
Jobs in buyer organisations often attracted council staff looking for promotion, with more
responsibility and variety than housing work in local government usually offered.468 Buyer
staff commonly argued (from previous personal experience inside various councils) that as
junior staff they had been powerless to address councils' failure to manage decline or
regeneration, partly due to weak political leadership and partly because councils had been
'under-resourced managerially'.469 Some co-ordinators were head-hunted internally,
contravening procedural constraints. Managers evidently understood the salience of
personal attributes and qualities in these key appointments.47o Postholders had to learn
quickly, communicate freely, persuade and bargain effectively. They had to operate on
behalf of the new committees, to whom they were accountable, holding the ring between
competing priorities articulated by people in local and central government, Scottish Homes,
lending institutions, technical consultants and local residents.471 The posts unleashed
management potential in most individuals472 though some did not rise to the challenge.47
Less successful appointments to such posts merely underline the dependence of project
success, even the overall programme, on an appropriate atttude, outlook and personal
cDmmitment of individuals in posts pivotal to implementation or 'programme' structures
(Hjern and Porter, 1981). In all completed transfers, the presence of and actions of such
officials in buyer organisations were critical at every policy stage apart from initiation.
Also vital to programme structures were local Development staff in Scottish Homes,
identified by most respondents as key in making Community Ownership happen, through
their contact with individuals and groups and in more formal settings.474 Those named in
Scottsh Homes varied according to the level of contact with the respondent but ranged
down to project manager level, where decisions were made about whether to provide
subsidy, how much and on what terms. Their capacity for action depended critically on their
ability to deliver a programme of expenditure, diminished in later years as resources were
468 Interviews Dhir, Forbes, Mulholland, Crooks 
ton, 1998.
469 Interviews, Dhir, Mulholland, 1998.
470 Interviews Rodgers, Whitefield, Hastie, 1998.
471 Interviews Dhir, Smith, 1998.
472 Interview Hastie, 1998.
473 Interviews Forbes , Mulholland 1998. The researcher assessed this in terms of their abilty to stay in the job, work with
commitee members, secure resources for the organisation and achieve regeneration to some extent. This was revealed as
much by its absence, in some buyers in Motherwell and Dundee, which illustrates the diffcultes arising from a breakdown or
absence of trust and goodwill, mentioned by a number of respondents. That scheme has suffered staff turnover and a
disrupted and delayed programme.
474 Interviews Bryden, Muir, McLeish, Mullgan, 1998.
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withdrawn and in relation to whole transfers. Relatively junior agency officials bargained with
senior council managers and members, with buyer staff and committees though they could
be too pushy, engendering later resistance.475 This serves as a reminder that there was a
fine line to tread in persuading potential opponents.
Elected and Community Representatives
Few elected representatives led change from the front. They engaged with the process to
the extent of suspending opposition and by permittng staff to talk to relevant stakeholders
(tenants). While Kingdon (1995) suggests visibility is the natural terrain of the elected
politician, elected politicians were hardly visible champions on stock transfer issues. In
Glasgow's pioneering phase, of the four key actors, the only visible champion (Kingdon,
1995) was an unelected community activist. The others worked quietly, out of the limelight:
clearing paths and blockages, constructing incentives and securing political and thus
resource support - all critical to minimising implementation failure (Bowen, 1982).
One of the key actors in Glasgow operated at both levels and, though an elected politician,
was more comfortable with the invisible role.476 He was instrumental in developing proposals
and ideas, softening others for stock transfer to tenant co-operatives.47 His professional and
academic background in law may have equipped him for seemingly contradictory behaviour.
In public, as a Conservative, he opposed proposals which he had privately helped to
develop,478 in order to convince Labour opponents to support them.479 Similarly, he
persuaded Tory Ministers not to congratulate Labour politicians on their actions and thereby
avoided puncturing delicate policy initiatives. His behaviour was more in keeping with the
profile of an official than of a politician and thus was rather a wily, invisible policy
entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995).
Local tenant committee members and activists (not councillors) were often identified as key
actors by others, not themselves. One or two individuals were named in each particular
place as being crucial in providing local leadership for change. Many were mature women
4751nterviews Dhir, Forbes, Crookston, 1998.
476 lan Dyer was a former Conservative councillor and housing sub-committee chair (pre-1984) and on the Scottish board of
HCiS until 1989. He moved freely between different levels and interests: he relished his influence with Conservative
politicians in central government although he did not think that Ministers, and stil less civil servants, always welcomed his
views. Ministers who listened included Rifkind and Ancram though he was convinced that he later became unpopular with
civil servants and politicians (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton) for stating unwelcome opinions about the limits and dire
consequences of the Right to Buy. Dyer was invited to participate in housing working groups on particular issues when
Labour took control of the council. He co-operated with local Labour politicians and was regarded by others as pivotal in
discreetly contributing to new thinking about transfers within the Glasgow Labour Part in 1985. Interviews Rodgers,
Wiseman, 1998.
477 He related that as sub commitee chair he used the opportunity to promote tenant participation in run-down estates. He
also proposed that commitees go out to visit estates and talk to tenants - unheard of at the time. Moreover in 1985, due to a
clash of dates with a Labour group meeting, he ended up accompanying a dispensable Labour councilor on a tour showing
Rifkind (then Minister) Glasgow's peripheral estates. The Minister was impressed with the council's 'fly' response to a
government loophole. Dyer claims he succeeded in quietly impressing on Rifkind the need to avoid congratulating the council
unless he wanted the initiative to stop. He also protected Scottish initiatives when they came through the HC Board in
London as registration matters.
478 Interviews Mills, Miler, 1998.
479 Interview Dyer, 1998.
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with grown-up families, often not involved in party politics.480 One activist was credited with
galvanising local tenants into action across Scotland.481 Epithets of 'charismatic leader',
'spearhead' were evidence of qualities likely to be prized among visible participants.482
While earlier chapters showed tenants assumed to oppose transfer on ideological grounds,
for tenant committee members in this study, transfer was a means to achieving better living
conditions and therefore to be supported. Committee activists in small-scale transfers were
sanguine that Community Ownership as such was not their idea to start off with.483 Their
pressure had been directed at achieving physical improvements: Community Ownership
and the resulting co-operative had become 'theirs' during bargaining. Tenants would 'go
along with anything' which produced money for investment in their housing, wherever it
came from.484 Such imperatives were not immediately evident to tenants in Stirling, who
decided to oppose transfer without reaching the bargaining stage.
Lukewarm support
Central Government: Politicians and Officials
While central government might have been expected to support transfer, its representatives'
behaviour was not supportive. Government actors did not shine through as trailblazing
either type of transfer at the local scale, though they were not opposed as such. This study
did not find evidence that central government actors (political or official) planned or
anticipated the local consequences of their actions. Indeed, former Minister Michael Ancram
recalled first hearing about transfer from Glasgow tenants. Having become convinced of the
value of the proposals, he then promoted transfer quietly inside central government,485
diverting resources to HCiS/ Scottish Homes which his successor protected thereafter
(Chapter Eight). Ministers showed personal interest in and support for early developments
and although the Glasgow proposals might have died without central resources, support
only followed after the Minister was personally lobbied by tenants (Clapham et aI, 1991 ).486
However, government officials seemed to be instrumental in clearing paths behind the
scenes,487 with stock transfer among the unintended consequences of other policies.
'Support' at the highest level was scant and reactive, without knowledge of the
consequences of decisions, even though Ministers had to approve disposals (SDD, 1988).
Central government offcials were not particularly helpful in supporting or approving cases
such as Berwickshire, allowing one respondent to comment that clarifying the framework of
480 Interviews Bryden, Muir, McLeish, Mulligan, 1998.
481 Interviews Breslin, Miller, 1998.
482 Interviews Dhir, Crooks ton, Breslin, Dyer, Mills, Ancram, 1998.
483 Interviews Bryden, Muir, McLeish, Mullgan, 1998.
484 Interviews Forbes, Mulholland, Crookston, Comley, 1998.
485 Interview Ancram, 1998.
486 Interview Ancram, 1998.
487 See Chapter Seven: Mills argued in 1998 that accounting for housing association expenditure as private rather than
public became key to creating the opportunity for private investment by associations acquiring council-buil stock.
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rules for transfer was like mountain-climbing in fog, without a map or compass. Prompt
processing was required in the run-up to reorganisation but responses to requests for
clarification of policy were delayed or absent. Deliberate attempts to soften political contacts
in central government clearly had not borne fruit.488 After a ballot in October 1994,
Berwickshire council applied for ministerial consent in March 1995, and received it on 30
August 1995, just weeks after a Cabinet reshuffe placed Forsyth in charge of the Scottish
Offce and 24 hours before the new council had legal rights to stop the transaction (see
below). Civil service allegations of councils avoiding decision-making about transfer
attempted to mask a policy void at the centre. While the policy of transfer was being
'managed into a mature programme' in England, concurrent policy in Scotland meant
disposing of Scottish Homes stock, though the receipts and debt consequences of this
came to haunt central government (as shown in Chapter Eight).
Until Raymond Robertson became Minister in 1995, central government did not promote
transfer heavily in Scotland. Arguably, local actors were more likely to pursue transfer the
less the government promoted it.489 Indeed, there was a continuing political reluctance to
take credit for transfer, in spite of the fact that the outcomes were mainly regarded as
successful on political, financial, social and physical grounds. Government officials were
consistently anxious to avoid any impression of undue influence especially over Ministers.490
While politicians seemed sanguine about their relative lack of power and the limitations of
Whitehall model of government (Campbell and Wilson, 1995),491 civil servants would cling to
ministerial decision-taking, while managing with subtle sophistry to achieve distance from
any decisions deemed 'brave'.492
Opposition: Non-Oppositon, and Suppression of Latent Conflct
Having seen who promoted and endorsed transfer, we can now examine sources of
opposition and opponents' actions. Organisations representing the interests of tenants,
councils and staff voiced strong ideological opinions about transfers as privatisation,
incompatible with the government's position. Civil servants saw lack of transfer as
ideological resistance, but opponents were initially difficult to identify in the case studies,
though unsolicited evidence of opposition cropped up in relation to failed or aborted transfer
488 Interview Jones, Findlay, 1998. Protracted correspondence with other councils during 1994 and 1995 shows the
emerging rules, including the shift to tenanted market valuation and a requirement for competiion, never pursued. It should
be remembered that the Scottish Office and Scottish Homes had recently been investigated over the handling of the
Waver/ey transfer including very sensitive valuation issues. It was 1996 before draft procedures were published.
489 Interviews Mils, Ewing, 1998.
490 Interview Mils, Ewing, 1998.
491 Interviews Ancram, Robertson, Lee, 1998.
492 Interview Ewing, 1998: an example of a brave decision was the requirement on councils to use 25% of fallng receipts for
debt redemption. A further example was the decision to earmark the source of receipts.
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attempts elsewhere.493 However with probing, some opponents were mentioned in the
context of Stirling (aborted) and to a limited extent in other case studies (completed). They
included tenants, junior and middle-ranking staff, and councillors - all of whom had different
types of vested interests in the institution of council housing (security of shelter, jobs and
votes respectively).
Councilors Stand Aside
The specialist literature suggests that organised opposition was critical (Kemp, 1990;
Furner; 1999; Horsman; 2000). Although alliances could have been formed in these cases,
none were - even in Stirling. The only instance of concerted opposition to transfer was the
attempt to stop the Berwickshire transfer, which was almost stymied by other local
government politicians and central government delays.
Although it was mainly Labour-controlled councils which promoted partial stock transfer,
vehement internal opposition came from some SNP and Conservative councillors and
avowedly idealistic Labour councillors.494 Calling transfer Community Ownership or 'co-ops'
however was a deliberate way of making the unthinkable less unpalatable. Some (Labour)
councillors were only reassured by the small scale of partial operations, relative to the
overall remaining stock. It was easier to achieve pragmatic decision-making about partial
transfer in a large authority where small-scale threats dented rather than punctured council
housing though only while it was the sole alternative.495 However, for some, promoting co-
operatives was a 'threat to council housing itself', it was 'acquiescing in Tory privatisation',
the 'latest extension of privatisation'.496 Instinctive opposition also stemmed from other
streams of 'stock transfer' without people understanding the different meanings.497 As the
scale increased, as in Glasgow in 1996, there were attempts to block further transfers,
perhaps anticipating a change of policy after the election.49B
Electoral anxiety may also help to explain why opposition to (partial) transfer was resisted,
even by Conservatives. Conservatives inside Stirling (and Berwickshire) did not all welcome
493 By 1994, some six councils (out of 56) were informally 'known' to be considering similar proposals of which only one -
Wigtown - eventually went to ballot and lost in the summer of 1995. The only Labour member in Wigtown DC represented
the area which contained the most substantial concentration of council housing. Quite apart from the unrealistic expectations
of staff and the technical (financial) shortcomings of the Wigtown proposals (highlighted by the independent adviser Smith),
the solitary Labour councí/or and local supporters ran an effective campaign against the transfer within the final few days
leading up to the ballot. The bàllot failed spectacularly with 75% opposition on a 75% turnout. The stimulus for consideration
of transfer in these cases was partly associated with local government reform producing locally unwelcome amalgamations
of small district councils. They were partly financially driven by efforts either to build more new housing (as in NE Fife and
Stewartry, Kahn, 1996) or 'magically release equity' (Wilcox, 1994) from the sale of council housing so as to fund other
council projects (e.g. Stirling, Wigtown, Nithsdale) though the essential calculations underpinning these proposals were often
flawed and í/-understood (Khan, 1996).
494 Interview Rowbotham, Luke, 1998.
495 Interview Comley, Whitefield, 1998.
496 Interviews Luke, Wiseman, Findlay, 1998. The Right to Buy was seen by many respondents to have been a forerunner of
sorts. The difference was about whether they liked what they saw.
497 In the Motherwell Labour group, wind-up transfers in the nearby New Town of East Kilbride leaked into discussions about
small-scale transfers by the council exploitng Scottsh Homes' investment resources.
498 Personal communication with council staff during data reconciliation in 1997.
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stock transfer, as they thought it was the council's job to provide welfare housing for people
in need.499 Even a partial transfer proposal could have been especially challenging to
reluctant collectivists among Conservative politicians, since the area proposed by staff
(western rural Stirlingshire) regularly returned Conservative councillors.50o Staff proponents -
mistakenly - assumed that this would have greater appeal: it might have been perceived as
counter-productive if councillors were exposed and votes correspondingly prejudiced.
Satisfying tenants in a ballot became increasingly challenging in an increasingly tense
political climate preceding local and national elections.501 Thus, opposition was not just from
socialists but from paternalistic Tories (Thatcher, 1993). Such opposition meant that transfer
ideas never reached ballot in Stirling and possibly in other (Conservative) authorities where
the issue of stock transfer was never even raised.502
Tenant Ambivalence
Formal tenant opposition to council transfer came mainly from organised groups, vocally
opposed to any erosion of public housing.503 Tenants' groups in some areas were stacked
with 'old Labour' activists, mainly men, who used mischievous scare tactics against transfer
(Khan, 1996). Sellers were not prepared to push reluctant tenants. Affected tenants in small-
scale transfers did not usually resist though forceful individuals could delay transfer by
active and vociferous opposition. Before 1991, the absence of ballots meant there was no
mechanism for articulating or recording opposition,504 though councils used a variety of
consultation mechanisms (Nicholson, 1990). Later, informal consultation preceded ballot to
ensure a positive formal resuipo5 Local opponents were simply excluded from subsequent
developments or proposals dropped by the seller.506 The handful of tenants who voted
against proposals were viewed as using their opposition as leverage for a better house. 50?
Stirling tenants issued a press release objecting to transfer in principle after rejecting
Conservative councillors' first proposals for partial transfer of a peripheral town estate. Later
proponents then fought shy of tenant consultation though - with hindsight - staff thought
such consultation in another area would have produced a positive result,50B
499 Interview Harding Scott, Findlay, 1998.
500 Interview McDermott, 1998.
501 Interview Jones, McLaughlin, Smith, 1998.
502 Personal communication 1996: the former Leader of Eastwood council knew informally that transfer proposals would be
unwelcome, as his members adhered to a one-nation Tory view of council housing. Thus, he argued, it was never put on the
agenda. It may be relevant that Eastwood faced being the basis of a new smaller council rather than a larger one. See also
Chapter Seven about Ministers' views of local Conservative members' conservative views on housing.
503 The sm response to the Conservative Tenants Charter in 1991 was to issue an alternative tenants' charter campaigning
for the right to a council house.
504 Interviews Hastie, Smith, 1998. It is worth noting that government records of transfer in Scotland did not include any
reference to ballot outcomes.
505 Interview Smith, 1998, though this clearly did not happen in Wigtown DC.
506 Interviews Mulholland, Whitefield, McLaughlin, Smith 1998.
507 For example 3% of tenants in Forgewood voted against.
508 Interview McDermott, 1998.
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Latent opposition from tenants was suppressed by the incentive of improved housing
conditions using Community Ownership funding.509 Many noted a historical lack of trust
between tenants and landlords due to a legacy of poor treatment.510 Some interviewees
speculated that prior distrust between landlords and tenants would have adversely affected
a transfer proposals, and could only be addressed by tangible (resource) incentives.511 Fear
of a challenge to credibility - even perceived job risks - might have dissuaded council
officials from bringing up proposals for whole stock / large scale transfers as funding started
to diminish.
Staff: Management and Street Level Bureaucrats
The third group of potential opponents was staff. Trade unionists defended council housing
publicly on ideological grounds, but Nalgo/Unison had no formal policy of opposition to
transfer.512 This left individual staff and union members free to oppose disposals in practice,
promote them if their organisation so wished, or take jobs in the new organisations. Earlier
sections have argued that it was in the power of senior staff to make (or break) proposals:
less senior (housing) staff and senior corporate managers certainly had, and used, negative
power covertly to obstruct and thwart transfer.
Some middle managers in housing were increasingly unhappy as their employer's small-
scale proposals gathered momentum and the climate shifted towards satisfying consumer
rather than producer interests.513 Even though the scale of developments was fairly
insignificant, they believed that their jobs and role were under threat from transfers.
However they could not openly challenge policy led from above. Besides, it was suicidal to
challenge policy/ practice designed to empower tenants and lever in new resources.514
However, junior staff individually 'scare-mongered' against local proposals,515 and middle
managers converted ideological opposition into obstructive action.516 Senior corporate
managers and offcials outside housing departments were reported to stretch out
interdepartmental deliberations and quibble over tiny details. 
51? If it was not their intention to
obstruct or delay progress, that was certainly the effect.
509 Interviews Bryden, Muir, 1998.
510 Interview McLaughlin, 1998.
511 Jones commented that consultants 'knew' whether a proposal would win from the tone of relations picked up on the
doorsteps, when surveying tenant opinion. If the tenants did not trust their present landlord, they would not trust the same
people in a different organisation.
512 Formal Unison opposition (Scotland only) was noted in 2000 by the Scottish Parliament after a policy position was
adopted in 1999. Khan (1996) notes that Unison could not formally oppose government policy until policy proposals had
been made public, which was not the case at the time. A lengthy process of deliberation would be required in order to arrive
at a positon.
513 Interview Forbes, Crookston, 1998.
514 Interview Dhir, 1998.
515 Interview McLeish, Mulligan, 1998.
516 Interview Forbes, 1998.
517 Interviews Forbes, Jones, 1998.
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Later resistance to Community Ownership came from central personnel in Scottish Homes
involved in regulation, as shown in Chapter Eight,18 By the mid-1990s, Scottish Homes
needed larger landlord vehicles with their own reserves to support development,519 and
small organisations were increasingly seen as unsustainable (Scottish Homes, 1994;
SODD, 1996c). Thus while development staff promoted Community Ownership, Registration
staff undermined the establishment of new organisations.
Opposition was thus mostly suppressed, especially through resource incentives for tenants,
provided by the centre. Local politicians often suppressed their own objections by deferring
to tenants. Just as staff were key in initiating transfer in some areas, they were critical in
blocking transfer in others, lending weight to the argument for street level bureaucracy
(Hudson, 1997). Foot-dragging behaviour by staff was more effective in changing policy
direction and speed, providing evidence of action to achieve non-decision-making
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).
Officials: Holding the Key to Power?
By examining different stances and actions within each layer of decision-making, we can
see staff power in practice. Neither elected nor representative, but paid, staff had no formal
role in decisions but undertook most of the groundwork for elected representatives (some
paid) and volunteers who were ultimately responsible for taking decisions. The housing
literature underplays the significance of staff behaviour, action and power in preparing
formal decisions for others to take. Based on the evidence here from Scottsh transfers, staff
had and exercised effective informal and hitherto unaccounted power in both stimulating
and blocking transfer.
The range of organisations and protagonists within those organisations were the same in
each case but their relationship varied from case to case and from time to time, depending
on the interpersonal relations and dynamics of the individuals and circumstances. This study
reveals that the initiative for stock transfer could come from a number of sources but
chances of completion (and ultimately success) were enhanced, when they came from very
senior staff of the selling organisations. Figure 45 seeks to depict the original source of
initiative, who was enthusiastic or was persuaded, who was involved in bargaining,
preceding transactions and implementation and who opposed. In some respects, this
oversimplifies the array of interests, in others, it helps to clarify power in the process.
518/nterviews Hastie, Miler, 1998.
519/nterviews Anderson, Bres/in, Rend/e, Miller, 1998.
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Figure 45: Scottish transfer Case Studies - Protagonists' Roles
Organis-ation Role
Central
government
Government
agency
Seller
political! elected
civil service
board! appointed
Development (paid)
R&S (paid)
political! elected
official paid
tenant! vol. members
paid staff
paid staff
paid staff
Bu er
Lender
Consultant
Key
took initiative
enthusiastic supporter
persuaded to support
neutral
opposed/ resistant
unknown
Source: analysis of qualitative interviews, 1998
Initiative
Contrary to the common argument in the literature, responsibility for getting a matter such
as transfer on a council agenda lay more commonly with offcials than politicians. In small-
scale completed transfers, tenants of stock in poor condition520 had often been pressing for
improvements which the council could not fund due to capital borrowing constraints. Having
come up with transfer as a possible solution, the trick was gettng councillors to agree to
staff talking to tenants in the first place.521 Typically, senior staff had to 'soften up' elected
members though in some cases, the fact of tenant support (or at least lack of resistance)
allowed elected members to agree to proposals against their better judgement,22
A Shelter survey of authorities' responses to voluntary transfer (Nicholson, 1990) showed
that only two councils had a written policy and there was a general reluctance to initiate
action:
... the majority of authorities adopt a reactive stance, responding to tenant-
led initiatives, .... to locally based associations.
Nicholson, 1990: 6
520 The stock concerned was not necessarily the oldest stock of the council. Ina number of cases it had been buil within the
previous 20 - 30 years to very poor standards and was in low demand, often displaying problems of diffcult to let estates.
521 Inteiviews Whitefield, Rowbotham, Comley, 1998.
522 Inteiview Luke, 1998.
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In 1990, Berwickshire was among those which would 'not be considering transfer'. Although
in Berwickshire politicians drove the process (from 1992), their actions were triggered by the
Director of Housing before the 1992 election prior to his retirement. New staff responded
enthusiastically to their agenda.523 Stirling was in the category of authorities which 'would be
considering transfer' (Nicholson, 1990), yet at that time it was under Labour control and
interviews in this study revealed no evidence of transfer intentions before the Conservatives
took control in 1992. While politicians and junior staff came up with separate proposals
within months of each other, neither got off the ground.524
The initiative in Motherwell was equally shared between Scottish Homes' Development staff
and senior council staff, though it could equally be argued that the latter responded to a
funding opportunity, to deal with prior letting problems affecting housing.525 Enthusiastic
support of Scottish Homes development staff (instrumental in most small-scale cases) was
lacking in Dundee. The decision to support registration and the development of co-
operatives was eventually taken by the Board overturning staff recommendations, following
a judiciously timed visit instigated by council offcials.526
Response
Lack of opposition, or neutrality at least, was a pre-requisite for staff to be able to move
proposals on to the next stage of the process (e.g. from initiation to persuasion). Both
neutrality and lack of opposition were missing in Stirling. Tenants rejected Conservative
politicians' proposals for a partial disposal without finding out about possible incentives or
alternatives. When middle-ranking staff attempted to develop a proposal for a partial,
privately funded transfer, they had not cleared lines of authority with senior managers:527
Significantly, they were unable to convince senior staff or the ruling Conservative group to
support their plans, even though Stirling DC (1992- 95) was regarded as among the most
ideologically driven council in Scotland. This confirms that a positive top-down and bottom-
up reception from tenants, politicians and staff, were vital prerequisites to advancing
detailed proposals to persuasion and bargaining stages.
Persuasion and Bargaining
Gathering additional support required staff to turn lack of opposition into support and if
possible enthusiasm, most often evident from Scottish Homes' staff, based on their resource
523 Interview Jones, Findlay, 1998. It was only after 1992 that poliicians decided to act on the information. Berwickshire was
nominally Conservative though most respondents played down the ideological dimension of poliical control as there was no
group activity as such. The Housing Convenor (key figure in the transfer) even switched his allegiance to the SNP in 1993,
thereby removing the Conservatives' control of the council. Yet he retained his status as a senior councilor as if nothing had
happened. He presumed that the Leader of the council would have had some quiet influence with the politicians in central
government (not least through golfing networks) though this never materialised.
524 Interviews Harding, Scott, McDermott, 1998.
525 Interview Whitefield, 1998. Tenants in two areas responded positively while others were approached about possible
transfer (Community Ownership) and rejected the proposals (personal observation).
526 Interview Rowbotham, 1998.
527 Interview McDermott, Harding, Scott, 1998.
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power. It is suggested that persuasion based on deeper values became more critical as the
scale of the enterprise increased and (with later proposals) as resource incentives lessened,
where ballots acquired more significance. It was not just a question of not facing
opposition: where active support was lacking, proposals could be diverted,52B stumble or run
out of time (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).
Transaction and Implementation
Even after a ballot, mere neutrality could stymie proposals, as was narrowly avoided in
Berwickshire.529 Where preparation was properly conducted, ballots were won and
transactions could be completed. Failure at this stage was costly, reflecting lack of perfect
conditions for implementation (Sabatier, 1986).530
Main Relationships
In completed transfers, the Director of Housing was usually the primary contact with
politicians and officials in central government, up to and including the Minister, at least while
rules were being developed and while transfer was becoming established locally. Once
rules were clear, the main line of communication ran between the council's Assistant
Director of Housing and Principal Officers in the Scottish Office Development Division. Once
a pattern or procedure was established within the council, senior staff were only involved in
troubleshooting. Locally, the council and the new body liaised mainly via staff, drawing in
politicians at the early stage or where political weight was required to help resolve sensitive
policy or resource problems. Councillors and senior housing staff liaised with their
counterparts in other councils via the intergovernmental network (CoS LA) but its role in
stock transfer was limited to in-principle objections to government objectives in 1987 and a
Code of Conduct governing transfer in 1995 (CoSLA, 1989).
Committee members and staff of the new bodies liaised to a limited extent with their
counterparts in other parts of the country through a producer network (SFHA).531 The
structure of the SFHA changed between 1988 and 1997 to accommodate different new
constituencies of interest: rural, co-operative and transfer532 to allow people engaged in
similar activities to exchange ideas and channel lobbying activity. Staff - often from a
council background - remained involved with professional networks. While a number of
loose networks were present, they were in the background, leaving action to individuals in
particular organisations.
528 Some of the early tenants groups in Glasgow did not respond enthusiastically and were bypassed in favour of others
(Clapham et aI1991).
529 Lack of positive support and clear rules from politicians and civil servants contributed to delays in other councils,
perversely at a time when the government might have been expected to support such large scale disposals.
530 In Wigtown in 1995, staff ran out of time and so did not listen to tenants, did not prepare the technical basis of the
proposals and did not secure key actors' support.
531 SFHA is a separate Scottish autonomous producer network: its counterpart in England is the National Housing
Federation.
532 The 'transfer' category was usually joined by bodies formed or expanded to acquire stock from Scottish Homes and New
Towns.
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Accommodation and Mutual Adjustment:
Networks, Relationships and Dynamics of Interaction
While bodies representing institutional interests were inimical to transfer, they did not
circumscribe members' behaviour. Those who could have defended such interests locally,
acted to accommodate competing views on transfer, without advertising a change of stance
or decision as such. Individual incumbents were in effect unable to shun the chance of
resources and seller personnel deferred to tenant power, especially once ballots were in
place.533
Having seen council housing thus amenable to local negotiation, we can question the depth
of perceived attachment to council housing (Sabatier 1986). Committee activists
appreciated that there needed to be a change in the way things were done.534 Perhaps
tenants were more attached to physical comfort than tenure by being prepared to alter
identity if necessary. Such an important institutional change in such a hostile climate
required quiet action, which indicates that actors, notably tenants and staff, were prepared
to take action based on adjusted identities, creating the possibility of change (March and
Olsen, 1996).
An appetite for change in various camps was recognisable after the event, if not articulated
at the time.535 Arguably retrospectively councils could never have achieved regeneration on
this scale, while managing investment and empowering tenants.536 Tenant volunteers
accepting small-scale transfer responded to the pressures of under-investment and to the
opportunities for alternative investment via Community Ownership funding. Although
technically free to walk away from proposals, tenants could not resist exchanging tenure
ideology for comfort. This can be interpreted either as exchange (Hjern and Porter, 1981) or
power dependency (Rhodes, 1997), where one party (central government) has more power
to achieve change, through resources. The incentives for better housing through the new
bodies were usually too great to be dismissed, even though Chapters Seven and Eight
provide little evidence of central government deliberately constructing incentives in this way.
Placing tenants in charge of the new landlord bodies allowed latent conflict to be
suppressed.
533 See earlier chapters about compulsory transfers, House of Lords' amendments requiring tenant ballots and late
amendments to the 1988 Act regarding balloting tenants.
534 Interview Muir, 1998.
535 Interviews Jones, Mulholland, Muir, Breslin, Luke, 1998.
536 Interview McLaughlin 1998.
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Initially hostile elected members 'came round' to become Labour's reluctant privatisers, and
firm supporters of their local co-operative/housing association, provided tenants were in
favour.537 Many came to be persuaded to change their stance as visual evidence reinforced
desperation at the limited possibilities arising from constrained council resources and
prompted admiration of 'demonstration' projects.538 Moreover one or two dynamic councillors
were instrumental in changing minds within local (Labour) party groups and in driving
forward officials' ideas. Locally elected respondents generally thought they had been
instrumental in changing staff and tenants' minds in support of regeneration initiatives,539
though such leadership was only rarely identified by other respondents. By comparison,
staff were usually pivotal: councillors merely got out of the way.540
While 'demonstration projects' helped to clinch the decision for some (not Stirling), personal
connections helped others and dynamics between the various individuals were crucial in
any given project, for good or ilL. At one level, this reflects respondents' reluctance, or
inability, to distinguish formal position power from the exercise of power by individual
incumbents. Incumbents' failure to acknowledge their own power could be modesty or
reluctance to accept responsibility for their own actions, which would undermine the
paradigm of political responsibility. In doing so, they underplay the significance of
interpersonal dynamics.
The coincidence of formal and informal networks was vital in consolidating working
relationships between staff. Some had previously worked together and dispersed into
elTployment in the voluntary sector, in councils, in Scottsh Homes' Development funding or
Regulation teams. Interconnections between central and local government were more rare,
but there were linkages between individuals: some respondents referred to others as 'my
old friend'.541 Officials thus enjoyed position and personal power to 'deliver', a degree of
mutual professional understanding and frequent communication.
In a similar way, committee members in the buyer organisations bonded together, growing
through adversity. Although there may have been no history of such relationships in a local
area, these were clearly valued and there was much mutual respect and admiration, without
537 Interview McLaughlin 1998. Transfers took place in wards of some of the most senior commitee chairmen and in one
case in Motherwell, the ward of a Communist councillor, with his positive support.
538 Councillors (and tenants) were persuaded by visits to similar projects elsewhere. Visitors from Glasgow and Dundee
mentioned examples of relevant projects in Sweden, London or Liverpool pre 1985: later other visitors came to Glasgow from
other parts of Scotland, before taking up transfer. Councillors and others from Berwickshire and Stirling went to different
parts of England, and Grampian and Berwickshire was in turn visited by NE Fife DC and Wigtown. These had significance in
convincing local actors that ideas could work. Evidence of associations' track records through tenement rehabilitation work
particularly helped to persuade councilors with experience on local commitees in Glasgow and Dundee to see their potential
in other peripheral estates. Councilor visits to see the conditions in which their own tenants were living in peripheral estates
was also compelling in changing the minds of some elected members previously opposed to transfer to favour any form of
investment including co-operatives if necessary.
539 See also Cllr Lee's comments in previous chapters that councils had come up with the idea of transfer and got one over
on the government.
540 Interviews Comley, Rowbotham, Whitefield, 1998.
541 Interviews Dyer, Mils, 1998.
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undue complacency. There was less crossover and communication between
volunteers/activists and elected members, other than in whole stock transfer.542
Given the complexity of the process, progress by solitary action was impossible. Thus
alliances and coalitions were essential to deliver action. This confirms that progress and
completion depended critically on vertical interdependence between central government, its
agency, councils and buyers, in both directions (Rhodes, 1997). Not only were various
parties required to give formal approval, but active participation and ownership of
developments was a prerequisite and, in this respect, the presence of trust between
participants was vitaL. The teamwork relationship or 'spark' between certain officials was
critical in making things happen.543 Trust and understanding were vital not just between
officials but also with tenants and elected members in local government. Many of the sparks
to problem-solving and new thinking occurred outwith formal settings, emphasising the
almost accidental nature of the policy process (Kingdon, 1995). Moreover reports of
unexpected and casual encounters reveal the porousness of the policy community.544 The
evidence here reveals a pragmatic commitment to solving problems.
Lack of trust or alliances between senior staff and councillors fatally undermined aborted
LSVT proposals elsewhere (Khan, 1996).545 The relevance of personal credibility to policy
success was understood by some at the time. Certain elected representatives were chosen
to articulate the council's policy as some incumbents in formal positions were known to be
severely lacking in credibility.546 But the trust and credibility that characterised the completed
transfers in this study were missing in Stirling. While some objectives appear similar on
paper, the characters were strong and without positive interpersonal dynamics or mutual
respect. Some of the proponents were political opponents and were seen as aggressive,
unpopular, even untrustworthy. Mutual credibility of and respect for individuals promoting
new policies were lacking and rumours of internal strife within the ruling group meant that an
idea from one source would not be supported. Whether interpersonal trust could have
overcome ideological hostility in such a contested locality is mere conjecture.
Trust between actors was essential: even though they might not share a political outlook,
they needed to share common objectives, whether accessing much needed investment
and/or creating opportunities for local control. The fact that personnel turnover changed the
dynamics of relationships between roles emphasises the dependence of progress on
interpersonal dynamics and trust.547 Not only did this affect processes but also outcomes.548
542 Inteiview Findlay, 1998.
543 Inteiviews Anderson, Jones, McDermott, Crooks ton, Mills, Miler, Smith, 1998.
544 Inteiviews Bryden, Rodgers, Findlay, Mills, Ancram, 1998.
545 Khan examined Wigtown, NE Fife and Stewartry in some detail in 1995/6 for an unpublished MSc dissertation on
councils' attempts at whole stock transfer.
546 Inteiviews Wiseman, Breslin, Dyer, 1998.
547 Inteiviews Forbes, Mulholland, Crooks ton, Rowbotham, 1998.
548 As a result, some groups formed in the early 1990s were born of conflict between interests and ultimately failed to thrive.
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While the policy studies literature discusses the nature of pressure groups, the stability and
interdependence of networks, whether group members are insider or outsiders to the policy
process, very litte is said about trust (or the lack of it) and interpersonal dynamics in the
conduct of policy. If anything, it is implicit in the context of programme structures, to which
we now turn.
Programme structures
If the 1987 government objectives are taken at face value, the government did not
consciously or deliberately provide agency or clear objectives as to what should, or would,
come out of the pressures. There was arguably no programme of action other than the Right
to Buy and even that relied on tenants using the provisions. If anything, small scale transfer
is bottom-up policy.
Chapter Two showed Hjern and Porter's ideas about bottom-up implementation structures,
containing seven broadly theoretical statements about administration, now annotated with
the small-scale council transfer programme in mind, as follows:
Participants have a variety of goals and motives: motives were labelled differently but
agreement on these was not required as long as each was satisfied. Co-ops delivered
empowerment to suit some, while delivering resources to suit others;
Programme rationales determine how resources are applied: Community Ownership funding
criteria allowed Scottish Homes Development staff and council offcials to package projects
to receive resources;
Authority relationships are replaced by 'co-ordinative competence': quality of buyer staff
appointments was salient, as were communication and trust between protagonists at
different levels;
In the face of local discretion, control strategies are of limited value: Chapter Eight showed
the weakness of control at the top/centre over local or priority resource distribution.
Programme managers in Scottish Homes could not control the supply of transferred stock;
There is no single structure of implementation but a variety. different scales of organisation
and programme emerged to accommodate local bargaining though the programme became
more uniform through regulatory intervention;
Each structure contains specialised roles which vary from programme to programme: the
process required many different contributions depending on constant communication and
bargaining;
Structures differ in cohesiveness and shift continually. practice changed over time and not
all transfers to new bodies proved sustainable.
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These annotations are based primarily on interpretations of actors' behaviour. These
statements are the nearest that policy theory comes to explaining partial subsidised
transfers in Scotland. It would be interesting to test the generalisability of these statements
by examining English (partial) subsidised transfers using this framework.549 However it is
doubtful if it would apply to whole stock transfer in Scotland, based on the cases examined
here.
Conclusions
All completed transactions were preceded by complex interactions and a range of different
actors working in concert, persuading, bargaining and securing approval ready for
implementation. In these interactions, officials were consistently more important than
elected members, as they could either stimulate or resist change. Although elite actors were
not willing to claim responsibility for decisions or innovation at the time, interviews revealed
them to be more sanguine a decade later about conceding the manner of their involvement
and their thinking. This is a consequence of conducting interviews 'after the event': these
accounts were not readily available at the time. They also saw the 'policy' as success and
sought at least to share the credit. This success could not have been guaranteed in earlier
years, nor might they have wished to be seen to have had such influence on policy
development, while the policy was 'live'.
In small-scale transfers at least, councillors were also less powerful than tenants, which
itself represented a seismic shift in power relations in council housing. Others, including
staff, suppressed opposition if tenants were in favour. Latent tenant opposition was defused
by means of resource incentives in small-scale transfers and by bringing tenants into control
of the new landlords. Early transfers cleared blockages and provided compelling
demonstration projects, which allowed resistant elected members to see how control might
usefully remain in a collective/local and voluntary domain (rather than become private or
bigger). This adjustment of identity and values allowed incremental institutional change to
take place.
Invisible entrepreneurs, mostly officials, formed alliances based on mutual trust, proposing
transfer as a solution to various problems (demand, conditions, investment and
regeneration, tenant participation).55o Politicians both in local councils (mainly Labour) and
central government (Conservative) responded to transfer as a 'solution' generated by such
entrepreneurs. Solutions addressed the problems and preferences of paid officials,
responding to deeper problems of resource allocation beyond their control. Once politicians
could see these proposals as providing a solution to their problems, they adopted them as
their own. Where in early cases, pressure for some solution came from tenants, later (at roll-
549 ERCF programme appeared more top-down by virtue of competitive bidding, terms and parameters set in advance,
administration by a government department rather than an agency, up-front funding and clear annual spend.
550 This was not a core objective in the early English transfers nor was it an outcome but in Scotland most of the buyers in
stock transfer were small tenant-controlled bodies, though this changed over time.
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out) it was more often local managers who identified problems and persuaded tenants to
support solutions.
Potential tenant opposition to changing property rights was suppressed by incorporation and
incentives. Potential resistance thus yielded to pragmatic accommodation. The concept of
programme structures provides the most plausible explanation for what happened in small-
scale transfer with stealthy accommodation of interests at the local scale, by latent
opponents. The later withdrawal of resources was partly responsible for changing
bargaining terms about transfer. Where new tenant-controlled bodies were promoted in rule
development and roll out phases, new problems and a changing environment caused
support for such bodies to diminish. Later, resistance to old policy became manifest in
practice within Scottish Homes, before the new policy was adopted.
Larger-scale transfers were explored with some stealth after the re-election of the
Conservatives in 1992. While local government reorganisation drove some to consider stock
transfer, it also constrained the window of opportunity: although in the end the outgoing
councils had three years to achieve change, this could not be anticipated and rules about
transfer were insufficiently clear to allow effective use of the time available. Moreover, for
councillors facing election in 1995 and 1997, concern mounted about the adverse electoral
consequences of implementing Tory-inspired policy, however strong the financial
imperatives.
Visible champions were most evident among community activists, but rare overalL. Less
visible champions in neighbourhoods initiated and progressed small scale transfers -
council, agency and buyer officials - did so in response to resource problems, created by
central government without stock transfer as an intended outcome. Officials had no formal
power but in the absence of initial opposition, they exercised influence to persuade and
bargain with amenable tenants about proposals, eventually winning support via ballots.
Their capacity was based on power to influence agendas, to regulate new bodies, secure
and manage resources, and promote ballots underpinning formal decision-making. Visible
champions were not so essential when incentives were available to persuade actors to
change their stance, but transfer without resource incentives could not be progressed
without credible visible champions.
Power in the policy process affecting small-scale transfers was more evident as pragmatic
action than as decision-making based on stances. The pattern of consensus,
accommodation and adjustment in the case of completed transfers was missing in the
aborted transfer. Even avowedly radical local Conservative politicians avoided courting
controversy by pursuing transfer. Stirling should be seen as non-decision-making, rather
than opposition, abortion rather than failure.
Non-decision-making and inaction about transfer are thus evident. Absence of transfer
could be read as weak or strong conviction in councils facing external pressure for change.
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No visible champions were forthcoming among the politicians. In councils (not under Labour
control) who considered larger transfers later, the rules were neither clarified in time nor
eventually so appealing to tenants, whose vital support was too difficult to deliver in a hostile
political climate. Absence of larger transfer could be interpreted as staff aversion to risk,
more inaction than non-decision-making, and not necessarily based on ideological
resistance. A critical opportunity for investment drove invisible entrepreneurs in Labour-held,
urban councils to form improbable coalitions for partial transfer. A plausible explanation for
absence of voluntary transfer elsewhere is senior officials' reluctance to broach transfer as
poliicians approached elections.
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Chapter Eleven
Voluntary Stock Transfer - A Case of Policy Emergence?
The introduction to this thesis revealed the seeming paradox of Labour councils voluntarily
acting to dispose of rented housing while formally opposed to government policy to that
effect. It also showed the paradox of government cutting spending, not least on housing,
while making available additional resources to support investment in former council housing,
before it changed its own rules about the financing of transfer. Using an original definition of
'transfer', the thesis set out to challenge the assumption in the secondary housing literature
that there was no transfer in Scotland, and to reveal who had conducted transfers, why and
by what means. It thus sought to explain both this paradox and the absence of transfer after
formal policy adoption. Given the contested meanings of 'policy', the study sought to use
competing theories about policy making to answer these questions. In particular two
contrasting ideal types were identified to understand more about policy-making.
This chapter therefore brings together key themes from the specialist literature, linking with
methodological and theoretical concepts from the literature on policy studies. It deliberates
on the nature of policy-making based on this case and its implications for the period after
1997. It starts by summarising the argument around who transferred what, why and how. It
considers the relative contributions of the various methodological and theoretical
approaches, before claiming contributions to knowledge about policy-making and housing,
finally arriving at conclusions about the emergence of policy about transfer in Scotland.
Transfer in Scotland: Who, Why, How
Who? Mostly Labour-Controlled Councils
A large number of transactions were conducted, mainly in urban central Scotland. Most
were partial, one was whole. Transactions started in 1986 and most were completed by
1995/6, when activity all but stopped. Most of the 17 sellers were Labour-controlled though
two Conservative-controlled councils conducted transfers: one very early in the period, via a
series of partial transactions in an out-of-town estate, with subsidy. The other was only
nominally Conservative, and sold its mainly rural housing stock prior to reorganisation of
local councils into one much larger body. Most partial disposals were to small, new, tenant-
controlled organisations, with newly recruited staff though by the mid-1990s, more existing
associations with reserves were involved in acquisition. In the latter (nominally
Conservative) case, the control of the buyer organisation was vested in wider local interests,
including a few tenants and it was managed by former council housing staff. All transfer
landlords were state-regulated, making them eligible for government subsidy which most
received, notably for partial transfer until 1996.
Inside selling and buying organisations, action depended on individuals. Although the
bodies representing the views of councils, political organisations (other than Conservatives),
staff and tenants were vehemently opposed to transfer, individuals took local action on a
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small scale towards transfer. Elected members played a limited role, rarely championing
proposals and operating chiefly in the background, more often than not suspending doubt.
Arguably local tenants enjoyed greater power than offered under the previous council
housing paradigm, whether by participating in ballots or controlling the boards of the new
landlords. The main actors inside the selling and buying organisations were officials,
supported or channelled by their counterparts in the government's housing agency,
responsible for funding and regulation respectively. Government agency offcials were
critically well placed to secure and distribute resources to former council housing: the
agency's use of resources was not generally documented in such a way as to allow
government or others to monitor spending relative to objectives.
Why? Twin Rationales of Investment and Local Control
In spite of stakeholder attachment to council housing and vocal opposition to transfer, local
interactions allowed two sets of imperatives driving transfer to be accommodated. At the
headline level, these two imperatives were investment and local control. It could be argued
that investment and local control resonate with contemporary central government objectives
about investment and empowerment, at least at the level of rhetoric. Both were essentially
about the increased role and power of private - including voluntary, rather than public -
interests. However there was no evidence in this study that actors outside central
government in Scotland agreed with central government objectives, consciously responded
to them, or - still less - implemented them.
What respondents understood by 'investment' and 'local control' varied according to local
circumstances. Local control does not feature particularly strongly as a rationale for transfer
in the literature and may be of greater relevance in Scotland than in England, interpreted
both at the neighbourhood scale and at the district scale arising from reorganisation. In
subsidised partial transfers, 'local control' effectively meant the new landlords being
neighbourhood, tenant-based organisations as against centralised or professionally-
dominated municipal bodies. In larger-scale transfers, it meant reducing the threat of losing
out to a new political body at reorganisation (larger or regional), without necessarily placing
tenants in control of the new bodies. Investment was more commonly interpreted as
subsidy than borrowing. In relation to small-scale transfer, investment primarily constituted
subsidy to improve conditions. In larger, whole-stock transfer, where current conditions were
not dire, investment was seen as private re-financing to support future development.
The dataset revealed steady growth in transactions, stock and public resources until 1995/6;
thereafter there was a sharp fall in numbers of both transactions and resources. While it is
relatively easy to explain the basis of resource cuts with reference to the wider financial
environment, interest in transfer among sellers may have fallen off first. Records of resource
cuts merely coincide with the fall in transactions and it has not been possible to establish
from analysis of quantitative data whether falling local demand for transfer led to resource
cuts or vice versa. Later Scottish Homes' records of spending allocations suggested more
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resources going into former council housing than the researcher had been able to associate
with particular transactions for the database, though the decline from 1995/6 is similarly
marked. The gap between the database and the agency's records points to the extent of
managerial discretion in decision-making about where to allocate and how to record
resources, though it might reveal methodological shortcomings about the definition of
transfer and the use of secondary data based on official records. Regardless of which
explanation applies, the inadequacy of records, definitions and data, internal or published,
meant that government actors barely knew at the time or since how much money was spent
in this area, nor to what effect.
How? Constraints and Incentives, Bargaining and Accommodation
The completed transfers existed mostly in the absence of a formal framework of legislation,
apart from the important but belated requirement for tenant consent. In this respect council
disposals were strictly voluntary. Rules and levers under central ministerial and
administrative control served more effectively to constrain than to direct action. In the case
of partial transfers, resources were secured from government funds. Government initially
responded to ground-level pressure from tenants in dire conditions who had powerful,
selfish reasons to secure resources. Later rule changes emphasising private funding
(eclipsing subsidy) emerged prior to formal adoption in guidance in 1996, as an extension of
prior action by government agency actors in wider arenas (Scottsh Homes, Scottish New
Towns and English LSVT).
Resources were made available by agency offcials securing ministerial support for public
investment for council housing, with little evidence of rational policy-making. Senior staff
were critical at many stages in setting agendas and in brokering and nourishing
relationships, horizontally and vertically, as they moved freely between politicians,
professionals and community activists. Later, larger transfers also depended on offcials;
this time in alliance with elected members and the wider community identifying transfer as a
solution to problems of future investment, not unlike their English counterparts.
Tenants were given incentives and opportunities to control the new bodies in partial transfer.
In the end tenants responded to such incentives, attenuating any ideological attachment to
tenure. These instruments could be construed as deliberate incorporation. At the local scale,
institutional stakeholders whose national representative bodies articulated opposition to
transfer engaged with others to solve problems presented by lack of investment through
existing, established routes. They did so quietly, without a fanfare of publicity, by forming
new alliances and by adjusting identities, roles and relationships. Bargaining between
governmental and voluntary actors in local processes was thus of critical importance.
A key factor in the absence of whole transfer and the decline of disposal transactions on any
scale, was the wider restructuring of councils generally. If senior staff were critical in placing
transfer on the agenda, it was especially they who were challenged by the very short
timescale for completing preparations for the new councils, with councillors already facing
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major disruption to constituencies and power relations. In that turbulent climate, anything
with the potential to rock the political boat went overboard, including - arguably especially -
council housing transfer, given ideological leakage from other forms of transfer. The window
of opportunity remaining after reorganisation, was too small for change, with an imminent
general election expected to produce a Labour government and the possibility of 'salvation'
through policy change.
Though the formal decisions and documents indicate that legislative change in local
government structures and resource pressures developed in parallel, this study showed
local government reform preceding critical pressure on resource incentives. The researcher
concluded, however tentatively, that policy-makers did not anticipate the consequences of
reorganisation for transfer and that timing of cuts was coincidentaL.
Methodological Issues
The main approaches used in this study fell into one of three schools of theory:
behaviourism, institutionalism and new institutionalism, incorporating rational choice. A
combination of methods was used, including quantitative analysis of secondary data,
qualitative analysis of secondary literature, primary documents and key actor interviews.
Interviews explored concepts from policy theory including the interests, preferences and
power of actors; the relative importance of formal decision-making and action at different
scales and in different periods; the nature of the processes at work; the existence of
networks and relationships between (groups of) actors; relative power and control from the
top / centre. These methods were designed to reveal different, potentially complementary,
aspects of policy-making about transfer. The focus of this section is on the contribution
made by the various methods while referring to relevant policy literature.
Behaviourist Focus On Outcomes
In this study, a quantitative approach using analysis of secondary data revealed, for the first
time, the uneven spatial and temporal distribution and incidence of transfer in England and
Scotland. Whereas analysis of qualitative data focussed on completed and failed (or
aborted) transfers only in Scotland, quantitative analysis focussed on completed transfers in
England and Scotland, permittng and limiting the comparability of English and Scottish
transfer.
Weakness and sensitivity in the policy process itself contributed to such data not being
available sooner about Scotland or England. In the end, the availability of quantitative data
at a later stage provided the opportunity to bring out the similarities and differences between
English and Scottish approaches to transfer, at different junctures. Data showed the longer-
term pattern of transfer in Scotland and the abrupt decline in transactions from 1995/6.551
Data collection after the event also permitted an original definition of the phenomenon
derived from use in the field, based on analysis of qualitative interviews.
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Reliance on official access to sensitive secondary data constrained the design of the
research and limited the potential to follow through on questions arising from the
quantitative analysis. Because the qualitative fieldwork was already completed when this
was verified, it was only possible to interrogate evidence already collected from interviewees
and documents. Had the interviews succeeded quantitative analysis, key actors might have
been asked to offer explanations, for example of the dramatic decline in funding in 1995/6.
More robust conclusions might then have been possible about factors causing decline in
partial transfers.
Research can usefully draw attention to and interpret the significance of existence of data
and access. This applies where official data might reasonably be expected to exist, be
available and be analysed automatically or in particular ways. Such a focus can bring to light
issues about policy-makers' concerns, which the researcher did not set out to find, though
this requires detachment which can be hard for a researcher to achieve when operating as a
semi-insider.
Qualitative Approaches: Institutionalist Focus On Formal Rules
Qualitative methods were invaluable for understanding mechanics of policy-making.
Institutionalism provided a spotlight on rules in changing actors' strategies though
examination of this policy sphere showed the weakness of highly formal rules including
legislation, other than to constrain behaviour. Formal decision-taking (to support or oppose
transfer) was generally less important than action and inaction (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963),
revealed here through other methods. The discretion of bureaucrats, outwith direct
government control, operating within rules determined and applied by government agencies,
carried much more significance in determining the incidence and shape of small-scale
transfers. This focus on process, which was present and indeed important in all cases
studied here. The institutionalist focus on stages in a process assisted crucially in defining
and analysing roles and power relations at various junctures.
Analysis of documents and interviews found little intention or deliberation to effect council
transfer in the government's Scottish legislative proposals in the late 1980s. The duty to
consult tenants was essentially an afterthought, due to a late intervention by the House of
Lords, responding to overt conflict about premature consultation experience in England,
originally derived from proposed compulsory transfer arrangements. Some of the most
important changes to power relations in the process of transfer throughout Britain, were thus
triggered by footnotes to essentially English legislation. The focus on legislation confirmed
that the requirement on sellers (in Scotland and England) to demonstrate to Ministers that
tenants were not opposed to transfer, accidentally gave potential opponents power in the
process of transfer. This presented opportunities for latent rather than overt conflct (Ham
and Hill, 1993) to defuse tenant opposition, in the form of incorporation rather than coercion
(Hill, 1997a). Other legislation in Scotland (notably local government reorganisation and
551 Transfer transactions in Scotland had not risen to their previous level by January 2003.
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mandatory disposal via New Town wind-up) affected councils' boundaries, structures and
functions more broadly.
A focus on action on the ground was recommended in situations when there appeared to be
no originating programme or output evidence (Hill, 1997b). However there is a danger in
assuming that examining documents is not useful because there is no programme: adopting
Hill's approach in this case might have led to the neglect of key sources. By contrast, the
researcher revisited legislation and accessed to material not otherwise available, based on
persistence and trust arising from former professional relationships and networks.
Researchers must persist in looking for such materials, if necessary using insider access,
though this can compromise detachment. A traditional, institutionalist examination of
legislative rules (Rhodes, 1997; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) contributed to the explanation of
transfer through the post hoc requirement to demonstrate consent. Using documentary
analysis based on policy programmes, as is common in housing studies, thus remains
valuable up to a point.
New Institutionalism: The Role of Incentives and Interests
Examination of less formal rule changes and especially of incentives shone light on
government control of agents and resource distribution (Lane and Ersson, 2000). Interviews
and document analysis revealed the weakness of ministerial control over governmental
officials. Civil servants initiated the restructuring of rules underpinning the treatment of
borrowing by housing associations, though as Campbell and Wilson, (1998) argue, without
fully understanding or anticipating the consequences. Ministers agreed additional grant
allocations to a government agency at a critical juncture, while exercising weak control over
the agency's use of subsidy (Scottish Offce, 1996c), and squeezing municipal resources.
Analysis of interviews and documents pointed to an invisible entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995)
responsible for implementation, exploiting ministerial acquiescence in access to and use of
resources.
The use of these resources to distribute development grant to housing associations into
urban areas to support refurbishment of transferred council estates, was neither trumpeted
nor controversiaL. However, analysis of expenditure outcomes and primary documents
reveals that their availability depended in part on more controversial disposal transactions
conducted by the agency itself, and also known as transfers (though on different terms).
Ministers permitted the resulting receipts to be recycled for investment rather than to
redeem debt. The government agency's impending insolvency - for the third time in ten
years - compounded Scottsh Offce budget problems created by the Industry
Department,52 Such problems provided the imperative for remedial action by cutting
resources, though the decision to cut was only taken following ministerial personnel
changes, with ministers personally blamed for the cuts.
552 New Town stock transfer to local authorities without producing a net receipt in PSBR terms.
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Policy as Process - Bargaining: Using Case Studies and Elie Interviews
Behaviour at the local scale to complete transfer was revealed mainly by examining power
relations (Dahl, 1957; Ham and Hill, 1993) and through examination of policy as process,
(Gardiner et aI, 1991; Audit Commission, 1993). This approach relied on case study
evidence - from Glasgow, Dundee and MotherwelL. The process was adapted to expose
roles and layers of action and decision-making (Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hill, 1997a).
Analysis of interviews in the case studies showed how informal support had to be garnered
in order to secure later formal approvals: senior staff in selling organisations had a vital role
in initiating, persuading and bargaining with others to achieve change (March and Olsen,
1996). A series of local advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1986) were built upon pre-existing
coalitions, due to the prior development of housing associations, with cumulative learning
and change at the policy core (Hall, 1993), before transfer came on to the agenda as such.
Such learning included the revised treatment of housing association borrowing (as private),
control of housing organisations by tenants and local residents rather than elected
politicians. Local coalitions producing improbable alliances of tenants, councillors, and
housing managers. While document analysis showed representatives of such interests
vociferously opposed any dismantling of council housing, interviews revealed individuals at
the local scale accommodating each other in such coalitions.
Case study material was interpreted in relation to new institutionalist theory about the role of
incentives (Lane and Ersson, 2000). Tenants were - in the main - incentivised by resource
distribution via the government's agency. They were thereby convinced to support change
to improve immediate living environments. Arguably security and physical comfort were the
'deep core' values at play (Sabatier, 1986) rather than ideological attachment to tenure.
Other stakeholders (councillors and trade unionists) who might have been expected to be
formally opposed to transfer, suppressed effective opposition as long as local tenants
supported proposals for change (March and Olsen, 1996). Interviews brought out the ways
in which senior council offcials (reluctantly) linked the solution of transfer of ownership to
associations to problems of investment and local control. Senior staff could thus be seen as
vital invisible entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995) both in partial transfer (Glasgow, Dundee and
Motherwell) and in whole stock transfer (Berwickshire). It could be argued from this premise,
that senior staff were also critical to inaction, though further research would be required on
abortive transfers and non-transferring councils to verify such a hypothesis.
Rational Choice: Interplay of Constraints and Incentives
A rational choice perspective provided compelling evidence of the interplay of incentives
and constraints. The literature suggests that at the deepest level, policy based on rational
choice theory may have underpinned central government decision-making about the
structure of incentives and constraints (Campbell and Wilson, 1998). This study showed that
while the process, rules and constraints were the same across Scotland, not all actors
responded equally to them, as seen in the uneven distribution of transactions. But the effect
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of incentives and constraints was revealed in particular cases examined: for example,
Glasgow's officials pursued creative routes to public funds and Berwickshire councillors
sought to protect local control of local assets via housing stock transfer. Qualitative semi-
structured interviews exploring interactions at the local scale facilitated examination of
action taken by individuals inside organisations. This consistently emphasised the
importance of senior staff relationships, issues not generally recognised to be important in
the traditional institutional approach.
A rational choice perspective also allowed us to see how offcials exploit systems of political
authority in ways we tend not to acknowledge in Britain, arguably especially in Scotland, in
spite of ministerial dependence on civil servants (Midwinter et aI, 1991). Qualitative
evidence here revealed that offcials had and used power and influence, though such
respondents were not always happy to acknowledge their own role and power. Invisible
entrepreneurs were very powerful and largely unchecked. The evidence showed too how
visible champions were more strongly present and effective at the local neighbourhood
scale, in the community, than among elected representatives. Perhaps certain individuals in
Berwickshire prove the exception rather than the rule.
Senior officials quietly promoted solutions, which accommodated government goals for
increasing the role of the private (i.e. not public) sector, but on terms conflicting with other
government priorities. Scottish transfers thus used generous subsidy without significantly
increasing private investment, not at all what the government had professed as its
objectives. Actors' interests clashed on grand ideological questions, but they
accommodated others' competing values/ stances, redefining their core values in the
process.
Analysing elite interviews, the researcher concluded that successful, stealthy operations
depended critically on trust and the quality of interpersonal relationships between individuals
in pivotal roles. This dimension of policy success was largely absent in the theory reviewed
for this study. The most relevant literature focuses on more formal aspects of networks and
policy communities in public sector organisations (Richardson and Jordan, 1987; Grant,
1995; Baggot, 1995; Rhodes, 1997).
Balancing Alternative Methods: Issues for Future Methodology
None of the theory reviewed for this study brought out the significance of trust in
interpersonal relations during paradigm shifts. Arguably, the more pronounced the
dissonance between stance and action (Brunsson, 1989), the more useful it is for research
to focus on the behaviour of individuals at the local scale, as achieved here through the
case studies. Such research not only requires reflexivity on the part of the researcher
(Alvesson and Skjoldberg, 2000), but also greater reflection on the part of the research
subjects. The abiding problem is that individual actors are not generally aware of the
meaning of their actions day to day (March and Olsen, 1996). Methodological challenges
thus remain in realising such an approach: these might be resolved by examining the
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actions of individuals in certain types of roles, recognising their organisational settings, but
without assuming that the organisation's stated policy or stance represents the whole
picture. This should impel policy researchers especially in Britain, to look at, but also
beyond, documents and rules structuring the behaviour of individuals. Methods to bring
forward evidence would need to instantiate particular episodes of exchange or transaction
(Hastings, 1996), from a range of perspectives. Research could establish the range of each
actor's contacts and networks in relation to particular episodes. However the normal
constraints on research resources would undoubtedly limit the number of episodes which
could be examined in this way and selection would need to be careful and considered. This
reinforces the argument for a case study approach to allow theory to be built up through a
series of heuristic case studies (Eckstein, 2000). Such an approach does not obviate the
researcher's responsibility for interpreting the meaning of actors' behaviour.
As discussed in Chapter Two, Hill (1997b) and Sabatier (1986) argued that appropriate
methods were required to suit different policy situations. Such choice presumes sufficient
prior knowledge of the phenomenon to judge the relevance or utility of different theoretical
or methodological assumptions. This increases the prospect of research finding the answers
it set out for, maximising consistency while minimising the opportunity for new or
unexpected perspectives. In practice, research methods are also chosen to suit available
resources, which limits the scope for deploying a range of approaches to the same
phenomenon. Moreover there may be imperatives against unorthodox perspectives, which
present particular challenges to research on politically sensitive arenas such as ownership
and control of public assets or services. Methodological choices necessitated by such
constraints may bring conceptual coherence, but at the expense of diversity.
Following Hill's advice in this case would have overlooked valuable evidence: ignoring
documents and legislation in the case of the partial transfers on the assumption that they
were 'programme-free', would have omitted relevant material producing significant
conclusions. Neglecting local interaction around completion and failure in larger scale
transfer would have been similarly mistaken. Even though certain methods seemed not to
'fit' certain situations, the range of methods applied was valuable throughout the period,
regardless of the type of policy situation. Preliminary assessment of a policy situation cannot
entirely determine what is relevant: that is the purpose of investigation. In adopting an open,
multi-theoretical approach, this study of housing transfer in Scotland found that different
methods can be combined meaningfully, shedding new light on different aspects of complex
social phenomena. Behavioural, quantitative approaches point to evidence of actions and
decisions, though, as identified by Marsh and Stoker (1995), with a tendency to describe
rather than explain. Qualitative, institutional approaches provide much useful explanatory
materiaL. Different approaches enrich understanding and are not merely beneficial but vitaL.
While it may be unconventional to combine different, ostensibly incompatible approaches,
this thesis shows the benefits of approaching social phenomena using complementary
methods assoicated with different theoretical assumptions.
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Theoretical Contribution: Ideal Types and Phases of Policy-Making
Chapter Two summarised assumptions about two ideal models of policy-making, denoted
as 'rational' and 'opportunistic'. It also hypothesised two phases of policy-making in Scottsh
transfers without assuming that these necessarily corresponded to the theoretical models.
The models are now reviewed, bringing together empirical evidence collated so far about
partial and whole transfers in Scotland. The contribution of the study to the literature about
policy-making and housing is addressed in the next section.
Rational model
This model contained a series of assumptions ranging across state control of resources and
opponents, explicit policy objectives, primacy of political actors and good understanding of
cause and effect. The model firstly assumed greater state power, by virtue of control of rules
and resources. Four sets of controls and rules provide evidence of the greater power of the
state, interpreted here as including governmental agencies, (without assuming that
employees of the state necessarily act purely on its behalf). The four comprise successive
constraints on council housing finances, the restructuring of PSBR rules benefiting housing
association borrowing and the allocation of public funds subsidising former council housing.
These three provided a framework of constraints and incentives informing transfer decision-
making and action along with a fourth, (belated) legislation which required, in effect, tenant
consent to disposaL. Otherwise, key mechanisms of central government control using
legislation were of more relevance in explaining the absence of transfer than its existence.
Secondly, the model claimed effective (state) control of local actors' behaviour using
incentives and constraints. The application of resource incentives facilitated local action but
without constituting effective control. Though it has been argued earlier that government
was more effective in constraining council (seller) action than in directing voluntary (buyer)
action, it is not clear that squeezing resources in the early 1980s was designed to produce
stock transfer as such. Moreover, these constraints also triggered other perverse responses
(including increasing flows of revenue funding into capital investment works, ultimately
funded by state assistance via Housing Benefit). Incentives and constraints offer no
guarantee of utilisation or desired consequences.
Thirdly the model suggests 'conscious use of incorporation to subvert opposition'. There is
limited evidence in this study to support the argument that the central state consciously
incorporated opponents. Tenant opposition in some instances was in effect defused by
creating co-operatives and it could be argued that offcials in the local state in Glasgow
offered tenants opportunities to take control of the new bodies for this very purpose.
However these new bodies were designed as temporary custodians of redevelopment until
the state agency of the Housing Corporation reinterpreted the proposals on a more
permanent basis, building in pre-existing models of ownership and governance thus creating
new demands for services. It is thus not clear that incorporation was a deliberate tactic in
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partial transfer. The lack of consultation with insider pressure groups preceding the issue of
guidance in 1996 suggests that incorporation was not employed later either.
Fourthly, according to the rational model, pre-defined outcomes could be assessed against
clear public statements of policy (intentions). Until the government sought to direct transfer
activity using draft guidance in 1996, there were no clear statements of policy or
programmes indicating a government seeking extensive whole stock transfer. To the extent
that the guidance was a clear statement, it produced no effect. Moreover outcomes could
barely be defined after the event, still less in advance. It is not clear how the rational model
explains the existence of multiple partial transactions in the absence of programme
objectives.
The model suggested fifthly that policies were the product of political work by elected
members, in a linear and logical process. To the extent that elected members were involved
in policy-making about stock transfer, evidence here suggests that most were reacting to
agendas initiated elsewhere, amongst offcials, leaked from similar bodies and responding
to resource incentives from the centre. Whether in central or local government, politicians
were rarely at the forefront of transfer developments, more often than not suspending
opposition, acquiescing in or legitimising others' proposals. On a related note, the sixth
feature of the model is the idea that elected members are supported by officials paid to
implement policy in an assumed hierarchical chain of command and co-ordination. As
suggested above, evidence of a hierarchical chain of command has been scant in this
study. Moreover, when politicians assumed control, the proposals generally failed.
Finally the model assumed that government would have adequate understanding of
problems and solutions as well as a valid theory of cause and effect. Evidence here
suggests that in partial transfer government did not grasp the extent of problems in council
housing, the costs of addressing those problems, the output for resources invested or the
significance of subsidy in facilitating transfer. Key actors in the government agency
understood these issues but they did not operate according to some hierarchy of command:
they were clearly not under control (Scottish Offce, 1996c). In whole transfers, government
did not understand the limitations of read-across from transfer practice in England, in terms
of motives, valuation, politics or processes. Nor did central government comprehend the
negative spillover effects from New Town wind-up and local government reform on their
housing policy aims.
This study of a long critical episode of policy-making on British housing policy shows the
limited utility of the rational modeL. It appears ineffective in explaining actions or outcomes
beyond the existence of underpinning rules and resources. These are the manifestations of
the superior power of state, structuring others' actions, though without knowing or
anticipating their consequences. Crucially, explaining the involvement of local staff and
tenants is not assisted by this modeL.
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Opportunistic model
This model contained different assumptions about policy-making, emphasising action inside
and outside the state, accommodation of conflict between actors about certain kinds of
issues, the importance of timing and critical junctures producing emergence rather than
formal adoption of policy. Firstly the model claimed that what mattered was action on the
ground not stated policy intentions. Though stated policy on partial transfer was absent,
action could be measured by numbers of transactions or episodes of decision-making.
Similarly if action was what mattered, whole transfer produced no outcomes after it had
been adopted as policy by central government. Thus, in highlighting the gap between policy
as action and stated intentions, the opportunistic model in this study validates the focus on
action and outcome which is so pertinent in Scottish partial transfer, though neglected in
accounts of UK housing policy.
Secondly, the model presumes that actors outside the state are no less powerful than state
actors including elected members. As indicated above in relation to the rational model, that
elected members did not have more power to make things happen, though they retain
considerable negative power in suspending approval. Evidence here showed the way in
which power relations were changed by the requirement for effective tenant consent, though
on balance power relations were unexpectedly reconfigured and more by accident than
design. Also, allocation of generous resources to a quasi-autonomous government agency
placed considerable power in the hands of its employees while limiting control by ministers
and local government capacity. The incentive effect of disposing such resources to locally
based organisations represented significant changes in power relations increasing the
power of local, voluntary actors and organisations.
Thirdly the model argued that local actors' behaviour would be based on conflicting values
and stances, in this case about council tenure. Evidence here confirmed that while indeed
stances of bodies representing stakeholder interests stood for council housing and in
opposition to transfer, in practice local stakeholders accommodated each other to develop
better housing conditions through alternatives to council housing. This further emphasises
the gap between stances and action, further undermining reliance on policy statements as
primary evidence of policy. On a related matter, the model suggested fourthly that actors
might adjust to and accommodate each other, realigning into coalitions to achieve practical
goals. From the completed transfers, whole and partial, this model has much value in
explaining adjustment between opponents. Indeed, the failed transfer also partly confirms
this perspective, as the goals of the various actors could not be aligned.
This discussion leads into the next two aspects of the model: one is the focus of
disagreement excluding core, non-negotiable positions; the other is about actors using
bargaining, adapting their identities and relationships. While tenure attachment to council
housing is often taken for granted, many local actors were able to relinquish their
attachment to serve different, more tangible practical goals.
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Successful, stealthy operations towards transfer depended critically on trust and the quality
of interpersonal relationships during bargaining between individuals in pivotal roles. This
dimension of policy success is largely absent in the theory reviewed for this study. With few
Scottsh councils adopting transfer as policy before 1997, councils, tenants' organisations
and trade unions either publicly opposed transfer or avoided taking a formal stance about
transfer, even while some of their own personnel (paid and voluntary) actively undertook
disposals. For transfer to be achieved, local tenants needed to support, even lead projects,
at the very least not oppose them. Staff, both at senior and middle management levels,
needed to feel safe and comfortable about raising the possibility of transfer with tenants and
therefore needed elected members to suspend any opposition and suspicion. This required
a considerable degree of trust, particularly in the early days of projects in each council, as
rules and practice were emerging. In the absence of political leadership, tenants fronting
transfer projects needed to have confidence and trust in the staff with whom they worked to
develop proposals. Arguably, in the failed transfer, core positions could not be
accommodated due to overt political differences and personal relations undermining trust
and thereby success.
Finally the model indicated visible champions and invisible entrepreneurs pursuing policy
goals, interests and preferences, by exploiting windows of opportunity - critical junctures - to
clear blockages. Visible championship or policy leadership has not been in evidence in this
study, as discussed under elected members above. The only visible champions were some
local residents with something to gain from transfer. The most publicly vocal councillor was
a "Conservative deserter in Berwickshire. If transfer had been government policy, support
might have been assumed to come from central government: yet the lukewarm response
from offcials and ministers to local transfer proposals bordered on neglect and obstruction,
even - almost especially - at critical junctures. The literature has not previously explained
adequately how transfer of council housing in Scotland came into being, as partial, small
scale and subsidised. Evidence in this study prompts the argument that a few key officials
and one elected member operated as invisible entrepreneurs, prioritising their own goals in
developing community-based organisations in partial transfer while improving housing
conditions. The concept of invisible entrepreneurship is both heretical and beneficial in
explaining this development.
This model offers greater explanatory potential than the rational model, in accounting for
policy as action in terms of the volume of outcomes in spite of stances which would suggest
inaction and opposition. It shows the practical power of individual incumbents not just in
state organisations. What the model fails to do is to take account of the importance of trust
in building alliances. This is an area in which the opportunistic model pays insuffcient
attention to the chemistry of relationships beyond interpersonal networks and formal
relationships. This study shows - across partial and whole transfer, early and late
transactions, competed and failed proposals - the importance of trust between actors at
critical times of change. Without trust between individuals in key roles, adjustment and
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accommodation could not take place. Overall the model contributes to the argument about
emergence of policy, derived from post hoc interpretation of action than of policy
statements.
Phases of Scottsh Stock Transfer Policy
The two phases of transfer policy can be explained quite differently in terms of policy theory.
The first phase could be measured by the number of completed transactions, running to
over 130, mainly partiaL. The outcome of phase 2 could similarly be measured, though in
practice by negligible outcomes whether in terms of transactions (partial) or stock.
Though no prior assumption was made about the fit between the phases and the ideal
types, the early phase corresponds reasonably closely to the opportunistic model though
latent conflict with institutional stakeholders could be interpreted as defused by stealthy
incorporation both organisationally and through resource incentives, more associated with
the rational modeL. The first phase of policy (mainly partial) was characterised by local,
bottom-up action, pre-empting formal policy-making at the centre. Moreover the various
ideological opponents quietly accommodated each other to achieve investment (improving
housing conditions) and local control (creating community-based organisations). This thesis
documents the extent of opportunistic policy-making, producing many partial transactions in
the absence of a published programme, though, the housing policy literature does not on
the whole acknowledge the existence of such transactions as transfer.
The second phase (whole stock transfer) corresponds more closely to the rational model, in
attempting - unsuccessfully - to apply the model without understanding the strength of the
alternative. The cultural legacy of the opportunistic model was very powerful and points to
lessons for future policy-making. It manifested itself in the formal publication of a policy
document issued by the centre: it may have been preceded by deliberation inside central
government but there was no evidence of consultation with formal policy networks and
pressure groups. Government policy overtly challenged the deeply held values of
institutional stakeholders in the form of workers (providers) and tenants (users), whose co-
operation was essential to the process and to local action. Partly because of turmoil created
by local government reform, it was difficult to establish trust. Because the policy was
'voluntary' rather than coercive, these actors had power to resist the policy of the centre, as
witnessed by absence of outcomes.
Contribution to specialist literature
This thesis makes contributions to knowledge in two main fields - policy making, particular
in Scotland and housing in the UK. These both have implications for policy-makers and
policy researchers after 1997 and beyond.
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Public Policy Making
Chapter Two offered a working definition of 'policy' as 'actions or decisions taken by
individuals or groups based on their stance on a particular issue within a process of which
the protagonist(s) may not be aware. It need not be labelled or overtly recognised as policy.'
This study concludes that policy cannot be much more tightly defined and still capture the
essence of policy making. This study shows the value of connecting empirical and
theoretical perspectives. An earlier section on methodology concluded that prior knowledge
of a policy situation was not necessarily a useful indicator as to suitable methods. This
provides ongoing methodological and theoretical challenges to policy researchers. For
example this study points to the importance of trust in facilitating policy actors to adjust their
identity during paradigm shift (Hall 1993). In future, methods to examine second or third
order change in reconfiguring council housing might - as already identified - usefully
address how actors change their identities at times of critical change.
Other observers have laid a verdict of implementation deficit on the Thatcher government:
though it was perceived to be powerful, determined and directive, it also lacked success
because it was entrenched. Poor outcome measures and unintended economic and
employment policy consequences were self-inflicted, by virtue of the government's inability
to consult or listen (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Drawing on 'perfect conditions' for
implementing clear policy programmes (Sabatier, 1986), Marsh and Rhodes concluded that
though there was a lot of legislation, outcomes revealed much less real change, with
housing policy cited as one among many examples of unsuccessful attempts to bring about
change (in spite of the right to buy). Change was more attributable to factors other than
government policy or any overarching government ideology: under Thatcher, the drive for
strong government meant less consultation, more confrontation and therefore - surely
unintentionally - less success (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The charge of (attempts at) strong
government might apply to the second phase of transfer policy (after 1995 and thus post-
Thatcher), where there was a policy. This study shows that Marsh and Rhodes' argument
does not otherwise hold in Scotland in the period 1986 - 1997, most of which displayed the
absence of a clear programme.
In completed transactions, this study showed evidence of strong informal relationships
between professionals and with communities, largely bypassing elected members in
changing public service provision. By contrast, proposals which failed to come to fruition
were characterised by a lack of senior staff initiative and support, poor understanding of
technical issues, vocal opposition, and lack of trust set against very small windows of
opportunity between elections. These confirm some problems of implementation to be found
in the literature (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Sabatier, 1986) but reveal more about
unexpected obstacles and opportunities in policy-making. This study confirms Hill's claim
(1997a) that ostensible loyalists avoid controversy and use resources quietly, in support of
preferred projects.
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The most compelling contribution to the literature is the critical importance of senior staff
whether in making change happen, in preventing it appearing on the agenda or being taken
forward. This is remarkable because local government officials (in Scotland) are (ideally)
represented as councillors' obedient servants. As suggested in relation to central
government (Campbell and Wilson, 1998; Midwinter et aI, 1991), the paradigm of the
elected politician at the centre of policy-making may have diminishing validity in local
government, unless the case of transfer is unusuaL.
This thesis challenges the established wisdom about the primacy of council tenure in
Scotland. Along with many other sources about the impact of the right to buy, and current
official statistics, this study confirms council housing as minority tenure and one on which
stakeholders are prepared to transfer loyalties and release previous attachments, given the
'right' combination of constraints and incentives.
While central politicians diverted resources to the government's agency in the early period,
they did not trumpet transfer as policy. There could be many explanations for their relative
silence: publicising disposal by Labour councils might have been thought counter-
productive. In addition, small-scale transfer may not have been considered a success - it
might have been seen as too costly or too limited to be really successfuL. Alternatively, the
term 'transfer' may have come to be unoffcially dominated by the English understanding of
the term and perhaps it would have been unhelpful to Conservative politicians to highlight
the differences and the use of resources.
Housing Policy
The thesis provides a more robust definition of transfer drawing on original data collection
and analysis, allowing comparison between outcomes in the two jurisdictions. This
compensates for the previous disinterest and resistance in central government to defining,
analysing and reporting transfers. It allows the researcher to reinforce exhortations not to
rely on official data at face value (Kemeny, 1992).
Though the literature has portrayed transfer as an English phenomenon involving the
disposal of whole housing stocks by mainly southern, rural councils under Conservative
control (Perry, 2002; Malpass, 2002), data here reveal a more differentiated picture. Whole
and partial transactions existed in England and Scotland, and partial transfer was mostly
supported by subsidy in both jurisdictions. Sellers were politically varied before 1997, even
in England alone. Apart from one whole stock transfer, Scottish sellers were predominantly
Labour councils conducting partial transfers with subsidy, displaying some similarity with
English partial transfers. Although the volume of stock transferred in England was greater,
the volume of transactions (reflecting episodes of decision-taking) was greater in Scotland
before 1997. However, transactions in Scotland declined dramatically in 1995/6 while they
were still rising in England. Data showed most Scottish transfer transactions to have been
completed during ten years of activity starting before 1988, finishing in 1996.
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The decline of transfer in Scotland coincided with the first publication of government
guidance on transfer, in the same year that government in England announced competition
for subsidy for partial transfer by urban authorities. At this very point subsidy for partial
transfer in Scotland felL. Comparison of partial transfers in Scotland and England show
differences of timing, value of subsidy per unit and relationship to private investment (Nevin,
1997). In England, subsidy was overtly competitive and directed by central government
rather than at arm's length. Funds were time-limited (three years from 1997): while actual
expenditure occurred under Labour, resource decisions were taken by a Conservative
government preceded by collaborative policy deliberation. Scotland featured more generous
subsidy decision-making and spending starting 10 years earlier, under the Conservatives,
with less evidence of wider council participation in securing central resources. Funding in
Scotland lasted longer though with limited government direction of the use of resources as
its agencies controlled its distribution. Moreover, the process of resource decision-making
was less transparent in Scotland and the timing suggests contrary decisions in the two
jurisdictions. Transfer existed concurrently in Scotland an England, but on rather different
terms and with different timing.
Referring to England, commentators observed that
'rather than dissatisfied tenants driving transfer process, it was disabled
landlords who sought to resolve their dilemmas through transfer'
Cowan and Marsh, 2001: 31.
This implies bureaucrats' protection and pursuit of selfish interests. In the small-scale cases
studied here, it was officials particularly in resource-strapped, Labour councils in urban
Scotland who sought to resolve dilemmas of under-investment, not by reconfiguring
themselves in another sector as in England but by placing dissatisfied tenants at the heart of
the process and in charge of new landlord organisations. Evidence in this study thus
indicated offcials in similarly disabled Scottish landlord organisations taking action so that
others could solve problems for them, outwith the public sector. This practice emerged in
Scotland even before the precipitate actions of local transfer enthusiasts in England
prompted the House of Lords to create the safeguard of majority tenant consent. Evidence
in this study showed this simple safeguard affecting the future of council housing
inadvertently turning traditional power relations upside down. The requirement for majority
consent was neither intended nor welcomed by politicians and, though it was a late addition
to the rules affecting behaviour in Scotland, it consolidated the effect of those incentives
already secured by ostensible loyalists in the government's agency. These changes left
central politicians in Scotland having to maintain incentives to satisfy tenants in order to
achieve their objectives. Meanwhile, tenants were able to accommodate change by taking
action based on reconstructed identities on behalf of landlord organisations.
This study agrees with Kemeny (1992) that focussing on process, relationships, roles and
power relations at various junctures challenges methodological, traditions about rational
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policy-making, commonly adopted in housing studies. Such a focus can reveal officials'
stealth and the pattern of incentives and constraints. In this case, these encouraged
institutional opponents to suppress resistance, without individuals or their representative
bodies having to take uncomfortable, in-principle policy decisions to endorse transfer in a
hostile political climate. This is not exactly coerced exchange (Kemp, 1990): rather it
constitutes partisan mutual adjustment, even though it has been argued that such
adjustment does not apply to grand questions of property ownership (Lindblom, 1965).
Further, this study suggests that tenants' attachment to council tenure may not be as strong
as was previously thought. Stakeholders' identity change was effectively enabled by
balancing constraints and incentives including greater local control, without transfer as the
necessarily intended outcome. The importance of tenants is known on ground especially in
Scotland where the history and experience of community based organisations has been
unique, but perhaps less well-researched, though there is potential for further work
theorising tenants' role in the process and organisational outcomes of change.
Lessons Post 1997 ?
This study potentially sets the scene for future comparative research examining transfer
post 1997. Perhaps in time, transfer discussions in the 1990s will be seen to have helped to
prepare central and local government to understand the task ahead when Labour was
elected in 1997. The possibility of policy learning by Labour would be a suitable hypothesis
for further research on the period after 1997 but that was beyond the remit of this thesis.
Nevertheless, there may be some validity in reflecting on the applicability of lessons from
one period and policy domain to another. The main lessons to be learned are about
limitations on the power of the centre and state actors in relation to people acting locally in a
voluntary capacity.
It was clear from this study that it was not in interest of centre to keep records / monitor
anything which showed policy intentions as failing in any way. Arguably it was better not to
have information available at alL. The same might apply when operating by stealth and
desirable not to draw attention to outcomes which may be unpopular / contested for any
reason. The absence of information does not mean policy has no outcome or that action is
not policy. However politicians, especially in the new Scottish Parliament might home in on
law making, and professionals might act similarly seeking to influence and lobby politicians.
However, policy-makers in New Labour and in the Scottish Executive might usefully
recognise the weakness of such an approach. Though policy-makers might focus on
legislation, this study showed the greater potential of incentives over more formal rules. An
effective culture of resource manipulation and lack of transparency might prove diffcult to
challenge, even with legislation.
Perhaps government actors should acknowledge the power of officials in central and local
government (in and beyond housing), whether in promoting or thwarting elected members'
policy intentions. In practice offcials initiate and drive proposals, and support them to
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greater or lesser degrees. Where politicians might expect offcials to grasp and implement
their ideas, there may need to be greater recognition of the de facto role of elected member
in legitimising or tempering the ideas and actions of officials.
The lack of transfer on a larger scale shows the abiding power of local government -
notably councillors, to resist change. While there are clear opportunities at the centre to
move major pieces on chessboard, thereby achieving significant change, the danger is that
such moves cannot anticipate future effects. Central actors can only set stage: the centre
does not control the end game, because of power given to and/ or used by local institutional
stakeholders. Local actors have to be the ones to pick up ideas.
Arguably, quiet influence achieves more than visible championship of formal public policy
programmes and according to this case central actors prefer to remain low-key, invisible:
this indeed is what makes Scottish ministers' proactive involvement in transfer remarkable
after 1997. Where central government actors become involved in particular cases, they risk
being perceived as interfering, they become open to allegations of discrimination,
favouritism, preferential treatment. Consequently there is a danger of being found
responsible for getting it wrong. Politicians use documents promoting policy for rhetorical
purposes. For researchers, such documents don't mean much in terms of policy substance,
although critical discourse analysis can help to unpack them.
In housing specifically, there is a continuing need for public resources to help tackle poor
cQnditions: this has been borne out by subsequent disposition of additional Treasury
resources outwith the Scottsh Consolidated Fund. The move to finance housing solely
through private borrowing is thus not tenable. The need for Treasury support shows the
significance of resources not necessarily under the control of the devolved administration,
limiting effective devolution of housing policy.
Ballots place huge power in hands of tenants at single, critical juncture, with the capacity to
overturn long-established power relations between consumers, politicians and officials. This
power shift may only be a temporary phenomenon unless consumers reposition themselves
in place of politicians, in control of professionals in new governance arrangements. This
requires change of perspective on the part of local institutional stakeholders, on which stock
transfer depends. Consumers and providers can reconstruct identity individually and
collectively but have to be willing to abandon the old paradigm in order to make any
transition. Where there is opposition, this requires considerable courage, political will and
capacity to learn and depends critically on trust between protagonists for new paradigms
and learning to take place.
Lastly, Scottish housing policy can be 'hijacked', distorted or driven off course by policy
elsewhere. Though officially separate, English housing policy can leak into Scotland through
professional and party policy discourses, whoever much it appears to be devolved.
Inevitably too, policy in other spheres within Scotland inadvertently leak reciprocally.
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Did Policy Emerge?
The early phase of transfer policy (until 1995/6) was characterised by the emergence and
development of rules (Hill, 1997b; Sabatier, 1986). This study has not found evidence of a
'dominant programme' even by the early 1990s when transactions were at their peak. While
strong government produced constraints to squeeze councils, there was no obvious end
game in the minds of key actors in central government in Scotland in the third term (1987 -
1992). So far from consultation and confrontation, small-scale transfers emerged as a
creative response from fertile minds in local government, more as invisible problem-solving
behind the scenes than through visible leadership of top-down policy from the centre. This
supports the first part of the hypothesis about stealthy mutual accommodation of opponents,
not only in Glasgow, but also to later roll-out sales by councils elsewhere. Even after more
councils came on board to promote transfers, there was only a loose framework of rules.
Much discretion was left with street level bureaucrats in the form of officials of the agency
(Scottsh Homes), councils (Motherwell, Dundee, Glasgow, Berwickshire) and new,
prospective buyers (housing associations).
Government objectives and legal mechanisms did not envisage sellers initiating sales but -
in Scotland certainly - individuals shifting ownership of their home to others. Scottish policy
ran concurrently with England and produced ostensibly similar outcomes in the form of
disposal to alternative landlords, but with different characteristics, (not just scale) and with a
different balance of instruments and interactions.
Later larger scale transfer discussion inside local authorities prompted councils to raise
transfer with central government, not vice versa. The impetus for whole stock transfer was
stimulated in part by discourse in the professional press about LSVT in England after the
1992 elections, and partly by local government reorganisation. Councils (unsuccessfully)
sought clarification from the Scottish Office about acceptable terms of transfer rather than
responding to central government guidance or policy directives. Completion occurred when
local alliances were formed based on trust, determination and shared goals (including local
control), rather than ideology. Delayed responses and blank stares from the Scottsh Office
do not provide compelling evidence of a government making policy.
This study found that action to produce transfer emerged more opportunistically than
rationally. Central pressure produced general cutbacks and restructured rules about housing
association borrowing without particular outcomes intended. Specific pressure leading to
transfer came from the bottom up, perversely accessing additional government resources
during a period of public cutbacks. Such action was neither flagged as policy nor claimed as
success at the time. Ministers acquiesced in supporting stealthy progress with small-scale
transfer by councils and by its own agency, until wider organisational and resource
problems started to emerge. It is not evident that government managers or politicians knew
how much money was being spent or to what effect. Moreover they did not draw attention to
the extent of their support. Slightly later, the same government could not make a top-down
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policy of whole transfer work in Scotland, in the face of competing policy priorities. It is
doubtful whether decisions taken to prioritise local government reorganisation and New
Town wind-up explicitly recognised the implications for transfer by councils. It is possible
that demand to transfer housing stopped due to wider reorganisation, before government
withdrew specific resource support for partial transfers. In conclusion, it appears that more
transfers occurred while government knew little about the programme, whereas the more
government sought to direct and control the programme, the less it achieved.
Transfer ran concurrently in Scotland and in England, producing the same abstract
outcome, changing the ownership of public rented housing. However, policy mechanisms
diverged critically, creating different patterns of constraints and incentives and with
contradictory outcomes. It is not clear that personnel at the centre understood or managed
the inherent tensions between central government's various ambitions for housing and local
government. They did not know what constituted stock transfer; they did not pay attention to
how transfer worked in Scotland or in England, still less understand the differences; they did
not identify obstacles or clear paths to facilitate policy. They did not appreciate the
implications of transfer by the New Towns and avoided referring to those disposals eight
years later, though the consequences were considerable, politically and financially. Indeed,
the more that Conservative politicians in 1995 sought overtly to direct and shape transfer
policy from the top (perhaps based on reports of English experience), the less success they
achieved in change on the ground. The reasons for failure were lack of clear objectives, lack
of skilful implementing officials, lack of support from interest groups. Finally, the
government's own wider changes unwittingly and fatally undermined its eventual rational
attempts to introduce a policy of whole stock transfer.
Perversely, increases in Conservative government subsidy allowed mostly Labour councils
to conduct transfer, in spite of explicit and deliberate government steps to reduce public
spending. Access to alternative resources was critical in facilitating a change of stance
among those assumed most likely to oppose transfer - councillors, tenants and staff.
Incentives rather than legislation assisted the adjustment of identity and to a degree, the
changes allowed actors to invest personally in new arrangements. Ultimately these changes
may prove instrumental as demonstration projects, as implied in recent government
promotional literature, allowing others to be inspired and encouraged by alternatives to
council housing.
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Appendix Two
Definition of Stock Transfer by Type of Respondent
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Appendix Three
Chronology of Key Events Affecting Scottish Local Authority
Stock Transfer
The account is derived from interviews and analysis of documents
1980
Following the election of the Conservatives, the Tenant's Rights etc. (Scotland) Act 1980 is passed giving public
sector tenants the right to buy their house at prices based on open market valuations, discounted for their length
of tenancy
Secretary of State for Scotland - George Younger, with Rifkind and Housing Minister
Cuts to borrowing consent and rental subsidy commence
1981
Requirement on Scottish local authorities to spend 100% of receipts within that year whereas in England relaxed
to 40% and then completely proscribed later. Masked extent of cuts to new borrowing by councils in Scotland
Developers take on transfers of empty property for refurbishment and sale - various locations
Management co-operatives established and encouraged in Glasgow especially based on Summerston model
1983
Election year: cash limits on public spending to private sector put "off ration" by Chancellor before the election -
affected non HRA and led to private grants 'bonanza' notably in Glasgow (and Dundee)
Glasgow (under Labour) appoints new Director Mugnaioni - shakes up housing dept and introduces radical new
ideas
Local groups e.g. in Glasgow and Dundee established at local initiative chiefly involving women, to press for
improvements in living conditions, starting with e.g. play facilities
Cross party working group established in Glasgow to find ways of increasing co-operative control over housing
with private funding in Glasgow. Cllr Dyer (Conservative and Board member of HCiS) invited to take part.
GDC housing staff group dedicated to investigate possibility of using private sector money to invest in council
housing.
Moratorium on HA funding via HCiS prompts successful lobbying for continued support
1984
Labour group in Glasgow agrees to consult tenants groups affected by delays in council house modernisation
programme
Mills appointed to post of Under Secretary at SDD (replacing lan Penman) - visits Glasgow HAs with HCiS staff
(notably Raymond Young) as part of a fact-finding visit on return to Scotland
Younger moves to Defence in Cabinet reshuffe and Ancram appointed as Housing Minister under SoS Malcolm
Rifkind
1 O,OOOth house celebration I exhibition Miles Better Miles To Go by Glasgow Forum of HAs
Sir Robert Grieve appointed to lead an independent inquiry into Glasgow's housing: (reported 1986)
GDC staff encouraged to identify suitable tenants groups to take up new investment ideas
HCiS start discussions with tenants groups in preparation for registration
Significant cuts in permitted RFC and HSG contributions to LA Housing Revenue budgets.
Glasgow Univ. researchers and GDC staff visit Swedish housing co-ops looking for new ideas
Local government elections - Labour returned in Glasgow Dundee and many other urban councils.
Conservatives lose seats overall and left controllng fewer councils
1985
RTB cost floor rules changed to restrict discount only on properties built more than 5 years previously; discount
scheme made more generous
Scottish and Welsh Offices co-ordinate successfully with DoE to win case to have HA expenditure treated as
private not public, in line with other EU states
Glasgow publishes Community Ownership proposals and Mills (Under-Secretary SDD) speaks warmly of
Glasgow's proposals at conference of Instiute of Housing.
Miles Better exhibition by Glasgow and West of Scotland HAs to celebrate 10 OOOth house completion: opened
and attended by dignitaries
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Scottish Office rejects proposals: Glasgow tenants visit Minister in Edinburgh
Summer: GDC officials negotiate with SO civil servants about terms of Glasgow proposals
HCiS register two co-ops (Calvay and Castlemilk East) - July
September: Under Secretary SDD advises meeting in Glasgow City Chambers of Scottish Offce's intention to
fund 3 new co-ops, via HAG administered by HCiS
Scottish Office review mounting debts of SSHA resulting from voluntary and RTB sales, impending insolvency
portends wind-up
1986
HCiS register third of Ph1 bodies - Broomhouse - May: Ph 1 appoint own staff and achieve site starts.
Grieve report published recommending to City of Glasgow District Council that they diversify the city's tenure by
divesting the council of one quarter of its housing to others
HA recipients of Traditional Programme funding become twitchy at potential loss of status and favour in light of
Community Ownership initiative and new funding.
Negotiations continue between remaining co-ops (Ph 2) and Scottish Office re future funding. Ph2 allowed to
proceed to billing (ie specifying contracts for) improvement schemes and later to fund per original proposals,
subject to evaluation
Co-ops establish own confederation of co-operatives outwith auspices of SF HA
GDC borrow £65m from Bank of Japan for special scheme of modernisation of council housing
SS HA moves area renewal teams from GEAR and Maryhill into Windlaw, Castlemilk to assist GDC with
modernisation of 1000 houses
1987
Feb Scottish Office issue Press Release with Minister (Ancram) arguing for break-up of council housing
monopolies and diversification of tenure. Heated response to challenges from Shelter and CoSLA
Feb Ph2 co-ops registered by HCiS - only three new bodies that year
March - White Paper published (2 months before election) proposing new body of Scottish Homes to replace the
HCiS and SS HA indicating SS HA landlord role to disappear statutorily - ie compulsory disposal
Ph 2 co-ops secure staff via secondments from GDC
May - Conservatives win 3rd term in General Election: Rifkind remains as Secretary of State but Ancram loses
seat - replaced as Housing Minister by Lord James Douglas Hamilton
June: Ormiston Peoples Action Group in Dundee approach council for housing funding
Sep - Dundee council appoints architects to work with tenants group on mixed funding proposals for Dundee
Dundee City Council sell empty stock to Gowrie HA for tenure diversification in peripheral estate
Ph2 finally given permission to proceed with GDC original proposal of non-HRA grants, MIRAS on private
collective borrowing and temporary staff secondments, first batch of Possil stock transferred
After general election, Scottish Office publishes New Life for Urban Scotland, proposing 4 Urban Partnerships in
peripheral estates promoting holistic regeneration and sociall economic diversity
Offcial change of treatment of HAs in terms of PSBR pre election: moves towards accounting as private
GDC start to approach other local groups in Glasgow about possibility of development as co-operatives and
prepare schedules of properties for disposal via Area Renewal, demolition, tenure diversification and
Improvement for Sale
Muganioni leaves Glasgow - replaced by his depute Comley
November Scottish Offce Development Department publish White paper proposing Scottish Homes, Tenant's
Choice and assured tenancies
1988
Feb Rosehill and Southdeen (Ph2) transferred
Torbay (Dorset hold controversial ballot of tenants and assume that no vote means support). Rules about
clarified in Lords initially in respect of HATs
District council elections: Labour win more seats and control of more councils at Conservative expense
Sep: Housing Under-Secretary promoted to Scottish Office - Principal Finance Officer and speaks at consultants
private finance conference promoting assured tenancies and urging councils to consider transfer
Sep: procedures on 'voluntary transfer' published by SDD as 'Information Paper' with a covering letter
HCiS promote co-operatives and community ownership in various local authorities throughout Scotland including
Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, and Clydebank
SoS appoints Scottsh Homes board to include (former Minister) Ancram, and McCall (tenant and founder
member of Calvay Co-operative)
SFHA and CoS LA adopt Code of Practice and agree principles of conduct to ensure that associations do not
embark on predatory stock transfer campaigns on council tenantsl stock
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HCiS register 8 new landlords in two batches for transfer by Argyll, Edinburgh, Perth, Dundee, Kìlmarnock and
Renfrew plus more in Glasgow. Only other registrations are rural- in Highlands and Islands
Chiltern and Sevenoaks councils ballot tenants successfully: DoE issue guidance.
Housing Acts for Engl UK and Scotland receive consent: various Tenant's Choice provisions made. Scottish
Homes established separating HCiS from HC in London and amalgamating with SSHA. Early senior
appointments based on regional structure with 2 of four directorships going to each of predecessors.
1989
Jan - implementation of assured tenancies introduced
April - Scottish Homes comes into operation with regional structure. Glasgow under control of former Director of
HCiS Glasgow
Waverley Trust set up behind the scenes in order to manage Scottish Homes' stock in Borders area (previously
managed by Roxburgh DC). Waverley set up by group including former officials of RDC and involving Ancram -
former local MP - on the board with tenant majority. Management company providing services, controlled by
staff
4 new HAs I coops registered - mainly arising from LA partial stock transfers (3 in Glasgow and one in
Clydebank)
IDS publish White paper about winding up New Town Development Corporations
1990
Controversy erupts over Waverley's management and ownership proposals in Borders and national media
amidst allegations of insider dealing by staff and by former Minister
November - Ancram selected as candidate for Devizes and moves south leaving Scottsh Homes and Waverley
Boards
Scottish Homes' ADP restructured to incorporate and consolidate new headings of Community Ownership and
Partnerships along with Traditional Programme
8 more new HAs I coops registered arising from LA partial stock transfers: Glasgow, Motherwell, and Dundee
8 ballot failures in English transfers vs. 11 majorities in favour
November Major replaces Thatcher as PM: Lang replaces Rifkind: Lord James remains
1991
Lengthy negotiations about value of stock in Waverley and how it would be valued - traditional or Discounted
Cash Flow.
Principle of unitary authorities becomes part of local government reorganisation proposals
Scottish Office publish final research report on Community Ownership pilot (Clapham et a/1991) and on stock
transfer activity more widely (Duncan, 1991)
Grampian co-operatives established by Scottish Homes tenants in Aberdeen and surroundings. Co-ops acquire
stock under Tenant's Choice in face of lukewarm support from Scottish Homes, partly delayed while valuation
methodology sorted out
RTB receipts start to dwindle and receipts from transfer and vacant sales start to impact on development
programme
Peak of 11 new HAs I coops registered arising from LA partial stock transfers as Shelter confirm that only 2
Scottish councils have 'policy' of transfer
Start of decline in capital receipts by councils from RTB sales
Waverley transfer goes through following ballot of tenants
1992
GDC starts to approach existing HAs (e.g. R&CHA) about small local transfers as Scottish Homes becoming
resistant to registration
April: Conservative election victory and (unexpected) with reduced MPs in Scotland. Lord James maintains
Edinburgh (Costorphine) seat and ministerial position in Housing under SoS lan Lang
Mills returns to SO Environment Dept (SDD renamed) as 'Head of Dept'
Consultation about LG reorganisation boundaries proposed for unitary authorities: emphasis on strategic role of
LAs, interpreted as stock transfer
Local Government etc Scotland Bill and boundary proposals
Compulsory Competitive Tendering proposed for introduction to housing management in Scottish councils with
effect from 1994 (later postponed until two years after reorganisation)
Scottish Homes restructuring into functional divisions following new appointment of civil servant Peter McKinlay
and early departure of original Chief Executive George Irvine, widely seen as ineffective
310
Oct - Scottish Homes clarifies role of new Initiatives Unit and procedures for own stock transfers with targets and
phased implementation programme
Confirmation by Scottish Homes that HAG will not be available to Scottish Homes' own stock transfers on
whatever scale
Local council elections: Conservatives surge of support -left in control of 6 councils including Stirling on 'cut of
cards' (10:10). Councillors immediately move towards stock transfer discussion with tenants
Scottish Homes stock revaluation by National Audit Offce and annual accounts show premature debt
repayment on old SSHA stock. Receipts recycled through development programme
Strategy published for disposal of Scottish Homes own stock and advice given to IDS about winding up New
Towns
During negotiations, UK confirms opposition to European monetary union and adherence to definition of public
borrowing. Becomes clear to professional lobbyists that definitions differ, prompting investigation of alternatives
1993
DoE publish interim research by Birmingham University on first 16 transferring councils in England, showing
tenant satisfaction but increased rents for new tenants and possibility of bias in campaigns by local authorities
DoE revise 1988 guidance on stock transfer in England confirming DCF as basis of valuation. Introduce levy on
stock transfer receipts - to recoup increased HB costs to Treasury
March - Stirling Conservative group reject staff proposal for stock transfer
Jul: BDC agree to sound out tenants on stock transfer after favourable consideration of consultants' report on
value
NE Fife council appoint same consultants as BDC
Jul - Ewing appointed Asst Sec Div 1, replacing Eileen Mackay
Large scale transfers of Scottish Homes' own stock expand amidst some controversy about 'level playing fields'
- ie whether existing staff have preferential access to tenants and information about stock condition
JRF publish academic I policy investigation of Local Housing Companies as alternative to LSVT, emphasising
need for redefinition of public borrowing
Sept - Scottish Housing Minister urges councils at consultants private finance conference to use reorganisation
as opportunity to consider to future landlord role
Autumn - Berwickshire DC visit Shropshire LSVT and ask for advice from Scottsh Homes on stock transfer
process and registration
Implementation of CCT proposals deferred in Scotland unti 1998, purposely after reorganisation
Parliamentary committee (CPA) and government auditors (NAO) start enquiries into Waverley transfer
Scottish Homes sells 2415 in 1993/4 houses bringing extra £20m to development
GDC start pushing for 100% nominations on HA lettings in peripheral estates
IDS publish financial arrangements for New Town wind-up
1994
AIan Stewart (Industry Minister) permits LAs to bid for New Town stock transfers in shortened wind-up
timetable, anticipating reorganisation with effect from April 1996
April - new Director of Housing appointed by Berwickshire DC - BHA CE designate
April- Scottish Homes increased interest in HA management and consults about issues of registration, scale
and standards of HAs - no more small bodies to be registered
Representatives of BDC seek clarification of Scottish Office rules affecting transfer
October - Local Govt Scotland Act passed with 32 authorities, many combinations of District Councils with much
larger housing stock holdings
Novernber - Berwickshire ballot result shows % of tenants in support
Dec - Scottish Homes indicates no more small new associations to be registered
NAO and CPA enquiries into Waverley conclude favourably but enquiries stimulate procedural review of transfer
throughout Scottish housing
SO joint focus with DoE on new investment for housing
SO embark on Next Steps quinquennial review of Scottish Homes
1995
Feb - Scottsh Grand Committee debate on Scottish Homes transfers heightens controversy
Council candidates in Borders initiate campaign in papers against transfer
March - BDC applies to Scottish Offce for consent to transfer subject to financial confirmation
NE Fife council (LD controlled) abandon transfer as valuation appears insufficient even with higher rents (later
turns out to have been miscalculated)
April - BHA registered by Scottish Homes
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Spring I summer: Phase One New Town ballots produce overwhelming support for councils in Fife and East
Kilbride553
April- elections for (29) shadow unitary councils: none under Conservative control and majority controlled by
Labour or by independent groupings. Borders - coalition. Twelve months of intense preparation for
reorganisation starts
April- price agreed for BDC housing stock
July - reshuffle: Lord James Douglas Hamilton replaced as Housing Minister by Raymond Robertson under new
Secretary of State Michael Forsyth; stock transfers pushed very strongly at every opportunity
July - Wigtownshire ballot fails with 77% turnout and 75% of tenants against
Aug - Robertson gives consent to Berwickshire transfer on the final day before the shadow authorities take over.
Transaction complete by end of month in spite of attempts by other Borders councils to frustrate with legal
challenges and after LD MPs publicly call on Forsyth to reject application for consent
Oct Minister addresses professional body and claims total of 15,000 transfers to date and proclaims
Berwickshire transfer 'a significant milestone'
Nov - Secretary of State invites views about whether councils should bid for Scottish Homes stock
Dec - Central Govt issues targets for transfer receipts in 1996/7 at £17m, (estd at 1 % of stock)
SO Environment renamed Development
CG announces budget cuts of £1 OOm to Scottish Homes investment, while permitting Scottish Homes own stock
sales receipts to be recycled into investment programme ADP, thus increasing the pressure for own stock
transfer by Scottish Homes.
1996
April - 29 new unitary authorities take over amid staff shortages disputes and financial difficulties
May - Draft guidance produced by Scottish Office on stock transfer, showing for the first time the new method of
calculating valuations based on discounted cash flow and offering free access to the methodology as used in
England. No estimates available of possible receipts to local authorities
Scottish Office publishes prior options review of Scottish Homes, showing impending insolvency -again
May - Secretary of State concludes consultation about future of Scottish Homes stock and changes council rules
on debt redemption requiring 25% of receipts to be used for redemption
June - Blair elected as Leader of the Labour Party and new Labour looks like winning the 1997 general election
July - Malcolm Chisholm replaces shadow housing spokesman John McAllion following resignation dispute with
new Party leadership over Scottish parliament referendum commitments
Julyl August: New Town ballots take place in Livingston, Cumbernauld and Irvine producing substantial
majorities overall in favour of local authorities: some small gains by housing associations involving former New
Town DC staff
Sep - Govt commissions research from HACAS via CIHS into case studies of stock transfer valuation in three
authorities
Dec - CIHS conference on Private Finance in Housing addressed by Head of SO Environment Dept: historic
debt emphasised as a problem for first time
Winter - new co-op slum landlords hit by severe frost damage to unoccupied stock
1997
Scottish Office publish research on tenant satisfaction in stock transfer (by local authorities and Scottish Homes)
March - calculations of gap between valuation & debt revealed at CIHS conference554 in absence of official
estimates. Only five out of 32 authorities reported able to cover their outstanding debt and thus no significant
receipt
553 Uvingston - July 1996: 7 out of 10 ballot areas went to council. l!Vine July 1996: council won 4 out of 5 ballots
Cumbernauld August 1996: all ballots won by council. East Kilbride June 1995: alii 0 ballot areas won by council on 99%
vote - 21 people voted for alternative landlords. Glenrothes March 1995: 10 areas won by council 80% support on 85%
turnout.
554 the researcher had carried this out privately - see Chapter Three. Some councils requested details of their own case
following conference
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April- valuation figures available to Scottish Office from consultants confirming independent estimates of only 5
councils able to generate receipts to cover outstanding debts. Paper (not published) shows extent of negative
valuations and need for subsidy to support transfers.
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Appendix Four
Interviews and Interviewees
Who Or What Made Voluntary Transfer In Scottish Local Authorites Happen?
NB sent to interviewees in advance with covering letter (below)
How would you define a stock transfer?
In what capacity were you involved in transfers? When and for how long?
What was your role in relation to local authority stock transfer (as it became known)?
Who were your main contacts at that time?
When did you first hear about transfers and howl from what source?
What were transfers designed to achieve?
Was your organisation active in promoting transfer or was it drawn in to this activity by others?
At the time did you regard stock transfer as a positive development? why i why not?
Who supported stock transfer? In what way
Who opposed stock transfer? In what way
Do you see stock transfer as something which grew out of other trends and policies or as a completely new idea
when it was first mooted?
At what point did transfer become more about whole stock transfer on a large scale and less about partial
transfers using community ownership HAG?
Do you see transfers as arising from the 1988 Act any more than any other policy change or action in the last
ten years?
What do you regard as the key factors driving transfers?
What do you regard as the key factors preventing transfers?
Were any particular policies or mechanisms critical to stock transfer progress?
Were any particular individuals or agencies instrumental in making transfers possible?
To what extent do you think stock transfer has been a good policy? Was this as intended? From whose point of
view are there benefits?
To what extent do you think stock transfer has created new problems - what? Could these have been foreseen
- were they?
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Sample letter to respondents
(Home address Stirling 1
Various dates May - December 1998
Dear
Independent research into Scottish stock transfers
I am carrying out research into the policy process surrounding transfer of stock by local authorities in Scotland.
The main output from the research will be a higher degree dissertation and therefore will not necessarily be
subject to publication. This project has not been funded or commissioned by an outside body and can thus be
regarded as independent.
The purpose of the research is to examine how the policy of stock transfer emerged and developed, to identify
the key players and to obtain their perspectives on the policy process and on the outcome of policy. I am
contacting a number of people in local and central government, in the voluntary sector and others who assisted
the process of transfer, on the basis that they have been involved in small or large scale voluntary stock transfer.
i would appreciate an opportunity to interview you as one of these people. i may also be in touch with others in
your organisation.
If you are amenable to being interviewed, I would not expect to take up more than an hour of your time, some
time between........... (inc) , to suit our respective arrangements. It may take the form of a visit to your
organisation or possibly a telephone interview. If you agree to take part, you will receive in advance a copy of
the questions I hope to put to you. This would give you an opportunity to collect your thoughts on the relevant
issues over the last ten years in advance of the interview.
i very much hope that you will agree to take part. If you have any queries about the purpose or content of the
work, please let me know. I can be contacted at the above address (tel no 01786 473768) or at work in the
Housing Policy and Practice Unit, University of Stirling (tel 01786467719; email mary.taylor~stir.ac.uk).llook
forward to hearing from you regarding your willingness to be involved and with some possible dates for an
interview.
Yours sincerely
Mary Taylor
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Appendix Five
Surveys and Correspondence with Sellers and Buyers
This appendix contains examples of correspondence and surveys undertaken by the researcher in an attempt to
gather data about stock transfer. The earliest correspondence was sent out in August 1995. Some were sent on
University headed notepaper and some as private I personal correspondence.
Letter to buyers and sellers August 1995
DATABASE ON STOCK TRANSFERS IN SCOTLAND
i am updating the University of Stirling database on the transfer of stock from local authorities to housing
associations and hope to publish a report shortly on the question of stock transfers in Scotland. I have received
some information on sales of houses by the relevant local authorities to a variety of organisations, including your
own. My purpose in writing to you is to ask you to confirm this information as it relates to your organisation.
To that end, i enclose a form which shows the information held in the database already on the local authority
salesl transfers in which your organisation has been involved. i would very much appreciate it if you would now
check the form to verify that the information which we hold is accurate and, where it is wrong or incomplete,
amend the details before returning the form. Please refer to the enclosed notes while completing the form.
i also enclose a blank form in case there are any transfer transactions missing completely. This should be
photocopied as often as necessary. In addition, if there are any transfers in the pipeline to your organisation,
from any local authority in Scotland (i.e. not including Scottish Homes or a New Town), the form could be used
to alert me to forthcoming transfer activity. Where the form is supplied blank, this means that there is no
information about transfer on the database. Where we have inserted some information please amend if it is not
correct. Please return forms by mid-September to the University.
Enclosed form requested details of
Property location by street address
Post-codes
Number of houses
Monthl year of consent
Month Iyear of transfer
Name of buyer
Type of buyer (1)
Purpose of transfer (Note 1)
Gross valuation £
Total receipt £
Date of original construction
Condition of housing (Note 2)
Note1: Purpose of transfer
(indicate more than one where applicable)
1 = letting
2 = renewal and lettng
3 = renewal and sale
4 = sale
5 = demolition for subsequent new housing
6 = other (please specify)
e.g. 2, 3, 5 = mixture of renewal for sale and rent,
along with partial demolition
Note 2 Condition of housing
L = in good, lettable condition
R = in need of catch up repair
MR = in need of major repairs
CR = in need of cornplete renewal
VH = uninhabitable
X = other: please specify
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Letter to sellers January 1997, after local government reorganisation
TRANSFER OF LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING STOCK
I am writing with two purposes in relation to the transfer of local authority housing stock. One is to offer
information which may be of interest and assistance; the other is a request for information from your authority.
Transfers completed or under way
You may be aware that at the University of Stirling, the Housing Policy and Practice Unit holds a database of all
the stock transfers to date by Scottish local authorities. If your authority or its predecessor carried out any
transfers, they should be on the enclosed summary record enclosed with this letter. This lists those transfers
prior to March 1995, which we understand have taken place in the area for which your authority is now
responsible. I would be grateful if you would draw to my attention any discrepancies and complete any missing
information in respect of the transfers listed. If the enclosed information is accurate to the best of your
knowledge, please return to me at the University address.
Please also bring to my attention any transfers which are not referred to on the attached schedule: you should
find enclosed a blank pro forma (yellow) for completion by you, to cover any cases of further portfolios of stock
transferred by your authority (or its predecessor)
'since March 1995 or
'in the pipeline.
Please make as many copies of the blank as you require and return by 21 st February. If your authority has no
previous transfers at all and none in the pipeline, please write briefly to confirm that this is the case.
Future transfer proposals
In addition to monitoring completed stock transfer activity, I am also interested in future transfer prospects and
what factors trigger local authorities to transfer stock. To that end, i have been using three sets of assumptions
(based on published HRA information) as inputs to the Scottish Offce's Tenanted Market Valuation (TMV)
modeL. This has been carried out for all 32 authorities in Scotland and i will able to make available to you, on
request, the outline valuations which I have conducted in relation to your authority. The exercise as a whole
allows certain general conclusions to be drawn about transfer prospects which i hope to make public shortly. It
would be helpful to my review of the Scottish Office's policy on stock transfer to have access to certain
information on particular authorities as detailed overleaf.
Last year for the first time, stock transfers were identified as one of the sources of receipts in the Government's
announcement of capital allocations for housing for councils in Scotland. These allocations itemised what value
of stock transfer the Government expected for each authority. It is my understanding that during the autumn of
1996, all councils had a meeting with the Scottish Office Development Department (SODD), regarding the future
capital programme for their authority. At these meetings the councils were expected to declare their intentions
regarding stock transfer and received an indication of
the level of stock transfer anticipated by the Scottish Office.
Although I already have some Scottish Offce figures for capital allocations (based on estimated receipts) for
1996/7 and 1997/8, it would be of great assistance to me if you could supply me with information on your
anticipated outturn for 1996/7 and the projections being made in respect of 1997/8:
1) by your authority; and
2) by the Development Dept.
Please return the attached questionnaire by 21 February 1997.
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Questionnaire on capital receipts and transfer proposals
LOCAL AUTHORITY STOCK TRANSFERS- ........................................................... COUNCIL
Name of contact .... ............. ......... ..... ......... ............. ....
Position .........................................................
Telephone number .........................................................
1996/7 £m
(a)
£m
(b)
1) According to my information:
your authority's gross capital receipts for 1996/7(estimated by SODD)
were
of which receipts from RTB sales should amount to
receipts from stock transfers should amount to
a.
figures.
b.
If the figures given above are inaccurate please cross them out and replace them with the correct
Please use the space in the right hand column to note the anticipated
outturn figure against each heading.
If your authority has completed any stock transfers to other landlords during 1996/7 and these are not included
on the enclosed schedule, please use the attached yellow pro-forma(s) to indicate the numbers, addresses,
value etc of the transferred stock.
1997/8
2. What assumptions did you make for your programming meeting with the
Scottish Office last autumn regarding stock transfer?
Numbers of houses ;..1~9718...........................................r199!'~............................................I..fei9!20.O~.....................................
::i~~::;~~f~:Pï1~g~T:1
3. What assumptions did SOOO make about your future transfer programme?
Numbers of houses ,..1..9~7/8..............................................!..19.9!'9..............................................I...1.9.99/g00~......................................
:s~~~~;:I~:Pïi~g~ITI
4. What type of housing stock - if any - are you considering for transfer? Please indicate the stock profile in
terms of:
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4.1 numbers of houses
4.2 numbers of neighbourhoods
4.3 level of demand for stock in these areas
4.4 void levels
4. 5 rent levels (average for area and highest
and lowest in area)
4. 6 date and type of construction
4. 7 need for and estimated costs of
repair/renewal
4. 8 other relevant information
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Notes on completion of forms and of codes/abbreviations used
The enclosed form(s) should show all block sales involving housing stock purchase (for whatever purpose), in
the period from 1980 to date. It would be helpful if there are any transfers in the pipeline and expected to reach
at least ballot stage (if appropriate) by December 1995, to include these on the schedules with the proposed
details marked "E" (estimated).
The form assumes that all the tenanted transfers have been conducted under the current LSVT arrangements in
Scotland. If any other mechanism has been used (eg Tenant's Choice) please make a note accordingly.
Some of the properties currently appearing on the schedules may be part of comprehensive tenement renewal
schemes in Housing Action Areas. If there are any such transactions on the schedule for your authority please
highlight them.
Please ensure that you report also on transactions transferring property where the Secretary of State's consent
was not requiredlsought.
Buyer name: The name of the purchasing organisation
Local authority: The name of the disposing authority
Numbers: The total number of housed transferred; if these resulted in subsequent demolition
or amalgamation, please note resulting numbers as well.
Date of transfer: The date on which ownership changed.
Valuation: Self-explanatory but information often missing - please include if at all possible.
Price paid: May be different from valuation - if so please note. Similarly, often missing so
please be sure to include.
Addresses:
Postcodes:
Date of construction:
Self explanatory
Very useful for further research on socioleconomic context. Please complete.
Approximate (i.e. decade)
Letter to buyers August 1998
SCOTTISH LOCAL AUTHORITY STOCK TRANSFERS - SURVEY OF HOUSING ASSOCIATION BUYERS
You may recall a previous questionnaire from me regarding research into small scale stock transfer by local
authorities in Scotland. I am writing now to request some further information from you regarding (name) HA's
experience of transfer. I hope it will not take you very long and that you will be able to assist.
I attach a two-part questionnaire about the development details following stock transfer and about the
association generally. I also attach a schedule which shows part of what is currently held on my database
regarding transfer activities to date by (namej HA .
(A separate letter was sent to the Glasgow buyers in November that year to avoid duplication with council
enquiries. It enclosed a schedule summarising various sources of information currently held about all 'known'
council stock transfers in Glasgow. 'Stock transfer' was identified as referring to any ownership transaction
affecting housing built by the council, for rent, regardless of whether it was tenanted or empty and regardless of
whether it was subsequently demolished. Glasgow buyers were asked to verify accuracy of the data held,
provide amended information, complete blanks.
The rate of response to both letters was insufficient to be of value. )
Questionnaire to HAs involved in stock transfer by local authorities before April 1997
Part One: The following questions relate to each transaction of stock acquired from LA
No of units acquired in transaction ............
From: (name of local authority)
In ( e.g. spring 1990)
Were the properties tenanted? (Circle whichever applies) Y N
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If so, please indicate roughly the percentage of properties occupied .......%
No of units demolished - if any - prior to transfer by LA
post transfer by HA
How much work was required: describe briefly (e.g. re -roofing, environmental upgrade,
selective demolition, height reduction, conversion etc)
Date of acquisition
Date of site start
Date of site completion
What price did the association pay for the property
£ ......... (nearest £,000 per unit)
Did this differ from the valuation? y N
If so, what was the valuation? £ ......... (nearest £,000 per unit)
£ ........mWhat was the total value of any work (approximately)
HAG (actual outturn)
Actual amount borrowed (privately)
Name of Lender
£.......m
£.......m
Rent charged by DC at transfer for typical 3apt
Rent charged by HA post transfer (unimproved) for typical 3apt
Rent charged by HA post-improvement for typical 3apt
Rent charged by HA today for typical 3apt arising from transfer
£.........p. a
£.........p. a
£........p. a
£.........p. a
*if no 3apts in the affected stock, use comparable average rents for each answer
No. of units on cornpletion for rent
for sale #
#If units were provided for sale, were they all finally sold? If not what happened to them? (Describe
briefly....... )
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Part Two: These questions apply to the association as a whole.
The information requested is acknowledged to be sensitive and its confidentiality will be respected.
Name of association Date of registration ................
Source of HA stock Nos
Acquired from and built bv LA
Acquired from and built bv SH or NT
Formerlv private sector
Built by association
Other
Total no. of units
Total no. of units before (first) transfer from LA
f ff i dNo 0 sta emp oye :
Before transfer At March
1998
Housinq manaqement
Maintenance
Development
Finance
Manaqement
If new staff have been employed since the transfer, were any previously employed by the LA which sold thestock? Y N
Were they part of a TU PE transfer? Y N
If additional staff have been employed since transfer, (regardless of their previous employment) , how many are
on the following salary bands
Less than £10000 pa
£10000 - 15000
£15000 - 20000
over £20000
Does the association have contracts with other agents for other aspects of its services (e.g. Development orFinance)? Y N
If so please specify which and with whom.
Similar assoc in Largerl older assoc in Other agency
partnership arrangement area
Housinq manaqement
Maintenance
Development
Finance
Manaqement
Does the association have any concerns about its long term financial viability?
(Circle whichever applies) None Some Serious
Does the association have any concerns about its ability to manage?
(Circle whichever applies) None Some Serious
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Please indicate any of the following statements which reflect your experience of monitoring by Scottish Homes
(tick any which apply)
It recognised what we do well
It identified some weaknesses which we need to work on
Expectations of what we should have achieved by now are pretty unrealistic
We feel pushed into merging with another body
We cannot grow any bigger through development because of a low rating from monitoring
Expectations of what we can achieve in future are pretty unrealistic
We are being actively encouraged to consider merger or some form of staff sharing
arrangement
Expectations of what we can achieve in future are reasonable
We are being encouraged and helped to grow
When was the association last monitored by Scottish Homes?
(It would be helpful if you could indicate here what monitoring rating was achieved by the association
.............)
Name of person completing the questionnaire
Date
Please note any comments about the surveyor issues raised by the survey.
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Appendix Six
Establishing Quantitative Data
This appendix contains details of data collection and analysis for Scotland and England respectively and comments
on the approach to conversion and analysis. Finally the Appendix contains sample of a Tenanted Market Valuation
on which prices for the English and Berwickshire transactions were based.
Scotland
Work to gather data has been in progress since 1991 with varying degrees of success. In October 2000, personnel
temporarily seconded to the civil service from the voluntary sector identified a need for better information on stock
transfer outcomes. Eventually a dataset on housing stock transfer in Scotland was developed by the researcher at
the behest of the Scottish Executive.
Scottish Executive Dataset
It was designed to show what transfer had delivered in terms of rents, investment, and tenant involvement in the new
landlord bodies arising from transfers by public landlords. Public landlords were Scottish Homes and Scottish local
authorities 1986 - February 2001 (not including New Towns). There was a conscious choice of emphasis on
competed transfers rather than on or failed or future transfers. The project was undertaken between January and
June 2001, with the assistance of a paid researcher555. The researcher negotiated freedom to undertake and publish
analysis of the data. The analysis was carried out in early 2002 and was offered to the Executive. By November
2002, there had been no response and no analysis (personal communication).
The project produced a dataset and identified scope for improving data collection and management. The dataset was
in three sections: sellers, transactions and buyers. Data issues were addressed in an unpublished report to the
Executive in June 2001 entitled 'Community Ownership Information - Commentary On Sources And Uses Of
Information About Completed Stock Transfers In Scotland'. It did not contain any data or analysis of data about stock
transfer, but focused on data collection, recording and suggested ways of interrogating the dataset to produce
answers to questions which may be posed by policy makers now and in future. This section draws on that report and
the preceding work and (for the most part) focuses on councils, suppressing reference to Scottish Homes transfers
though some comparative comment is relevant.
Access To Secondary Data From Official Sources
The University already held a database of stock transfer collected since 1991 (initially under the auspices of the
Planning Exchange - Duncan, 1991). Awareness of transactions was initially triggered by ministerial consents
intermittently advised by Scottish Office staff. The dataset had been expanded for this thesis by the author, using
periodic surveys (see Appendix Five). There were not resources within the Executive project to conduct further
surveys for details of transactions some of which were over 10 years old, (other than on an ad hoc basis to fill in
occasional gaps or clarify discrepancies). Information previously gathered by the researcher through surveys of
buyers and sellers was used to supplement and I or corroborate official data.
The project therefore used existing data already held (mainly by official bodies) as the brief emphasised retrieval of
existing information. The researchers established what information was available by whom and negotiated access as
appropriate. In the end, relevant information was found to be held in different agencies, including various
departments of Scottish Homes; Scottish Executive; and the Valuation Office. As information was in different formats,
and gathered for different reasons, the researchers sought to maximise consistency in recording data. The data were
collated, designed and entered on a database held in ExceL.
555 The researcher Derick Tulloch worked part time January - June, on data collection, data entry and assisted with the design of
the database. All work was carried out under Mary Tay/or's direction.
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Sources Of Information: Primary Association Of Secondary Data
Scottish Executive556
Executive staff had a summary database (held in Access) carrying very brief details of local authority stock transfers,
recorded by civil servants (clerical) at the point of ministerial consent to disposals557. The data were only ever made
available to the researcher in the form of a printed report covering
. names of seller and buyer,
. date of consent,
. numbers of houses and
. receipt.
The researchers could not gain access to more detailed documentation on local authority transfers: it is doubtful how
much more there was to obtain.
Scottish Executive Statistical Services had also (separately) collected summary information about sales from 1979
through an annual return completed by councils. By 1993, this covered not only RTB sales but Tenant's Choice and
'other transfers' (not defined and not usually published beyond RTB figures). The data had been collected using a
single sheet form, completed by each local authority each year. These statistics were eventually supplied
electronically, in the form of spreadsheets for each transaction for which data were available. Many of the
transactions were already known to the researchers through other sources. On further investigation, some unknown
transactions from this source could not be regarded as stock transfer in terms of the agreed definition558.
Scottish Homes559
Scottish Homes provided much inforrnation from different sources about transfers conducted by that organisation as
seller, regulator and developer I enabler. The focus here is about regulation and development of council transfers.
Summary data of RSL performance were supplied by Scottish Homes (Registration and Supervision) based on the
Annual Performance Statistical Return (APSR). This is completed by each association (though on slightly different
forms in various years) with the data entered and stored electronically by Scottish Homes on a spreadsheet, which
was supplied to the researchers. This provided information about performance, governance, satisfaction, and
development about RSLs generally, annually from 1996/7. Such information is not specific to particular transfers or
transactions.
The Business Intelligence Division provided information about HAG funding to associations for the ten years between
1990/1 and 1999100. This was especially pertinent to local authority transfers dependent on HAG funding. Selective,
project-based information at point of agreement of subsidy (input) was supplied electronically along with target
subsidy rates for each type of investment for each region. Data were split into different years, new build information
was isolated out and searches carried out on the relevant buyers within those years. Then addresses were checked
against addresses, postcodes and scheme numbers (where available).
The new build spending category was initially suppressed to isolate data on 'rehabilitation'. Preliminary analysis
revealed a dramatic decline in the amount of expenditure after 1994/5: gross expenditure appeared to fall from £35
million to £1.5 million in the space of one year (real values). Moreover some transfer projects (after 1992) requiring
investment showed no spending in this category though were known informally to have received funding. Anecdotal
information suggested that demolition of council stock before and after transfer became a more prominent feature of
later transfer projects and so new build spend data were later (Novernber 2001) scrutinised for relevant project
556 Scottsh Development Department and Scottish Offce Statistical Services.
557 A parallel commission gave DTZPieda access to the offcial consent data only and this was used as the basis for
disseminating publicity material to the wider community abut stock transfer, though it contains inaccuracies, judged by the revised,
cleaned and confirmed dataset. It is shown in Appendix One.
558 These included sales of 19th century tenements originally buil by the private sector and land sales
559 Registration and Supervision, Initiatives, Business Intellgence, Finance.
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information. This revealed further funding which could be associated with the postcodes for the addresses contained
in the stock transfer transaction. There was still a decline in the gross amount of spend but less marked. The
researcher summed revised HAG estimates associated with particular schemes for relevant years and applied the
HAG rate for that region, supplied by Scottish Homes, to show the estimated amount of HAG per scheme per
annum, assumed private funding and total project finance. These were aggregated to provide a cumulative figure
and, for this thesis, converted to constant prices. The data reported here therefore include more subsidy than the
amount reported to the Executive.
Outturn information is otherwise aggregated for Scottish Homes as a whole, and is not available per scheme. In
2002, Communities Scotland provided information which showed an outturn breakdown of the type of spending in
each area. The outturn reports from Communities Scotland (Chapter Eight) suggest that more money was spent on
former council stock than had been captured in the database as Figure 46 indicates.
Figure 46: Difference Between Estimates Of Spending By Different Methods
80%
0%
60%
40%
20%
-20%
Source: Communities Scotland, 2002: adjusted; Research database, 2001
Other Data Sources
The Valuation Office confirmed existing information and supplied information about some gaps in local authority
valuation data, mostly based on traditional capital asset values. This involved retrieving material from a number of
different local offices' record systems. As these were often manual and records of addresses and numbers varied,
researchers once again interpreted connections between certain transactions.
The Electoral Reform society was asked to supply information about ballots of local authority tenants as most were
assumed to have conducted a ballot under its auspices from 1991/2. Regrettably the ERS was not in a position to
supply such information as it was destroyed 12 months after the event and thus much useful ballot information about
local authority transfers was simply not available.
Remaining gaps for information on local authority stock transfers could only be filed by exploring the archives of
buyers and their predecessor authorities. There were insufficient resources to make this a meaningful exercise.
Dimensions and Limitations of Transfer Data
A total of 230 transactions were recorded including 135 by 17 councils in Scotland. It is not claimed that this is the
definitive list of transfers but it is thought to be the best attempt. There may have been other cases for which consent
was not sought, or which were not recorded on statistical returns or existing datasets. New Towns were not a priority
for the Scottish Executive; Tenant's Choice and trickle transfers were deemed too difficult and numerically
insignificant for data collection.
Some information about transfer was input information, in other words as intended at the point of transfer, whereas
some was outturn information, at the end of the process about what had actually happened. For example input
information included the number of houses in a project or transaction at the point of valuation, but not all of these
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properties were included in the final transfer. Outturn information was very limited and the report to the Executive
recommends improvements in this area.
There were problems in being able to show the impact of transfer due to lack of relevant information. Suitable
information is frequently not collected or is not comparable, in terms of its focus or timing. It was hoped that data
could be collected (for each transaction) about such issues as the context, the stock, the process, inputs and outputs
in terms of:
.. scale I numbers
.. occupancy
.. consultation (ballot turnout and results)
.. rent levels before transfer; after transfer; after investment
ID timing - consultation, consent, transfer and completion of investment
. destination - landlord name and type
. mix, location and form of property
. condition and investment needs
ID values, prices and receipts
ID purpose of transfer - e.g. demolition and rebuilding, height reduction, refurbishment, repair or re-letting
.. investment amounts and sources of finance, public and private, capital and revenue
In the absence of a common agreed definition of a stock transfer, the term had been used variously and
inconsistently. As a result, the project found included in datasets many examples of transactions with very different
characteristics. A definition (used in Chapter Six) was eventually agreed with the Executive although they were very
clear that the definition only applied for the purposes of the data exercise. Some buyers acquiring stock on terms that
fitted the definition disagreed that they had ever been involved in certain local authority transfer.
Table 32: Transaction data
Location Included comprehensive postcode data and the number of properties involved where addresses
were available. In many cases the number of properties changed from when discussions started
and valuations were conducted and the point of transfer (e.g. due to Right to buy sales and
partial demolitions). These were shown separately and can have particular relevance to
calculating per unit valuation figures. Postcodes could enable further analysis and linkage with
other socio-economic data more straightforward in future. Address schedules were often
incomplete.
Identity of sellers The names of sellers (old and new names) and of new owners (including subsequent mergers)
and buyers are shown. The existence of competition and identity of competitors was noted, though not
usually present in local authoritv transfer.
Process Dates of consent, transfer and valuation were recorded to allow analysis of the time taken to
process transfers and also allow conversion to constant prices. Ballot information was only
available for Scottish Homes stock. The names of Independent Tenant Advisers and other
consultants were recorded where known.
Stock condition and Only summary data about stock condition and age were recorded, alongside the value placed
value on the stock by valuers, the retention value560, the bid price and receipt. The receipt showed the
final price less admissible set-up costs. There are gaps in valuation data for local authority
transfers. Value and receipt figures are not always comparable, depending on how much time
has passed between one stage and the next, whether VAT is included or excluded, the extent to
which the base stock figure has changed, as well as other complex negotiations about funding,
especially affectinq Scottish Homes transfers.
560 Retention value only arises in the case of Scottsh Homes (and New Town) transfers.
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Rents Rental information was only available for Scottsh Homes transfers. Records allow comparison
between rent at the point of transfer and rent after transfer. The dataset also shows the amount
of Housing Benefit per tenancy per transaction at the point of transfer and the average amount
covered by Housing Benefit. The dataset contains the rental growth assumptions on which the
valuations and business plans were based561. Cost-reflective improvements were noted as 'yes'
I 'no' answers: see investment (below).
Investment Comparable data were not readily available at all for local authority transfers from existing
sources. Such information might have been available from feasibility studies for local authority
transfers but there was no scope in the time available to access these. However, HAG
information used for the local authority transfers was recorded by Scottish Homes development
staff based on schemes, with planning information at the point of tender rather than outturn
information.
Meaningful comparison of investment outcomes for Scottsh Homes transfers was virtually
impossible. Planned / projected investment could be gauged from 'key documents' about
Scottish Homes transfers. The ACCR562 showed the amount of outturn investment and the
period covered.
Business planning Such information is not normally available about local authority transfers, other than
Berwickshire. Attempts to survey buyers (in 1998) produced such a small response, that the
relevant data were not usefuL. For Scottish Homes transfers, the dataset recorded peak debt,
the projected surplus at year 30, the lender and assumptions about interests rates and inflation
on which valuation and offers were based.
Conversion to Constant Values
Data were supplied to the Executive in real terms but for the analysis reported in this thesis (Chapter Six), they were
converted to constant prices. Prior to analysis, all volume financial indicators were converted to real values, as
recommended by Marsh (1988). Using a formula derived from the headline Retail Price Index at April of each year
the figures for 1989 - 1993 were taken from Accountancy, January 1995. The figures for the period from 1993 to
2001 were taken from a website563. The following is a worked example of the formula used. Given the RPI for
December 1993 (141.9) and for December 2000 (172.2) inflation has been 21.4% over that period (i.e.
172.2/141.9=1.214). Based on an example of £1 ,200 then it was adjusted to year 2000 prices as follows:
Figure 47: Example of conversion formula
The results of the analysis are expressed in values at April 2001 in both the English and Scottish datasets. This
formula also applies to data about Scottish Homes ADP supplied in June 2002 by Communities Scotland.
Buyer And Seller Information: 'Before And After' Comparisons
Although most data entry was based on transactions, some linked to buyer and seller information. The report to the
Executive pointed out the weaknesses in attaching much significance to before and after comparisons using existing
data sources. Seller information for local authorities was taken from statistical bulletins for the for year period
1996/97, to 1999100 and thus only applied to the unitary local authorities post 1995/6. The information included total
561 The material seen by the researchers referred only to rent policy and rental growth assumptions rather than guarantees: this
also applies to investment. (These contractual commitments are usually recorded and held in the Minute of Agreement which are
not generally available to researchers). Post-transfer rent information (up to five years after transfer) is based on the ACCR. This
shows the percentage by which rents increased for various periods (along with a yesi' 'no' statement by the RSL about whether
commitments have been met).
562 Annual Contract Compliance Return required from each association undertaking a Scottish Homes transfer to Scottish Homes
(R&S). ACCRs use different time periods and review dates for each case so that no two ACCRs are comparable with each other
in terms of definitions of catch-up, routine repair, planned maintenance and major repairs; target periods; existence of cost
reflective improvements; the point at which information is collected about performance.
563 http:www.moneyextra.com/glossary/g100278.htm.
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arrears outstanding, rent losses through voids, admin costs per tenancy, repair and maintenance costs per tenancy,
average stock for that year, the average weekly rent, and finally the average debt per house.
Scottish Homes Annual Reports showed balance sheet information for the organisation as a whole but not broken
down by area and not using the same categories or definitions as local authorities. Scottsh Homes supplied
information, which was reasonably comparable for the last four financial years, and with health warnings but some
items of data had still not been made available by the end of the project in spite of repeated reminders. This was
taken as a sign of resistance to supply information in the months preceding the wind-up of the agency, rather than
any indication of lack of data.
Approximately 120 buyers were involved in all transfers and all but two were registered housing associations. Many
were newly established for the purposes of transfer, though some existed already. Associations self-select into peer
groups for performance review with the result that although many of the bodies in peer group 3 (post 1919 ex public
sector stock) are indeed council transfer associations, this is not a reliable indicator of their involvement in transfer.
As all but two of the buyers are registered Social Landlords (RSLs), information about them lies confidentially with
Scottish Homes Registration and Supervision, based on an Annual Performance Statistical Return (APSR)
completed by every association.
The APSR carries over 200 pieces of information though the format of the report has changed incrementally over the
years, which complicates annual comparisons. Data were supplied electronically on a confidential basis, in the
following categories:
11 stock characteristics and changes;
11 governance and accountability (numbers and selection of committee members, staffng, tenant
satisfaction survey results, tenant information);
11 housing management (Iettings, nominations, rental income, arrears policy review);
11 maintenance (condition, proportion of repairs carried out on time, inspections and quality control but
withoutthe total amount spent on maintenance per unit);
11 development (reporting to committee, claims and liabilities - not including scale of development
programme, HAG or private funding);
11 financial management (documents, reporting and showing proportion of income on staff costs); gross
rental income and breakdown of the average rent charged in each local authority area for each size of
property.
The dataset recorded the buyer name, registration number and date of registration. Key performance indicators such
as arrears and voids were recorded, though the definition of a void could not be readily compared with the figures for
local authorities. The absence of repairs or development spending information was noted as a critical weakness.
Data Qualiy, Monitoring and Relevance to Policy Process
The focus of the data commission was to capture as much as possible about completed transfers from existing
sources, before the information was lost. It was anticipated that such an exercise might help to anticipate the basis of
future monitoring needs. Confidence in the benefits of transfer is more debatable based on the quality of the
underlying evidence.
A substantial arnount of information was retrieved and recorded, using the authority and influence of the Executive's
commission to access previously unobtainable data. Information about local authority and Scottish Homes transfers
were recorded, beyond simple numbers and dates reported so far. However, definition problems abound and doubts
remain about whether, even now, all the transactions have been captured; and about the accuracy of the volume of
stock reported to have been transferred, at least by local authorities. Such basic information ought not to be
contestable 15 years after the start of transfer.
Better data was available about certain aspects of transactions conducted by Scottish Homes than by local
authorities, though in other respects, information about local authorities was better. For example, reasonable
confidence can be placed in data about investment post-transfer for local authority transfers (due to HAG) but not in
post-transfer investment information about Scottish Homes transfers as the key sources were of limited value. Poor
information about sellers limited meaningful before-and-after comparisons.
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Table 33: Summary Of Information On Streams Of Transfer
Scottish Homes
Information Availabilty
Local authority
A vailabilty Qualiy
Rent charged 1 B
M&M costs 2 B
Debt 1 B
Void levels 1 B
Amount of stock held 1 B
Location 1 A
Numbers 1 AlB
Age and condition 2 A
Valuation and price 1 B
Subsidy 1 A
Private investment 2 B
Ballot results 1 A
Rent 1 A
Total stock 1 A
Reg'n date and no. 1 A
Rent charged 2 B
%of tenants on c'tee 1 A
M&M costs 2 B
Peer group 1 A
Tenant satisfaction 1 A
Performance 1 A
arrears, voids
Contact details A
Codes
AlB
AlB
AlB
AlB
AlB
1
1
1
2
1
3
3
4
A
B
AlB
B
AlB
C
C
C
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
A
A
B
A
B
A
A
A
A
Information availabilty
Consistently present (0:95%)
2 Quite a lot of info available
3 Very little useful information available
4 No useful information available
Information quality
A Pretty good: robust
B OK: use with care
C Weak / indifferent: barely useable
The report noted that much of the available data was about what was intended, rather than outcome. Investment
definitions and data sources were poor and inconsistent. Moreover, base dates of information and periods of review
varied, confounding comparison. Rent guarantee information (not relevant across the board) was very poor, even in
the case of Scottish Homes where there was a conscious effort to establish a guarantee. Much valuable information,
which could have been available at the point of transfer, was inaccessible.
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The report to the Executive commented that information about transfer had not received sufficient priority, either at
the point when transactions were approved, or about what happened subsequently. Finally it pointed out that data at
the UK level ignored what happened in Scotland. The report urged more priority and constancy in future monitoring
making many specific practical suggestions. Lessons from the project might have influenced future policy
monitoring. To date no action has been undertaken towards analysis of the dataset or monitoring of ongoing
transfers (June 2002) and although evaluation of New Housing Partnerships (the latest terminology for stock transfer
in Scotland) has been on the Scottish Executive research agenda for some years, it has been reportedly deferred
again.
England
Access to Secondary Data
In January 2001 , the DETR564 was approached about data on completed transfers. The initial purpose of the request
was to establish what monitoring took place, what data were held by government and thereby what transfers had
taken place. The purpose of this was to facilitate comparison with transfers in Scotland, to support the Scottish
Executive data commission. Following a telephone conversation with the relevant government personnel, an Excel
spreadsheet was promptly supplied as an electronic attachment. Further email contact was maintained to clarify
certain issues, which are discussed shortly. The relevant current dataset is now on the Internet where it can be easily
accessed by anyone. The analysis here is based on a complete dataset to March 2001. The problems discussed
here are still present within the government's dataset structure.
Structure and Content of Dataset
The data consist of a single worksheet containing fields with information for each 'successful' transaction, listed in
date order. Transactions analysed here fall between 1988/9 (the first) and run to March 2001 , affecting over half a
million houses. The dimensions covered for each transaction an indication of timing, price, grant, borrowing, set-up
costs and levies. The information appears in this order:
1. a code (#) for repeating authorities
2. a code (p) for partial transfers
3. names of sellers (local authorities)
4. names of buyers - RSLs (also known as housing associations or Local Housing Companies)
5. dates of transfer (month I year)
6. ballot turnout
7. percentage support in ballot
8. gross prices: including information on grants (also known as dowries)
9. gross loan facilities at transfer
10. ratio of loan to price
11. numbers of dwellings in each transaction
12. price per dwelling (showing grants in the same column)
13. set-up costs (as absolute values) with grants to cover set-up costs shown in the same column
14. set-up costs (as percentages)
15. Gross value of levy payable on surplus receipts (where applicable).
This represents a 100% sample of the completed transfers, albeit with a limited range of variables, mostly financial or
volume indicators. The spreadsheet carried gross totals for each category and some averages. They were not
surnmarised for each financial year and analysis of the figures appeared very limited. Original data collection would
have been very time consuming and would have been unlikely to achieve a sufficient sample to be of significance.
Thus although the dataset has limitations, it was the best that could be achieved within available resources.
564 DETR is the Department of Environment Transport and the Regions as at 200 1. It had been known as the DoE until 1997 and
later in 2001 became known as the DTLR. In the spring of 2002 it became the ODPM - Offce of the Deputy Prime Minister
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Limitations of Dataset
The limitations are many and varied in terms of policy monitoring, beyond the issue of the amount of receipt and the
scale of new private investment. Firstly, government data do not show which RSLs were newly formed or pre-
existing, (relevant for monitoring diversity outcomes). Given these limitations, further information about the RSL
buyers was sought in May 2001 from two bodies: first, from the Housing Corporation (HC), a non-departmental public
body which regulates the new bodies on behalf of the government. Secondly, the membership body (National
Housing Federation - NHF was approached for information about their members. Both were able to supply lists of
'stock transfer associations' with relative ease: neither list corresponds to the government list.
The HC list included more landlords than the government with a discrepancy of the order of 20% though stock
numbers did correspond fairly closely. The discrepancies involved some RSLs which were newly registered for a
future transfer pipeline and thus not yet complete, but 14 landlords appearing on the government list were missing
from the HC list. In addition, many names were different. The HC list had no formal status and only existed by
chance565. Thus, the HC list (at May 2001) showed LSVT and ERCF transfers, but only to new RSLs: any transfer to
a pre-existing bodies were not recorded as transfers. This proved to be pertinent to the partial transfers. The HC list
also indicated the region responsible (for regulation) (see below).
The NHF list (at May 2001) provided merely contact address and telephone information, along with postcodes which
help to locate the transfers. It exists for marketing purposes. It was quite limited showing barely two thirds of the
landlords. Those missing were mainly those involved in transfers post 1997 and bodies in receipt of ERCF funded
transfers. It provided. The NHF list is only used in this thesis to make observations about definitional problems for the
purposes of policy monitoring, though since that tirne the NHF has put a considerable amount of effort into analysing
and commenting on transfers, though mainly for future policy, publishing a monthly bulletin called Transfers Today.
The available data do not show the size of landlords nor whether they had or used reserves. Nor do the data show
the governance arrangements of the new bodies or the duties taken on by the RSLs post transfer or the number of
staff employed and transferred under the TUPE regulations. They do not show any information about occupancy
levels or rent levels before or after transfer, nor any indication of Housing Benefit incidence among the tenant
population. Any of these dimensions would be relevant issues to monitor in policy terms, not least in relation to
political objectives and budgetary consequences. Moreover, though the trade I professional press highlights historic
debt or breakage566 costs as relevant also, the government does not hold data about these dimensions.
Establishing Types of Transfer
The DETR was contacted by the researcher in March 2001 to clarify a number of issues. In particular, there was a
need to establish whether the information received was in current prices (without conversion to constant prices);
secondly, whether the grant figures in the 'price' column could be assumed to be dowries, and whether these
reflected a negative valuation with no receipt to the seller. Thirdly, it was important to establish what if any sources of
grant, other than ERCF (Estates Renewal Challenge Fund). Finally DETR was also asked to confirm the source of
set-up grants and how they operated; and to confirrn what analysis of the data was undertaken by DETR or by others
known to DETR.
The DETR reply (by email) confirmed that the values shown in the dataset were held at current prices; the grants
shown were all ERCF funds administered by government. Those cases did indeed reflect negative valuations, with
no receipt to the seller as the ERCF funding was paid to facilitate purchase of low value stock. DETR personnel did
not indicate any other sources of grant funding.
565 This was due to a senior clerical member of staff using her initiative to code the new RSLs at the point of registration, to be
able to respond to a host of ad hoc information requests (personal communication in seeking to establish what information was
available).
566 Breakage arises where a selling authority is required pay a premium to extricate itself from existing loan arrangements, often
with the Public Works Loans Board. This can amount to 25% of the value of the outstanding debt and can make a significant
diference to the amount of money available to the authority post transfer, as shown in Wilcox, 2000/1.
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In an informal telephone conversation few weeks earlier, a senior official had commented that once the transfer was
complete the department 'lost policy interest' (personal communication). Further, an email from DETR personnel
dated 14 March 2001 confirmed that 'they do not tend to analyse the data' and were unable to direct the researcher
to any other sources of analysis or commentary on the data.
Cleaning
Some per unit information (eg price per dwelling) came in the form of hard entry values, rather than based on a
calculation or formula relating gross volume information and the number of dwellings in the transactions. These
figures were recalculated and reformatted in the interests of consistency throughout the dataset, checking to ensure
that the results were correct against the hard entry. New columns were introduced to allow grants to be isolated from
prices (receipts) and set-up costs, where they originally featured in the version supplied by DETR.
Additional columns were introduced to bring in data from other sources (Wilcox, various) about historic debt, the
useable receipt and the balance of receipt. It should be clarified here that when an English council sells an asset
such as its rented stock, its first obligation is to extinguish the debt and associated breakage costs (see footnote),
second to pay a levy. Only then can it access any remaining receipt.
Other additional columns show the region in which the council was located, using the regional definition of the
Housing Corporation (Hogwood, 1998). The Housing Corporation On line Register was used to check the registration
date of the RSL to check whether it had existed prior to transfer, though much of this information was already known
to the researcher. The repeating authority columns were scrutinised to show the repeats once only. These included
both split and partial transactions. There were all renamed 'multiples'. Anything which was multiple but not partial was
allocated to a new 'split' column. Then the partial transactions were scrutinised to see which had grant and a new
column was introduced to show which had grant and which did not. Finally, any transaction which was not, multiple
or partial was designated whole. This facility allowed the different types of transactions to be followed throughout the
dataset. New calculations were introduced, such as the proportion of all tenants voting in favour, the ratio of
borrowing to grant, and certain averages. Thereafter figures were converted as indicated on page 334.
Table 34: Dimensions of data on English transfers
Multiple using # to identify any authorities appearinq more than once
Partial disposal usina 'p' to identifv anv partial transaction based on DETR dataset, except where split
Split using # to identify any authorities appearing on DETR dataset marked as p but where
no qrant available
Grant usina 'v' to identify any authorities marked on DETR dataset as having received arant
Whole disposal usinq 'y' to mark any council which conducted a transaction which was not partial
Council name of authoritv from DETR dataset
Date of transfer from DETR dataset
Year of transfer Inserted
Region inserted using Housinq Corporation definition of region
Reqistered social landlord name of RSL from DETR dataset
Number of transactions usinq automatic marker = 1
No. of dwellinqs from DETR dataset
Price £m real at 2001 from DETR dataset, converted to real values usinq a formula discussed above
Grant £m real at 2001 from DETR dataset, converted to real values usina a formula discussed above
Borrowina £m real at 2001 from DETR dataset, converted to real values usina a formula discussed above 1
Ratio of loan: price calculated bv dividina loan bv price
Ratio of loan: qrant calculated by dividinq loan by arant
Price per unit calculated bv dividing aross price bv dwellings
Grant per unit calculated by dividina aross arant bv dwellinas
Borrowinq per unit calculated bv dividina aross loan bv dwellinqs
Gross set-up costs £m from DETR dataset
(nominal)
Set up costs as % of price calculated
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Grant for set up £m from DETR dataset
(nominal)
Grant for set up as % of calculated
ERCF
Levy paid to Treasury £m from DETR dataset
(nominal)
Levy paid as % of price calculated
Debt real £m from Annual Housing Finance Review published by Joseph Rowntree Foundation
drawing on published statistics: converted to real values using a formula discussed
above 1
Useable receipt real £m from Annual Housing Finance Review published by Joseph Rowntree Foundation
drawing on published statistics: converted to real values using a formula discussed
above 1
Net balance £m Calculated usinq the qross price less the useable receipt
Net balance as % of price Calculated as a proportion of the gross price
Name chanqe Checked aaainst HC reqister on line May 2001
Newly and purposely Checked against HC register online May 2001
reqistered
Analysis
The raw data were manipulated to permit analysis. This was based on inductive principles using the data available
rather than by creating a deductive framework based on previous research or the literature (Gilbert, 1995). In spite of
the limitations of the data, a considerable amount of analysis has been possible on this basis.
The cleaned, expanded dataset for each country is held in a separate file with one worksheet carrying a core dataset
linked to a series of other sheets for analysis. Analysis is then based on the type of transfer, the year of transfer, the
size of transactions and the area I region in which it took place. The summaries in Appendix Seven show gross
figures and averages. The totals can be seen to be consistent which provides confidence in the referential integrity of
each dataset. Frequency tables were generated from the data, with annual summaries and graphs prepared to
illustrate and present the data analysis. These are presented and discussed in Chapters Five and Six as two main
types of transfer:
1. whole (including split);
2. partial with and without grant
This allows marked variations to be distinguished from each other and comparison to be made between English and
Scottish partial and whole transfers. Cases of high value (price I receipt) and moderate borrowing567, can thus be
distinguished from cases of nil (or negative) value with substantial borrowing or subsidy (ERCF or HAG).
Independent and dependent variables
Some consideration was given to analysing the quantitative data to show relationships and effects, particularly in
relation to patterns of timing and electoral cycles. However it was concluded that there was too much information
missing from the dataset for such an exercise to be of value. For example, many aspects of transfers may be
interrelated but the data do not permit analysis to show which are independent. The identity of the seller might be
said to be an independent variable and a given, whereas many other dimensions such as price over time or the
volume of stock are clearly affected by other factors. Even the identity of the seller may depend on external factors
such as debt, political characteristics, personnel, the way the council was to be affected by incremental local
government reform.
567 As most of the high value group in England contained split transfers, these transactions are taken as whole stock transfers as
their characteristics are virtually indistinguishable, with one exception in Allerdale, (Lancashire) in the late nineties: the council
transferred a small neighbourhood with ERCF funding to one landlord while the remaining stock went to another landlord.
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Figure 48: Housing Corporation Regions
source: Hogwood and Gunn, 1998
Tenanted Market Valuation
Tenanted Market Valuation was a method of valuing housing from the mid 1990s, using discounted cash flow
techniques. It was recommended by the DoE and eventually promoted by the Scottish Offce in 1996 in local
authority transfer, after it had already been used in the Scottish Homes, New Town and Berwickshire transfers.
This sample valuation shows how income (rent) and spending assumptions detemrine price and the size of the debt
shortfall based on average Scottish council figures at 2001 which would have affected decision-making about
transfer had this information been available to policy-makers. Debt was higher in previous years and rents lower,
producing even greater shortfalls.
341
Anyburgh council preliminary benchmark valuation
ASSUMPTIONS (All assumptions are expressed in real terms)
Opening stock 29,000
RTB sales 2.00 %
Relet rate (turnover) 3.00 %
Income
Allowance for losses through voids & bad debts 3.57 %
Rents
Current rent 34.30 weekly £
Transfer tenants 34.30 as current £ 1,783.60
New tenants 36.02 5% Premium 1,872.78
no of weeks in year 52.00
Increases in rents (per annum)
Transfer tenants
Years 1-4 1.00 %
Years 5-29 1.00 %
New tenants 
Years 1-29 1.00 %
Expenditure
Maintenance & repairs costs per dwelling (exc VAT)
Year 0 £ 430.00 p.a.
real increase per annum 1.00 %
Management & supervision costs per dwelling (plus V AT)
Cost per let in year 0 £ 268.00
Increase per annum 1.00 %
Programme repairs cost per dwelling
Years 0-4 £ 370.00 p.a
Years 5 - 9 £ 370.00 p.a.
Years 10-14 £ 370.00 p.a
Years 15-19 £ 370.00 p.a
Years 20-24 £ 370.00 p.a
Years 25-29 £ 370.00 p.a
Catch-up repairs
Repair years 1 - 8 £ 1,750.00
Discount rate 8 %
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Appendix Nine
Statutes Relevant To Stock Transfers
This appendix contains a summary of the main statutory provisions which apply to transfers of local authority
housing stock. In the absence of clear government guidance, a statement of legal provisions was included in the
Scottish Parliament report on Housing Stock Transfer in July 2000. It showed that powers already existed to
allow local authorities to dispose of their assets subject to the approval of the First Minister,568 There was no
legal requirement on them to do so, and - under s2(6) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, a local authority was
not required to own or provide housing for rent. Thus, the report concluded that transfers could be referred to as
'voluntary' in the sense that there was no legal requirement either to sell or to retain stock.
The framework affecting large scale voluntary transfer was largely in place
before 198~ but is now mostly consolidated within the 1987 Act (as
amended by the 1988 Acts).
Scottish Parliament, 2000
f 11 d f S tt' h Off d f 'd bl' h d 1996The 0 owing summary was extracte rom co is ice ra t gui ance pu is e in
Act Purpose Notes
Housing Association Act 1985
s 59 and 60 (as General powers of local authorities to promote Consent of Secretary of State (S of S) required
amended)569 and assist housing associations (registered or for giving of assistance - certain assistance
unregistered) Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 (as restricted to registered housing associations.
amended).
Housing Scotland Act 1987
s12570 General powers of local authorities to sell land s12(7): Consent of S of S required to sell HRA
and buildings to which HRA applies. housing and land (exemptions detailed in
sections 12(8) and 12(14).
s13571 Enables S of S to impose conditions in consenting s13(3): Enables S of S to stipulate LA use of
to sale of such land and buildings to which HRA capital receipt, e.g. to payoff outstanding HRA
applies.572 capital debt.
s81A and The Provides that RTB provisions continue to apply to Regulation 6: Consent of S of S required where
Housing those who cease to be secure tenants because of acquiring landlord disposes of less than his
(Preservation of Right disposal by LA to private landlord. whole interest in a qualifying house
to Buy) (Scotland) (see also 12A below).
ReQulations 1993573 Continued
568 After July 1999, the First Minister replaced the Secretary of State as the Minister responsible for giving consent.
569As amended by the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, Schedule 23, paragraph 31(7).
570 As amended by the Housing Act 1988 Schedule 17, paragraph 77.
571 As amended by section 132 and Schedule 17, paragraph 78 of the Housing Act 1988.
572 The Secretary of State may have regard to 1) the extent to which the intending purchaser is, or is likely to be, dependent
upon, controlled by or subject to the influence of the local authority making that disposal or any members or officers of that
authority; 2) the extent to which the proposed disposal would result in the intending purchaser becoming the predominant or
a substantial owner in any area of housing accommodation let on tenancies or subject to licences; 3) the terms of the
disposal; and 4) any other matters whatsoever which he considers relevant.
573 As inselted by section 128 of the Housing Act 1988.
356
Act Purpose Notes
S818 and Sch 6A574 Requires LA to consult (stage 1 and stage 2 LA required to provide S of S with copies of
notice) tenants setting out information and inviting consultation material and notices and certificate
representations. Sof S cannot consent to of compliance with requirements for tenant
transfer if it appears majority of tenants are not in consultation.
favour.
SI2A575 Regulation of subsequent disposals by acquiring s12A: Consent of S of S to make subsequent
landlord, including disposing of an interest by way disposals, including the disposing of an interest
of granting a standard security. by way of granting a standard security for loan
purposes. Tenants must be consulted and the
S of S told of their reSDonses.
Local Government Act 1988
S24 and 25576 Enables LA to provide private sector landlords S25: Consent of S of S required for such
with assistance, e.g. financial assistance for assistance.
settina UD and transaction costs.
Source: extract from on Draft Guidance from SODD, 1996a
The draft guidance showed that under Part One of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988, Tenants' Choice provisions
gave secure public sector tenants the right to choose a new landlord. The new landlord, (whether either a
landlord approved by Scottish Homes or Scottish Homes itself), would purchase the property from the public
sector landlord at Tenanted Market Value, assuming that it would remain available for letting in the social rented
sector. The Right to Buy was not preserved under Tenants' Choice transfers but tenants could negotiate a
contractual Right to Buy with the prospective landlord when agreeing a new tenancy agreement.
574 As inserted by section 134 of the Housing Act 1988. In broad terms, a tenant who was formerly a secure tenant of a
house that has been sold to a private sector landlord wil continue to have the Right to Buy that house. This right applies to
any other house owned by that landlord of which he or she becomes the tenant on the terms and conditions, which would
have applied if he or she had remained a local authority tenant. It should be noted, however, that the Right to Buy is not
preserved where the disposal was made as a Tenants' Choice sale, nor where the disposal was made to a co-operative
housing association (ie a fully mutual housing co-operative).
575 This schedule required that a person who has acquired land or houses from a local authority, must not dispose of the
subjects without the consent of the Secretary of State if the consent of the Secretary of State was required for the disposal
(under section 12(7) of that Act). This requirement also applies to the disposing of any interest in the subjects, including the
granting of a standard security to a bank or building society. Before giving such consent, the Secretary of State must satisfy
himself that the landlord has taken appropriate steps to consult the tenants concerned and the Secretary of State is obliged
to have regard to the responses of tenants to such consultation.
576 The consent of the Secretary of State had to be obtained before assistance may be provided. Section 26 required that the
Secretary of State, in considering applications for consent, should take account of the extent to which a local authority should
gear the financial burden and the associated risks involved in the project at issue; the Secretary of State may also take into
account any other matter which he considers relevant. Further information on section 24 assistance is given in SOD Circular
No 22/1988.
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Appendix Ten
Case Studies - Timing and Scale
Glasgowm
Scale
Some 11,700 houses were transferred in 74 transactions between 1986 and 2001 but mainly around the early
1990s (see Chapter Three for discussion on data collection and Chapter 6 for analysis). The buyers were 37
bodies. Of these the majority (32) were newly created in areas where there had previously been no association
activity: two of the smaller ones have since merged with other bodies. Most of the areas in which transfers have
taken place are in peripheral estates (as envisaged by Grieve), with multiple bodies being created in succession
in the same areas. Only five of the buyers existed already, all as community based housing associations, which
only started to receive stock transfers from 1991 onwards.
Grieve suggested transfer as part of future strategy, and the Area Renewal and Tenant Participation Units
earmarked estates and tenants groups for action. However internal monitoring was based on poor record-
keeping inconsistent with rational strategic management. Reports in 1992 and 1993 contained poor data about
the stock, its characteristics or outcomes. The focus is on task-based management action, rather than analysis
and monitoring of outcomes. This situation came to be resolved in part, but not before 1998, by which time
Glasgow had transferred most of the partial estates it had packaged and was already contemplating a possible
whole stock transfer of the remaining 80,000 - 100,000 houses.
The city had disposed of over 10,000 other units of council-built stock around the city to the SSHA for
modernisation in the late 80s. These were inherited by Scottish Homes and later transferred to a series of
housing associations (Taylor, 1998). Transfers to associations in peripheral estates were approximately
equivalent to the acquisition of formerly privately owned houses by HAs (also then new), mainly in the 70s for
comprehensive tenement rehabilitation. Relative to the stock of the city council in 1986 when the initiative
started, transferred stock in the peripheral estates was small at around 6%. The new form of tenure represented
just under half of the voluntary sector holdings in Glasgow, until 1995 when other stock transfers by Scottish
Homes started to increase association stock holdings in the city and change the pattern of the city's tenure
(internal reports GDC, 1995).
Timing
The original proposals developed between 1984 and 1986 with three to six months of intensive negotiation
between the council and the Scottish Offce up to September 1985, Le. before the 1987 General Election. The
Phase 1 pilot ran between 1986 and 1989, with Phase 2 between 1987 and 1990. These are Phase A (rule
development) in this thesis. Resources for HAG expenditure via HCiS were extended with effect from 1988/9
after the Conservatives re-election for a third term. Many new local tenant-controlled buyer organisations were
promoted I developed immediately after 1988 by HCiS' successor Scottish Homes. As Figure 49 (below) shows
there was a sharp rise in the amount of stock transferred in the years around 1988 and HAG spending is far
from secure in this period even though there is a specific newly funded category of Community Ownership
spending targeted at the area of origin.
577 The main sources for this case study include staff and commitee members in three associations; staff and elected
members of the council; civil servants and agency officials (HeiS and Scottsh Homes) and an independent adviser. The
case study also draws on the government's interim and final evaluation report on community ownership.
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Transaction
All known transactions Glasgow
Post-codes Nos. transf- year of
(first five erred transfer
digits)
Buyer Purpose
Table 35:
G712 98 1986/87 Broomhouse HA 2
G450 36 1991/92 5
G349 241991/92 Blairtummock HA 2
G158 1121991/92 Cernach Housing Co-op 5
G212 84 1991/92 Copperworks Co-op 2
G45 155 1991/92 Craigdale HA 2
G537 3101991/92 Glen Oaks HA
G157 3361991/92 Pineview Housing Coop 2,5
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G334 109 1993/94 Calvay Housing Co-op 2
G31 3781993/94 Camlachie HA
158 1995/96
114 1995/96
Ardenglen HA
Cernach Housing Co-op
5
5
G459
G536
961995/96
32 1995/96
Craigdale HA
Rosehill Co-operative 2
941999100
3601999100
2881999100
Gardeen Housing Co-op
Spring burn and Possilpark HA
Thenew HA
2,3,5
2,5
Code 2 renewal for rent,
3 renewal for sale
5 demolition
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Figure 49: Glasgow Stock Transferred Relative To Timing of HAG Investment
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Then gross HAG rose ahead of increases in amounts of stock transferred, reaching a peak in 1992/3. Because
the data show finance approved at the start of projects, rather than budget anocations, it ought to follow the
amounts of stock being transferred. In 1991 doubts started to surface within Scottish Homes about the
sustainability of the programme in Glasgow, not least in view of the experience of the costs of refurbishment. In
addition, there were further senior management changes in the counciL. Thereafter a number of changes can be
identified creating what might be described here effectively as Phase 4,578 still focussed on refurbishment. Later
the practice changed again.
Three developments emerged in the course of the period 1991 - 1996. First, areas targeted for transfer by the
council were of increasingly poor quality and in lower demand areas, and with more empty houses than most of
the pilot schemes in Ph 1 & 2. Tenants' groups did not necessarily exist in these areas and many interviewees
referred to semi-serious quips at the time about the formation of steering groups around bus stop queues.
Secondly, demolition started to feature more prominently among the proposals, challenging the scope to retain
communities through redevelopment of existing housing. Thirdly, existing associations started to be approached
to take on the target areas with Scottish Homes particularly from 1994 querying whether more, new small
organisations should be registered. Indeed, new registrations peaked in 1991 with 11 in that year. There were
only five Community Ownership transactions in the following five years.579
As Figure 49 shows schemes continued to be transferred after 1996/7 but at a greatly reduced rate.
Nevertheless stock continues to be sold after gross HAG has started to falL. The names of buyers in Table 35
shows them to be sold almost entirely to existing bodies from 1996/7 onwards. Respondents in this study in
1998 queried the viabilty of setting up a further new body in Drumchapel in 1996 when there were already five in
the locality. Already the vested interests of the new landlords were coming to the fore, though under external
pressure from Scottish Homes R&S).
Though the data now suggest otherwise, some respondents in 1998 thought the council had effectively
suspended further transfers in 1996, for a number of reasons. These included anticipation of a possible election
of a Labour government in 1997, bringing policy and resource changes in favour of councils. Moreover, the
council's own stock strategy was reviewed internally by newly appointed managers in the Housing department,
prompted not least by their difficulties in letting council stock, which they saw as due to competition. In addition,
due to Scottish Homes emerging resource problems, there was also concern about the backlog of unimproved
former council stock now held by tenant-controlled bodies. This allowed some middle managers to argue that
previous approach had been haphazard and opportunistic rather than strategic. The fact of local government
reorganisation creating a new single tier authority in Glasgow with effect from April 1996, also had an impact on
the city's forward planning processes, distracting managers and staff with issues of restructuring and resource
management. 580
578 Phase 3 appears in the context of Dundee used as the time to imply a form of roll out of the policy
579 Further associations were registered in the Glasgow area but for stock associated solely with Scottish Hoes own stock
transfer programme
580 Much of this argument came from personal communication during attempts at data reconciliation rather than formal
interviews. However, the chaos is also revealed by a terse response by the Director of Housing to a request for information
about structures in 1997: he could not be expected to know or depict the structure of his department with over 1000 staff
¡sicl.
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Dundee
Scale
Many of the 'transfers' in Dundee were on a very small scale and tend to be known as the 'co-ops' rather than
stock transfer. The transactions range in size from 18 units to 486 with the majority being empty stock and
subject to demolition rather than rehabilitation due to the costs involved. The total of stock transferred amounts
to just over 1,000 houses although some of the recipient bodies do not regard what they were involved in as
stock transfer in any way on the basis that they bought land cleared of council housing and ready for new build
for rent.
The outcome is that there are now five more tenant controlled landlords in areas of council housing than there
were in 1987, with a combined stock of just over 600 each ranging from 118 to 237 units, substantially arising
from new construction on cleared sites. This compares with other established associations in the area whose
origins lie in chiefly inner city tenement renewal on a scale of 600 - 2000 properties. The city council still owns
over 20,000 houses.
Timing
The earliest transfer was in January 1987 though it is claimed to have taken two years of discussion in the
Labour group prior to decision making about that transaction. The feasibility study for Ormiston was meant to
take 3 months and actually took over 6 months. The transfer took place in January 1988 and within 3 years, the
programme of demolition and rebuilding was complete. The programme was meant to go on for a good deal
longer but dried up because costs of rehabilitation proved higher than anticipated and because there was
insuffcient money flowing through the Scottish Homes budget, both Community Ownership and Partnership
Areas.
Since 1994, the council has been involved in prolonged discussions about how to address outstanding
problems, with certain issues coming into sharper focus namely poor condition, urgent need for investment and
low value in relation to the council's outstanding debt.
North Lanarkshire/ Motherwell
Scale
Two small co-ops - each with less than 200 houses - were established on the outskirts of Wishaw and
Motherwell respectively. A further redevelopment I clearance area - Muirhouse, housing almost 4,000 people,
had been built in the 1960s 11970s with a similar profile of poor living conditions. It received a later form of
treatment involving partial refurbishment and partial demolition by the council followed by sale of cleared land to
housing associations581 and a private developer for new low rise mixed tenure housing. Some regarded this as a
form of stock transfer because it represented a loss of stock to the council for legitimate regeneration purposes.
Indeed the Convenor of Housing for North Lanarkshire argued that the transfer was easier to achieve because
the stock was empty.
Timing
A co-op was first mooted in Gowkthrapple, Wishaw in 1988 by the HCiS in Glasgow, also in the Jewel scheme in
Bellshill. The tenants in Bellshill rejected the opportunity to explore ideas further at that stage and attention was
focussed solely on 200 flats and houses in Wishaw, using an independent consultant to work with a steering
comrnittee of tenants. The feasibility study was completed in 1989 and a ballot held in 1990 over 140 houses,
producing a majority in favour. This allowed the Garrion People's Housing Co-operative to be established and
registered in 1990/1 as Lanarkshire's first housing co-operative. Its development programme was largely
complete by 1996, some 8 years after the original idea was mooted.
581 This is not on the database because of the way in which transfer was defined. Two associations have built housing for
rent on the site. Since that time, the council has sold a further tranche of housing in Old Monklands, Coatbridge under New
Housing Partnerships to an established housing association for refurbishment. HAG was not available though the NHP
funding provided some subsidy.
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The overall Forgewood regeneration scheme had started in the mid 1980s with demolition and private sector
building but in 1991 council tenants in the neglected areas started to discuss with the council opportunities for
improvements. After a feasibility study and protracted negotiations between consultants, tenants, the Forgewood
Initiative, Motherwell DC and Scottish Homes, the Forgewood Co-operative was registered in 1994 following a
successful ballot of tenants (97% in favour). Development is still underway and may end up taking over 10 years
from inception. It now shares the same Director as Garrion after the demise of Forgewood's former Director.
Developments in Muirhouse started in 1992 at the instigation of the local councillor, now Convenor of Housing,
with a pilot project in 1993. Though much larger in scale than the other two areas, progress on the ground
appears much faster.
Scottish Borders / Berwickshire582
Scale
Given the cumulative impact of the RTB since 1980, just over 2,000 houses remained from the stock built and
managed by BDC. They were in a single collective sale to the new housing association. As the section above on
origins indicates, there were expectations of substantial new build opportunities to replace some of the housing
sold under the RTB. Promises were made by BDC in the first newsletters to tenants that up to 100 new houses
would be built by the association, funded by receipts from equity release. To date, there has been no new
construction by the association although it bought six new houses funded entirely by borrowing. These had been
commissioned by the council long before transfer, and without subsidy.
The association is the main provider of social housing in the Berwickshire area. The new Scottish Borders
Council583 is the main provider elsewhere in the Borders though with competition from Waverley Housing and
from Eildon Housing Association, both newly established in the late 1980s.
Timing
During 1992, councillors and staff became aware from press and Party media, of transfers emerging in England.
Chapman Hendy were appointed in April 1993 to undertake a feasibility study, which was received by the
council four months later. The report suggested that the value of the houses might amount to £15m which would
repay their historic debt and have a surplus of some £5m left over for investment in housing in the local area.
This gave the council the confidence to take two further steps: to appoint a Director of Finance designate for the
new association, at the council's expense of up to £40,000; and to put proposals to tenants sounding out their
views on stock transfer.
Although the Director was approaching retirement, he helped to organise an exploratory visit to a Shropshire
council then in the midst of stock transfer preparations, and seen to be comparable. The Shropshire trip involved
the council Leader, the Director of Housing and depute, the Convenor of Housing and the local Development
Manager for Scottish Homes. The council had been giving consideration to the possibility of 'trickle transfer'
(single houses as they become vacant) but the 'successful' visit convinced the Leader and Convenor that a
single transfer was the way to proceed (interview Findlay, 1998). The depute Director of Housing was the least
convinced of those on the visit. The Chief Executive of the council was also keen to retire and showed litte
interest in the matter though he was later to prove quite obstructive to the development and implementation of
transfer.
The outgoing Director of Housing chose to retire in autumn 1993, after the visit. The council took a number of
decisions to progress the transfer proposal. It formed a housing association steering group584 to take plans
forward, under the chairmanship of a local businessman chosen by the council because he was a member of an
582 The main sources were Philip Jones and George Findlay, an official and member respectively of the district council.
Another member of staff (legal) was not permited by her new employer to speak on the subject for this research. Other
sources who referred specifically to Berwickshire were Minister Robertson, his civil servants and an independent adviser who
had worked on the Berwickshire proposals. Their comments are included in the case study. Material has also been drawn
from a postgraduate dissertation on the approaches to valuation in Berwickshire (Tulloch, 1997).
583 In 2002, the council was preparing to dispose of all its remaining stock via transfer to a new body after a successful ballot
of tenants and the Borders area could be the first to have no council housing on tow counts, Berwickshire before 19996 and
Borders after.
584 Many rural councils were in any event settng up new associations to work in partnership accessing funding for rural
housing from Scottsh Homes.
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establishment golf club in Edinburgh. It also agreed to appoint a new Director of Housing, with a commitment
that the successful candidate would become the Chief Executive designate of the new landlord body, in the
event of transfer. This job advertisement was the first public intimation of the council's transfer intentions.
To councillors' surprise and delight, the new appointment was taken up in spring 1994 by the then Director of
Housing of another small semi rural authority in central Scotland, who was unknown in the Berwickshire area
(Findlay, 1998). Tenants had been sent newsletters before he was appointed but the pace increased, coming
out monthly during the campaign running up to the ballot in October 1994. Some tenants volunteered for the
committee of the new association.
Independent advisers were appointed in consultation with tenants. Scottish Homes helped to identify suitable
contenders for advice work based on their experience,585 the facility had been used in Scottish Homes transfers.
The Independent Adviser (Thenew HA) was to scrutinise the financial and management aspects of the
proposals and make a recommendation to tenants prior to ballot. The Adviser's report indicated that BHA was
putting forward a 'credible case' though with some areas of the proposals subject to clarification. There was
some 'comfort for tenants' in the authority's commitment to proceed only when they were 'happy that the
promises to tenants could be fulfilled once the finances were finalised' (interview Smith 1998).
The postal ballot was held amidst much national publicity and some local controversy facilitated by the media.586
It was held under the auspices of the Electoral Reform Society, in October 1994 and the result announced in
November 1994 showed 83% in favour on a turnout of 79% (BDC press release, 1994).
The new landlord was to be a new housing association called Berwickshire HA which needed to be registered
with Scottish Homes partly in order to have the possibility of HAG and also to give lenders the comfort of state
regulation. Application was made to Scottish Homes to register Berwickshire HA in October 1994: notice of
registration was received in April 1995, a mere six months even though this as the year in which Scottish Homes
claimed officially it was not proposing to register more new small associations. However a stock of over 2,000
houses would place BHA at the large end of the Scottish spectrum.
The Director of Housing operated in two roles (buyer and seller) until immediately after the ballot result. Then,
transfer preparations - as Chief Executive (CE) designate - involved discussions with a variety of interests. He
liaised with the Scottish Office (mainly with officials) following official notification of the council's intentions to the
Secretary of State in March 1995. He negotiated with other departments of the council about terms of sale,
generally supported by various consultants. He was also involved in discussions with the council and with trade
unions about the terms and conditions of employees transferring to the new body. He led the negotiations with
prospective lenders, again supported by consultants, with funding being agreed in March 1995 to the tune of
£20m on an £11 m valuation, to give headroom for the debt profile to increase to cover new investment (interview
Jones 1998).
In the summer of 1995, it seemed that the transfer might run aground. Ministerial consent had not been
granted.58? Some interpretations of the Local Government etc Scotland Act suggested that the shadow Scottish
Borders Council would be eligible, from 1 September 1995, to confirm or overturn any proposed actions by
councils whose assets and liabilities it would inherit. Rumblings from aspiring (later elected) Scottish Borders
councillors threatened to de-rail the entire transaction. The association's legal consultants thus sought to
galvanise action over the summer to do everything possible to ensure the transaction was complete by the end
of August 1995. The main stumbling block was the conveyancing of the properties in spite of delaying tactics by
some high-ranking officials within the council unsympathetic to transfer. This final push resulted in very high
transaction costs being incurred. Scottish Office records show consent being granted on 30 August 1995, at the
eleventh hour. After the transfer went through the new Minister commented in speeches that it marked a
'significant milestone in Scottish housing history.'
585 independent advisers had never previously been used in a local authority stock transfer in Scotland though in England it
was a requirement from 1993 to have a Tenants' Friend, according to revised guidance from DoE on LSVT processes.
586 The first of the New Town ballots were due to take place shortly thereafter with Minister Allan Stewart having given
councils permission to bid in February 1994
587 July 1995 marked a reshuffe with Lang and Lord James leaving the Scottish Office, to be replaced by Forstyh and
Robertson.
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Stirling88
Scale
The councillors' partial proposal affected a medium-rise estate in Stirling, which was an 'eyesore, clearly visible
from the Motorway' (interview Harding, 1998). It had been the subject of failed attempts at physical and
management improvements. The new vision was of demolition of at least part of the stock to be replaced by
new private development. Without remembering what the value was based on, Councillors recalled that the unit
transfer value was expected to be around £5,000: based on English experience from Broadlands in Norfolk, they
therefore anticipated a substantial surplus receipt after redeeming debt, which they wanted to use for non-
housing purposes.
The Cathedral proposal also showed a average unit valuation of £5,000 for 1800 houses in reasonable
condition, scattered throughout Dunblane, north and west Stirlingshire where one of the protagonist was already
a housing manager and known to tenants. The proponents had spoken to lenders who were amenable to
lending around £10m to a new landlord body (1993 prices). It is not known how many or which houses were
affected by the possible Quality Street proposals.
Timing
Considerable activity took place in the year immediately following the take-over by the Conservative councillors
in May 1992. The context at the time was discussion about local government reform and boundaries in
particular. In 1992, Stirling was faced with remaining a single authority with the disaggregated powers and
resources of Central Regional Council (Labour-held) or for the district functions to come under a council based
on the old regional boundaries. Forsyth was in favour of small councils (Boyne et aI, 1998) and this may have
had some impact on the decision to leave Stirling as a single counciL. This decision was only settled when the
Local Government etc Scotland Act received Royal Assent in November 1994. Anticipation of elections in 1995
to the new authorities left a window of opportunity for the Conservatives in Stirling. Years later, with the benefit
of hindsight, councillors acknowledged they had seen the window as being open for 18 months at most,
although they in practice they could have had up to 3 years until the shadow authority before the new unitary
council took over. They had no particular reason in 1992 to expect to lose the 1995 election, (although in the end
they did lose control again to Labour).
Councillors themselves were active in promoting transfer ideas among senior staff and tenants in the six months
after their election. Thereafter they mayor may not have encouraged the Cathedral proponents to submit a
proposal- respondents' recollections of this issue contradict each other directly. What is clear is that the
Cathedral protagonists had initial private meetings with councillors in the autumn and spent at most 6 months
preparing a bid, which was presented to the Conservative group in March 1993. This was unsuccessful to the
extent that councillors asked for more information while giving the impression that they were not actually that
interested any more. This may have been a casualty of competition within the Conservative group at the time.
The protagonists did not take the proposals any further at that stage and they formally fell in May 1993 following
a recommendation from the Director of Community Services not to proceed until future strategy, objectives and
parameters were clarified,5s9 This individual was one of those alleged to have been involved in talking to Quality
Street.
The radical edge to the new Stirling council administration also prompted the privatisation of the legal service
section. This was seen by many staff in the council as the thin end of the wedge ideologically, and was
recognised by councillors to have backfired in entrenching some staff opinion against them and creating the
wrong climate for transfer.
588 The main sources were Conservative councillors Harding, Scoff; former employee McDermott, documents.
589 Confidential report to commitee May 1993 on behalf of the Evaluation Panel
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